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A  
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

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ENGLISH TRANSLATION  
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IN THREE VOLUMES.—VOL. I.  
*ANCIENT AND MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY*



LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.  
RUSKIN HOUSE 40 MUSEUM STREET W.C. 1.  
NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.

**First Edition . December 1891**  
**Second Edition . January 1893**  
**Third Edition . June 1898**  
**Fourth Edition . Sept. 1910**  
**Reprinted . July 1922**

## EDITOR'S PREFACE.

THE present translation of Erdmann's *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* has been made from the third and last edition (Berlin, 1878), and executed by different hands, as follows: The Ancient Philosophy (vol. i., pp. 1-222), by Mr. Canning Schiller, B.A., late Exhibitioner of Balliol College, Oxford; The Patristic and Scholastic periods of Mediæval Philosophy (vol. i., pp. 225-542), by the Rev. Arthur C. McGiffert, Ph.D., of Lane Theological Seminary, Cincinnati; The Period of Transition of Mediæval Philosophy (vol. i., pp. 543-723), by the Rev. Andrew Rutherford, M.A., of Dundee; Modern Philosophy down to Kant (vol. ii., pp. 1-358), by Mr. George Macdonald, M.A., Master in Kelvinside Academy, Glasgow; Modern Philosophy from Kant to Hegel's death (vol. ii., pp. 359-707), by Mr. B. C. Burt, M.A., formerly Fellow of Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore; German Philosophy since Hegel's death (vol. iii., pp. 1-330), by the Rev. E. B. Spiers, M.A., of Glendevon, Dollar.

The Editor has revised and is responsible for the entire translation. But the rendering given to technical terms and phrases, and the literary form of the whole, are more particularly his work, while the general phraseology is, in the main, the unaltered work of the several translators. For the translation of the Author's prefaces, the tables of contents and the indexes, the Editor is alone responsible.

The attention of the reader is directed to what the Author says in his prefaces—which have been reprinted largely on this account—in explanation of two characteristics of his work—the relatively full treatment of the Middle Ages, and the principle on which the bibliography has been given. Concerning the latter, no attempt has been made to supplement the Author's citations, in order to furnish something approaching a systematic and complete bibliography. In some respects, such a plan undoubtedly would have been desirable; but on the whole it seemed better to preserve the Author's





principle intact. As it stands, the literature given has a special significance in reference to the exposition ; and it is believed that all scholars will appreciate the fact that extraneous additions have not been made. The Editor has sought, however, to add information about all works cited as in progress at the time of publication.

For obvious reasons of convenience, it has been thought advisable to publish the very lengthy "Appendix" to vol. ii. as a third volume. But in consideration of the fact that the Author does not regard this part of his work as strictly continuous with the rest (as is explained in vol. ii., § 330, 2), the designation of "Appendix" has been retained, although it now forms a separate volume. Dr. Erdmann's statements about the history of the "Appendix" are of course to be found in his prefaces to vol. ii. As this account of the German philosophy of this century is the only one of note extant, it is believed that it will be very welcome, notwithstanding the Author's conviction that he has here supplied, not a history, but only a contribution of material towards a history. The Editor has undertaken to bring the necrology of this part down to date, and to add the important works of Lotze and Eduard von Hartmann that have appeared since its publication. He has also supplied vol. iii. with a General Index to the entire work.

In conclusion, the Editor desires to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor J. H. Muirhead, M.A., of London, for reading the sheets on Plato and Aristotle, and for correcting the second proof of the entire third volume after page 96 ; to Miss Arlisle M. Young, B.A., for assistance with portions of the proof ; and to many others whom he cannot mention by name for information and assistance of the most varied kinds. As manifestly more appropriate to the English version in three volumes, it has been decided to omit the designation of "Outlines" from the title-page, although the work is referred to by that name in the Author's prefaces and in the text, particularly of the third volume.

It should perhaps be added that Professor Erdmann gave his ready assent to the translation of his work, and has kindly communicated with the Editor on any points of unusual difficulty.

W. S. H.

## PREFACE TO VOLUME FIRST.

A FEW words respecting the origin of these *Outlines* may perhaps prevent them from receiving unwarranted criticisms in addition to the numerous ones which will doubtless be deserved.

As it seems to me that Schleiermacher's remark, "A professor who dictates sentences for his students to take down, in reality claims for himself the privilege of ignoring the discovery of printing," although likely to be forgotten by many, is in danger of being discredited by no one, I have, where it appeared desirable that my students should carry home notes approved, not only by them but by me, had *Outlines* printed for my lectures. But I thought such outlines unnecessary for the History of Philosophy. For a long time, in answer to the oft-recurring question, what compend I preferred, I was able to recommend only Reinhold's, much as his book leaves to be desired, since Tennemann's *Manual* was out of print, Marbuch's seemed never likely to be completed, and, finally, Ueberweg's learned work was not yet expected. As I saw, however, that (what would have horrified the author himself) Schwegler's *Outline*, and at length even pitiable imitations of this cursory work, were the only sources from which students,—especially those preparing for examinations,—gained their knowledge, I attempted to sketch an Outline which should give my students in concise form what I had said in my lectures, and which at the same time should indicate throughout where the materials for a more thorough study were to be found. For Ancient Philosophy, inasmuch as we possess the excellent works by Brandis and Zeller, and the valued collection of citations by Ritter and Preller, this method could be followed, as indeed it likewise could for the Gnostics



and Church Fathers ; and hence the first fifteen sheets of these *Outlines* contain only in very few parts more extended expositions than I was accustomed to give in my lectures. Had I been able to follow this plan to the end of the work, the further designation "For Lectures" would have been added to the title of "Outlines," and it would have appeared in one volume instead of in two. That, however, this would not be possible, was clear to me as soon as I came to the treatment of the Schoolmen. However great my respect for the labours of Tiedemann on the earlier Schoolmen, and of H. Ritter and Hauréau on the later ; however much, further, I am indebted to monographs upon individual Schoolmen ; with whatever appreciation and wonder, finally, I regard the gigantic labour which Prantl undertook in behalf of the Mediæval Logic, I nevertheless found so much in the philosophers since the ninth century, of which the existing expositions of their doctrines said nothing, and I saw myself so often obliged to deviate from the traditional order and arrangement, that, especially as I desired in this book to keep myself free from all controversy, I regarded greater fulness essential to the establishment of my views. The introduction of citations into the text of this part was furthermore obligatory, since we do not possess a chrestomathy of Mediæval Philosophy, such as Ritter and Preller have prepared for the Ancient. The limitation "For Lectures" had to be omitted ; for I am able to compress only a very condensed summary of what the last twenty-four sheets of this volume contain into the few weeks which I can devote to the Middle Ages in my lectures. On account of the difference of character which thus falls to the first and to the two other thirds of this volume, it has come about (what may strike many readers as strange), that Mediæval Philosophy here occupies more than twice the space devoted to the Ancient. Whoever would make out of this a charge of disproportion, and refer me to many of the recent expositions of the history of philosophy as models worthy of imitation, should first consider that where Brandis, Zeller, and others, had

convinced me of the correctness of their views, I naturally did not need to introduce also the reasons for them. On the contrary, every assertion of mine which conflicted with the customary view had to be substantiated. In the second place, however, I wish to say, that I am not moved to imitate the example of those who begin by asserting that the Middle Ages brought forth no healthy thoughts, and then proceed to give themselves no further trouble about them, except perhaps to relate some curiosity or other from Tennemann, in order after all to say something. It may be a very antiquated notion, but I hold it to be better,—not to speak of the dogmatism of proceeding otherwise,—first to study the doctrines of these men, and then to ask whether they, who among other things have given us our entire philosophical terminology, are to be counted as nothing. I know very well that what we have ourselves produced, and not learned from another, is wont on that account to seem more important to us than to others, perhaps indeed than it is ; and so I will not dispute with my critic who would bring the charge, perhaps, that because I myself was obliged to pore so long over Raymond Lully, I now burden my reader with such a lengthy description of his famous Art. But I shall be ready to declare this exhaustiveness to be wholly useless only when the critic tells me that he (more fortunate than I) has been able easily to gather from the previous expositions of Lully's doctrines how it happened that Lully's disciples at one time nearly equalled in number the followers of Thomas Aquinas, that Giordano Bruno became enthusiastic over him, that Leibnitz had such a high opinion of him and got so much from him, etc. What I mean to say, is this : To the reproach of disproportion, I answer by way of apology, that where I only said what was to be found elsewhere, I could be brief ; but where I differed from others, I was obliged to be explicit.

J. E. ERDMANN.

HALLE, 1865.

## PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

INASMUCH as the Preface to the first edition fixes the point of view from which I desire that this work should be judged—and it is on that account that I have had it reprinted—it only remains here to speak of the points wherein this second edition differs from the first. With the single exception that the earlier exposition of Weigel's doctrines was exchanged for quite another (partly because I took into consideration Sebastian Franck, omitted before, but also for other reasons), I have altered nothing, but only made additions. A somewhat larger size nevertheless made it possible to meet the wish of the publishers not to increase the number of sheets. I was brought to make most of these additions by various reviews, of which my book has received a gratifying number, among them undeservedly laudatory ones. Most of my critics will find that I have followed their suggestions. Where that is not the case, let them not at once suppose that their suggestions passed unheeded. When, however, the grounds given in my book for separating Anaxagoras from the earlier philosophers are only met with the question whether this is really necessary,—when my separation of Neo-Platonism from ancient philosophy, supported by reasons, is treated as an unheard-of innovation, although Marbuch in his Text-book, and Brandis in his Lectures, as I know from his own lips, have made precisely the same division,—when, finally, my pointing out that the doctrines of Thomas Aquinas and those of Duns Scotus form different phases of scholasticism, meets only with the peremptory assertion that both stand upon the same level (to be sure, with the immediately added declaration that Duns is related to Thomas as Kant is to Leibnitz),—I am only able, inasmuch as once for all I will not enter into controversy, to pass over such unsubstantiated, or self-destroying criticisms in silence. Other suggestions I should perhaps

have followed, had not those who gave them made it themselves impossible. Thus, an anonymous critic in the *Allg. Augsb. Zeit.*, whom one cannot otherwise charge with not being perfectly explicit, has omitted to indicate the passages where my book seeks to force applause by "exits from the stage," and thus deprived me of the opportunity of proving to him by expunging the same, that a ranting actor is at least as offensive to me as to him.

It was not through criticisms that the alteration was occasioned by which the second edition contains a considerable amount of bibliography wanting in the first. This has not been added in order to make my work into a serviceable reference book; even were I prepared to write such a work, I should certainly have forbore doing so now that we possess such a good one in Ueberweg's *Outlines*. But what I had declared in the Preface to the first edition as my purpose: at every point to indicate where advice and instruction for a profounder acquaintance with any philosopher was to be found, was not adequately executed, so long as the titles of books were unmentioned from which I myself had gathered information, and which I thus knew from experience to contain it. The list of these has been completed, and in addition those books are indicated which I have read with profit since the appearance of the first edition. The limitation solely to such books as have been of value to myself, rests upon a wholly subjective principle, and must result in a great disproportion in the literature given. But if I had abandoned this method, my book would have lost its character, and therewith its chief, perhaps only, worth.

My entire work, indeed, is based upon a principle which on my behalf may be called a subjective one, and shows, just as the bibliography it contains, no proportion whatever in its several parts. Had my exposition of the history of philosophy sought to be like the great panoramas which one surveys by following round a circular gallery, and hence by constantly changing the point of view, but which, precisely on that ac-

count, can be executed only by several artists working upon them at the same time, I should have looked about me for coadjutors, and should have followed the example shown by famous works of the day in pathology and therapeutics. This, however, since I belong to the old school, I would not do, but adopted as my model, not the painter of a panorama, but the landscape painter, who delineates a scene as it appears from a single, unalterably fixed point of view. Be it, now, that the subject chosen was too large for me; be it that I did not set about the work soon enough; be it that I did not apply myself to it assiduously enough; be it, finally, that all these causes were combined together,—no one knows better than I, that what I have exhibited before the world is no painting on which the artist has put the finishing touches. Let it therefore be regarded as a sketch in which only certain parts have been executed in detail, namely those in which light and colour effects never to recur were involved; while other portions have remained in sketch-like touches, since here the work could be completed at leisure in the studio, after earlier studies or the paintings of others. To drop the figure—I have sought before everything so to represent such systems as have been treated in a step-motherly fashion by others, that a complete view of them might be obtained, and perhaps the desire aroused to know them better. And this because, in particular, my chief aim has after all always been to show that, not chance and planlessness, but strict coherence, rules the history of philosophy. For this end, however, philosophers not of the first rank (just as for Zoology, the Amphibians, and other intermediate species) are often almost more important than the greatest. More than all else, however, this my aim demands an unswerving adherence to a single point of view. Since this cannot be occupied by two at the same time, I might treat in my exposition only of what I myself had, if not discovered, then at any rate seen. The gratifying consciousness that I have not deviated from this singleness of view will be felt, if I mistake not, by the attentive reader.

This open, I might almost say innocent, character would have lost its physiognomy, or only been able to assume it again artificially, if I had copied from others without verification, even were it only in the matter of the iron inventory of the customary bibliography. "If I mistake not," I said. Without this reservation I declare that now, but only now, I am certain, that everything that I have made an author say, often perhaps through a misinterpretation,—the possibility of which I of course do not deny,—has nevertheless always been found in him with my own eyes. In the case of many a remark, it would now be very difficult for me to find among my excerpts the passage where it stands; in the case of others, it would be impossible without indeed reading through the entire author, as the exposition was made direct from the text without extracts. Now, however, I am in the fortunate position of one who, when a promissory note is presented to him written in his own hand, dated at his place of residence, without referring to his diary to convince himself that he was not at home on that day, refuses acceptance, because he never gives promissory notes. It is unpleasant for any one when his critic exclaims: "What thou assertest is said, is nowhere to be found," and so, where I feared that, I have given citations; and I am accustomed, when this fate nevertheless befalls me, to search first among my extracts, then in the books themselves from which the extracts were taken, to see whether I cannot find a quotation. If I do not find it, I relinquish the pleasure of having convinced my critics. For myself, the matter no longer disquiets me, which, did I otherwise, might give me a sleepless night. This my certainty, resting upon subjective ground, I cannot of course communicate to others; and they will, where they find assertions without citations, consult other expositions. So much the better; for, as I have no love for the *homines unius libri*, I have not wished by my book to increase their number.

J. E. ERDMANN.

HALLE, 1869.

## PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

SINCE on the appearance of a new edition of a book it is usually important for the reviewer, often also for the reader, speedily to ascertain the deviations from the last edition, I give the additions which have enriched or otherwise altered the present work. I shall confine myself, of course, to the more extended ones. For although the result of the reading of an entire work has been frequently condensed into a few short sentences, I nevertheless would not venture to call attention to these cases, as I will not offer the reading public the history of my "Outlines," instead of my "Outlines of History." Accordingly, I note first that in § 113, instead of the mere mention of the name, Hermes Trismegistus has received a full exposition. As I am unfortunately unacquainted with Arabic, the reference of his Holiness, the Bishop of Speyer, in a letter to me of the 8th November, 1873, to the "Youthful editor of the Arabic Trismegistus," remained unnoticed. I can only concur in the wish of his Reverence, expressed in the same letter, that some one would edit, together with Hermes, the *Theologia Aristotelis* and the *Liber de causis*.—The additions in § 135 on the Latin Apologists, are at the same time an expression of indebtedness to Ebert for the information which his excellent book on the Christian Latin Literature affords. § 147 is designed to bring Isidore of Seville, previously only mentioned by name, to merited recognition; likewise § 155, at Prantl's suggestion, William of Hirschau. In § 182, the previously unmentioned *Theologia Aristotelis* is noticed. Averröes occasioned me the greatest trouble in the entirely

rewritten § 187, about whose doctrines I believe I have said some things hitherto nowhere to be found. In the following sections Joël's thorough investigations have occasioned additions, as likewise in § 237 has Fr. Schultze's *Philosophie der Renaissance*. § 232, which treats of the German Reformation and its influence on philosophy, is wanting in the earlier editions.

In accordance with my previously-mentioned plan, I have added the titles of books from which I have learnt anything worthy of note. On the other hand, it seemed to me, inasmuch as I state exactly where all the citations are to be found in Ritter and Preller, and in Mullach, a waste of space should I particularly specify some of them besides. So I have struck out the references of the earlier editions. What I have further to say to the reader, he will find, be he so disposed, in the prefaces to the earlier editions, which for that reason I have had reprinted.

J. E. ERDMANN.

HALLE, 1876.

## EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THIRD ENGLISH EDITION.

IN preparing the Third Edition of this translation for publication, the Editor has been specially indebted to Professor Henry C. King, of Oberlin College, for a number of important corrections and suggestions, as well as for the "Outline" which is printed at the end of the third volume. His obligations are due also to Mr. Theodore G. Soares, B.A., for a careful revision of the Indexes, which, it is hoped, will now be found wholly free from error. Other alterations have been confined to such few verbal improvements as the limits of a stereotyped work would permit.

The Editor may take this opportunity of expressing his appreciation of the uniformly generous treatment he has received at the hands of his critics.

W. S. HOUGH.

MINNEAPOLIS.



# CONTENTS OF VOLUME FIRST.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION, §§ 1-14 . . . . .	1

## PART FIRST.

### ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION, § 15 . . . . .	13
SOURCES AND AUTHORITIES, § 16 . . . . .	14

#### FIRST PERIOD. IMMATURITY . . . . .

I. The Pure Physiologers, §§ 21-27 . . . . .	18
<i>A.</i> Thales, § 22 . . . . .	19
<i>B.</i> Anaximander, § 24 . . . . .	20
<i>C.</i> Anaximenes, § 26 . . . . .	23
<i>D.</i> Diogenes of Apollonia, § 28 . . . . .	24

II. The Pure Metaphysicians, §§ 30-41 . . . . .	27
<i>A.</i> The Pythagoreans, §§ 31-33 . . . . .	28
<i>B.</i> The Eleatics, §§ 34-41 . . . . .	38
<i>a.</i> Xenophanes, § 34 . . . . .	38
<i>b.</i> Parmenides, § 36 . . . . .	40
<i>c.</i> Melissus, § 38 . . . . .	43
<i>d.</i> Zeno, § 40 . . . . .	44

III. The Metaphysical Physiologers, §§ 42-48 . . . . .	47
<i>A.</i> Heraclitus, § 43 . . . . .	48
<i>B.</i> Empedocles, § 45 . . . . .	54
<i>C.</i> The Atomists, § 47 . . . . .	58

#### SECOND PERIOD. THE ATTIC PHILOSOPHY . . . . .

I. Anaxagoras, § 52 . . . . .	65
II. The Sophists, §§ 54-62 . . . . .	69
III. Socrates, §§ 63-66 . . . . .	78
IV. The Socratic Schools, §§ 67-73 . . . . .	86
V. Plato, §§ 74-82 . . . . .	95
VI. Aristotle, §§ 83-91 . . . . .	130

THIRD PERIOD. DECAY . . . . .	179
I. The Dogmatists, §§ 95-98 . . . . .	181
II. The Sceptics, §§ 99-104 . . . . .	193
III. The Syncretists, §§ 105-114 . . . . .	200
CONCLUSION. § 115 . . . . .	221

## PART SECOND.

## MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION, §§ 116-120 . . . . .	225
FIRST PERIOD. PATRISTICS . . . . .	229
I. The Gnostics, §§ 122-125 . . . . .	230
II. The Neo-Platonists, §§ 126-130 . . . . .	235
III. The Church Fathers . . . . .	253
SECOND PERIOD. SCHOLASTICISM . . . . .	287
I. The Rise of Scholasticism, §§ 152-177 . . . . .	290
<i>A.</i> Scholasticism as a Fusion of Religion and Reason, §§ 154-162 . . . . .	292
<i>B.</i> Scholasticism as Mere Rational Science, §§ 163-164 . . . . .	327
<i>C.</i> Scholasticism as Mere Religious Science, §§ 165-173 . . . . .	331
II. Scholasticism at its Height, §§ 178-209 . . . . .	356
<i>A.</i> Mohammedans and Jews, 181-190 . . . . .	359
<i>B.</i> Christian Aristotelians, §§ 192-208 . . . . .	381
<i>a.</i> Alexander, § 195 . . . . .	386
<i>b.</i> Bonaventura, § 197 . . . . .	393
<i>c.</i> Albert, § 199-202 . . . . .	400
<i>d.</i> Thomas and the Thomists, §§ 203, 204 . . . . .	423
<i>e.</i> Lully, § 206 . . . . .	447
<i>f.</i> Dante, § 208 . . . . .	468
III. The Decay of Scholasticism, §§ 210-225 . . . . .	475
<i>a.</i> Roger Bacon, § 212 . . . . .	476
<i>b.</i> Duns Scotus, § 214 . . . . .	485
<i>c.</i> Occam, § 216 . . . . .	502
<i>d.</i> Pierre d'Ailly, § 219 . . . . .	518
<i>e.</i> Gerson, § 220 . . . . .	521
<i>f.</i> Raymond of Sabunde, § 222 . . . . .	526
<i>g.</i> Nicolaus of Cusa, § 225 . . . . .	532

	PAGE
<b>THIRD PERIOD. TRANSITION . . . . .</b>	<b>543</b>
<b>I. Philosophy as Divine Wisdom, §§ 229-234 . . . . .</b>	<b>547</b>
<i>A. Speculative Mysticism, § 230 . . . . .</i>	<i>548</i>
<i>B. Practical Mysticism, § 231 . . . . .</i>	<i>556</i>
<i>C. Theosophical Mysticism, § 234 . . . . .</i>	<i>578</i>
<b>II. Philosophy as Secular Wisdom, §§ 235-256 . . . . .</b>	<b>595</b>
<i>A. The Renaissance, §§ 236-239 . . . . .</i>	<i>595</i>
<i>B. The Natural Philosophers, §§ 241-250 . . . . .</i>	<i>612</i>
<i>a. Paracelsus, § 241 . . . . .</i>	<i>612</i>
<i>b. Cardanus, § 242 . . . . .</i>	<i>624</i>
<i>c. Telesius, § 243 . . . . .</i>	<i>630</i>
<i>d. Patritius, § 244 . . . . .</i>	<i>634</i>
<i>e. Campanella, § 246. . . . .</i>	<i>639</i>
<i>f. Bruno, § 247 . . . . .</i>	<i>652</i>
<i>g. Bacon, § 249 . . . . .</i>	<i>668</i>
<i>C. The Political Philosophers, 251-256 . . . . .</i>	<i>684</i>
<i>a. Ecclesiastical Political Philosophers, § 252 . . . . .</i>	<i>685</i>
<i>b. Anti-ecclesiastical Political Philosophy, § 253 . . . . .</i>	<i>689</i>
<i>c. Non-ecclesiastical Political Philosophy, § 255 . . . . .</i>	<i>694</i>
<i>d. Naturalistic Political Philosophy, Hobbes, § 256 . . . . .</i>	<i>706</i>
<b>CONCLUSION. § 257. . . . .</b>	<b>721</b>

# HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

## INTRODUCTION.

### § 1.

IF the History of Philosophy admitted of no other mode of treatment than either the simply learned, which regards all systems as equally true, as being alike mere opinions; or the sceptical, which sees equal error in all; or lastly, the eclectic, which discovers fragments of the truth in all, we should have to agree that those are right who, in the interests of philosophy, warn all, or at least beginners, against studying its history. But whether a better method exists, and which is the right one, can only be decided by a consideration of the conception of a history of philosophy.

### § 2.

Philosophy arises when, not content with the facts of existence (that is, of the world), men proceed to the inquiry into their reasons, and ultimately into their unconditioned reason, *i.e.* their necessity or rationality. It is not, however, on this account, merely the work of an individual thinker; rather, there are laid down in it the practical and theoretical convictions of mankind, just as the wisdom and the experience of individuals is laid down in their maxims and principles, and that of nations in their proverbs and laws. Just as a people or a country utters its wisdom and its will through the mouth of its sages and lawgivers, so the world-spirit (*i.e.* collective humanity) utters its (or the world its) wisdom and its will through the philosophers. If, therefore, we substitute "world-wisdom" for philosophy, "the world" here stands as at once the subjective and objective genitive.

## § 3.

And just as the individual passes through the various stages of life without detriment to his unity, so the world-spirit is in succession the spirit of the various times and centuries. Man in the eighteenth century is not the same as in the seventeenth. If by the same substitution by which we say "world" instead of "world-spirit," we say "times" instead of "spirit of the age," and "century" instead of "spirit of the century," then every time has its own wisdom, every century its own philosophy. And those who are the first to utter it, are the philosophers of that particular time. They have the true knowledge of their time, and the philosophy, in which the time arrives at knowledge of itself, does nothing but formulate the unconscious life, the instinctive tendencies of that time. It only utters its secret, utters what people feel to be true and right.

## § 4.

This dependence upon a particular time, into which every philosophy is driven by the fact that it is final truth only for that time, impairs its absoluteness just as little as duty ceases to be unconditional because duties are different at different times of life. Nor does duty thereby become transitory; for the boy's function of obedience is preserved in the man—who learnt by obedience to command—in the form of *having obeyed*. Moreover, since philosophy ever follows like the fruit upon the flower of an age, it has often appeared to be as the cause of a decay, which, however, it never calls forth, but only betrays. In particular, it is not philosophy that destroys naïve piety, but rather this must have ceased before philosophic movements can appear.

## § 5.

Just as the world-spirit passes through the different spirits of the ages that make up the history of the world, so its consciousness, the wisdom of the world, passes through the different consciousnesses of the times, and it is just in this that the history of philosophy consists. In the one case, as in the other, there is nothing lost; but the results of one age and --- afford the material and the starting-point for

their successors. Hence the distinctness and even the conflict of philosophic systems is no disproof of the assertion that all systems of philosophy are only the development of a single philosophy, but rather speaks in favour of this same assertion.

### § 6.

Every philosophic system is the outcome of that or those put forward before it, and contains the germs of its successor. The first part of this assertion is not overthrown by exceptions in the shape of philosophers apparently, and as a rule only apparently, self-taught, nor by the fact that such intellectual descent is generally protested against ; for the connection need not be one of direct discipleship, and opposition also is a form of dependence. Just as little is the second disposed of by the fact that no philosopher wishes to be the father of the system which goes beyond him. That this should be so is inevitable by reason of the limitations, without which nothing great is achieved, and without which, therefore, no system is constructed. This phenomenon therefore recurs everywhere ; but it proves nothing, because the full and proper significance of a system cannot be rightly appreciated by its founder, but only by posterity, which in this respect also stands on a higher eminence than the former.

### § 7.

The history of philosophy can be represented rightly, *i.e.* in its true nature, only with the help of philosophy, since it alone enables us to trace in the sequence of systems, not random change, but progress, *i.e.* necessity, and since also it is impossible, without a consciousness of the course of the human spirit, to show what has been the course of its wisdom, and the recognition of such necessity and such consciousness is, as we saw in § 2, philosophy. The objection that a philosophic representation of the history of philosophy must not be called history, but rather philosophy of the history of philosophy, is distinguished neither by its novelty nor by its insight ; it forgets that even an unphilosophic representation is not the history itself, but only a representation of the history.

### § 8.

A philosophic treatment of the history of philosophy takes

## § 3.

And just as the individual passes through the various stages of life without detriment to his unity, so the world-spirit is in succession the spirit of the various times and centuries. Man in the eighteenth century is not the same as in the seventeenth. If by the same substitution by which we say "world" instead of "world-spirit," we say "times" instead of "spirit of the age," and "century" instead of "spirit of the century," then every time has its own wisdom, every century its own philosophy. And those who are the first to utter it, are the philosophers of that particular time. They have the true knowledge of their time, and the philosophy, in which the time arrives at knowledge of itself, does nothing but formulate the unconscious life, the instinctive tendencies of that time. It only utters its secret, utters what people feel to be true and right.

## § 4.

This dependence upon a particular time, into which every philosophy is driven by the fact that it is final truth only for that time, impairs its absoluteness just as little as duty ceases to be unconditional because duties are different at different times of life. Nor does duty thereby become transitory; for the boy's function of obedience is preserved in the man—who learnt by obedience to command—in the form of *having obeyed*. Moreover, since philosophy ever follows like the fruit upon the flower of an age, it has often appeared to be as the cause of a decay, which, however, it never calls forth, but only betrays. In particular, it is not philosophy that destroys naïve piety, but rather this must have ceased before philosophic movements can appear.

Just as the world-spirit passes through the different spirits of the ages that make up the history of the world, so its consciousness, the wisdom of the world, passes through the different consciousnesses of the times, and it is just in this that the history of philosophy consists. In the one case, as in the other, there is nothing lost; but the results of one age and one philosophy afford the material and the starting-point for

their successors. Hence the distinctness and even the conflict of philosophic systems is no disproof of the assertion that all systems of philosophy are only the development of a single philosophy, but rather speaks in favour of this same assertion.

### § 6.

Every philosophic system is the outcome of that or those put forward before it, and contains the germs of its successor. The first part of this assertion is not overthrown by exceptions in the shape of philosophers apparently, and as a rule only apparently, self-taught, nor by the fact that such intellectual descent is generally protested against; for the connection need not be one of direct discipleship, and opposition also is a form of dependence. Just as little is the second disposed of by the fact that no philosopher wishes to be the father of the system which goes beyond him. That this should be so is inevitable by reason of the limitations, without which nothing great is achieved, and without which, therefore, no system is constructed. This phenomenon therefore recurs everywhere; but it proves nothing, because the full and proper significance of a system cannot be rightly appreciated by its founder, but only by posterity, which in this respect also stands on a higher eminence than the former.

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A philosophic treatment of the history of philosophy takes



an interest, like the merely learned, in the finest differences of systems, admits, with the sceptics, that they conflict with one another, and concedes to the eclectics that there is truth in all. Hence it neither loses sight of the thread of growing knowledge, like the first, nor regards the result as nil, like the second, nor, like the third, recognises in every system only pieces of developed truth, but the whole truth only in an undeveloped form. And thus it does not, like the first, beguile us into regarding philosophic doctrines as mere fancies and opinions, nor does it, like the second, shake the confidence in reason necessary to philosophy, nor lastly does it, like the eclectic method, make us indifferent towards dependence on a principle, *i.e.* towards systematic form.

### § 9.

And this method not only avoids these dangers to philosophy, but, by teaching us to philosophize about the history of philosophy, it is so far from seducing us from philosophic activity, that it is even a practical introduction to it. And indeed, where the interest in philosophy has given way to that in its history, and especially where a shrinking from strictly philosophic, *i.e.* metaphysical, inquiries manifests itself, a philosophic representation of the history of philosophy is perhaps the best means to induce those who merely wish to hear the tale, to join in the philosophizing, and to show to those who doubt the importance of metaphysical definitions, how wholly different views of the world and of life often depended only on the difference of a couple of categories. In some circumstances, the history of philosophy, though in the system of science it forms the conclusion, may be the subject of which the study is to be recommended most of all to beginners.

### § 10.

Since every attempt at philosophy must have a definite character, and it is impossible to represent a development as rational unless it leads up to some end, every philosophic representation of the history of philosophy must be coloured by the philosophy which the author regards as the completion of the previous development. To require the contrary of this under the name of dispassionateness and impartiality is to make a preposterous demand. It is true that fairness must be

required of every historian, and it is the duty also of the philosophic historian. And if, in the case of the former, fairness consists in his narrating, not how he himself, but how history has judged this or that phenomenon, it is the duty of the latter to display the rationality of this judgment, *i.e.* to justify it. And in that alone does the criticism consist which he not only may, but should apply.

### § 11.

Philosophic criticism, then, must display the necessity, both of the appearance of a philosophic system in history, and of its supersession by another which went beyond it, and there must therefore be distinguished in it a positive and a negative element. Now this necessity is twofold: the appearing and the superseding of a system is necessary to the history of the world, in that the former was conditioned by the character of the time of which the system was the right understanding, and the latter, again, in that the time changed (*vid.* § 4). And again, the necessity, in the history of philosophy, of each of these processes is exhibited, when there is shown in a system the conclusion to which previous systems formed the premises, and on the other hand, that it was necessary to advance in order not to stand still half-way. Hence we can note it as a defect of a system only if it fails to go on to what follows immediately from it, but we must not take as the standard, whereby to judge it, a system separated from it by intermediate stages. And just as history has corrected Cartesianism by Spinozism, but not by the Kantian doctrine, so it is only by Spinoza and not by Kant that the philosophic critic may estimate Descartes. The observance of this rule secures a philosophic historian of philosophy against committing himself to a single system in a narrow-minded way, without requiring him to disavow his own.

### § 12.

The epochs of the history of philosophy, *i.e.* the points at which a new principle is asserted, as well as the periods which they dominate, the spaces of time required to set free the new doctrine from its revolutionary and despotic character, run parallel to the epochs and periods of the world's history, but in such a way that they succeed them at a greater or less distance, but never precede them. Epoch-making systems them-

selves can have no appreciative understanding for the past, which, however, will be shown all the more by those that conclude a period. Hence the adherents of the former type of philosophy will, in their treatment of its history, run greater danger than those of the latter of disregarding historical justice.

### § 3.

#### LITERATURE.

Until the end of the 18th century all expositions of the history of philosophy only sought to satisfy the interest of the learned,<sup>1</sup> of sceptics,<sup>2</sup> or of eclectics.<sup>3</sup> After that there is not one that is not coloured more or less by philosophy. And in most cases we must complain not so much that each author regards his own system as the conclusion of the previous development, as that his views are continually making themselves heard before the narrative has reached its end. This holds good already of the first writer who regards the history of philosophy from a philosophic point of view, viz. the Frenchman Degerando.<sup>4</sup> And the Germans who followed his example can just as little be acquitted of his fault. Kant, who himself had given only hints as to how the history of philosophy was to be philosophically treated, left the development of his idea to his disciples. But his system was too much of an epoch-making one to be able to lead to a just estimation of the past. Hence, in the historians of the Kantian school, the comparison, censured above in § 11, of even the oldest systems, with doctrines that could only be propounded in the 18th century—a procedure which so

<sup>1</sup> Stanley: *History of Philosophy*; 1655, 2nd ed. 1687; also as: *Historia philosophica auctore Thoma Stanlejo*. Lipsa, 1712. 2 vols. small fol.

<sup>2</sup> P. Bayle: *Dictionnaire historique et critique*. 1695-97, 2 vols.; 1702, 2 vols.; 1740, 4 vols. fol. The sceptical tendency less pronounced in Dietrich Tiedemann: *Geist der speculat. Philosophie*. Marburg, 1791-97, 6 vols. 8vo.

<sup>3</sup> J. J. Brucker: *Historia critica philosophiæ a mundi incunabulis*. Lipsa, 1766. 6 vols. 4to. J. G. Buhle's: *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie und kritische Literatur derselben*; Göttingen, 1796-1804, 8 Pts. 8vo, is also eclectic.

<sup>4</sup> J. M. Degerando: *Histoire comparée de l'histoire de la Philosophie*. Paris, 1804, 3 vols. 2nd ed. 1822, 4 vols. In German as: *Vergleichende Geschichte der Systeme der Philosophie mit Rücksicht auf die Grundsätze der menschlichen Erkenntnis*, übers. von W. G. Tennemann. Marburg, 1806. 2 vols. 8vo. (The Anglo-French empiricism and sensualism is taken as the standard of judgment.)

disfigures the otherwise valuable works of Tennemann.<sup>1</sup> Fichte's doctrine could neither rule long nor stimulate to historical studies ; and thus it had at the most this result for the treatment of history, that the canon was established even more firmly than in Kant, that progress consisted in the compensation of one-sided oppositions. Far more lasting was the effect of Schelling's philosophy ;<sup>2</sup> what could alone be regretted was, that the individual differences of the subject-matter were obliterated by the ready-made scheme applied to it. The peculiar views on the history of philosophy, and of ancient philosophy in particular, which Schleiermacher developed in his lectures, had already long been made known to the reading public through others,<sup>3</sup> when they were published after his death.<sup>4</sup> To some extent this was also the case with Hegel, with whose way of regarding isolated portions of the history of philosophy and of its course, disciples<sup>5</sup> and readers of his works<sup>6</sup> familiarized the world, long before his lectures on the history of philosophy<sup>7</sup> were placed before it. The greater part, however, of the historical works proceeding from the Hegelian school treat only of isolated periods, although some<sup>8</sup> also attempt to narrate the history of philosophy as a whole. Connected with these are the surveys attempted from

<sup>1</sup> W. G. Tennemann : *Geschichte der Philosophie*. Leipzig, 1794, 12 vols. (unfinished). The same : *Grundriss der Philosophie*, 1812. 5th ed. by Wendt, 1829. (Distinguished by its copious bibliography. Often translated.)

<sup>2</sup> J. G. Steck : *die Geschichte der Philosophie*. Part I. Riga, 1805. F. Ast : *Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie*. Landshut, 1807, 2nd ed., 1825. T. A. Rixner : *Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*. 3 vols. Sulzbach, 1822. A supplementary 4th vol. to the 2nd ed. in 1850, by V. P., Gumposch.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. in H. Ritter's *Geschichte der ionischen Philosophie*. Berlin, 1821.

<sup>4</sup> F. Schleiermacher : *Geschichte der Philosophie*, edited by H. Ritter. Berlin, 1839. (Schleiermacher's works, 3rd Div., 4th vol., 1st part.)

<sup>5</sup> As Röscher, in his : *Aristophanes und sein Zeitalter*, 1827, where Hegel's views about Socrates are developed.

<sup>6</sup> Windischmann : *Kritische Betrachtungen über die Schicksale der Philosophie in der neueren Zeit*, etc. Frankfurt a. M., 1825. The same : *Die Philosophie im Fortgange der Weltgeschichte*. Bonn, 1827. Part I.; the principles of philosophy in the East. Book I., China ; Book II., India.

<sup>7</sup> G. W. Hegel's : *Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Philosophie*, edited by Michelet (Works : vols. 13-15). Berlin, 1833.

<sup>8</sup> G. O. Marbach : *Lehrbuch des Geschichte der Philosophie* (Part I. Antiquity, II. Middle Ages, III. [wanting]). Leipzig, 1838-41. A. Schwegler : *Umriss*. Stuttgart, 1848. 14th ed., 1887.

different but yet kindred points of view.<sup>1</sup> Speculative eclecticism has greatly increased the interest in historical works both in France,<sup>2</sup> and also in Germany; and we owe to it accounts of the development both of philosophy as a whole<sup>3</sup> and of separate philosophic problems,<sup>4</sup> in which the effect of the ideas of Schelling and Hegel is perceptible. From their influence not even those have been able wholly to withdraw themselves, who in their account take up a different position, more akin to that of Kant, or quite peculiar to themselves,<sup>5</sup> or protest against every philosophic treatment of history as an *a priori* construction.<sup>6</sup>

### § 14.

Just as the history of the world is divided into three main periods by the entrance of Christianity and the Reformation, so in the history of philosophy, on the one hand those systems

<sup>1</sup> C. J. Braniss: *Uebersicht des Entwicklungsganges der Philosophie in der alten und mittleren Zeit*. Breslau, 1842.

<sup>2</sup> V. Cousin: *Cours de philosophie* (Introduction). Paris, 1828. The same: *Cours de l'histoire de philosophie*, I and II. Paris, 1829. The same: *Histoire générale de la philosophie*. Paris, 1863. 7th ed., 1867.

<sup>3</sup> H. C. W. Sigwart: *Geschichte der Philosophie vom allgemeinen wissenschaftlichen und geschichtlichen Standpunkt*. Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1884. 3 vols.

<sup>4</sup> A. Trendelenburg: *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*. Berlin, 1846.

<sup>5</sup> E. Reinhold: *Handbuch der allgemeinen Geschichte der Philosophie für alle wissenschaftlich Gebildete*. Gotha, 1828-30, 3 vols. The same: *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1837 (5th ed., 1858 in 3 vols). J. J. Fries: *die Geschichte der Philosophie, dargestellt nach den Fortschritten ihrer Entwicklung*. Halle, 1837-40. 2 vols. F. Michelis: *Geschichte der Philosophie von Thales bis auf unsere Zeit*. Braunsberg, 1865. C. Hermann: *Geschichte der Philosophie in pragmatischer Behandlung*. Leipz., 1867. E. Dühring: *Kritische Geschichte der Philosophie von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*. Berlin, 1869. 2nd ed., 1873.

<sup>6</sup> H. Ritter: *Geschichte der Philosophie*. Hamburg, 1829, 12 vols. (I.-IV., Ancient Philosophy, V.-XII. Christian, V. and VII. Patristic, VII. and VIII. Scholastic, IX.-XII. Modern, extending only as far as Kant, excl.; a further narrative did not form part of the author's plan.) F. Ueberweg: *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie von Thales bis auf die Gegenwart*. Part I. (Antiquity). Berlin, 1863. 5th ed., 1876. Part II., Div. 1 and 2 (Patristic and Scholastic times), 5th ed., 1876. Part III. (Modern Times), 1866. 4th ed., 1874. [Parts I. and II. of Ueberweg's History appeared in a 7th ed. in 1886; Part III., 7th ed., has just appeared (1888). English Trans. from the 4th ed., 2 vols. New York and London.—Ed.] A. Stöckl: *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*. Mainz, 1870. G. H. Lewes: *History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte*, 4th ed.

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which arose as yet wholly uninfluenced by Christian ideas, and on the other, those which developed under the influence of the ideas called forth by the Reformation, stand apart from the intermediate systems, because of them neither of these assertions holds good. These three main periods we shall denominate the Ancient, the Mediæval, and the Modern.





# ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

## INTRODUCTION.

### § 15.

THE task of apprehending its own nature in thought can only tempt the human mind, and indeed it is only then equal to it, when it is conscious of its intrinsic dignity. And as in the East, except among the Jews, this point is not reached, we must not be induced to talk of a pre-Hellenic philosophy, or worse still, of pre-Hellenic *systems*, either by the rules of propriety and external decorum enunciated by the Chinese sages,<sup>1</sup> or by the pantheistic and atheistic doctrines which the Indian spirit attains in the Mimansa, and in Kapila's teaching in the Sankhya, or by the intellectual exercises to which it rises in the Nyaja,<sup>2</sup> or finally by the confused semi-religious and semi-physical doctrines of the ancient Persians<sup>3</sup> and of Egypt.<sup>4</sup> For, since it is the Greek ear that first catches the *γνώθι σεαυτόν*, philosophizing, *i.e.*, the attempt to comprehend the nature of the human mind, in Western or at least in Greek parlance, is called *thinking*; and the history of philosophy begins with the philosophy of the Greeks.

<sup>1</sup> Windischmann's, Schmidt's, and other idealizing panegyrics on Chinese wisdom have been successfully opposed, especially by Stühr.

<sup>2</sup> The reports of Colebrooke, Balentyne, Röer, and Max Müller supply the data of an estimate which avoids the extremes of the earlier adoration and the subsequent contempt.

<sup>3</sup> The fancies of Röhde and others have long been forgotten, and the later origin of many of the doctrines of the Zendavesta has been proved.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, though he calls the Egyptian priests the first philosophers, is yet unable to mention any philosophic doctrine of theirs. Röth, who more recently has been foremost in insisting on the Egyptian origin of all philosophy, nevertheless throughout calls their doctrine a *faith*, and himself denies the scientific importance of Pherecydes, whom he asserts to have deviated least from it.

## § 16.

## SOURCES AND AUTHORITIES.

As the whole or the greater part of the writings of the older Greek philosophers have been lost, we are compelled to draw upon the accounts of those to whom they were still accessible. And although historical works on individual philosophers were composed even before the time of Socrates, and since his time there has been no school that failed to produce several such works, and hardly one from which there have not issued treatises on the different tendencies of philosophy, this avails us but little, as the majority of these works, a list of the authors and titles of which has been compiled by Jonsius<sup>1</sup> and Fabricius<sup>2</sup> with unwearied industry, have also been lost. For us the oldest authorities are Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch, all of whom only quote the opinions of others by the way, in order to develop their own, and from whom therefore we can hardly expect fidelity, and much less require completeness. Were the treatise of Plutarch on the doctrines of the philosophers<sup>3</sup> really genuine, it would certainly be the oldest account we possess of the different systems. But it has now been shown that it is only an excerpt from the genuine work of Plutarch, which Stobæus<sup>4</sup> still had before him, and from which he made extracts. Thus the nearly contemporaneous works of Sextus Empiricus<sup>5</sup> and Diogenes Laertius<sup>6</sup> may perhaps be older than this work of

<sup>1</sup> Joannis Jonsii Holsati: *De scriptoribus historiae philosophicae*. Libb. II. Francof. 1659.

<sup>2</sup> J. A. Fabricii: *Bibliotheca græca*. Hamb., 1705.

<sup>3</sup> Πλουτάρχου περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκόντων τοῖς φιλοσόφοις (*De placitis philosophorum*). Ed. Buddæus: Basil., 1531, 4. Ed. Corsinus: Florence, 1750, 4.

<sup>4</sup> Ἰωάννου Στοβαίου ἐκλογῶν φυσικῶν διαλεκτικῶν καὶ ἠθικῶν βιβλία δύο (J. Stob.: *Eclogarum physicarum et ethicarum libri duo*). Ed. Heeren, 1792–1801, 3 vols.

<sup>5</sup> Σεξτοῦ Ἐμπειρικοῦ πρὸς Μαθηματικοὺς βιβλία ἑνδεκα. *Sext. Empirici adv. Mathematic. Libri XI*. Ed. Fabricius: Lips., 1711, fol. Ed. emendator: Lips., 1842, 8vo. 2 vols. *Sextus Empiricus*, ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri: Berlin, 1842, 8vo.

<sup>6</sup> Διογένης Λαερτίου περὶ βίων καὶ γνωμῶν καὶ ἀποφθεγμάτων τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ εὐδοκμησάντων βιβλία δέκα, first appeared in Latin at Rome, 1475, fol., afterwards in Greek at Bale, 1533, Froben, 4, and in 1570, pub. by H. Stephanus. The latter commentaries, as well as those of Casaubon and Menagius, were included by Pearson in his edition: Lond., 1664. This has been reprinted, imperfectly by Meibom: Amst., 1692, 2 vols. 4to; far better

the Pseudo-Plutarch. These are our most important sources, although both must, for contrary reasons, be used with caution. The history of philosophy ascribed to a contemporary writer, the physician Galen, is not genuine, but a compilation from (the Pseudo-)Plutarch and Sextus. The later commentators also on Aristotle,<sup>1</sup> as well as some of the Fathers,<sup>2</sup> are important, because they possessed much that has since been lost. The collections of the chief passages out of the above writings, which have been made from time to time,<sup>3</sup> are the most meritorious preliminaries to the treatises on Greek philosophy. In this respect progress has been so rapid, especially in Germany, that works which a few decades ago were justly praised,<sup>4</sup> are to-day forgotten, because so much better ones have been since published.<sup>5</sup>

by Hübner: Leipz., 1828, 2 vols. text, 2 vols. commentary. Edited also by Gabriel Cobet: Paris, 1850 (Didot).

<sup>1</sup> Above all, *Simplicius*, who still possessed the lost history of Porphyry. Afterwards, John Philoponus.

<sup>2</sup> Justin Martyr, especially in his: *Cohortatio ad Græcos*. Best edition, that of Otto: Jena, 1842, 3 vols. 8vo. Clement of Alexandria, especially in the *Στοιμαίους*. Ed. Sylburg: Paris, 1641. Origen, especially in the treatise: *Against Celsus*. Eusebius, especially in the 15 books *εὐαγγελικῆς προπαρασκευῆς* (*Præparatio evangelica*). Ed. Heinichen: Leipz., 1852, 2 vols. 8vo. Hippolytus, especially in the first book of his *Philosophumena*, which after their discovery by Gronovius used to be ascribed to Origen, until they were rediscovered by Miller (*Hippolyti refutationes omnium hæresium libb. x. rec. lat. veritt. L. Duncker et F. G. Schneidewin. 2 voll. Gött., 1856-59*). Augustine: especially in his *Civitas Dei* and *Retractationes*.

<sup>3</sup> H. Stephanus: *Poesis philosophica*, 1573. F. Gedike: *M. Tullii Ciceronis historia philosophiæ antiquæ, aliorum auctorum locis illustr.* Berlin, 1782. 2nd ed., 1808. H. Ritter et L. Preller: *Historia philosophiæ græco-romanae ex fontium locis contexta; Hamburgi*, 1838. Seventh ed. Gothæ, 1886 (the first ed. quoted in this work). Far more complete and accompanied by instructive introductions, F. W. A. Mullach: *Fragmenta philosophorum græcorum*. Paris (Didot), 1860. Vol. 2, 1867. [Vol. 3 appeared in 1881.—Ed.]

<sup>4</sup> W. T. Krug: *Geschichte der Philosophie aller Zeit, vornnehmlich unter Griechen und Römern*. Leipz. 1815. 2nd ed., 1827.

<sup>5</sup> C. A. Brandis: *Handbuch der Geschichte der griechisch-römischen Philosophie*, Part I. Berlin, 1835 (as far as the Sophists). Part II., Division 1, 1844 (Socrates and Plato). Div. 2, 1853 (the older Academy and Aristotle). Part III., Div. 1 (Survey of the Aristotelian doctrine, and discussion of those of his successors), 1860. Div. 2 (Dogmatists, Sceptics, Syncretists, and Neo-Platonists), 1866. The same: *Geschichte der Entwicklungen der griechischen Philosophie und ihrer Nachwirkungen im römischen Reiche*. The first and greater half, Berlin, 1862. Second half, 1864. E. Zeller: *Die Philosophie der Griechen, eine Untersuchung über Charakter, Gang und Hauptmomente ihrer Entwicklung*. Part I., Tübingen, 1844 (3rd ed., 1869). Part II.

## § 17.

It does not follow from the fact that the attempt to solve the riddle of one's own existence and of existence generally is in Greek called thinking, that the philosophic spirit at once thinks in the characteristic Greek manner or grasps its own Hellenism in its purity and superiority to all barbarism. Rather, just as man rises above the level of the beast only by passing through it in his pre-human (immature) state, so Greek philosophy matures in the direction of its aim, to solve that fundamental problem (§ 15) in the Hellenic spirit, in such a way that it at first answers the question contained therein in a pre-Hellenic sense. Hence those who belong to this *period of immaturity* seem "dreamers" to the later philosophers, for the same reason that we are wont to call embryonic life a dream-life. That which had been the principle of the religious and moral being, and the life of mankind in its pre-Hellenic stages, is here formulated as the principle of philosophy; and even if the several Greek philosophers had not been influenced by the several stages of popular culture, we should be able to assert and to comprehend their parallelism.

Cf. A. Gladisch: *Einleitung in das Verständniss der Weltgeschichte*. Part I., the Pythagoreans and the ancient Chinese; Part II., the Eleatics and the ancient Indians. Posen, 1844. The same: *Die Religion und die Philosophie in ihrer weltgeschichtlichen Entwicklung und Stellung zu einander*. Breslau, 1852. The same: *Empedokles und die Aegypter, eine historische Untersuchung*. Leipz., 1858. (Gives reasons and fuller details for what had been hinted at in *Das Mysterium der Aegyptischen Pyramiden und Obelisken*. Halle, 1846: and in *Empedokles und die alten Aegypter*, in Noack's *Jahrbuch für specul. Philos.*) The same: *Herakleitos und Zoroaster, eine historische Untersuchung*. Leipz., 1859 (a development of what the author had shown in Bergk and Cæsar's *Zeitschrift für Alterthumswissensch.*, 1846, No. 121, 122; and 1848, No. 28, 29, 30). The same: *Anaxagoras und die alten Israeliten* (in Niedner's *Zeitsch. für histor. Theol.*, 1849, Heft. iv. No. 14). Revised as: *Anaxagoras und die Israeliten*. Leipz., 1864.

(Socrates, Plato, Aristotle), 1846 (2nd ed., 1859). Part III. (Post-Aristotelian Philosophy), 1852. [Later editions have since appeared, as follows: Part I., 4th ed., 1876; Part II., Div. 1, 3rd ed., 1874 (out of print); Part II., Div. 2, 3rd ed., 1879; Part III., Div. 1, 3rd ed., 1880; Part III., Div. 2, 3rd ed., 1881. English Trans. Longmans. London and New York.—Ed.]

# FIRST

## PERIOD OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

### GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN ITS IMMATURITY.

#### INTRODUCTION.

##### § 18.

IN Greece, as everywhere else, philosophy becomes prominent when the heroic struggle to acquire the conditions of existence has been followed by its enjoyment, the labour for the necessities of life by the luxury of artistic creation and of thought, and the unconscious growth of custom by its formulation into laws, necessitated by the attacks to which it has been subjected ; in short, when the unquestioning acceptance of life has yielded to reflection. And these reflections, the maxims and proverbs, though their value is chiefly national, form the transition to philosophy proper. The fact that their authors, the sages (Solomons) of Greece, were generally active also as legislators, is to be explained in the same way as is the fact that the one among them whose maxim contains the whole problem of philosophy, is not only accounted one of them, but is regarded as the pioneer of philosophy proper. Differences have been introduced into the traditions as to who were to be counted among these sages, through respect for the number seven, combined with preponderating preferences for one or other of the claimants.

Cf. Bohren : *De septem sapientibus*. Bonn., 1867. Mullach : *Fragm. phil. græc.* I., 203-239.

##### § 19.

In order that not only laws and moral maxims, but also reflections on the totality of existence, and thus philosophy, may arise, the freshness of existence must die out still more, and decay must begin. And in any case these conditions are specially found in colonies, in cities or States originating from prudent calculation and developing with rapid splendour ; while in the case of the Greek colonies we must further take into consideration that just among them intercourse with non-

Hellenic nations rendered possible the growth of philosophies that (*vid.* § 17) should answer the question of the riddle of existence in the pre-Hellenic spirit. For many reasons, therefore, the Ionic colonies in Asia Minor and the Archipelago became the cradle of philosophy; from there went forth even those who kindled in other quarters the spark that grew into the flame of a philosophy very different from that of the three Milesians who first taught men to philosophize.

### § 20.

In the presence of the splendour of the East, the Ionic spirit can produce only a realistic philosophy of nature in its philosophy, just as in its poetry it found its satisfaction in the objective epic, and in religion in the mysteries connected with the worship of nature. According to the content of their doctrine, we shall call the first Greek philosophers, *physiologists* pure and simple, and understand thereby, in agreement with Aristotle, those who considered the riddle of existence solved when the original material had been stated, out of the modifications of which all things consist. Thus the answer to the questions, What the world is, and, What man is, is in this case, that they are material substance; an answer, it is true, spoken rather in the spirit of a primitive race than adequately expressive of the Hellenic mind. But it cannot be called materialistic so long as the antitheses of Matter and Spirit and Matter and Force are still unknown. It is naïve Hylozoism.

## FIRST DIVISION.

### The Pure Physiologists.\*

H. Ritter: *Geschichte der ionischen Philosophie.* Berlin, 1821.

### § 21.

When the inquiring mind identifies the reality it seeks with the material substratum, modifications of which all things are

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\* It has been thought preferable to translate the Greek *φυσιολόγοι* by the more accurate "physiologists," rather than by the more familiar "physiologists," in order to guard against the misleading associations of the modern sense of the latter word.—[Tr.]

supposed to be, it has no unlimited choice of such primal matter. The more definite is the configuration of such matter, and the more it withdraws itself from certain modifications, the less suitable will it be for such a purpose; the more formless and modifiable is it, the more suitable. Hence fluids are regarded as the primal substance. But of all fluids, that which first presents itself as such, which moreover appears the most powerful to a maritime population, and is susceptible of the greatest variety of form in atmospheric phenomena, which, in a word, seems most worthy of veneration to minds just emancipating themselves from mythology, is Water, and especially the sea. Hence it is quite intelligible that Thales, the first philosopher, properly speaking, should make Water his primal substance or element, of which all things were to be regarded as modifications, although this doctrine might perhaps appear to savour of impiety and foreign wisdom to the Greeks, who felt that they were something more and better than condensed water.

#### A.—THALES.

F. Decker: *De Thalete Milesio*. Halle, 1865.

#### § 22.

THALES was born at Miletus in the 35th Olympiad, and is said to have been still alive in Ol. 58. His mathematical and astronomic knowledge, which he seems to have embodied in metrical writings, lost at an early period, as well as his political sagacity, indicate a sensible turn of mind. Hence he was accounted one of the Seven Sages. He is also a philosopher in being the first to search for a permanent and ultimate matter underlying all things as their substance, out of which they are composed and to which they revert. Water, which he regards as such a substratum, is also in his eyes the support in space on which the earth, the principal part of the universe, floats. Whether it was the observation that all seeds and all food were moist, or whether the myths of the old theogony induced this supposition, was uncertain even in Aristotle's time. The later ancients asserted the first, the moderns the second, as certain; and the former have also founded an argument on the theory that the constellations are nourished by the evaporating water. The assertion of Cicero, which he ascribes to an Epicurean and afterwards himself



retracts, that Thales, in addition to his elemental matter, assumed a world-soul, is certainly erroneous, as well as that of others, that he regarded the universal world-reason as a principle. It harmonizes with his naïve hylozoism that he regards all things as animated, all things full of dæmons and gods, and every physical motion as a sign of life. The saying, also ascribed to him, that there is no difference between living and dying, agrees well with this. Wherever, as in this case, a definite quality is ascribed to the elemental matter, there is a temptation to consider all differences as merely quantitative. Hence the remark of Aristotle about certain physiologists, that they regarded everything as arising out of the condensation and rarefaction of an elemental matter, has probably been rightly referred by later authors to Thales. By the side of Thales, Hippo is frequently mentioned, who was probably a Samian by birth, and whose "moisture" can hardly have been different from the Water of Thales. The circumstance that a man living in the age of Pericles could still satisfy himself with the doctrine of Thales, would alone suffice to justify Aristotle's unfavourable judgment about him.

The authorities for this § are found fairly complete in Ritter and Preller, I., c. 1. § 14-18.

### § 23.

For the reason, already correctly indicated by Aristotle, that a substance of so definite a nature as water, excludes many physical qualities by reason of its opposition to them, so that it is impossible to derive them from it, it is necessary to conceive the first principle in a different form. What is left out is not its material character, but only the definite exclusive quality. And just as the doctrines of Thales have reminded many of the Homeric tale of Oceanus, the father of things, so the theory of the second Milesian philosopher, as to the indefinite elemental substance, invites us to suppose a dependence on the Chaos of Hesiod.

### B.—ANAXIMANDER.

Schleiermacher: *Ueber Anaximandros von Milet*. An academical lecture of Nov. 4th, and Dec. 24th, 1811. Works, 3rd division, 2nd vol., p. 171.

### § 24.

I. ANAXIMANDER, son of Praxiades, a Milesian, twenty-eight years younger than Thales, can hardly be, as is asserted, a

disciple of his, although he shared with him his fondness for astronomic and mathematical studies, as his acquirements and inventions prove. His book, which was composed in poetical prose, probably had the title *περὶ φύσεως*.

2. Seeing, as Aristotle remarks, that everything definite is relative to something else, Anaximander took as his principle what he called the *ἄπειρον*, or according to others, the *ἀόριστον*, and always opposed to the *εἰδοποιημένον*. It is the unchangeable in all changes and therefore the immortal. It must certainly be conceived as material, only we must not yet admit the idea of dead matter. Because it, like Hesiod's Chaos, is only the ground of all things qualitatively definite, and contains them potentially (*seminaliter*), Aristotle and Theophrastus are entitled to call it a mixture, with a reference to Anaxagoras and Empedocles. That the passages in Aristotle in which he speaks of those who take for their principle a substance intermediate between air and water, and which many commentators apply to Anaximander, really refer to him, has been made very improbable by Schleiermacher.

3. In the case of an original substance devoid of qualities, it is impossible to derive all qualitative differences from differences of quantity and degree. Hence the doctrine of Anaximander is, that qualitative oppositions separate out from the Indefinite (*ἐναντιότητος ἐκκρίνεσθαι*). The opposition of the Cold and the Warm, which appears first, is followed only at a later stage by that of the Dry and the Moist. Schleiermacher ingeniously suggests, that before this last antithesis the undifferentiated Warmth (Fire—Air), which may be what Aristotle means when he speaks of a substance intermediate between Air and Fire, is opposed to the undifferentiated Cold (Earth—Water) which may be the *πρώτη ὑγρασία*, of which Anaximander is said to have called the sea the remnant (after the earth had separated from it). And this theory is rendered still more probable by the manner in which he conceived the further development. For while the earth, shaped like a (flat) cylinder, separates itself off from the rest of the universe, there is formed opposite to it a warm sphere. And the condensations of this fiery air are the constellations, which are called the gods that have come into being, or the gods of the heavens, as opposed to the eternal *ἄπειρον*. (According to other accounts, the flat disc of the earth is said to be

encompassed by the stream of Ocean, the further shore of which is formed by the edge of the heavenly hemisphere. This hemisphere consists of opaque layers, like the bark of a tree, and through their apertures the light of the sun, the moon, and the stars passes, when they do not, as in the eclipses, obstruct one another.) The influence of this warm environment produces bubbles in the earthy slime, out of which the organic creatures are generated, and at last, in their further development, men, who therefore have originally lived in the form of fishes. As all things have issued from the Indefinite, so they also pass back into it, "paying the penalty after the order of time"; an assertion which it is certainly very natural to explain with Schleiermacher as referring to a periodic compensation of the one-sided predominance of one of the contraries. Anaximander, however, seems to have assumed many such periods of egression and return, so that the plurality of worlds which he is said to have taught was perhaps one of succession. Each of these worlds was a transitory deity compared with the ἀφθάρτον.

Ritter and Preller, § 51-57. Mullach, I., 237-240.

### § 25.

The advantage offered by the doctrine of Anaximander, that the Dry and the Warm do not stand in a more hostile relation to his principle than the Moist and the Cold, is outweighed by the disadvantage that it is, properly speaking, impossible to derive qualitative differences from that which has no qualities. His is, therefore, the contrary one-sidedness to that of Thales, whom he nevertheless transcends by making the elemental moisture a secondary thing. By introducing the convenient expression of "issuing" or "separating," he really again let in by a back door the qualitative definiteness which he had just before excluded from his principle. Hence, any one who does consciously what Anaximander did unconsciously, and attributes a definite quality to the ἄπειρον, will stand above him, because he understands him better than he did himself, and at the same time return in a way to the position of Thales. This does not mean, of course, that he will attribute to his principle the same quality as Thales, which was an exclusive one. Rather, in positing the infinite Air as the original substance of all things,

the younger companion of Thales and Anaximander has overcome the one-sidedness of both, since his principle is not, as might have been supposed, the sum, but the negative unity of theirs.

### C.—ANAXIMENES.

#### § 26.

1. ANAXIMENES, son of Eurystratus of Miletus, cannot, indeed, have been born in Ol. 63, and have died at the time of the capture of Sardis, as Diogenes relates on the authority of Apollodorus. The dating by an historical fact causes less suspicion of false reading than that by a number, but it also is indefinite, as it may refer either to the capture by Cyrus or to that by the Greeks. Probably Anaximenes was a younger contemporary of Thales and Anaximander. He is called the pupil of the latter, and approximates to the former in his doctrine: perhaps he had known and listened to both, which would explain the origin of his intermediate position between them. His work, composed in the Ionic dialect, was still known to Theophrastus and discussed by him in a separate essay. All later authorities seem to have derived their information from him and from Aristotle.

2. Anaximenes also seeks some principle underlying all definite existence, which must therefore be universal and infinite, but he wishes it to be at the same time definite in quality. When therefore he said, not Water, as Thales had said, but Air was the first principle and the Infinite Substance out of which everything issued, he was perhaps impelled by the consideration that water could not accept many qualities, and certainly by this, that the breath of life, which he identifies with the soul, and the heavens encompassing all things were air. Just as the water in the case of Thales, so in his the air bears up the earth, which floats on it like a leaf. With regard to the derivation of individual things, it is certain that he let everything be represented as generated by condensation and rarefaction, and was probably the first to go into the details of this derivation. But when at the same time he introduces the antithesis of Cold and Warmth, he appears here again to mediate between Thales' method of derivation and that of Anaximander, a task all the easier to him as blowing hot or cold depended upon the rarefaction or condensation of the breath. The more probable assertion, that he regarded the air

as generating clouds, the latter water, and this, by its precipitates, the earth, is contradicted by another, according to which the earth was the first product. Perhaps the latter refers to the whole earth containing all the elements, and the former only to earth as an element. The earth forms the centre of the universe, and in it have originated the constellations, which consist of earth and fire, and move round it. We have express testimony to confirm what was probable in itself, viz., that everything was to be resolved again into air.

Ritter and Preller, § 19-24. Mullach, I., 241-2.

### § 27.

Anaximenes completes the circle of a group of views, since the thesis "qualitative," the antithesis, "without quality," and the synthesis, "yet qualitative," neither requires nor permits any further development. And accordingly, as far as its matter went, there was no further progress in the direction of the pure physiologers. On the other hand, there arises a man, who attempts to prove the silent assumptions from which the Milesians had set out, because they were being contested from another point of view, and thus, as is always the case with defenders of an opinion, promotes the doctrines of the physiologers in the point of form. But since the point of view from which the assumptions of the Milesian philosophers of the unity and materiality of the first principle are combated, is a higher one than theirs, Diogenes of Apollonia may be denominated a reactionary. Like all champions of a lost cause, he displays in his performances a high degree of subjective ability, without greatly furthering his cause objectively. This is the explanation of the fact that Schleiermacher shows such a preference for him, while he is not even mentioned by Hegel.

### D.—DIOGENES APOLLONIATES.

Schleiermacher: *Diogenes von Apollonia*. Academic lectures, 1811. Works, iii. 2, p. 149. W. Schorn: *Anaxagoræ Clazomenii et Diogenis Apolloniata fragmenta*. Bonn, 1829. F. Panzerbieter: *Diogenes Apolloniates, etc.* Leipz. 1830.

### § 28.

1. DIOGENES was born at Apollonia in Crete, and therefore belonged to the Dorian stock, but, like all the writers *πρὸς ἰωνοὺς*, made use of the Ionic dialect. His synchronism with

Anaxagoras, which can hardly be denied, can only be reconciled with the statement that he heard Anaximenes by means of very forced suppositions. Probably he learnt the latter's doctrine by tradition, and also in the same manner that of Anaximander. The work, of which fragments have come down to us, was perhaps his only one, and the others that are mentioned only subdivisions of it.

2. As his historical position requires, Diogenes demands a greater formal perfection of the doctrine by the setting up of a fixed principle and a simple and dignified mode of statement. Hence he attempts to prove, in the first place, what hitherto has been a tacit assumption, that the original substance was one, and everything a modification of it. If this were not the case there would be no mixture and no relation of different things, there would be no development and no transition, since all these are only thinkable if a single (permanent) One is transformed. But if there is only one unique ultimate substance, it immediately follows that there is no generation, properly speaking, but only change. Secondly, Diogenes denies consciously what his predecessors had denied unconsciously, viz., the existence of the immaterial. Not only does he expressly call his original substance of which all things are modifications, a *σῶμα*, but he already knows that a distinction is made between matter and spirit, and it is evidently in opposition to such a dualism that he maintains that reason, which to him is identical with vitality and feeling, is immanent in the air and unthinkable without it. Hence everything, even inorganic existences, and especially man, receive life and knowledge by breathing. Physiological examples, *e.g.*, the foam-like nature of seeds, are intended to prove the life-giving nature of the air. This attempt to maintain the earlier Monism against Dualism makes the naïve hylozoism into a materialistic doctrine.

3. Like Anaximander, Diogenes derives the individual by means of the antithesis of Cold and Warmth, like Anaximenes, he identifies it with that of the Dense and the Rare, but then proceeds to make both equivalent to that of the Heavy and the Light. As he is said to have adopted Anaximander's view that the sea was a "remnant," we must probably modify the statement that his principle was something intermediate between Air and Fire, in the sense that this intermediate substance was already secondary, just as in

the case of Anaximander. The earth arises out of the separation of the Light and the Heavy, and likewise the constellations, the circular motions of which are considered a consequence of warmth. Since they are nourished by the exhalations of the earth, the latter is continually becoming drier and on the way to complete exsiccation. His doctrine as to the nature of the stars, viz., that they resembled pumice-stone, was probably borrowed from Empedocles or Anaxagoras, and may have contributed to bring upon him the reproach of atheism. All individual things partake of Air, but each in a different way, depending on the different degree of their warmth, dryness, etc. The Air itself seems to have not only different degrees of warmth, but also of density. The individual human souls also differ only in their different participation in the principle of life and knowledge. Altogether Diogenes made living beings, and above all man, the special subject of his inquiries, a fact also indicated by his investigations into the nature of veins.

Ritter and Preller, § 25-34. Mullach, I., pp. 251-256.

### § 29.

If Philosophy is the self-comprehension of the spirit, the proof that a philosophic system does not understand itself, is also a proof that it is not a complete philosophy, and therefore must be transcended. Now such is the condition of the pure Physiologers. If they understood themselves, they would admit that they were not concerned about Water or Air, but about what was permanent, substantial, and essential in all things; and that they are not driven beyond animal and vegetable nature in virtue of its animal and vegetable character, but in virtue of its being variable and merely apparent. Strictly speaking, therefore, the question is not at all about substances that can be perceived by the senses, but the interest lies in permanency and change, *i.e.*, in thought-determinations or categories. The mind is prevented from perceiving this by the paradisiacal splendour of the East, in which the external world so occupies men that even one who begins to reflect, like Diogenes, always returns to the opinion that he is interested in warm air. In the twilight of the Western world, on the other hand, the mind is induced to reflect upon its own nature, and thereby makes the discovery

that it is not what shows itself most modifiable to the senses that can solve the riddle of existence, but only what is discovered by thought. Hence there arise the *Pure Metaphysicians*, in those colonies of Magna Græcia which, even where their origin was not Dorian, were yet inspired by the Dorian spirit. They form the diametrical opposite of the physiologers pure and simple; and whereas the aim of the latter is to derive everything from material substance, theirs is to deduce all things from thought-determinations. The rupture between them and the views of the physiologers is marked by the fact that the first metaphysicians are Ionians, and yet emigrate from the land of the philosophy of nature.

## SECOND DIVISION.

### The Pure Metaphysicians.

#### § 30.

The previous development of philosophy prescribed in what form thought-determinations were to be regarded essential and decisive of everything. When all variety has been explained by condensation and rarefaction, the mind, in reflecting upon itself, must arrive at the conclusion that differences of essence have become differences of greater simplicity or greater complexity, of more or less, that is to say, differences of number. If then differences of essence are only differences of number, it is an easy transition to the conclusion that Essence and Number are one and the same thing. And if the far more advanced thought of Plato is still fond of designating the relation of Substance and Accident as that of the One and the Many, it is intelligible that when metaphysical thought is only just beginning its flight, these quantitative categories seem to be quite sufficient. For do they not, as has been rightly remarked by philosophers of ancient and modern times, form as it were a connecting link between the physical and the logical? And thus they supply the readiest means of facilitating the great step from the one to the other by dividing it. Hence the mathematical school of Pythagoras displays the first beginnings of metaphysic.



## A.—THE PYTHAGOREANS.

## § 31.

## HISTORICAL.

E. Röth: *Geschichte unserer abendländischen Philosophie*, etc. Mannheim, 1846–1858, vol. 2, p. 261 seq.

The untrustworthy character of the three biographies of Pythagoras that have come down to us from antiquity, and the objections that have been raised against them by more sober authorities, have made critical investigations necessary. These, however, led to contradictory results, according as the critic was an enthusiast for the originality of everything Greek, or an Indo- or Egypto-maniac. The last few decades have been marked by a one-sided predominance of the former tendency, and hence the latter, represented, *e.g.* by Röth, seems in these days an innovation in a way it would not have done formerly. It is generally agreed that PYTHAGORAS was born in Samos, as the son of the engraver Mnesarchus, and was a descendant of Tyrrhenian Pelasgians, which may explain his preference for mystic rites. On the other hand, the more recent authorities, for the most part, after putting his birth in Ol. 49, *i.e.* 584–580 B.C., or in some cases twenty-four years earlier, regard him as leaving his native city in his fortieth year, and after travelling for twelve years in Ionia, Phenicia, and Egypt, as settling in Croton, in Magna Græcia, in his fifty-second year, and founding his school. Röth, on the contrary, chiefly on the authority of Jamblichus, gives 569 B.C. as the date of his birth, and maintains that he left Samos as early as his eighteenth year, then received for two years the instruction of Pherecydes, and spent two years more in travelling in Phenicia, then twenty-two years in Egypt, and, finally, twelve in Babylon, whither Cambyzes had brought him with other Egyptian prisoners. It was only after this, *i.e.* in his fiftieth year, that he returned to Samos, and came in his sixtieth year to Magna Græcia, where he lived twenty years in Croton, and, being driven out thence, nineteen years more in Tarentum and Metapontum, and died in his ninety-ninth year. Nor are the divergences of opinion as to the true sources of the Pythagorean doctrine less than as to chronology. For whereas most modern authorities only lightly touch upon the tradition of antiquity, that Pythagoras was a

disciple of Anaximander and Pherecydes, and call the first part of this improbable, because of the different character of his doctrine, and the second futile, because we know nothing about the doctrines of Pherecydes, Röth attributes great importance to both. According to him, the doctrine of Pherecydes was that of the Egyptians quite unchanged, in which the deity was conceived as Four in One, viz. Spirit, Original Matter, Time, and Space, from which proceeded by way of emanation the World-egg. Familiarized with this doctrine by Pherecydes, who taught it quite unscientifically, Pythagoras afterwards became acquainted with other Ionians, *e.g.* Anaximander, whose doctrine was also of Egyptian origin, and then acquired so thorough a knowledge of the wisdom of that country in Egypt itself, that he must be considered the chief channel by which it was transmitted to Greece. Theology and geometry are the subjects which Pythagoras is said to have learnt in Egypt; into arithmetic on the other hand, in which he excelled perhaps even more than in geometry, he was initiated by the Chaldeans whom he met in Babylon. The reports of antiquity as to a league, involved in peculiar secrecy, to which the more advanced disciples of Pythagoras belonged, are too unanimous to make it possible to doubt its existence. But while most modern authorities ascribe to this league religious and perhaps also political, but by no means scientific importance, Röth differs from them in this point also. Those who not only used to attend the public lectures of Pythagoras on the rules of morality, immortality, etc. (the Acusmatics), but really belonged to his school, were received after a previous moral and intellectual examination, and first severely trained, especially in music and mathematics (hence called mathematicians). Those among the disciples who approved themselves—for many were formally excluded—were declared fully competent by means of religious initiations, and instructed in the most truly profound doctrines, which were the same as the Egyptian theology and cosmology, only modified to this extent, that Dionysus was substituted for Osiris, etc. Since, however, some of the disciples never became acquainted with this dogmatic teaching, while they had yet penetrated far enough into the doctrine of Pythagoras to recognise that everything they knew was only the prelude to science proper, it was possible that these should look round for another metaphysic, which they could combine with the doctrine of number

they had learnt in the lower classes. Hence it came about that from the mathematically trained disciples of Pythagoras there issued in the first place true pupils of his (whom Röth calls Pythagorics), whose reverence for the doctrines imparted to them, prevented them from publishing what they had written down in or after the lectures, so that for this very reason it remained concealed down to the times of the Neo-Platonists. But in the second place, especially through the expelled pupil Hippasus, who combined with the Pythagorean doctrine of Number the dualistic metaphysic of Zoroaster, of which Democedes, the former court-physician of the Persian king, and the Crotoniate medical school generally were adherents, there arose the metaphysic of the spurious disciples of Pythagoras, whom Röth calls Pythagoreans. These were the first to make current the doctrine of opposites, and, finally, even the absurd doctrine that numbers were the essence of things. To them there belonged above all Philolaus. Since, however, recent criticism had declared spurious all the fragments of Timæus, Ocellus Lucanus, Eurytus, and Archytas transmitted to us, and did not admit the genuineness of anything except the fragments of Philolaus collected by Böckh, and the unimportant *χρυσᾶ ἔπη*, and since, moreover, Plato was wholly indebted to Philolaus for his doctrine of Numbers and of Ideas, one could understand how in modern times we regarded as the teaching of Pythagoras and the Pythagorics, that which the Pythagoreans and Platonists had made out of it. If the testimony of antiquity had not been treated with contempt, when it represented Pythagoras as deriving his wisdom from Egypt, and if the Egyptian doctrines had been better known, it would have been more readily obvious that there was no reason to complain of lack of authorities, seeing that the so-called *Orphica* contained writings by Pythagoras himself, especially the *ἱερὸς λόγος* for the more deeply initiated disciples. Even if, as can hardly be maintained, Röth were right in all that he says, the result of his inquiries would yet involve not even a change in the name of Pythagoreans, but only in that of the first author of the doctrine of Philolaus and Plato. He would have to be called Hippasus henceforth, instead of Pythagoras. For he himself admits that the doctrine of the Pythagorics had no influence on the subsequent development, while that of the Pythagoreans was immense. And this change would be doubly unimportant, as all later authorities, following the

example of Aristotle, have taken great care to avoid distinguishing the doctrines of Pythagoras himself from the additions of his successors.

## § 32.

### THE DOCTRINE OF THE PYTHAGOREANS.

Böckh : *Philolaus des Pythagoreers Lehren nebst Bruchstücken seines Werkes*. Berlin, 1819. H. Ritter : *Geschichte der pythagoreischen Philosophie*. Berlin, 1827. (On the other side, E. Reinhold : *Beitrag zur Erläuterung der pythag. Metaphysik*. Jena, 1827.) Brandis : *Ueber Zahlenlehre der Pythagoreer und Platoniker*. Rhein. Museum, 2nd year. C. Schaarschmidt : *Die angebliche Schriftstellerei des Philolaus*. Bonn, 1864. Rothenbücher : *Das System der Pythagoreer nach den Angaben des Aristoteles*. Berlin, 1867.

1. Aristotle mentions as the first reason why the Pythagoreans did not assume a sensible original substance, but found the elements of all things in those of numbers, that numbers are the principle of all mathematics ; secondly, that all harmony depends on the relation of numbers ; thirdly, that certain numbers continually recur in so many natural phenomena. There was added to these objective reasons the subjective one, that Number is the means to true knowledge, and that the Pythagoreans also never denied the fundamental maxim of this whole period, that like is known by like. As to how they conceived the relation of things to the numbers, our accounts are contradictory. In addition to the two ancient views, that they regarded the numbers as the things themselves, *i.e.*, their immanent essence ; and secondly, as the archetypes of things, according to which the latter were fashioned ; Röth has in modern times advanced the assertion, that the numbers were only made use of as the symbolic or tropical designation, in such a way that because the Pythagorean (*i.e.*, Egyptian) doctrine regarded matter as a combination of two substances, it was called "the Two," in the same way as we talk of "the Twelve" and mean the Apostles, and of the "evil Seven," and mean the deadly sins. If Philolaus can be regarded as the representative of the strictly scientific Pythagoreans, their doctrine is, that the Numbers *are* the Things, strictly speaking, so that the development of the numbers, really and not only by the substitution of the part for the whole, coincides with the development of things, and the system of numbers with that of the world.

2. That out of which all numbers come, their ground or principle, which is henceforth called their origin (*γενή*) or the father that generates them, is the One (*έν*) or Unity (*μονάς*), which because it contains all numbers within itself, is often called Number as such. From the One as their common origin there emanate the numbers, in virtue of the opposition, so important for the whole system, between the Indefinite (*άπειρον* or *άόριστον*) and the Limiting (*τά περαινόντα*, or, as Plato more significantly calls it, *τό πέρας*). Hence, though it is permissible to call the introduction of the *ένάντια* with a view to the derivation of things an approximation to Anaximander, this great difference, that a logical opposition has here taken the place of physical ones like cold and warmth, etc., must not be overlooked. And indeed, that the Pythagoreans were conscious of going beyond the Milesian physiologers is shown by the fact that the same word which Anaximander had used to designate his principle, describes only a single, and, as will appear presently, a subordinate aspect of theirs. The Limiting is continually described as the higher and more powerful factor, but the Unity stands above both and contains both bound together; hence it is called a harmony, and it comes to the same thing whether the Number or the Harmony is mentioned. This Unity devoid of oppositions is the highest idea of the system, and therefore its god, and it matters little whether the name of god or deity is expressly applied to it at an earlier or only at a later period. The emanation of the numbers out of the One, of things out of God, takes place in virtue of this opposition. But since it is itself conceived in the most different ways, and ten different conceptions of it, in particular, were soon established, we can easily reconcile the reports that according to some the Pythagoreans derived everything from Number, according to others, from the ten contraries. The latter are secondary principles, but not the primitive element, for this the One alone is. The opposition of the Even and the Odd, which is also one of the ten, was probably the one that first struck the Pythagoreans in their speculations about number, and perhaps it was only by retrogressive abstraction that they were induced to assume the germ of this opposition among numbers already in the common root of all. The Odd as corresponding to the Limit is considered the higher principle, and the preference for odd numbers grounded on the power they display of changing the character of any number they are com-

bined with, further on the fact that they alone have a beginning, end, and middle, and finally, on the fact that they are all differences of squares, and hence, when conceived spatially, are enclosing and comprehending gnomons. When the One, which as it is superior to all oppositions is superior also to this, is called the ἀρτιοπέριττον, this word must not be taken in the usual mathematical sense. The fact that the odd numbers are put above the even has been emphasized by Gladisch in his comparison of the Pythagorean with the Chinese doctrine, and the fact, moreover, that among the oppositions, we find those of Light and Darkness, Good and Evil, has induced many in ancient and modern times to suppose that they were borrowed from Zoroastrianism. If among the various expressions of the opposition is found also that of ἐν καὶ πλῆθος, this brings out clearly the preference for the one side, but also involves the possibility of misconceptions as to whether the ἐν refers to the first principle itself, or only to one of its factors. The distinction later authors made between μονάς and ἐν has remained unfruitful, because the one called the μονάς precisely what the other called the ἐν; and that between the first and the second One, which is also found, is certainly clearer. The Plurality which is opposed to the (second) One is sometimes also called δυνάς, and later δυνάς ἀόριστος, in order to distinguish it from the number two. Geometrically this opposition is conceived as that between the Rectangle and the Square, logically as that between the Moving and the Quiescent, physiologically as that between the Female and the Male, and Left and Right, in such a way that the first member of each pair represents the ἀπειρον, the second the περαίνοντα.

3. When the oppositions, quiescent in the absolute One, meet outside it, there arises the system of numbers or things. And since arithmetical conceptions are not yet as strictly distinguished from geometrical ones as was the case in later times, not only the numbers, but also their factors, are thought as spatially extended; and hence the conception of the Indefinite coincides with that of the Void, as being undefined spatiality, which then is easily regarded as that which is like breath, i.e., capable of definition. Opposed to it is the Limiting as the spatially extended substance which fills the void, which is often comprehended under the word Heaven (i.e. the universe). Hence the expression which seems at first surprising, that the heaven by drawing or breathing in the void thereby produces

διαστήματα, and thus plurality. This expression we could reproduce in the abstract modern speech without changing the idea, by saying that opposition enters into the Unity and thereby produces plurality, all plurality, and therefore also that of moments following one another, and hence Time. The more prominent this spatial way of regarding things becomes, the nearer does this metaphysic approach to a physical theory, and thus it may come about, that Aristotle can make it a reproach to the Pythagoreans that their numbers were not μοναδικοί, i.e., not out of space, and that one of the younger Pythagoreans, Ecphantus, conceived them so materially that he came very near to the atomistic doctrine of the Void and the Plenum. If, moreover, numbers are things and at the same time form a system, it is intelligible that the Pythagoreans were the first to think and to call the universe an order (κόσμος). And if the inexplicit number or the One was identical with the Deity, it ceases to be strange that the world is said to be ruled by one akin to it, or that it should be called an unfolding (ἐνέργεια) of God. But Ritter's conclusion from this expression, and the dictum of a Pythagorean, that not the first was the most perfect, but the later, that the world was the evolution of the Deity, seems too bold; all the more so that this dictum perhaps only referred to the relation of larger and smaller numbers. The system is consistent in regarding the world as correlated to the Deity, and therefore as eternal and indestructible.

4. As regards the details of the derivation, there is generated by the first meeting of the *ἐν* and the *πλῆθος*, i.e., by the first multiplying of unity, the number two, *δύας* (different from *δύας ἀόριστος*), which at the same time is the line or the first Dimension, just as the point coincides with unity, from which it is only distinguished by its *θέσις*, i.e. spatiality. The one and the two together produce the *τριάς*, the first complete number, which is at the same time the number of the plane, as being the *διχῇ διαστατόν*. The most perfect number, however, is the number four (*τετρακτὺς*), not only because it is the number of perfect spatiality (*τριχῇ διαστατόν*), but also because the series  $1 : 2 : 3 : 4$  gives the essential harmonic relations, the *ἁρμονία* or *διὰ πασῶν*, *διὰ πέντε* or *δι' ὀξείων*, *διὰ τεσσάρων* or *συλλαβά*. But if the number four is space with all its relations of harmony, the veneration thereof, i.e., of the harmoniously ordered universe, is very intelligible. Moreover, since  $1 + 2 + 3 + 4 =$

10, the *δέκας* is only a further development of the Tetraktys, and, like it, not only a symbol but the most exact expression of the world. The world itself is represented, at least in the later development of the Pythagorean doctrine, as ten divine spheres, of which the outermost is the sphere of fire or of the fixed stars, within which move the seven spheres of the planets (including the sun and the moon), the circle of the earth's orbit, and lastly that of the counter-earth, which conceals from us the direct sight of the Central Fire, the hearth of Zeus, which we see only in the reflected light of the sun and the moon. At an earlier period, when the earth was regarded as the stationary centre of the universe, the idea that the seven moving and therefore vibrating planets formed a heptachord, was quite natural, but it cannot be reconciled with the moving spheres, and hence Philolaus knows nothing about the music of the spheres, which we were said not to notice only because we always heard it. As a heavenly body the Earth, like the whole Cosmos, is subject to the law of Necessity, but on the other hand it is the centre of the sublunary world, the *οὐρανός*, the world of change, in which chance also shows its power. The totally different character of the Pythagorean and Ionian physics is at once evident in their account of the earth's sphere in their doctrine of the elements. The antithesis of Earth and Fire is not derived from the physical antithesis of Cold and Warmth, but from the arithmetical one of the Straight and Curved, and water as containing both is called the first curved and straight substance (in the mathematical sense). Others give geometrical reasons for assigning to each element one of the five regular solids as its primary form (*i.e.*, of its particles) so that the tetrahedron is ascribed to Fire, the cube to Earth, the icosahedron to Water, octahedron to Air, and the dodecahedron to the all-embracing Ether. They also wish to trace the number four in physiological functions, and Eurytus, a pupil of Philolaus, is said to have gone into such detail that he even attempted to refer every thing to the number that expressed its essence.

5. Connected with the Pythagorean physics is their doctrine of the soul, *i.e.*, of the principle of life. They begin by ascribing a soul even to the world, which from the centre of the universe is said to penetrate all things as the harmony that rules them. Hence it, and sometimes even the centre of gravity of the universe, is called One instead of the



principle of union. Whether it is to be conceived of as the substance of the individual souls, or as their archetype, or as the whole out of which they are developed as its parts, it would be possible to decide only if we possessed more of the third book of the work of Philolaus. The conception of the human soul as the harmony of the body, and that moreover it was, like the world itself, the number ten, and hence capable of knowing the world, evidently contains the germs of the later doctrine of the macrocosm and the microcosm, and agrees with the other doctrines of the Pythagoreans; but the assertion that the body is the prison of the soul, and that of metempsychosis connected with it, has a more foreign appearance. Both of these assertions, as well as the doctrine of the dæmons and spirits of the air, seem to be unconnected with the theory of Numbers. All the clearer, however, is its connection with the fragments of their theory of knowledge and their ethics that have come down to us. The psychological foundation of both is the distinction of a rational and an irrational part, in addition to which *θυμός* was probably already assumed in order to mediate between them. And as the different functions of the soul are attributed to different bodily organs, this doctrine has also a physiological basis. It goes without saying that knowledge is ascribed to the rational part of the soul. It is brought about by Number, which is impervious to deception; hence what is not susceptible of definition by mathematics is unknowable, because it lies beneath knowledge. The distinction of the four degrees of knowledge, and their comparison with the first four numbers, is probably a later one: the *νοῦς* is related singly to its object, while knowledge is represented by two, opinion by three, and perception by four. The moral spirit which the whole character and also the doctrine of Pythagoras breathes, has induced some to assert that his philosophy was chiefly ethics. This, however, is erroneous, for only slender efforts are made, not to recommend moral action merely, but also to grasp its nature. That the Pythagoreans proposed a mathematical formula for justice, which is censured by Aristotle, is rather to be praised for its consistency; even that it is designated as ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκεις ἴσος, is intelligible when one considers that they regard it as consisting only in retribution. The report, too, that they defined virtue as the health of the soul, in which the *ἄπειρον* (i.e., the sensuous) was subjected to measure, is not incredible in

spite of its approximation to Platonic and Aristotelian formulas. This becomes still more prominent in their discussing justice with special reference to the life of the State, and in their comparison of the legislative and judicial function with that of hygiene (gymnastic) and medicine, which is in verbal agreement with the Platonic *Gorgias*. With an aristocratic temper, they despised the *πλῆθος*, the masses, and called anarchy the greatest evil. Even their dislike to beans has been regarded, perhaps not wrongly, as a political demonstration against the democratic method of filling magistracies by lot. The fact that all practice was confined to the sphere of the changeable, was probably one of their reasons for placing it so far beneath theory, and considered the latter, and especially the study of the scientific properties of number, the true happiness.

6. Besides Philolaus and his pupils Simmias and Kebes, through whom Pythagoreanism passed into the neighbourhood of Athens and into the possession of the disciples of Socrates, Ocellus the Lucanian, Timæus of Locri, Archytas of Tarentum, Hippasus of Metapontum, Lysis, Eurytus and Ecphantus, a famous mathematician, may be mentioned. The fragments of their supposed writings have all been attacked by modern critics, and those who consider the most recent attacks on the genuineness of the fragments of Philolaus also well founded, will have to content themselves with the conclusion that all the accounts of this school are third- and fourth-hand evidence.

Jamblichus: *Vita Pyth.*: the same: *Theolog. arithm.* Ritter and Preller, § 92-128. Mullach, i. pp. 193-200; ii. pp. 1-128.

### § 33.

The necessity of going beyond also the Pythagorean point of view is proved, as soon as it is shown that it really aims at something quite different from that which it achieves; for thus it would fail to be the full understanding of itself, which philosophy should be. The tendency of the Pythagoreans is evidently to exalt the One above the Many, at the expense of the Many, and to make it the only Absolute. Yet it is continually becoming again the other side diametrically opposed to the Many, but just for this reason co-ordinated with it, its mere correlative, and thereby ceases to be, properly speaking, the first principle. They are driven into this contradiction between what they intend and are able to effect, by the

mathematical form of their doctrine, however necessary that had been. If the difference between a principle and that which is derived from it, is conceived as a numerical one, it is inevitable that since both are numbers, they should be put into the same rank; and, since the higher number contains the lower and therefore contains more than it, it may even come about that the relation of the principle and that which is derived from it, is inverted, at least in appearance. Moreover, the Pythagoreans, when they call the Many also the Other or the Moved, and thus give to its opposite the meaning of the Same and the Persistent, themselves begin to use qualitative instead of quantitative categories. And if, instead of those they used, the more abstract categories underlying them, such as the unchangeable Being and the Changing or Becoming, are applied, the human spirit will not only understand itself better than where it contented itself, as among the Ionians, with an original matter common to all things, but will also succeed in what it failed to accomplish where, as among the Pythagoreans, the manifold things were multiplications of the principle. Hence just as the Pythagoreans represent the transition from physiology to metaphysics, so the Eleatics represent pure metaphysics in its extreme anti-physiological form.

### B.—THE ELEATICS.

Brandis: *Commentationes Eleaticæ*, Altona. 1813. Karsten: *Philosophia græca veteris reliquæ*. Brussels, 1830.

### § 34.

#### XENOPHANES.

Victor Cousin: *Nouveaux fragmens philosophiques*. Paris, 1828, pp. 9-95.

I. XENOPHANES, son of Orthomenes or of Dexinus, was born in the Ionic colony of Colophon. As regards his date, it is impossible to reconcile the direct statements of Timæus and Apollodorus, found in Clement of Alexandria. It is necessary, therefore, to make a supposition which will agree with the established facts, that he mentions Thales and Pythagoras as famous sages, that he is known to Heraclitus, and that he celebrated in song the foundation of Elea (or Velia), where he settled, apparently after long wanderings over many cities of Sicily and Magna Græcia, and lastly, that he lived to the age

of ninety-two, at least. These facts may be reconciled with the ancient tradition that he flourished in Ol. 60, although this also has been disputed, *e.g.*, by Brandis. He composed didactic poems, besides some of an epic character, and sang them as a rhapsodist : they are called *σῖλλοι*, probably because they often displayed a satirical vein. The fragments of these poems, collected first by H. Stephanus, then by Fülleborn, Brandis and Karsten, imply great knowledge on his part.

2. According to Plato, the Eleatics, whose doctrine was perhaps older than Xenophanes, called that which we call the universe, the One. But since all their proofs of unity consist in polemics against Becoming, it is evident that the One is their name for unchanging Being, which also agrees with the assertion of Theophrastus, that they conceived Being as one. This name justifies the inference as to Pythagorean influences, even if the tradition that Xenophanes was instructed by the Pythagorean Telauges, should be false. It is a polemical contradiction of the Pythagorean doctrine, when Xenophanes asserts that the One does not breathe (*cf. supra*, § 32, 3). The above Platonic testimony is completed by that of Aristotle, who says that Xenophanes, contemplating the whole universe, had said this One was God. Since Time contains multiplicity, the alone existent One, or the Deity, is eternal. Together with plurality, the indefiniteness (the *ἄπειρον*) of the One is denied, and Aristotle's censure that it remained a moot point whether Xenophanes conceived his principle as *πεπερασμένον*, is undeserved. The spherical figure which Xenophanes is said to have ascribed to the Deity, is intelligible in one to whom the universe displays the Deity, and a consequence of the denial of every multiplicity of functions, and hence also of organs. "A whole it sees, a whole it hears." Where all plurality is excluded there can be no question of Polytheism, nor, where no Becoming is assumed, of a Theogony : hence his scorn of the popular religion, his hatred of Homer, etc.

3. With regard to the physics of Xenophanes, our accounts are conflicting. The derivation out of four elements is too strongly attested as due to Empedocles to be already assumed here. That everything was derived from the earth, can only be reconciled with the assertions of Aristotle, if the earth is understood not as element but as heavenly body, in which case it might be combined with the other report, that he regarded all things as being generated from earth and water

(the primeval slime). We can hardly, however, believe that Xenophanes already displayed the logical consistency of Parmenides, and regarded all sensible things as illusive appearances; and it is far more probable that, as other authorities say, he himself was in doubt. This would also explain why he was so soon considered a sceptic, in spite of the fact that there is hardly any doctrine as dogmatic as that of the Eleatics.

Ritter and Preller, § 129-140.—Collected fragments, H. Stephanus: *Poët. phil.* pp. 35-38.—Brandis, *l.c.* sect. I.—Karsten, *l.c.* I. 1.—Mullach, I. 99-108.

### § 35.

The One devoid of all Multiplicity, the Being devoid of all Becoming, is, it is true, an abstraction to be grasped only by thought, but there is nevertheless another underlying it, which, together with a more precise determination, composes it, and which is therefore its element. Such is Being (*das Sein*), the purest of thought-determinations, in which the Existent (*Seiende*) itself describes itself as participating. Hence if philosophy proceeds to the ultimate or absolute ground (§ 2), it cannot be satisfied with that which is based upon, or participates in, something else, but must proceed to this ulterior principle. Hence it is something more than an unimportant change in the terminology, when the successor of Xenophanes omits altogether the Pythagorean determination by number, and substitutes for the Absolute described by a participle (*ὄν*), one which he thinks he cannot better describe than with the infinitive, Being (*εἶναι*). Parmenides brings to perfection the abstract metaphysics which are opposed to physiology, and the supporters of which Aristotle rightly calls *ἀφύσικοι* (deniers of nature).

### § 36.

#### PARMENIDES.

I. PARMENIDES, the son of Pyrrhes of Elea, is called by some a disciple of Xenophanes, by others of the Pythagoreans, being perhaps attracted by their mode of life rather than by their doctrine. According to Plato he must have been born in Ol. 64, or 65. The respect in which he was universally held because of his moral worth and civic virtue, was extended by Plato and even by Aristotle, who does not betray any preference for the Eleatic doctrines, also to his scientific impor-

tance. His metrical work, entitled *περί φύσεως*, begins with an allegory, which Sextus Empiricus, through whom it has come down to us, on the whole interprets rightly. It was divided, like the doctrine of Parmenides, into two parts, of which the first treated of truth and knowledge, the second of appearance and opinion.

2. Truth is attained, not by the presentations of sense, but by purely rational cognition. The principal doctrine here implied is that Being alone has truth, and Non-Being none, and for this reason also the existence of the Void is denied. The reason given, that otherwise knowledge would be impossible, displays the confidence of Reason in itself, as yet unshaken by scepticism. Being is one and excludes all plurality and multiplicity, whether they consist in temporal or in spatial differences, and also all Becoming, because this contains an element of Non-Being. Free from all determination from without, it reposes on its own internal necessity, and for both these reasons is thought to have the form of a sphere. It is not unlimited, else it were defective, but yet not limited by anything outside it. There is not even opposed to it a thinking Reason to which it would stand in the relation of object; for that which thinks and that which is thought are one, Being is Reason, and thought has Being for its attribute. There is no room for any other deity by the side of this the only true Being, and hence Parmenides leaves the existence of the popular gods an open question transcending the province of reason. When, therefore, upon occasion he calls Eros the father of the gods, he probably means thereby the necessity which is the bond of the universe, which he has often called the Dæmon, and apparently also Aphrodite.

3. A position like this does not admit of any derivation of the manifold. The evidence of the senses alone compels its recognition. But since the senses do not perceive Being and are deceptive, multiplicity also is a mere appearance and physics is the doctrine of opinions. Why man is subjected to these opinions, is a point Parmenides cannot understand, but only deplore. Nevertheless, although Non-Being is only appearance, the world is not so denuded of truth that it would be hopeless to seek to penetrate into it by means of knowledge. The two principles from which he derives all multiplicity, and which he calls sometimes Flame and Night, sometimes Warmth and Cold, sometimes Fire and Earth,

repeat the fundamental opposition of Being and Non-Being, and hence the one is called the self-identical, the other the apparent, the unknowable, etc. These two contraries are mingled and combined by the power which also impels the male towards the female, the love of the universe mentioned above, or the friendship that rules all things. Like every individual thing, man also is a mixture of these elements : generated out of the primeval slime, he is the more perfect the warmer he is, and just as his igneous nature enables him to recognise Being, so his earthy structure subjects him to Opinion, *i.e.*, he perceives Non-Being. And because neither of these elements occurs without the other, it is possible to say that the higher and the lower knowledge are the same (*i.e.*, probably, differ only in "degree"). Parmenides' conceptions of the system of the heavens have either been wrongly handed down to us, or are unintelligible, owing to the strangeness of his phraseology. Yet they did not prevent him from having considerable astronomical learning for his time.

Ritter and Preller, *l.c.* § 143-153. Fragments collected by H. Stephanus in *Poës. philos.* § 41-46. Brandis, *l.c.* comment. II. Karsten, *l.c.* P. II. Mullach, i. 109-130.

### § 37.

Just as Anaximenes represents the highest perfection of the physiological, so Parmenides represents that of the metaphysical tendency. As in the former case, it is no more possible to make further progress in the doctrine itself, but it can be defended against opponents. Such defence, which in the original philosophy could be directed only against more advanced thinkers, and hence had to be reactionary (*cf.* § 27), may indeed be this also in this case ; but it may also be directed against the obsolete and lower position of the Physiologists. This latter task Melissus takes upon himself. It is less difficult and requires less strength to accomplish it, just like swimming with the stream. Moreover, since every conflict with another point of view makes it necessary to enter upon that of one's opponent and thus to approximate to it, the reactionary contest with the higher position will lead beyond one's own, at least in matters of form, while that with the lower will cause a decline below one's own. Hence it is inevitable that Melissus should be—what Aristotle censures in him—a less subtle thinker than the other Eleatics, and that he should have

conceived in too sensuous a manner things having the nature of thought, *i.e.* have regarded their metaphysical determinations too physically.

### § 38.

#### MELISSUS.

(Pseudo-) Aristotle: *De Xenophane (i.e. Melisso) Zenone et Gorgia.* Ch. 1 and 2.

1. MELISSUS, the son of Ithagenes, a Samian, and distinguished as a general, is called the disciple of Parmenides, to whose doctrine he had perhaps been converted by writings alone. He flourished about Ol. 84, and wrote a book in prose, in the Ionian dialect, called according to some authorities *περὶ φύσεως*, according to others *περὶ ὄντος*, of which some fragments have been preserved. He seeks to refute the doctrine of his kinsmen the Physiologers, in the interest of the Eleatics. The negative result of some of his arguments, though consonant with this object, has brought upon him the undeserved reproach of scepticism. On the other hand, the way in which he entered upon the point of view of his opponents has, not always undeservedly, subjected him to the accusation that he sullied the purity of the Eleatic abstractions, and understood Parmenides somewhat crudely.

2. Melissus, like Parmenides, puts aside the religious conceptions as lying outside the possibility of knowledge. His subject is the *εὖν*, which he puts in place of the Parmenidean *εἶναι*, and thereby again approximates to Xenophanes. What he meant, if he really distinguished simple Being from Being, is obscure. After showing why Being could neither originate nor pass away, he at once concludes from this infinity in time, that of space, and thus, to Aristotle's disgust, gives up the definiteness attributed to the Absolute by Xenophanes and Parmenides. Unity, indivisibility, immateriality, and the impossibility of all movement, are the further predicates of Being. His polemics against condensation and rarefaction, mixture and separation, are combined with the assertion that the Void, and therefore movement into it, are impossible. Thus there is hardly one of the Physiologers who is not referred to.

3. With an inconsistency similar to that of Parmenides, Melissus asserts, indeed, that multiplicity is only a product of the illusion of the senses, which everywhere illude us with



a show of transition, where there is in reality, only immovable Being, but yet sets up a scientific knowledge of this illusion in the form of physics. That he assumed Fire and Earth as the original substances is probable in view of his relation to Parmenides. The transition from Parmenides to Empedocles is so easy that it is hardly contradicted by the other tradition, that Melissus altogether followed the latter.

His fragments, Brandis, *l. c.* Sect. iii. Karsten, *l. c.* Ritter & Preller, § 160-167. Mullach, i. 261-265.

### § 39.

By the side of Melissus, as the champion of Eleaticism as opposed to the doctrines beneath it, stands Zeno, who protects it as a reactionary combating innovations. His task is a desperate one, and therefore requires great force. Hence the great subjective importance of the man. It is not a question here of discovering profound novelties, but of exercising all imaginable acuteness in order to secure what has been found. Hence the perfection of the formal side of his philosophizing, which makes Zeno into the Diogenes of Apollonia of his school. And since the position against which Zeno defends his master combines his fundamental idea with its contrary, it is intelligible that Zeno's defence aims at proving contradictions in the doctrines of his opponents. Hence he is the inventor of dialectic as the art of discovering contradictions; but although his dialectic only leads to negative results, and was afterwards made use of in the interest of the Sceptics, it nevertheless here stands wholly in the service of the thoroughly dogmatic Eleaticism.

### § 40.

#### ZENO.

(Pseudo-) Aristotle: *De Melisso Zenone et Gorgia*, Ch. 3 and 4.

1. ZENO of Elea, son of Teleutagoras, according to some the adopted son of Parmenides, his senior by twenty-five years, was alike distinguished for his political insight and for his heroism and character. Amongst other prose works, he composed when still young a defence of Parmenides, which has become especially famous. The form of this, which if it was not a dialogue at least came very near it, and the frequent employment of the dilemma, to say nothing of its contents,

was one of the reasons why Zeno was called the inventor of dialectic. This dialectic is negative, because his only object was to bring home to the opponents of the Eleatic doctrine, the reproach of self-contradiction they had made against it.

2. While Parmenides had only attributed truth to the Unity excluding all Plurality, the Being negating all Becoming, the Persistent devoid of all Motion, Zeno's aim is rather to show that all who assume Plurality, Becoming and Motion involve themselves in contradictions. The proof consists in showing that on the supposition of the reality of plurality one and the same thing would be definite and yet indefinite, and rests upon the fact that all plurality is a definite thing, *i.e.* number, and yet contains an infinity *i.e.* of fractions. His argument is based on infinite divisibility, only he regards the *διχοτομία* as one in space, by at once substituting for the idea of being distinct, that of being *separated* (by something). The Many, too, would be infinitely great as containing an infinite number of things, and at the same time infinitely small, as consisting of nothing but infinitely minute particles. And Becoming is combated by him in just the same way as plurality. Whether it is supposed to start with what is like or what is unlike that which becomes, it contains a contradiction. Lastly, the possibility of Motion is disputed. Of the four proofs of this which Aristotle mentions as due to Zeno, the first two again rest upon the infinity produced by the infinite divisibility, in the one case of the space to be passed through, and in the other of the start which Hector (or the tortoise) has as regards Achilles (or the hound). The third proof first takes for granted that the flying arrow at every moment is at a point (*i.e.* at rest), and then draws from this the inevitable conclusions. Lastly, the fourth seems to regard motion as being merely a change of distance, and to conclude from the fact that a moving object approaches an observer who is at rest more slowly than one who goes to meet it, that in the first place the results may be different in spite of the equality of the velocities and the times, and secondly all sorts of other absurdities. In view of the important bearing which space has upon the question of motion, and according to Zeno also upon that of plurality, it is natural that he should seek a contradiction in this conception also. This is said to lie in the fact that space cannot be thought except as in space, and thus pre-supposes itself.

3. To Zeno, as to the other Eleatics, the deliverances of the senses are deceptive. Perhaps in order to prove this he invented the confutation ( $\psi\acute{o}\phi\alpha\varsigma$ ) which shows that the senses will not admit the validity of things which have been rationally admitted. If this and others like it were later applied by sophists and sceptics, it is nevertheless no proof that Zeno belonged to the latter, and the report that he denied the existence of the One, is also probably due to a misunderstanding—perhaps of a passage which has been preserved in which, speaking once more of infinite divisibility, he seems to indicate the impossibility of ultimate particles (atoms). With an inconsistency like that of his predecessors, he also supplies a system of physics. Our accounts say he took the four contraries of Anaximander for his elements, friendship and strife for his formative principles, and necessity for his regulating law, and conceived the soul as a mixture of these four elements. The premises of all these positions were already given, but their approximation to the doctrine of Empedocles is so close, that the report that in later life Zeno wrote comments on the didactic poem of Empedocles, becomes explicable. But if he even then still taught the possibility of the transition of one element into another, the difference between him and Empedocles would be one of principle. Probably, however, he remained nearer to the position of Anaximander on this point also. One is also reminded of Anaximander by his doctrine of a (probably successive) plurality of worlds. It seems as if this doctrine was directed polemically against Heraclitus and the Atomists.

Ritter and Preller, § 154–159.—Mullach, i. 266–270.

### § 41.

The antithesis of matter and category,  $\nu\lambda\eta$  and  $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\alpha\varsigma$ , as Aristotle calls it, has been reduced by the Pythagoreans to that of the Many and the One, and, finally, by the Eleatics, to that of Non-Being and Being, to formulas which even Plato makes use of as being quite adequate. In attempting, however, to carry out a tendency to which the Pythagoreans had only inclined, viz., to lay stress on Being to the exclusion of Non-Being, the Eleatics become pure and anti-physical metaphysicians, and form, as Plato and Aristotle rightly remark, the opposite extreme to the Physiologers. But just this

extreme position which they have taken up, continually compels them against their will to set up again what they had tried to deny just before. And this is natural; for if Being is to be thought, to the exclusion of all Non-Being, and the One in opposition to all plurality, the thought of the second reappears by the side of the first, just as along with the thought of the concavity of a surface, there appears that of the convexity of the other side. The Eleatics, as Aristotle rightly says, have been *compelled* to set up, by the side of their science of Being, a theory of that which they nevertheless declared illusive appearance. And if progress, as was remarked above (§ 25), consist in doing wittingly and deliberately what was done unconsciously and under compulsion from an earlier point of view, progress will require a philosophy which combines Being and Non-Being, the One and the Many, and hence also metaphysics and physics. Hence the *Metaphysical Physiologists*, or physiological metaphysicians, occupy a higher position, as compared with the groups considered hitherto. And in the case of at least two of them, the "Ionian and Sicilian Muses," this position has been fixed by Plato with an accuracy that admits of no improvement. If, on the other hand, Aristotle reckons them among the physiologists, he overlooks the fact that his own definition of the conception no longer fits them, since they do not derive everything from the material *alone*.

### THIRD DIVISION.

#### The Metaphysical Physiologists.

##### § 42.

The first step taken in this direction is to show that that which Parmenides has denied, but has always been compelled to re-affirm, viz., Non-Being, is the predicate of everything just as much as Being. If this is the case, their combination, Becoming, is really the only true category, in spite of the contradiction it contains. This purely metaphysical advance is followed by the second one, that this category is also at the same time regarded physically. In order to appear physically Becoming cannot require a natural substance, but only a

natural process. Heraclitus, who makes this twofold advance beyond the Eleatics, recognises Becoming in the process of volatilization and especially in that of combustion. Since, moreover, there is as yet no question of a distinction of the material and the spiritual, of the physical and the ethical, the different degrees of the fire are at the same time the different stages of life and of knowledge. All that withdraws or excludes itself from the influence of the universal fire, separates itself from the life and the reason of the universe, and falls a prey to death, idiocy and egotism.

#### A.—HERACLITUS.

Schleiermacher: *Herakleitos der Dunkle*, in Wolf and Buttmann's *Museum der Alterthumswissensch.* vol. i., 1808. Afterwards in Schl: *Sammtliche Werke*, ii. 2, pp. 1-146. Bernays: *Heracritea*. Bonn, 1848. The Same: *Heraklitische Studien* and *Neue Bruchstücke des Heraklit*, in the *Rhein. Mus.* Ferd. Lassalle: *Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunklen von Ephesos*. Berlin, 1858, 2 vols. P. Schuster: *Heraklit von Ephesus* (*Act. Soc. philol.* Lips. ed. Ritschelii. Tom iii.). [E. Pfeiderer: *Die Philosophie des Herakleitos von Ephesus im Lichte der Mysterienidee*. Berlin, 1886. I. Bywater: *Heracleti reliquias recens.* Oxon. 1877,—Tr.]

#### § 43.

1. HERACLITUS, the son of Blyson, born according to most authorities at Ephesus, is said to have flourished about Ol. 69, and to have lived more than sixty years. The descendant of a noble family in which the honorary office of βασιλεύς, which he resigned to his brother, was hereditary, he retained to the end his contempt for the masses. The polemical way in which he mentions Thales, Xenophanes and Pythagoras, and insists that he taught himself, shows that his predecessors benefited him chiefly by provoking him to contradict them. The way in which he adhered to his own convictions has become proverbial. His book *περὶ φύσεως*, called the "muses" by the later ancients because of an expression of Plato's, contained perhaps still more ethical and political advice than we can gather from the fragments that have been preserved. Perhaps the later ones among the many interpreters of his work, separated these teachings from the rest, and thus brought about the existence of several divisions of it, and finally the legend that he wrote more than one. The gloomy conciseness of his character is reflected in his writings, which even Socrates called hard of comprehension, and which at an early period earned him the

sobriquet of "the dark." Perhaps, in addition to their profundity and their adoption of foreign doctrines, reasons of style also contributed to this.

2. In opposition to the Eleatics, who attributed truth only to Being and denied Non-Being, Heraclitus maintains that everything, and even one and the same thing, both is and is not. Thus he substitutes for the Eleatic Being its combination with Non-Being, *i.e.* Becoming; and the idea that everything is in process and nothing at rest, and the idea that everything is undergoing continual change, objects as well as the subject that contemplates them, for of this also the Being is explicitly denied, is expressed by him in the most various ways. While to Xenophanes Being and the One void of difference were identical, and Parmenides exalted Eros or Friendship above all, Heraclitus finds pleasure in conceiving everything as contradicting itself; he extols conflict, and blames Homer for his love of peace, since rest and stationariness (*στάσις*) exist only among the dead. Connected with this continual flux of things is the uncertainty of the senses. For the flux escapes their notice, though it is perceived by rational cognition; and it is because what we see is stark and dead, that the eyes and ears are untrustworthy witnesses. (Compare by way of contrast the doctrine of Melissus, § 38, 3.) Perhaps the preference which he displays for the sense of smell is based upon the fact that it perceives volatilization, and thus is most of all dependent upon the change of form. Schuster acutely shows that the passages which seem to imply Heraclitus' contempt for the senses may also be differently utilized, especially so as to make him appear as the champion of the inductive method, in opposition to one-sided deduction.

3. However this may be, a doctrine like that of the universal flux, separates Heraclitus from the Ionian Hylicists; and since this principle is the result of thought, it makes him a metaphysician, like the Eleatics considered above. On the other hand, he is opposed to them, through the fact that his principle is contemplated also physically. Now Becoming, interpreted physically, is noticeable, first, in Time,—and accordingly he is actually said by Sextus Empiricus to have made time his first principle, whereas both Xenophanes and Parmenides denied this,—secondly, and more concretely, in the elementary process of combustion. Heraclitus did not seek the ground of the universe in any creative deity, but considered

it eternally burning fire. It would, however, be a misunderstanding to regard this fire as a substance, the condensation and rarefaction of which explained the manifold. Rather Heraclitus sees different degrees of the process of combustion or volatilization in the different forces of nature, which as *πυρὸς τροπαί* stand in such relations with one another that each lives in the death of the other, and the process of combustion is the measure of true being in all, as gold is the measure of the value of all things. This, the sum and substance of reality, is also conceived as the spatial envelope of the universe, and is called the *περιέχον*, the *περιοδικὸν πῦρ*, etc. And just as Becoming corresponds to the process of the fire, so its two forms, coming into being and passing out of it, correspond to the rise and fall of the fire, the famous *ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω*, in which the direction in space is not more essential than the increasing or waning. In this, the stiffening and cooling are the descent.

4. The inseparable connection between the forms of Becoming has been illustrated by Heraclitus in the most various ways. Sometimes he calls the two paths one and the same; sometimes he speaks of an alternation of desire and satiety, and of a play in which the world is produced; sometimes he says that necessity regulates the two contrary currents. (It is characteristic of Heraclitus' attitude towards the pure physiologists and metaphysicians, that where Anaximander and Pythagoras had alike spoken of *ἐνάντια*, contrary *propositions*, we find in his case *ἐναντία ῥοή*, contrary *current*.) The names given to this power are *Εἰμαρμένη*, *Δαίμων*, *Γνώμη*, *Δίκη*, *Λόγος*, etc. The fact that the handmaids of this force, which he calls the seed of all that happens and the measure of all order, are entitled the "tongues," has probably been rightly ascribed to the influence of the Persian Magi. On the other hand, he connects himself with his country's mythology, not indeed without a change of exegesis, when he places Apollo and Dionysus beside Zeus, *i.e.* the ultimate Fire, as the two aspects of his nature. In this twofold tendency or scale, the rigid earth forms the lower, and the mobile fire the upper extreme, since the latter as an element (*Hephæstus*) is distinguished from the ultimate fire or Zeus. This last is the permanent factor in the circulation of the elements, and therefore never appears as such. Fire, as the extreme contrary of rigid corporeality, is conceived as the moving and animating principle. Midway between it and the earth is situated the sea, consisting half of

earth and half of fiery air, and hence precipitating the former and exhaling the latter, and often called the seed of the world. Hence the transition to rigid corporeality is called a quenching or moistening, while the increase of the fiery nature is also an increase of life. Hence, even if the expression *ἐκπύρωσις*, found in the writings of the Stoics, were due to Heraclitus, it would be wrong to understand by it a destruction of the world, rather than the eternal circular motion of all things, the expiration of which may have been the "great year" of Heraclitus, the one turning-point, to which would be opposed as its diametrical opposite the transition into earthy slime.

5. Heraclitus found his views confirmed by the phenomena of the air, amongst which he includes the constellations. They are in his opinion collections of shining vapours in the boat-shaped hollows of the heavens, or, conglomerations of fire, but in any case generated and nourished by the evaporations of the earth and the sea. Especially is this the case with the sun, which radiates forth and loses its light daily, and daily renews itself by this nourishment. And since the evaporation is of two kinds, one dark and damp, another dry and bright, it serves to explain day and night, eclipses and meteoric appearances of light, although at the same time stress is laid on their strict subjection to laws. The two contrary tendencies conflict still more in organic beings, than in the forces of nature which compose them. Perhaps because it is more difficult to recognise it in them, Heraclitus says that the hidden harmony is better than the visible. Isolated utterances indicate that he assumed a gradation of beings. Thus, because nothing in the world is entirely devoid of the principle of life, he regards all things as full of gods and dæmons, and says a god is only an immortal man, and man a mortal god. But man also is a worthless being on the purely bodily side, and is hence called the naturally reasonless. Life and soul, and, since the latter is still regarded as identical with consciousness and cognition, these also, man acquires only by participation in the all-animating fire, and in its purest appearance, the enveloping. It is this which is alone rational, and the soul partakes of it the more fully, the warmer and drier it is, and hence more easily in warm and dry countries. As consistency requires, the soul's entrance into the body is to man a moistening, and hence an extinguishing and dying. The death of the body, on the other hand, is the true return to life of the soul.



6. As the enveloping fire is the truly rational existence, reason is that which is common to all (*κοινόν*), and the individual partakes of it only when he allows himself to be penetrated by it through all the channels, especially of the senses, and is permeated by its glow, like a coal which remains close to the fire. Thus sleep is the half-way house to death, because in it the gates of the senses are closed, and man has part in the enveloping reason only by breathing, and lives in other respects in an isolated world of his own. And no less does he shut himself off by his merely subjective opinion, which Heraclitus calls a disease from which no one is quite free, since every one pursues the childish play of opinion, and cherishes the illusion that the reason within him is his own. Laying the stress he did on the common element, as against isolating subjective contemplation, it is intelligible that he should regard language as the proper means of cognition, and should be the first to subject it to philosophical examination. His ethical doctrines also quite agree with the rest: the transition to fieriness becomes identical with the good, that to rigidity and death with evil. And just as those two processes belong together, so good and evil form a harmony, even as in the form of the bow or the lyre contrary tensions are harmoniously united. (The fact that in another passage the arrow is mentioned instead of the bow, leads Lassalle to the supposition that here also we have an allusion to the double activity of Apollo.) Hence in ethics also, conflict and not rest is the ideal. The position held by opinion in theoretical matters, is here taken by insolent self-will. Nevertheless it must be suppressed, hard as that may be, for the law stands highest, just as above the *κοινὸς λόγος* did. The citizen should fight more strenuously for the laws than for the walls of his city. Hence what Heraclitus demands of man is submission to necessity, as the result of the recognition of the fact that the alternating predominance of good and evil is far better than what is desired by the selfish wishes of man. And because this submission rests upon such insight into the nature of things, it is free, and its requirement does not conflict with his polemical attacks upon astrology and other fatalistic notions.

Fragments collected by H. Stephanus, *l.c.* pp. 129-155. Schleiermacher, *l.c.* Bernays, *l.c.* Lassalle, *l.c.* Ritter and Preller, *l.c.* § 35-50. Mullach, *l.c.* 315-329.

## § 44.

Heraclitus' polemics against the Eleatics lower the superiority of his point of view and render it one-sided in its turn, though in a contrary way. This is still more markedly the case with his disciples. When Cratylus outdid his master, and declared it impossible to enter the same river not only twice but even once, he thereby made Heraclitus a denier of all Being. Thus it could come about that the sceptics, who only assume Non-Being, counted him among their number, and that Aristotle classed him, the opponent of the anti-physical doctrines, among the mere physiologists. In this an injustice is indeed done to Heraclitus, but there was some ground for it. Hence the problem of philosophy is to retain the Eleatic Being by the side of the Becoming exalted by Heraclitus, without, in so doing, relapsing into abstract metaphysics. Hence it is necessary to assume, in agreement with the Eleatics but in opposition to Heraclitus, an unchangeable Being. But it must be conceived, in opposition to the Eleatics, as a physical substance, and, in the spirit of Heraclitus, as a plurality, *i.e.* a plurality of unchangeable substances or elements. Further, it will be necessary to assume, in agreement with Heraclitus, and in opposition to the assertions of the Eleatics, a real process. But this process will not be, like that of Heraclitus, a burning without a substratum, but one which the substrata undergo. It will differ from that of the pure physiologists, in that it will consciously rest upon metaphysical principles. Empedocles is the man who was enabled by his nationality and the course of his development to make this advance, and to combine in his doctrine, not eclectically, but in an organic whole, what previous philosophers had taught. Thus there is not a single school among which he has not been counted with an appearance of justification. For he recognises the chaotic primeval mixture of Anaximander, the spherical form of Xenophanes, the water of Thales, the air of Anaximenes, the earth and the fire of Parmenides and Heraclitus, the love of the Eleatics, the strife of Heraclitus, the condensation and rarefaction of Thales and Anaximenes, the mixture and separation of Anaximander, and finally even the domination of numerical relations in the mixtures, like the Pythagoreans.

## B.—EMPEDOCLES.

F. W. Sturz: *Empedocles Agrigentinus*. Lips. 1805. Karsten, *l.c.* Vol. ii. Amst. 1838. Lommatsch: *Die Weisheit des Empedokles*. Berl. 1830. Panzerbieter: *Beiträge zur Kritik und Erklärung des Empedokles*. Meiningen, 1854. Steinhart: *Empedokles*, in Ersch and Gruber's *Encyclopædia*.

## § 45.

1. EMPEDOCLES, the son of Meton, born at Akragas (Agrigentum) in Sicily as the descendant of a noble family, lived probably from Ol. 72—Ol. 87. Famous for his patriotism, eloquence and medical skill, he was indebted to the last, together with many peculiarities in his mode of life, for his reputation as a magician. His death was adorned with fabulous details at an early period, in the interest of different views. There is considerable authority for his familiarity with Pythagorean doctrines; and even if chronology does not admit of his being a disciple of Pythagoras personally, he has been called a Pythagorean even by modern writers. Others, in reliance on the reports which make him a disciple of Parmenides, call him an Eleatic. Finally, the majority follow the example of Aristotle (who had really no right to do so, according to his own statements; *vid. sub.* 2.), and account him one of the physiologers. But it is Plato's mention of him together with Heraclitus, which is justified also by the influence of the Ephesian upon him, that assigns to him his proper position. Of the writings of Empedocles, the titles of which are stated variously, there have been preserved fragments of two, the *περί φύσεως* and the *καθαρμοί*. Some modern writers regard the latter, and also the *ιατρικά*, as subdivisions of the former.

2. Empedocles agrees with the Eleatics in retaining unchangeable Being, in opposition to the coming into existence, which he declares impossible. But by admitting the factor of plurality and materiality, which the Eleatics had denied, his Being becomes a plurality of unchangeable elements, of which he was the first to assert that they were four in number, while he denied that they passed into one another. In this doctrine, one is reminded of the Pythagoreans by the occurrence of the number four, and of Heraclitus by his calling them *dæmons* and giving them the names of the popular deities, and by the preference for Zeus or Fire. In addition to these unchangeable substrata (*ρίζώματα, ὑλικάι ἀρχαί*), he regarded as principles

two forces or formative principles, Friendship and Strife, the attraction and repulsion of different substances, conceived as yet only physically. This avoids the rigid Rest of the Eleatics, and substitutes for the Heraclitean process without a substratum, a process of the substrata, *i.e.* change with its two Anaximandrian forms of mixture and separation. These two active principles are inseparably united, and their combination is called sometimes necessity, sometimes chance. But to infer from isolated expressions of Empedocles that he considered friendship identical with fire, strife with the remaining elements, would disturb the clearness of his doctrine. This would reduce him to a mere physiologist, and it is more correct to recognise with Aristotle, that he regarded these active principles as efficient causes by the side of the material substrata.

3. The primitive condition of matter is described as a *μῆγμα*, which is often designated the One, in Pythagorean fashion, or, Eleatically, Being, and also the universe or the eternal world, but generally the *σφαῖρος* in virtue of its figure. Naturally it does not admit of any definite quality, and hence as being *ἄπειρον*, corresponds to the indefinite Chaos of Anaximander. And as such a state of intermixture, which is so intimate as to admit of no void, suggests the idea of very small particles, Empedocles has been by some identified with the Atomists, and has had attributed to him by others the views of Anaxagoras, and even the very expressions which are generally ascribed to the latter. But Empedocles cannot assume any existence beside the *σφαῖρος* or the whole, and all conceptions of a transcendent deity are either falsely ascribed to his doctrine, or inconsistencies in it. Just as little may we conclude, as many ancient and modern authorities have done, from the fact that not the separate senses (which are set apart for the perception of the separate elements), but the *νοῦς* perceives the *σφαῖρος*, that Empedocles taught the existence of a *κόσμος νοητός* in the sense of Plato. In the original state of mixture Friendship is of course alone active, or at least Strife is reduced to a minimum. This so easily suggests the confusion of the unity with the cause of union, that we must not be surprised to find the One and Love used as synonymous. In virtue of the action of Strife upon this mixture, the heterogeneous substances are separated; and it has been unreasonably called an inconsistency, that he makes Hatred a cause of union, *i.e.*

of the homogeneous. At this point similar particles unite, and there ensues the separation of the elements. As to the order of this separation our authorities differ. And since it is a separation of the heterogeneous, the heavens have become void of Love and the elements of the world are ruled by Hatred. But it is only part of the whole that enters into this severance, and only in it, the *κόσμος*, does Strife bear sway, but not in the rest of the universe. The unseparated chaotic part of the *σφαῖρος* is only rarely considered dead matter in the spirit of Heraclitus ; generally Empedocles, like the Eleatics, regards it as the higher existence, and therefore regards all things as ultimately reverting into this negation of all particularity.

4. Of course it is only the simple elements that owe their existence to Strife ; other substances and especially organic beings are very composite and the result of Love, which keeps together the individual limbs that originally grew separately out of the ground, and the increasing power of which is displayed in the succession of beings of increasing complexity. The perfection of organisms is conditioned not only by the number of its components, but also by the proportions of the mixture, which are even expressed, in Pythagorean fashion, by figures. But even man, most perfect of all, and therefore of most recent origin, is not eternal as a separate being ; and metempsychosis here takes the place of immortality. The fact that he is himself composed of them, enables man to perceive all the six principles. The fire within him perceives the fire without him, etc. In his consideration of sense-perception, Empedocles seems to have gone into great detail, and to have explained many things by the assumption of pores. The mixture of the elements is nowhere more thorough than in the blood. Hence he regards it as the seat of the *νόημα*, i.e. of the sum of all perceptions. Cognition by the senses is deceptive because it depends on a *single* object, and *one* element, and can only grasp the elements in their separation, and not the *σφαῖρος*. This is not the case with the *νόημα*, which, itself the combination of all perceptions, has cognition also of that which is united by Love. Just as in these passages the principles of life and of cognition are still quite identical, so also the conceptions of physical and moral evil. These exist only in the *κόσμος*, subjected to segregation ; beyond it, in the unseparated *σφαῖρος*, all things are good. The ascetic rules which Empedocles gives are based upon

reverence for all the manifestations of Love. The religious doctrines, contained chiefly in the *καθαρμοί*, refer especially to the future life, alike of the blessed in the seat of the gods, and of those who are guilt-laden and hunted through the world in restless flight. They breathe a priestly spirit, and show many points of contact with Pythagorean doctrines; but they do not always agree with those of Empedocles himself. The same applies to his treatment of the popular deities, where he does not, as above, mean the elements. Zeller has given a full account and a just estimate of these doctrines. (Vol. i., p. 547 f., 2nd ed.)

His collected fragments in H. Stephanus, *l.c.* pp. 17-31. Sturz, *l.c.* with supplements by Peyron (1810), and Bergk (1835-39). Karsten, *l.c.* Ritter and Preller, § 168-181. Mullach, i. pp. 1-14.

### § 46.

The reproach which could be brought against Heraclitus with a show of reason, against his successors with an abundance of reason—that they really affirmed Non-Being only, will be brought against Empedocles by no one. Rather the contrary reproach: for he expressly denies the void, which is Non-Being regarded physically. Not only does this in a way justify his being counted altogether among the Eleatics, but it also involves him in contradictions, which, perhaps, induced Plato to place him so far below Heraclitus. That all multiplicity is generated only by *διαστήματα*, *i.e.* interpositions of the void, had been shown by the Pythagoreans; that motion is only possible by reason of the void, was known already to the Eleatics. But since it is through these that the world comes into existence, Empedocles affirms its reality, while denying its conditions. It is a similar contradiction when the segregated part of the universe receives the honourable title of *κόσμος*, and then the unseparated portion of the *σφαῖρος* is preferred, *i.e.* chaotic disorder to order, to say nothing of the subordinate contradiction involved, when one who denies the void explains so many things by the assumption of pores, etc. Hence the advance required by such contradictions will consist in this, that in opposition to the Eleatics and Heraclitus, the metaphysical principle be maintained, that Being and Non-Being be alike justified; that the time of mere metaphysics being past, this principle be carried out in a system of physics, in

which Non-Being is opposed to the many unchangeable substrata which represent Being ; and that the two entering into each other produce Becoming, viewed physically, *i.e.*, motion and change. This advance is made by the *Atomism* of the Abderite philosophy. Hence, even if its champions had not been acquainted with their predecessors in philosophy, as may be proved to have been the case with its chief representative, we should have to say that their point of view surpassed all previous ones, because it combined them.

### C.—THE ATOMISTS.

F. Papencordt : *De Atomicorum doctrina*. Berl., 1832. F. G. A. Mullach : *Democriti Abderitæ Operum fragmenta*. Berl., 1843.

#### § 47.

1. As hardly anything is known of LEUCIPPUS, and the accounts of his date vary, while none of his writings have come down to us, and since, moreover, it is perhaps nothing more than a misunderstanding that Theophrastus is said to have ascribed to him one of the writings of Democritus, we must regard as the true representative of Atomism his countryman and disciple, or younger companion, DEMOCRITUS, the son of Hegesistratus, especially as he would probably have included in his work the whole teaching of his predecessor. Democritus, born about Ol. 80, spent his large fortune in travels undertaken with the object of accumulating treasures of knowledge in all lands then known, laden with which he returned to his native city, and died at a very great age. Of his numerous writings, which Thrasyllus arranged in tetralogies, many are, perhaps, subdivisions of larger works. The most important, probably, were the μέγας and the μικρὸς διάκοσμος, which, together, contained his doctrine of atoms and of the construction of the world. Probably many of the fragments preserved belonged to them. In spite of occasional solecisms, the style of Democritus was famous in antiquity.

2. The agreement of the atomist doctrine with that of the Eleatics, which ancient authorities explain by historical connections, is seen in the fact that both deny the reality of Becoming, both of the Many out of One, or of the One into Many ; also in their conception of extended matter, as τὸ ὄν, and the unchangeable reality attributed to it ; and, finally,

in their designation of the void as the *μὴ ὄν*. Similarly the Atomists agree with Heraclitus, the opponent of the Eleatics, probably once more not without historical connections, and his rightness or wrongness is, like theirs, acknowledged in the sentence which contains the substance of atomist metaphysics, viz., that Being is no more than Non-Being. But it is a further step that these thought-determinations are at the same time conceived physically; Being is the full (*πλήρες*), extended (*στερεόν*), corporeal (*σῶμα*), Non-Being the void (*κενόν*), or according to others also the rarefied (*μανόν*). Their curious formula for this antithesis, *δέν* and *μηδέν*, may be represented by "a-thing," and "nothing." The idea that the void, by entering into the existent, produces plurality in the latter, is familiar already to the Pythagoreans. Hence the existent consists of an infinite number of very small and therefore invisible *σχήματα* or *ιδέαι*, which, because they have no interstices within them, are *παμπλήρη*, and because they can have none, are *ἀδιαιρετά*, *ἄτομα*. The void, on the other hand, by forming the intervals between the ultimate particles, supplies the *διαστήματα* or *πόροι*; by enveloping them all, it is the void properly speaking, or the *ἄπειρον*, the name given to it already by the Pythagoreans. In this infinite void there exist an innumerable number of worlds, perhaps separated from one another by membranous partitions, but all consisting of similar atoms, as different books consist of the same letters. These atoms do not display any qualitative differences at all, they are *ἄποια*, and differ only in size and shape. For this reason, the assertion that different weights were attributed to the atoms is more credible than that this was not done.

3. The Atomists think that multiplicity and change can be explained only on the assumption of a real Void, without which things would form a continuous mass. Change, again, is reduced to motion, which either implies an enveloping void or, if it consists in condensation or rarefaction, void spaces or pores within bodies. The Atomists, just like Empedocles, therefore, teach the existence of Becoming, only with an unchangeable Being for its substratum, and their agreement becomes a verbal one, when they deny the possibility of coming into being, and substitute for this, mixture and separation. They agree further with Empedocles, that necessity (*ἀνάγκη*, *δίκη*, *εἰμαρμένη*) regulates these minglings and separations. This, too, may have been the fiery world-soul which, accord-



ing to an old account, Democritus is said to have declared to be the Deity. But since this power which regulates the atoms is not immanent, and, according to Aristotle, acts not naturally but by force, it has not unjustly been called chance; for Democritus' protest against this word merely amounts to saying, that nothing falls outside of the bond of cause and effect, and everything has a reason. But those who attribute to him a teleological point of view as well, forget that in opposition to the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras (*vid.* § 52, 3) he expressly maintains a *φύσις ἀλογος*.

4. The atoms, though themselves devoid of qualities, give rise to qualitative differences, in that a greater or less number of them produces a greater or less density, and therefore weight, which is also supposed to account for differences of heat. Moreover, they also have different shapes and sizes, and can combine in different positions and in different order. Thus the elements consist of atoms of different sizes, fire, *e.g.* of the smallest and roundest. Similar to it, and consisting of atoms like the motes in a sunbeam, Democritus imagines the soul to be, which permeates the whole body, and renews itself in breathing by continually taking up similar atoms. And because of the general diffusion of such atoms, no body can be declared quite inanimate and devoid of soul. The outward manifestations of the soul depend on the different organs: thus it manifests itself as thought in the head, as eagerness in the heart, and as desire in the liver. And as animation and the principle of cognition are not distinguished from each other, his theory of knowledge is purely physical; the images propelled from the objects immediately or mediately strike the organ of sense, and thereby arouse sensation. But since many of these sensations, especially those of sight, indicate not so much what is the nature of the object in itself (*ἐτεσῆ*), but rather how they affect us or are for us (*νόμος*), it becomes necessary to distinguish between deceptive (*σκοτιή*), and true (*γνησίη*) cognition. The latter, rational cognition or *διάνοια*, is related to the underlying (*ἐν βύθῳ*) truth, *i.e.* the atoms; but, like the first, it depends on material action, and is concerned with phenomena (*φαινόμενα*).

5. Ethical determinations are hardly to be expected from such a point of view. Nevertheless, a large number of maxims and ethical precepts have been preserved, of which Democritus is said to be the author. Their number has been

still further increased, since also those formerly attributed to Democrates, have begun to be ascribed to him ; so that the critics are already beginning to sift the material once more. And since some of these dicta did not seem to fit in well with the materialism of his philosophy, some have maintained the opinion that they were composed at an early period, and the *Diacosmus* in his old age. But in the case of many of these wise sayings, it would be more difficult to deny that they represent the experience of an old man, than in that of the atomic theory, which may even have been handed down to Democritus in his youth. Besides, he would not be the only example of a man upon whom life forced maxims differing from those of the theory he had sketched. As to the content of his ethical advice, his praise of equanimity (*εὐεστρώ*) fits in quite well with his system of necessitarianism : a considerable number are rather trivial, others bear witness to his experience and to a loving heart ; and others, again, can only have been invented by an old bachelor. Those which connect morality with thought about the gods, might be the most difficult to reconcile with his other doctrines ; for it is known that he derived the belief in the gods merely from the fear of thunderstorms and similar phenomena.

Ritter and Preller, § 75-91. Mullach, i. 330-382.

### § 48.

The Atomists close the period of the men whose philosophy appeared to Aristotle to have been one of "dreamers," because they show the truly Greek wisdom only in an embryonic state. Aristotle's judgment about them, that as yet no distinction was made between that which knows and that which is known, may also be expressed in the form, that the peculiar dignity of the human spirit is not recognised. In this form, it gives the reason why their doctrines were certain to appear to the Greek people as exotic growths, even if they did not in their wide travels really bring them from foreign countries. Thus the doctrine of the *pure Physiologists*, that everything, including man, is a modification of a material substance, reflects the spirit, not of the Greeks, but of primitive peoples. The absolute supremacy of number and of mathematical laws, announced by the *Pythagoreans*, is something which the Chinaman experiences in the prescribed precision of his daily

life, far rather than the cheerful Greek. The absorption of all separate existences in a single substance, as it is taught by the *Eleatics*, seems rather an echo of Indian pantheism than a principle of the Hellenic spirit. The kinship of the doctrines of *Heraclitus* with those of the Persian Fire-worshippers, has both in ancient and in modern times led to the assertion of historical connections between them; and even those who will not let themselves be convinced by the evidence adduced in order to represent *Empedocles* as a disciple of the wisdom of the Egyptian priests, will be unable to deny the relationship of his doctrines with theirs. The *Atomists* finally, the inheritors of all the previous systems, may be described as those who formulate not merely the nature of a single stage preparatory to the spirit of Hellenism, but of Pre-Hellenism as a whole, on the point of advancing to Hellenism.

## SECOND PERIOD OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

GREEK PHILOSOPHY AT ITS HEIGHT, OR THE ATTIC PHILOSOPHY.

### INTRODUCTION.

#### § 49.

IN the heart of Greece, at Athens, there had been no philosophy hitherto, because other tasks, like the liberation of Greece, etc., had been more urgent. It is only after these achievements that Athens enjoys the leisure which Aristotle says is required for philosophy. But at this time the previous state of things, when a single spirit permeated the whole city to such an extent that the superior ancient families were not hated as nobles, nor the inferior despised as the mob, had already come to an end. Their reputation and the wealth which flowed into Athens, called forth insolence and selfishness in individuals; and the vulgar temper of the masses, devoid of all patriotic feeling, developed to such an extent, that the noblest Athenian, who has given his name to this age, was compelled to make use of it, and thus to nourish it, in order to realize his own aims and those of the State. He, as well as all others on a level with the age, would have smiled if any one had asserted, like Diogenes of Apollonia, that reason dwelt in the masses, or, like Heraclitus, that all things were full of the divine. But when Anaxagoras came forward in Athens with this general formula of the world: that it was reason which determined the mass in accordance with its ends, Pericles himself, and all those who lived in harmony with the more modern ideas, were bound to recognise him as the man they wanted, who truly understood the times. As always, the adherents of the old times hated and persecuted as the author of this decay, the man who only proclaimed its existence.

## § 50.

Besides this necessity in the history of the world (cf. § 11), possessed by the dualism of Anaxagoras, he is also called forth by the fact that the previous development of philosophy requires him as a necessary consequence. For since, according to the Atomists, the individual material particles have no qualitative character, in virtue of which they can seek or avoid one another, as in Empedocles, it is necessary to assert that the material contains no reason why they should combine in one way and not in another. But since they again expressly maintained that this combination did not take place without reason, but *ἐκ λόγου*, they had asserted two positions which could only serve as the premisses to this single conclusion, that the reason of this combination, *i.e.* of motion, lay in the immaterial. And since, moreover, the reasons of motion which lie in the immaterial are called motives, these two principles of the Atomists so nearly lead up to the assertion of an immaterial existence besides the material, which moves the material according to motives, *i.e.* of a Reason (*νοῦς*) that acts according to design, that the most important Atomist himself considered it necessary to attack this doctrine.

## § 51.

Anaxagoras is the father of the Attic philosophy, not only because he transplanted philosophy to Athens, but because he laid before it the subject which it had to develop there. His assertion that the *νοῦς* was the highest existence, and the demand contained in it that everywhere search must be made for the final cause, has been repudiated by none of his successors. In spite of the difference between the Sophists, who regarded the *νοῦς* as mere sharpness, and Aristotle, who regarded it as the universal reason thinking itself; in spite of the antithesis that the final cause meant to the former the use, to the latter the justification of a thing, both move within the limits of the task first propounded by Anaxagoras. And so do all those who intervene between the Sophists and Aristotle. In Anaxagoras, Greek philosophy issued out of its embryonic condition, in which its doctrine was pre-Hellenic. The first principle of its own and all existence is now no longer found by the human mind in a single element, or in a

mathematical rule, or in the collisions of atoms, but in that in which it transcends the natural. This is the first solution of the problem of philosophy in a Greek spirit, and hence the philosophy of Anaxagoras does not reflect any stage of pre-Hellenism, but the life of the Greek, and especially of the Athenian. Hence it is intelligible that Socrates, the incarnation of anti-barbarism, and Aristotle, the concluding representative of Attic philosophy, should regard Anaxagoras as the first who was "awake," that is, who had spoken sensibly, in contrast with the dreamers before him.

## FIRST DIVISION.

### Anaxagoras.

J. T. Hemsen : *Anaxagoras Clazomenius*. Götting., 1821. E. Schaubach : *Anaxagoræ Clazomenii Fragmenta*. Lips., 1827. W. Schorn, *vid.* § 28. Breier : *Die Philosophie des Anaxagoras nach Aristoteles*. Berlin, 1840.

### § 52.

1. ANAXAGORAS, the son of Hegesibulus, was born at Clazomenæ, probably about Ol. 70, and therefore cannot have been, as is reported, a personal disciple of Anaximenes. After he had sacrificed his fortune in the interests of science by leaving Ionia, he selected Athens as his place of residence, according to some at once, according to others only after long travels. More important probably for his scientific development than his travels, and the intercourse with his countryman, Hermotimus, must have been his acquaintance with the doctrines of the earlier Physiologers, of Empedocles, who, although a little younger, began to write before him, and of Leucippus. The reproach of plagiarism from his predecessors, made against him by Democritus, refers perhaps to Leucippus, the common teacher of Anaxagoras and himself. At Athens, Anaxagoras was active as a teacher of philosophy for thirty years, and not only won the friendship of Pericles, but surrounded himself with a circle of men, to which Archelaus, Euripides and Thucydides, and perhaps also Socrates belonged. They were all regarded with suspicion by those who kept to the old-fashioned ideas, and in part perhaps decried as atheists.

Thus Anaxagoras' knowledge of physics, with his zeal to explain what the masses regarded as miracles (*e.g.* the shower of stones, whence the legend that he had predicted it), his allegorical method of explaining the Homeric myths, all these things contributed to arouse the suspicion of atheism against him, which finally, perhaps in consequence of the book he published in his old age, issued in his accusation. This was followed by his imprisonment, and exile or flight from Athens. He betook himself to Lampsacus, where he died soon afterwards, in Ol. 88, 1. Besides a mathematical work elaborated in prison, he was the author of a book *περὶ φύσεως*, perhaps his only other work, of which fragments have been preserved.

2. Like Empedocles and the Atomists, Anaxagoras denies the Becoming of the material substance, and only admits in it a change due to mixture and segregation, in the course of which the substratum is neither increased nor decreased. Like Anaximander and Empedocles, he imagines the original condition of things to have been chaotic, in which the most different things were mingled, and therefore nothing individual was perceptible (*ἐνδηλον*). But he agrees with the Atomists in thinking that there were not only four kinds of these particles, but an infinite number, and infinitely various shapes. Lastly, he again asserts, in agreement with Empedocles and in opposition to the Atomists, the qualitative variety of these particles, so that not only were the larger combined with the smaller, but that gold, and flesh, and wood, etc., in their finely divided condition, were united into a mass without gaps or pores. Hence there is here really no question of a mixture of elements, but things (*χρήματα*, *i.e.* *πράγματα*) are mixed; and their finest molecules, which even in their infinite division retain their qualities, are called *σπέρματα*, or in atomistic phraseology also *ιδέαι*. The beginning of his book, *viz.*, *ομοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν*, became the classical expression, to describe this condition, which Anaxagoras himself called *σύμμιξις* or *μίγμα*, and this formula is also used in an abbreviated form and substantively. On the other hand, the report that Anaxagoras called the ultimate particles *ὁμοιομερῇ* or even (contrary to all analogy) *ὁμοιομέρειαι*, arose at an early period, owing to a misunderstanding of passages in Aristotle in which Anaxagoras is blamed for regarding as ultimate substances, complicated substances, which Aristotle calls *ὁμοιομερῇ*. At the most it might be admitted that Anaxagoras uses *ὁμοιομέρεια* to

designate the condition of mixture, but even this is improbable. The combination of the individual particles is so close, that, as their divisibility is infinite, it is impossible to arrive at an ultimate wholly unmixed particle. Hence it is necessary to say that everything is contained in each thing, an assertion which was combated by his opponents, and involves him in great difficulties himself, unless by everything and each thing material substances are meant.

3. This mass void of form and of motion, in which we may recognise the *ἄπειρον* of Anaximander, the *σφαῖρος* of Empedocles, and the union of smallest particles of the Atomists, is now approached, not indeed by a separating and combining necessity, which is just what Anaxagoras denies, but by the *νοῦς*, a conscious power, the introduction of which at once provokes the teleological mode of regarding things. In direct opposition to the principle of the previous period as formulated by Aristotle (*v.* § 48), Anaxagoras ascribes to the knowing *νοῦς* predicates contrary to those belonging to the known object (the mass). The *νοῦς* is *ἁμῶς*; it is the One and therefore knows the mass, which had been defined as the Many and the *ἄπειρον*. And whereas of material things everything is contained in everything else, the *νοῦς* is not, because it is not passive, and just for this reason does it sway the material. Thus in Anaxagoras separation and combination become a purposive forming and ordering, and to the Becoming of the *διάκοσμος* of the Atomists there corresponds an active *διακοσμεῖν* on the part of the *νοῦς*. It is true that Anaxagoras contents himself with enunciating his principle. In discussing particular instances, he does not state the purpose, but only the nature, or at the utmost the reason of the change, so that it here becomes almost indifferent whether it is referred to a conscious or to a blind power. This is justly censured by Plato as a relapse to a lower point of view.

4. The process of segregation initiated by the *νοῦς* unites the qualitatively similar particles, and according to the preponderance of one substance or another their names are given them, though, as has been remarked, they are never wholly pure. As in Empedocles, not all things take part in this segregation, and the unseparated residuum is probably the "envelope of the many" (things) which he mentions. The segregation is conceived as a successive one, starting from a centre and extending in ever-growing circles and with an



ever-growing impetus. In consequence of this there arises the ether, which composes also the red-hot bodies like pumice-stones, which are called stars, as the warm, light, and bright substance, opposed to the cold, damp, and heavy earth which prevails at the centre. And like the elements, organic beings also are composed of the ultimate particles. They arise out of the primeval slime, as in Anaximander, and attain to self-propagation only at a later period. The more perfectly a body is organized the more powerful is the *vous* within it, and the more powerfully does it promote knowledge and animation. Hence even the plants are not devoid of soul; but the experience and reason of the soul of man is greater, because he is endowed with hands. Compared with the reason, the senses do not supply any sure knowledge; and hence the appearances with which they illude us, as *e.g.* the white colour of snow, are often refuted by the reason, which teaches that snow is water, and therefore not white. Apparently Anaxagoras already connected with this uncertainty of the senses extremely subjective opinions as to the nature of knowledge. Ethical dicta, which one would have been far more inclined to expect from Anaxagoras' point of view than from his predecessors, have not been handed down to us.

Ritter and Preller, § 58-70 Mullach, i. 243-251.

### § 53.

The philosophy of Anaxagoras must give way to another, not only because the times of which it was the expression pass away, and the rule of demagogues like Kleon and others far worse follows upon the guidance of Athens by Pericles, but this is also required by an internal defect. That reason takes the first place, and that everything should be considered teleologically, is to say very little, so long as the question is not decided whether by reason we are to understand that displayed in the cunning of the subject, or in the order of the world, and so long as the real meaning of conformity to end is not more closely determined. And since Anaxagoras refuses to decide the first of these questions when he expressly says that all reason is alike, the greater, or universal, as well as the smaller or particular, he cannot possibly decide whether the world exists for our use, or in order to fulfil its purpose. Not having decided this, he must put

aside all questions as to the wherefore of things and renounce every teleological point of view. And yet the decision was not far to seek. For if the mass in itself is devoid of spirit and of reason, the purposes which the reason brings into it must be external to it, and it must be forcibly adapted to them. If now we call such purposes or ends,—since they have their limit in the material opposed to them, as it has its limit in them,—*finite*, then the first determination given to the wherefore, which Anaxagoras had failed to define, will be, that it means a finite conformity to end, and not one immanent in things. But as soon as the nature of the end has been more closely determined, the indefiniteness as to what was called reason also ceases. For reason having finite ends for its content is reasonableness or cleverness, as it exists in reasonable subjects that seek their own advantage. However much, therefore, it may appear as a retrogression that the dictum of Anaxagoras, that reason rules the world, should receive the sense of “cleverness rules,” or “the clever are masters of everything,” it was yet a meritorious achievement to have determined more closely what had been undefined. And that the definition thus given by the *Sophists* was the one required by the position of affairs, is shown by the way in which not only Archelaus but Anaxagoras himself approximates to the sophistic point of view. For Archelaus’ dictum, that right and wrong depend only upon arbitrary enactment, only completes the assertion ascribed to Anaxagoras, that nothing is true in itself, but everything only for us.

## SECOND DIVISION.

### The Sophists.

Geel : *Historia critica Sophistarum*, Ultraj. 1823. Baumhauer : *Quam vim Sophistæ habuerint*, etc. Ultraj. 1844. M. Schauz : *Beiträge zur Vorso-  
kratischen Philosophie aus Plato*. Heft. I. The Sophists. Göttingen,  
1867.

### § 54-

The Sophists, by placing the reasoning subject above everything, and showing how everything exists only to be mastered by man theoretically and practically, hold the same position in

Greece that the cosmopolitan sages of the 18th century do in modern times, viz., that of the fathers of culture. The likeness begins with the names they respectively applied to themselves; for "enlightening" and "making clever" are the same thing. It extends to the object of education they lay down; for the *δεινός* of the Sophists precisely corresponds to the "strong mind freed from prejudice" of the others, and the virtue which the former undertake to teach, to the reasonableness and light which it is the latter's boast to disseminate. The means, finally, which they use are identical. For the *ἀντιλογικὴ τέχνη*, which, according to the testimony of their opponents and the admission of the Sophists themselves, was their real weapon, is only the art of representing things differently from different points of view, i.e., the art of argumentation, which produces versatility, the enemy and opposite of narrow-minded simplicity. And because no simplicity can withstand argumentation, simple piety and simple manners also yield to it. Hence the arguer is not only formidable in his own estimation, but appears dangerous to others and especially to the simple. Enlightenment carries its dangers with it; the Sophists make the people too clever, and the words "Enlightener" and "Sophist" became terms of abuse instead of titles of honour.

### § 55.

There is, however, this difference between sophistry and the enlightenment of the 18th century, that the former has greater consideration than the latter also for the practical domination of man over things. Hence the Sophists strive to deliver man, not only from the narrowness of his views, but also from the narrowness of his means, and to free him, not only from prejudice, but also from poverty. The possession of these means is not only called, but really is, to have money. Hence the Sophist, just like the merchant, regards his money-making power as the measure of his skill, and makes it a subject of his instruction. This end also is attained most surely by argumentation. For since in those days it was impossible to make money without lawsuits, and lawsuits could not be won without persuading the judges, i.e. by finding as many good points as possible in one's cause, the *ἀντιλογικὴ τέχνη* was the surest introduction to the art of pettifogging successfully, τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν, as the sophistic formula ran.

Evil as this art is, it yet brought in its train the development of grammar, style, and rhetoric, all of which owe, in part their existence, in part their advancement, to the Sophists. And however much they might diverge in other respects, they were all united in their labours on behalf of the art of eloquence, or at least of the exercises preparatory to it ; and even their enemies have not denied their merits in this respect.

Cf. L. Spengel : *Συναγωγή τεχνῶν*. Stuttgart, 1828.

### § 56.

A strictly scientific proof, and a view of the world based upon a single principle, are incompatible with the historical position of the Sophists, and with the task they had put before themselves. The one appears to them pedantic, the other as one-sided, and both as uncultured. In order to obtain as many points of view as possible, it is necessary to make use of the most various doctrines, and to borrow from every possible system. A sceptically-tinged eclecticism is always the attitude of the "enlightened," and so it was in Greece. Nevertheless the Sophists had a great influence, not only on general culture, as has been shown so far, but also on the growth of systematic philosophy. Not only, as was shown above (§ 53), did their position result from the previous development of philosophy, but it made possible that which followed. It is only the facility with which, in arguing, the mind regards things from every possible point of view, that enables it to adopt so entire a novelty as Socratism ; and it is only by the practice of finding the contradictions between the various aspects of a thing, that it becomes acute enough to discover with the Platonic Dialectic the contradictions that lie within itself. And again, it was necessary that the wisdom produced by the Dorian and the Ionian spirit should be intermingled, in order that the lightning spark of Socrates' genius should produce in it the Attic wisdom which combines them both, not in the form of a mixture, but in a higher unity.

### § 57.

It is only in the sense that different elements predominate in each, that Gorgias, as the Sophist trained by the Eleatics, can be opposed to Protagoras, as the adherent of Heraclitus. The opposition between them, which often rises to actual con-

flict, does indeed draw some of its nourishment from this fact, but depends still more on their tendencies. For while Protagoras defines as his proper aim, the art of making men clever in practical matters, Gorgias wishes merely to be, and to train, an arguing rhetorician. They both recognise the importance of the study of language, and divide their labours in such a way that Protagoras concerns himself especially with words and their forms, and Gorgias with the formation of sentences. In as high repute as these two, stood Prodicus, apparently morally the strictest of the Sophists, and Hippias, the most learned. These, however, did not attach themselves to any master by preference; the first, because he regarded practice as the most important; the second, because he esteemed above all things theoretical and practical versatility. But they also paid attention to language, Prodicus especially with regard to correctness of expression, and Hippias in respect of its rhythm and the measure of syllables. Besides this, he subjects the laws of the State to his arguments. Around these chief figures are grouped the less important Sophists. Thus Antimærus, Antiphon, and Critias may be connected with Protagoras: the two eristic polemics, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus with Gorgias, because of their rhetorical artifices: and lastly Polus, in spite of the encouragement which he may have received from Gorgias, with Hippias, by reason of the principles which he maintains with regard to the laws of the State.

### § 58.

#### PROTAGORAS.

J. Frei: *Quæstiones Protagorææ*. Bonn, 1845. O. Weber: *Quæstiones Protagorææ*. Marb., 1850. Vitringa: *De Protagoræ vita et philosophia*. Gröning., 1853.

I. PROTAGORAS, the son of Artemon, or, according to others, of Mæandrius, has been regarded as the disciple of Democritus, probably only because he was born at Abdera. The latter was, however, twenty years younger than Protagoras. Already at an early period stress was rightly laid on the close connection of the doctrines of Protagoras with those of Heraclitus; but this does not exclude the possibility that at an early age he became acquainted with the sources by which Democritus and Anaxagoras had profited, viz., earlier atomistic doctrines. He acquired fame and, since he was the

first to teach for money, also wealth, by his instructions, at first in Sicily, and from his 30th year at Athens. The excellence (*ἀρετή*) and strength (*δεινότης*) which he promised to instil by means of his instructions, and on account of which he called himself a Sophist, in the sense of a teacher of cleverness, consisted in the adroit management of one's property and of civic affairs. And since this could not be thought of unless a man was a match for every law-suit, his instruction aimed at giving directions for speaking correctly, beautifully, and, above all, persuasively. Hence the subjects of his instruction were grammar, orthoëpy, and especially the art of making the most of every case, by representing it from various points of view. He was also the panegyrist of decorum and morals, without which no one could be esteemed in the State; and altogether he was extremely conservative in his politics. He also committed his doctrines to writing; and the titles of many of his works have been preserved. A work of his concerning the gods was publicly burnt, and caused his exile from Athens, in the course of which he died.

2. The Heraclitean doctrine of the flux of all things, which Protagoras interprets in the sense of the Heracliteans, induces him to go even beyond Democritus, and to regard all sensations without exception as mere subjective affections. Perhaps he combined with it the dictum, uttered already by Leucippus, as to the equal importance of Being and Non-Being. In short, Protagoras maintains that every assertion may be opposed by its direct opposite with an equal amount of truth, since one thing is true for one man, another thing for another, and existence as such is not found anywhere at all. This subjectivism is adequately formulated in the dictum, that every individual man is the measure of all things. This means, on the theoretical side, that what is true to me, is true; on the practical, that what is good for me, is good. Thus probability takes the place of truth, and utility that of goodness. It is consistent with this, that he extols prudence as the highest virtue. But it is clear that such subjectivism destroys the meaning of all objective determinations of universal validity. Hence the Athenian people did not let itself be pacified by the modest sound of his sceptical utterances with regard to the existence of the gods; nor did Plato allow himself to be dazzled by his declamations as to the beauty of god-given virtue. Nevertheless Protagoras deserved the

high esteem in which he was held, on account of his moral worth, which also explains the fact that a doctrine which idolized what Heraclitus had called a disease, viz., individual opinion, was less dangerous to its author.

Ritter and Preller, § 184-188. Mullach, II., 130-134.

### § 59.

#### PRODICUS.

F. G. Welcker: *Prodikos von Keos Vorgänger des Sokrates*. (*Kleine Schriften*, ii. pp., 393 foll.; originally in *Rhein. Museum*. 1833. 1.)

PRODICUS, born at Iulis, in the island of Ceos, seems to have come to Athens about Ol. 86, where he taught for some forty years, apparently without interruption. His lectures consisted partly of longer courses, partly also of separate essays on some subject or other, and were paid for at a higher or a lower rate, according as they seemed to promise a smaller or a larger audience. He, too, regarded it as the proper aim of his instruction to prepare men for the management of their household and their State, partly by means of speeches which were midway between scientific lectures and exhortations, and partly by instructing others how to compose such speeches. The means by which he produces his effect are not a various stock of knowledge, as in the case of Hippias, but rather a right use of language, as also its force and expressive picturesqueness, together with the quotation of favourite passages from the poets. The speech about the virtue of Heracles, reproduced in the *Protagoras* of Plato, the depreciation of life and the exaltation of death, preserved to us in the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus*, his panegyric on rural life, and his preference of virtue to riches,—all these things explain why even the opponents of the Sophists speak of Prodicus with greater respect. His interpretation, to the effect that the gods were the forces of nature, does not prove that he devoted himself more to physics than the rest. His chief merit, with which the influence also which he exercised on later orators was connected, was probably his accurate discussion of the meanings of words, perhaps combined with hints for the construction of effective plays upon words, etc. Hence the fame and the high fee of his lecture at fifty drachmas.

Mullach, ii. pp. 135-142.

## § 60.

## GORGIAS.

(Pseudo) Aristotle: *De Melisso, Zenone et Gorgia*, ch. 5 and 6. Foss: *De Gorgia Leontino*. Halle, 1828.

1. GORGIAS, the son of Carmantidas or Charmantidas, by birth a Leontine, probably lived from Ol. 72 to Ol. 98, and is often described as the disciple of his contemporary Empedocles, to whom he may have been considerably indebted in his opinions upon physics. Probably, however, the influence of Zeno upon him was still greater. As a distinguished orator, trained by Tisias, he was sent by his countrymen to Athens in Ol. 88, 1. There he not only succeeded in obtaining the help against Syracuse he asked for, but was requested soon to return and to take up his residence at Athens. This he did, and lived partly at Athens, partly in other cities, especially in Thessaly, as a Sophist in the later sense of the term, *i.e.*, as an arguing rhetorician and a brilliant type of the Sicilian school. His orations were not forensic, and indeed not really composed for any special occasion, but were delivered in a house or a theatre to the assembled audience. He also made improvised speeches and maintained debates upon any given subject, which, in spite of the vanity and a kind of bombast he displayed in them, were much admired. He did not wish to be anything but an orator, and derided those who called themselves teachers of virtue. Whether the two declamations which have come down to us under his name are genuine, is disputed, at least in the case of one. Other accounts make mention of several orations as well as of a rhetoric, which have been lost. The pseudo-Aristotelian writing and Sextus Empiricus give us an account of his book *περί φύσεως ἢ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*. According to them, its train of thought was as follows:—

2. Nothing exists, for neither that which is nor that which is not, nor lastly, that which both is and is not, can exist. Nor, in the same way, can the one and the many, the generated and the ungenerated, exist. But supposing that something that was did exist, it would be unknowable; for it may easily be shown that our presentation of an object is not identical with the object. And lastly, even if something existed, and were knowable, it yet could not be communi-



cated ; for the words, by which we communicate our thoughts, are different from the latter, which are peculiar to the individual, and cannot therefore be communicated. The whole arrangement of this deductive reasoning betrays the orator, with his love of climax ; and its outcome is, of course, complete subjectivism. Thus, in spite of the difference of their theoretical basis, Gorgias and Protagoras arrive at the same result, that since all objective reality disappears, it is left open to the subject to represent everything just as he pleases. Hence he and Protagoras were equally the masters of the eristic writers of speeches, who composed, or even had in stock, pleas for every possible case, to be read out by the contending parties. Plato's satire on Euthydemus and Dionysodorus seems to be often intended for Gorgias.

Ritter and Preller, § 189-193. Mullach, II., § 143-146.

### § 61.

#### HIPPIAS.

Mähly, in the *Rhein. Museum*. New Series, XV., XVII.

HIPPIAS of Elis, a contemporary of Prodicus, acquired fame and fortune, less at Athens perhaps than in Sicily, and also in Sparta, by lectures and improvised answers to all sorts of questions. The fulness of his knowledge, of which he was fond of boasting, really seems to have been very great, and probably disposed Aristotle more favourably towards him. Of his activity as an author we know little. Philostratus asserts that the speech on the wisdom of life, mentioned by Plato, was a dialogue. Whether he actually wrote a book of miscellanies, which evinced his learning, seems a moot-point. While Protagoras and Gorgias dazzled by means of their clever points of view and antitheses, he preferred to do so by the continuous stream of thoughts which he poured forth. Hence their jeers at him, and his proud contempt for their ignorance. Language he took into consideration chiefly from the musical point of view. He took an interest alike in the phenomena of nature and the customs of men, of barbarians no less than of Greeks. His frequent occupation with these probably contributed to the sceptical result at which he arrived with regard to the laws of the State, viz., that they

were altogether a product of arbitrary enactment, and that a universal, natural right, valid in itself, did not exist. There agree with this negative result of Hippias, Polus, who however is said to have been a pupil of Gorgias, and Thrasy-machus, as to whom we are unable to decide whether he attached himself more closely to the one or to the other.

### § 62.

The Sophists neutralized the doctrines of the previous philosophers by mixing them together, and at the same time made their mode of treatment the common possession of all educated men; and hence it is not possible to revert to the position of any one among them. And since, moreover, their chief point of view is suitableness, utility, they also made it a matter of course that the question of the wherefore had to be raised first of all. This lesson remains unforgotten, even when there issues from the soil of sophistry a philosophy which devours and denies it for this very reason. The necessity of this is found in the fact that the principle of the Sophists leads further and beyond them. The Sophists posited the Useful as the universal finite aim of all thought and action. But there exists in the conception of the Useful these two opposite determinations, that in the first place it is that which is conformed to an end, *i.e.* an attained end, and secondly, that it is useful for something, *i.e.* a means to an end. And though consciousness in making use of this category experiences in every definite case, that that which it regarded as an end just before, is really only a means, yet it does not in the one case think of the other; or if this contradiction once strikes it, it calms itself by keeping the two apart by the sophistical, "from one point of view" and "from another," so that that which is an end from one point of view, is supposed to be a means from another. But if the mind understood itself and the category it made use of, it would be compelled to perceive that these two determinations must be connected into a single idea, which must take the place of the Useful. And conversely, when the human spirit has made this new thought-determination its own, instead of the previous one, it is an indication that it has risen to the next higher stage of self-knowledge, *i.e.* of philosophy. And again, if in that which is called an End-in-itself, or Idea, means and end are really one, Idealism

is the proper consequence and truth of subjective finalism ; and Socrates, who is the first to raise philosophy to the level of ideal contemplation, here takes the next step in advance beyond the Sophists, whom he rightly combats, although he could neither have come forward himself, nor have found adherents without them.

### THIRD DIVISION.

#### Socrates.

##### § 63.

##### HIS LIFE.

Xenophon : *Memorabilia*. Plato's *Dialogues*. Diog. Laert. ii. 5. E. Alberti : *Sokrates ; ein Versuch über ihn nach den Quellen*. Götting., 1869. S. Ribbing : *On the relation between the accounts of Xenophon and Plato as to the personality and doctrine of Socrates* (in *Uppsala Universitets Arsskrift*, 1870. Philosophi Sprakwetenskap och Historiska Vetenskaper iii. and iv.). A. Krohn : *Sokrates und Xenophon*. Halle, 1875.

I. SOCRATES, the son of the sculptor Sophroniscus, and the midwife Phænarete, was born at Athens in Ol. 77, 3 (469 B.C.), and is said to have first carried on his father's art, which, however, he soon abandoned in order to devote himself wholly to philosophy. However justly he attributes to himself complete originality, one need not on that account deny that his friend and music-master Damon, and the proximity of Thebes, the residence of Philolaus, familiarized him with Pythagorean doctrines ; that already in his youth he conversed with the most important of the Eleatics ; that by the advice of Euripides he read and appreciated Heraclitus, and finally that he was induced, either by his previous intercourse with its author or by Archelaus, to throw himself enthusiastically into the study of the book of Anaxagoras. In this indeed he was so disappointed by the lack of teleological explanation that he discarded it. His frequent intercourse with the Sophists is also well established ; and he even paid one of them, Prodicus, for a lecture. It is true indeed that he did not receive his proper philosophic instruction from any of these, but by associating with all sorts of men, whereby he acquired what he himself, and in his opinion also the oracle given to Chære-

phon, regarded as his peculiar wisdom, viz., the knowledge of his own ignorance.

2. Passionately fond of Athens, he left it only when the duty of defending his country required it; but once in the field, he excited admiration by his endurance of hardships, his bravery, coolness, and care for his comrades, together with his ungrudging recognition of their merits. With his contempt for the masses, he could not be attracted by democracy in any form; with his truly patriotic feelings, not by the form of democracy he found at Athens. Hence his attacks on the favourite institution of democracy—the filling up of offices by lot; hence too, his abstention from a direct participation in State affairs. On the two occasions on which he did take part in them he showed his independence, not without danger to himself; in the one case by opposing the will of the people after the battle of Arginusæ, in the other by opposing the arbitrary will of the Thirty Tyrants in the matter of Leon of Salamis. Nor did he show any greater appreciation of domestic life than of public affairs; and Xanthippe's outbursts of anger must be excused, on the ground that, in the pursuit of his higher mission, her husband left her to bear by herself the burden of his disordered household.

3. This higher mission he fulfilled, by strolling about the whole day and engaging in conversation with everybody, in order to discuss philosophic questions with them. He pursued by preference beautiful and clever youths, but in such a way that the gallantry towards youths, prevalent at Athens, and rightly regarded as so objectionable by us, was spiritualized and rendered at least endurable. And not only were the youths with whom he consorted enchanted with him, but the most different natures found him irresistible, and could not dispense with his company. Thus one sees the proud, practical Critias by the side of the dissolute genius of Alcibiades; Antisthenes, proud of his virtue, by the side of Aristippus, devoted to tasteful pleasure; the strictly logical Euclides and the master of dialectic, Plato, by the side of Hermogenes with his childlike piety, and the worthy Xenophon with his lack of all speculative talent; the enthusiastic youth Chærephon by the side of the cool-headed though equally young Charmides; and Euripides, now growing old, with his sentimentalism based upon reflection,—together forming what one must call the circle rather than the school of Socrates. The attrac-

tive force he exercised may be explained ; for the disproportion between external ugliness and internal beauty, which appeared such a perversion, especially to the Greeks, and at first only produces astonishment, soon excites to admiration. Poor and without wants, in spite of the assertions of the later Cynics, he was at the same time also the model of a cultivated man, and the favourite of the graces gifted with Attic urbanity. According to some, it was a happy disposition, according to others, the force alone of his character, that made him the noblest of men, and one who, when he had fought out in secret the hard struggle against his evil inclinations, had nothing more to overcome or to fear ; and for this very reason need not reject pleasure, because he was certain never to be lost in it. In this security he is able to put himself into positions which would have been compromising for everybody else, but not for him, who, truly *αὐτοῦργός*, had wrought himself into the most perfect image of Greek virtue.

### § 64.

#### THE DOCTRINE OF SOCRATES.

Schleiermacher : *Der Werth des Sokrates als Philosophen* (1815), Works ii.  
 Süvern : *Ueber Aristophanes Wolken*, 1826. Röscher : *Aristophanes und sein Zeitalter*, 1827 (containing Hegel's views). Brandis : *Ueber die angebliche Subjectivität des Sokrates*, in the *Rhein. Mus.*, 1828. E.v.  
 Lasaulx : *Des Sokrates Leben, Lehre und Tod*. Munich, 1857.

1. Socrates himself repeatedly places true wisdom in the fulfilment of the Delphic exhortation : " Know thyself." This alone makes a man truly himself, for *σωφροσύνη* combines the conceptions of consciousness as a whole, of conscious knowledge, of theoretic self-cognition, and of practical mastery of self : its contrary, the condition of the *ἄφρων*, necessarily implies also *ἀκολασία* in practice, and is not much better than madness. Nevertheless, in spite of his making, like Protagoras, man the subject of science, rather than the heavens and stars, Socrates is yet able to speak disparagingly about Protagoras, because he ranks the individual highest. Not *πᾶς ἄνθρωπος*, as in Protagoras, but *ὁ ἄνθρωπος* is regarded by Socrates as the measure of all things ; and he identifies the former with *ἡ ὕς*, and the latter with *ὁ Θεός*. Compared therefore with the point of view of the Sophists, that of Socrates is

objective ; measured by the pre-sophistic standard, it emphasizes the rights of the subject.

Cf. Siebeck : *Ueber Sokrates Verhältniss zur Sophistik*. Halle, 1873. (In his *Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen*.)

2. These two determinations, that all truth is contained in the subject, but only in so far as it is universal, are expressed in the method of Socrates in this way, that on the one hand all learning is regarded as mere recollection, all teaching as the delivering of the learner, or as eliciting knowledge from him, while, on the other, it is maintained that it is only in thinking in common, *i.e.* in conversing, in which the merely individual views neutralize one another, that truth is found. Hence the ignorance of Socrates, which continually induces him to put questions, is not a jest (repeated, too, for fifty years !), but perfectly serious. The dialogue is as necessarily the form of his philosophizing, as the monologue was that of the Sophists, who idolized opinion and denied the possibility of mutual explanations. The φιλόλογος or φιλέταιρος, who, himself unfruitful, cannot produce but only deliver others, seeks for what is brought out of other men, by which he gives up his isolation ; *i.e.* he seeks knowledge, and not opinions. Hence Aristotle rightly states as the peculiarity of the Socratic dialogue, that its method is inductive, and its aim is the definition of a conception. He sets out from the particular instance, which, it is shown, cannot be maintained, and thus, especially by his famous "irony," produces a feeling of perplexity, in consequence of which one-sided determinations are given up, and in the most favourable case the universal and generic conception is found. This, together with the specific differences found in the course of the inquiry, gives the concrete conceptions and definite definitions which Socrates wishes to put in the place of the views from which the argument started. Where, as is often the case, there is no positive result, but only the negative one of perplexity, it may come about that the partner in the dialogue feels as though he had been mocked, and thinks that Socrates wished merely to confuse him, while knowing better himself. He is mistaken, as the Sceptics are mistaken in accounting Socrates one of their number. For the knowledge which they deny is the guiding star of his inquiries.

3. If from the method of his investigations we proceed to

their content, we find that with Socrates, as with Anaxagoras and the Sophists, the wherefore is the chief question. It is no contradiction of this assertion, that, according to the best authorities, he always inquired τί ἕκαστον εἶη; for it is just the purpose of a thing that tells us what it really is, and also what is its reason. Hence Socrates everywhere requires that the purpose should be considered: he blames Anaxagoras for giving only the reasons of natural phenomena; and when he himself considers nature, as in the conversation with Aristodemus reported by Xenophon (which, however, may be of a later date), he does so quite teleologically. Connected with his contemplation of nature, are his utterances as to the universal reason which governs and orders all things, and the connection of which with the νοῦς of Anaxagoras is obvious. On the whole, however, he is little interested in nature; trees and fields teach him nothing, whereas men do; and hence his chief problem is, What is the purpose of man's existence and action? Here again, just as he had opposed knowledge to the opinion of the Sophists, he opposes to that which is an end only for particular individuals, *i.e.* the useful, that which is an end in and for itself, *viz.*, the Good. Philosophy, which until then had been successively physics and logic, either in the form of mathematics or of metaphysics, and lastly both, thereby becomes ethics; and the heir of Socrates can enunciate what since then has remained an indisputable axiom, that logic, physics, and ethics are the essential divisions of philosophy. The Good is regarded by Socrates as being the object of knowledge as well as the content of action. For just as he considers it inexplicable to know what is good and not to do it, so he declares it impossible to do what is good without insight. Thus knowledge is one with the essence of virtue to such an extent, that he expressly says that no one can knowingly be bad, and that it is preferable to go wrong knowingly than unknowingly. Hence he is continually repeating that virtue is ἐπιστήμη, and can be taught in so far as anything at all can be taught. His καλοκἀγαθον, which coincides with happiness, is the Good willed and recognised as such. He no more regards a happy natural disposition as virtue, than he is satisfied with the discipline and morality which is based upon custom. On the contrary, he requires a morality which is conscious of the grounds of its action and can impart them to others; nor has any foreign

authority, or anything but a man's own insight, the right to determine what is good. The virtuous man has, as it were, made a contract with the laws of the State, and does not break it. And though the emphasis thus laid on the insight of the individual has induced many to speak of the subjectivism of the Socratic ethics, and even of their sophistic character, it must yet not be overlooked that he always maintains with the same energy, as against the Sophists, who placed inclination above everything, that the Good consists in obedience to law, and in agreement not only with the written enactments but also with custom and usage. And he showed how seriously he interpreted his own precepts by dying in obedience to his country's laws. These two determinations are so completely united in his mind, that it is possible to say without any real contradiction, that Socrates, like the Sophists, only followed his own inclination; and again, that, in opposition to them, he made his country's laws his standard of conduct. For he never inclines to anything else than what they enjoin. Their voice is heard in the most subjective of all sensations, as a tingling in his ears.

4. If this subjective feeling filled with an objective content be called conscience, Socrates was the first to assert the principle of conscience. For conscience is that god or "dæmon" which every man hears within him, and which is the true measure of all things. But in Socrates it took such a form, that it connected itself with a warning presentiment, which kept him back by a peculiar "sign" from injurious but morally indifferent actions. The secure *abandon* which makes him so attractive, consists in his giving himself up wholly to his natural and moral genius: when Socrates consults Socrates, he obtains the best advice. It is true that, because his virtue is natural genius, he displays it more perfectly than he can describe it. When he does so, he always extols mastery of one's self (called sometimes *ἐγκράτεια*, sometimes *σωφροσύνη*), whether he defines it quite formally as the being by and with oneself, or calls it divine to have no wants, with a reference to the natural instincts, and requires of the sage that he should be the master and not the slave of pleasure. But because all these are only various manifestations of *σωφροσύνη*, he emphasizes the fact that there is only one Good and one Virtue, and a single opposite of these, viz., ignorance, under which he includes both unconsciousness and uncertainty.



## § 65.

## SOCRATES' FATE.

F. W. Forchhammer: *Die Athener und Sokrates*. Berl., 1837.

That a man's own conscience is to decide what is right and what is wrong, is an innovation from the point of view of ancient morality. And so long as this stands unshaken its representatives will not with nervous dread regard every new movement as dangerous. And again, so long as it is only stray foreigners who preach egotism, it does not much matter. But the case is different when discipline and morals are everywhere shaken, and at this very time the noblest son of one's own city announces a new wisdom. This elicits a reaction on the part of those who long for the good old times. Aristophanes shares these feelings to the extent of Philistinism; and hence, though he seems to have esteemed Socrates personally, he attacks his principle in the most violent way, and represents him to the people as the worst of the Sophists, teaching the worship of new gods (the clouds), and generally destroying the proper respect for parents, and more particularly as having made Alcibiades an ungrateful son of Athens. Upon this accusation, which was very seriously intended in spite of its comic form, there followed the legal accusation,—and very characteristically it took place during the brief period of reaction under Thrasybulus,—which brought forward precisely the same charges. It is difficult to decide whether all the three accusers,—Meletus the poetaster, Lycon the rhetorician, and Anytus the leather-worker,—were merely prompted by feelings of personal vindictiveness, or whether the last was impelled by his zeal for the old times, which is known also from other sources. But we may be sure that the fact that his political opponents sat in judgment on him contributed to his condemnation. But it may also be explained on other grounds. For his defence on the charge of religious innovation, by putting his “dæmonic” sign on the same level with the oracles recognised by the State, really proves the correctness of the accusation; to say nothing of the fact, that many of his judges may have thought of what might not be mentioned, viz., that Socrates had disdained to be initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries, and thus not displayed the reverence for them cherished by every good Athenian; and that

t might perhaps be something more than an accident, that persons so closely connected with him as Euripides and Alcibiades, should respectively have indiscreetly profaned and even desecrated the mysteries. The second charge also is really admitted, when Socrates confesses, that where he recognised the proper vocation of the children better than their parents, he has instructed them accordingly. And lastly, however great and sublime Socrates may appear in claiming to be supported at the Prytaneum as the punishment he had deserved, it is sublimity in the modern sense, and explains the exasperation of the judges and the people. That this continued after his death, is proved by the fact that five years afterwards Xenophon found it necessary to oppose it by the defence contained in his *Memorabilia*. The behaviour of Socrates after his condemnation, the constancy with which he refused the light which his friends had made secure, and lastly his death,—the most sublime that any mere man has ever died,—all this has been preserved for all time in the wondrously beautiful description of Plato. Socrates drank the hemlock in April 399 B.C., Ol. 95. 1. His is a tragic figure because he perishes in the conflict between a new and higher principle with one that is obsolete, but supported by the right of long existence. His is a prophetic nature because his principle is that destined to sway the future.

Ritter and Preller, § 194–200.

### § 66.

Socrates put Knowledge and the Idea in the place of the subjective Opinion and the finite End idolized by the Sophists; his philosophy, being subjectivism as well as objectivism, is precisely, Idealism. But the Idea appears with him in its immediacy, as life, and idealism as Socrates himself, its incarnation. For this reason, the question of what is good, reduces itself to questioning his genius, knowledge of truth to the knowledge of self; and his opponents, like himself, identified him with his opinions. It was only possible to refute his philosophy by killing him. But it is only in his person that the two factors, the combination of which constitutes the Idea, interpenetrate each other: as soon as they leave the individuality of this genius in virtue, they fall apart. This happens also when he attempts to express his own internal





life. Then he sometimes speaks exactly like a Sophist, and says, *e.g.*, that in some circumstances stealing, etc., is good for us, and therefore not to be censured; and at another time, just like an honest citizen of the good old times, who regards the laws and customs of his forefathers as sufficient to decide what is right and wrong. But the contradiction exists only outside himself, when he expresses himself, not within him; for since only that is advantageous for him which is demanded by law and custom, he can without danger seek his own advantage. And just as the elements combined within him are liberated when he utters them, so too they are liberated when he bequeaths the doctrines to his disciples and dies. When his individuality is taken away, the bond is gone which united the opposite sides, and the Socratic teaching falls apart into one-sided Socratic tendencies.

## FOURTH DIVISION.

### The Socratic Schools.

#### § 67.

THE lesser Socratic schools attempt to conceive consciously what Socrates had *been*, and to answer the questions as to what the Good is, and what knowledge is, not merely as he did by a, "Come and see! Philosophize with me, and you shall find out!" They wish to formulate an answer in which the guiding principle is always, as the most important of this class of philosophers continually confesses—to learn from Socrates. This was necessary, and therefore it was an advance, all the more because Socrates himself had demanded that knowledge based upon reasons was everywhere to take the place of the immediate voice of genius (the sacred madness of the artist); and hence inspired Socratism also had to give way to the clearly conscious form it received after the process of reflection. It is true, indeed, that none of the schools succeed in grasping more than a single side of the Socratic character. But even this one-sidedness is the indispensable condition, and promotes the progress, of philosophy. For it brings to light a thing which also belongs to the self-knowledge of Socratism, viz., the extent to which it surpasses the content of previous points of view. Its author, the innovator, only knows that he

agrees with none of these, and that none satisfy him. But that his own point of view is not only different from, but higher than theirs, is shown by the demonstration that it attains to all they achieved, and still more. Thus the lesser Socratic schools show how much of the pre-Sophistic metaphysics and physics, and how many of the Sophistic doctrines, may be derived from the theoretic side of Socratism, and further illustrate how the Good of Socrates may be interpreted logically and physically, just as well as ethically. Their labours enabled the fully self-conscious Socratism to boast that it combined everything hitherto taught as to the reasons of existence, and to set up a system of ethics which can find room for logical, physical, and ethical virtues. Or, to put it more concretely; without the Megarians, Cyrenaics, and Cynics, no Plato was possible, and without Plato no Aristotle.

#### A.—THE MEGARIANS.

G. L. Spalding: *Vindiciæ philosophorum Megaricorum tentantur*, 1792.  
 Deycks: *De Megaricorum doctrina*. Bonn, 1827. H. Ritter: *Bemerkungen über die Megarische Schule*. Rhein. Mus. ii., No. 3.

#### § 68.

1. The founder of this school, Euclides, of Megara, or according to others, of Gela, had been initiated into the Eleatic doctrines before he attached himself devotedly to Socrates. When he began to teach at Megara, still in the life-time of Socrates, he not only zealously practised the dialectic of Zeno, but combined the Parmenidean doctrine of the One in a peculiar way with the ethics of Socrates. He was a friend of Plato, and is said to have written dialogues, some of which bore the same titles as those of Plato. They have not, however, come down to us. His successors seem to have used their dialectic in a very one-sided fashion, in order to confuse the ordinary conceptions, and were hence called dialecticians and eristics. Eubulides and Alexinus are mentioned as the inventors of new fallacies, Diodorus Cronus as having disputed the possibility of motion with novel arguments. Stilpo, however, seems to have devoted more attention to ethical questions. The doctrine of Phædo the Elean, whose school was called the Eretrian from the time of Menedemus, and died out about the same time as the Megarian, seems to have been closely akin to it.

2. The fact that Euclides made the Good his proper subject

of inquiry, and regards Virtue, insight, god, *νοῦς*, etc., as being merely different names for it, shows that he was a decided disciple of Socrates. When, however, he calls the Good the One, because its essence consists in its unity with itself, or in its unchangeableness, or also Being, because its opposite does not exist at all; when he himself probably, his followers certainly, try to prove its reality by polemics against the possibility of Becoming and of motion, we cannot blame Cicero for calling the Eleatics the original authors of the Megarian doctrine. Moreover, such a fusion of Socratism with the doctrine of the One is rendered possible by Socrates' assertion that Virtue is One and excludes all plurality, and by the fact that he often described it as consisting in agreement with one's self, especially if we consider that motion and plurality were regarded as equivalent conceptions. This does justice indeed only to the formal side of the Socratic conception of virtue, and more and more overlooks the fact that, even if virtue is knowledge, it does not follow that all knowledge is virtue. The inquiries into the nature of knowledge, the opposition between rational cognition and opinion, because the former is concerned with the One and the universal, all this is quite in the spirit of Socrates. On the other hand, the Megarians display all the Eleatic fear of particularity, when they fail to penetrate to the conception containing its specific difference, but are contented with the abstract universal, excluding all particularity. This is the reason why reality is not attributed to the cabbage that is washed, but only to its generic conception; and why validity is only ascribed to the identical proposition: this is the ground, further, of Plato's rejection of the transcendent ideas of the Megarians in the *Parmenides*, as there was no third thing to mediate between them and reality. As to the further report respecting the Megarians, that they denied the antithesis of possibility and reality, this has been a favourite dictum of nearly all Pantheism. They also put it in the following way; that there could be no such thing as possibility—this middle term between Being and Non-being. This doctrine, afterwards, became important in their views as to the nature of the hypothetical judgment.

Diog. Laert. ii. 10 and 11. Ritter and Preller, *l.c.* § 228-243.

### § 69.

The reproach which Aristotle subsequently made to the

Pythagoreans, that in their conception of virtue they took no account of the material basis of all virtue, viz. the natural instincts, is perfectly applicable to the ethics of the Megarians. Their moral philosophy is formalistic, like that of Wolff and Kant in later times, because it has no consideration for individual divergences and natural capacities. It seems as if the undoubtedly important discovery of the Sophists, that the individual being is the standard of everything, had never been made at all. Similarly, when the Megarians cling to the Eleatic One, they quite forget that Heraclitus vindicated the claims of Becoming, and the Atomists the reality of plurality, and that because perception is concerned with both of these, it must nevertheless not be simply rejected as illusion and deceptive opinion. This one-sided interpretation of Socratism, which draws it down from its superiority to these earlier points of view because it is opposed to them, must be met by a supplementary interpretation which lays special stress on the very things the Megarians had excluded from Socratism. Hence the antithesis to the Megarians is formed by the Cyrenaic School.

### B.—THE CYRENAICS.

F. Mentzius: *Vita Aristippi*. Halle, 1719. A. Wendt: *De philosophia Cyrenaica*. Leips., 1835.

### § 70.

1. ARISTIPPUS, brought up in the luxurious city of Cyrene as the son of a rich merchant, came to Athens as a highly cultivated man of the world. He had been attracted by the fame of Socrates, and was so captivated by him that he did not again leave him. Even when, after the death of Socrates, he came forward as a teacher, he always wished to pass for a Socratic, although most of the others who called themselves followers of Socrates classed him among the Sophists, and not only because he received payment for his lectures. Nor was he altogether wrong, for it is really an aspect of the Socratic character which he makes his principle; and though it is a travesty, there is a Socratic element even in the *ἐχω οὐκ ἔχουαι* of Aristippus. Of the many writings attributed to him, a considerable portion perhaps really belonged to his successors. None of them have been preserved.

2. Like all philosophers since the time of Anaxagoras, Aris-



tippus also inquires into the purpose of everything. And since he, like Socrates, is interested only in man, all his inquiries are directed towards the highest end for man, *i.e.*, the Good. Whatever excludes the conception of an end, he neglects, as *e.g.*, mathematics. Logic and physics also are without interest in themselves, but acquire it by becoming subsidiary to ethics. For since, according to Socrates, virtue was knowledge, inquiries into knowledge as such (*περὶ πίστεως*) must form the logical part of philosophy, all the more that mistakes of reasoning may cause us to miss the highest end. The result of this is, that since all knowledge is perception, and since perception perceives only how it is affected, we only know about our own states of consciousness. These and their causes (*πάθη* and *αἰτίαι*) form the subject of the physical portion of his doctrine. All states of consciousness are reduced to violence, moderation, and lack of motion, and of these the first and third are opposed to the second, as pain (*πόνος*) and apathy to pleasure (*ἡδονή*). Which of these states of consciousness is to be sought and which to be avoided, is treated of in the properly ethical division of his system (*περὶ αἰρετῶν, περὶ φευκτῶν*). The decision is in favour of pleasure, which is declared to be the only good. In the reason given, *viz.*, that *all* men seek pleasure, one is inclined to see a divergence from Protagoras' "*every* man," and an approximation to the "man" of Socrates. By pleasure, Aristippus means only momentary (*μονόχρονος*) well-being, especially on its physical side, and hence the exercise of bodily functions is the means to virtue. The wise man never chooses pain, not even to purchase pleasure thereby. His maxim is to seize the enjoyment of the moment, not in order to be mastered by it, but in order to master it, as the rider does the horse. This levity, which does not think of the future in its enjoyment, distinguishes the hedonism of Aristippus from the deliberating and calculating eudæmonism of Epicurus and his followers (*v.* § 96, 4). Even here, however, we must recognise a Socratic element in the fact, that Aristippus is as little fond as Socrates of solitary enjoyment, and extols the art of living with men as the highest. It is true, however, that the addition of "like a stranger," again emphasizes the hedonistic aspect of social intercourse; and no one will wish to identify Aristippus' pleasure in society with the Eros of Socrates, which depended on the common pursuit of philo-

sophy. But it can be identified just as little with the isolating egoism of the Sophists. Even where Aristippus' utterances completely agree with those of the Sophists, he neutralizes them by others which show the impression made upon him by Socrates. Thus, when he regards nothing as being right by nature, but everything by enactment, this opinion is rendered harmless by his saying, that the sage would live just the same if there were no laws, as if there were. Many, in short, of the characteristic traits of Aristippus handed down to us display him as a man who might have served as a model of virtue to many a Cynic and Stoic.

3. The successors of Aristippus seem soon to have diverged from him, and to have approximated to the later position of the Epicureans. And then many of them formed schools of their own, which were called by their names. Besides the younger Aristippus, the son of the sister of the founder of the school, Theodorus is mentioned, together with Theodoriacis, who preferred the more reflective joy to the pleasure of the moment, and converted the myths into mere history. In this, his disciple Euhemerus went still further. Hegesias and his followers, in opposition to Aristippus, extolled freedom from pain as the highest good, and consistently preferred death to life. Anniceris and his adherents seem to have again approximated more closely to the original hedonism. But even they are wholly classed among the Epicureans by many authorities.

Diog. Laert. ii. 8. Ritter and Preller, l.c., 210-219. Mullach. ii. 397-438.

### § 71.

The moral philosophy of Socrates is degraded from its eminence both by its conversion into logic and into care for physical health and well-being. Whoever therefore maintains its opposition to such one-sided views may so far be called the true Socratic. But the attack upon each of them must necessarily bring about an approximation to the other; and any thinker with a deeper insight should come to see that both are not only wrong but also right, and hence consciously combine the sum of their doctrine. But where the profundity of thought required for this is lacking, the negative side only, viz., that both are wrong, will be upheld. But the Socratism which is opposed to them thereby becomes one-

sided in another way, and Socrates is conceived abstractly, to the exclusion of the pre-sophistic and sophistic elements within him. Hence the Socratism of the Cynics is abstract and exaggerated, or, as Plato calls it, Socratism gone mad.

### C.—THE CYNICS.

Chappuis: *Antisthène*. Paris, 1854. A. Müller: *De Antisthenis Cynici vita et scriptis*. Marburg, 1860.

#### § 72.

1. ANTISTHENES, the son of an Athenian of the same name and of a Thracian mother, came to Socrates after having received the training of a Sophist and Rhetorician under Gorgias. He was attracted by nothing so much as his god-like freedom from wants. This, however, so captivated him, that when, after the death of Socrates, he came forward as a teacher of philosophy in the gymnasium of the Cynosarges, from which the name of the school is derived, he maintained that he was only learning from Socrates, together with his hearers. But his rigid pride in his virtue, which Socrates censured so delicately, only enabled him to produce an exaggerated copy of the noblest of mortals. Of the large number of writings attributed to him, the authenticity of the greater part was denied already in ancient times. His rhetorical training seems to have come out strongly in those which really belonged to him. Besides himself there are mentioned, as representatives of his views, Diogenes of Sinope, whom the anecdotes told of him make into a model of impudent rudeness, perhaps to a greater extent than he deserved, and next to him Crates, who led the doctrine of the Cynics over into Stoicism.

2. Though his education as a Sophist might have inclined Antisthenes, like Aristippus, to lay most stress upon subjective satisfaction, he was preserved from one-sided individualism by the circumstance that Gorgias had been trained in the Eleatic doctrines. Hence, he regards as the highest end, neither, like Protagoras, what every man, nor, like Aristippus, what men in general, but what the universal principle in man, viz. the reason, requires. This doctrine completely harmonizes with Socrates, as does this, that virtue is one and consists in insight, and its opposite in ignorance, and that it is teachable; and it also agrees well with his continual appeal to the Socra-

tic force as the first thing requisite. But as soon as he defines more closely what the model thus held up really is, it becomes clear that Antisthenes only perceived in Socrates what the Megarians and Cyrenaics had neglected, and also that where he agrees with them he cannot combine the doctrines they had severally emphasized. This is especially illustrated by what we know of his *logical* inquiries. The Megarians by ascribing reality only to generic conceptions, and the Cyrenaics by ascribing it only to objects of perception, divided what the concrete conception of Socrates had contained as a whole. This Antisthenes feels; but when he demands that universal assertions should never be made concerning particular things, but that identical propositions should be uttered on the one hand, and the things be pointed out on the other, he never succeeds in uniting what Socrates combined, both in his process of induction and in his definitions. But what was remarked above, that Antisthenes was capable only of a limited comprehension of what Socrates was, is especially illustrated by his inquiries in *ethics* proper, to which he seems to have passed on without paying much attention to physics.

3. The Socrates of whom Antisthenes wishes to be a disciple, is only the man who defied all hardships, who stood in front of silversmiths' shops in order to rejoice that he did not want so many things, who wore no shoes, etc. The Socrates, on the other hand, who could give himself over to enjoyment so safely, at the feast of Agathon, he has never seen, and hence he thinks that Socrates always did things he found irksome. Hence he considers the struggle against the pleasures of the senses, the *πόνος*, as the true Good, in conscious opposition to Aristippus, and defines pleasure as an evil, which the wise man should shun in order to be self-sufficient, and to associate with himself. This anti-Aristippean formula Antisthenes was certain to enunciate, since he regarded social life as arising simply out of the fact that man is not sufficient for himself. The same holds good also of moral associations; hence marriage, family, and country become things indifferent to the sage; and there results a moral egoism, ill compatible with his master's passionate attachment to his city. And he is even put to shame by hedonism, when Aristippus connects with the proposition accepted by both, viz. that all laws are valid only by enactment, the assurance that the sage always acts in accordance with them, while

Antisthenes opposed virtue to obedience to the laws of the State. And reason he opposed not only to the natural instincts, but also to the ordinary opinions of men. Hence Antisthenes occupies a negative position with regard to all prophetic and divine influences, often in conscious opposition to Socrates ; and this has induced him to regard the myths of popular religion as mere allegories, and probably, like many of the Sophists, as allegories with a moral meaning. This refers especially to his moralizing commentaries on the *Odyssey* and on *Theognis*.

Diog. Laert. vi. 1, 2. Ritter and Preller, *l.c.* § 220-227. Mullach ii. 261-395.

### § 73.

The universal objective reason which Anaxagoras had meant (or at least included) in his *νοῦς*, has by the moral genius of Socrates become subjective in him (the *ἄνθρωπος* of Protagoras) ; so that when he consults his own genius, the deity answers in it, when he follows his own pleasure, reason is followed. Thus he stands above Anaxagoras and Protagoras as their higher unity. But when his genius is withdrawn, the two factors fall apart in such a way that the Megarians emphasize the first (*νοῦς*, *θεός*, *ἔν*), *i.e.* the content of the will of Socrates, the Cyrenaics the second, and therefore put pleasure above everything (*ἡδονή*, *χαρά*), which, in the case of Socrates, always accompanied his willing what was rational. Antisthenes could censure their one-sidedness, and hold fast the rights of subjectivity in opposition to the Megarians, and the objective content of the Good in opposition to the Cyrenaics. But as he was unable quite to comprehend the two as one, he also could not consciously reproduce the whole, but only one aspect of Socrates. But these attempts to comprehend more definitely single aspects of Socrates are only preludes to the achievement of combining them all, and of thus representing the idealism, in which Socrates had lived, as conscious and fully-comprehended Socratism. And comprehended also in this respect, that its connection with the past is recognised. The Megarians had shown how much room there was for Eleatic metaphysics in the Socratic doctrine ; Aristippus had indicated its points of contact with Protagoras, and hence with the physics of Heraclitus and the Atomists ; finally, Antisthenes had proved the possibility of being an adherent of Socrates, and yet remaining a dialectician after the fashion of a Gorgias trained

by Zeno and Empedocles. None of these facts were forgotten, and at the same time the last of the pre-Sophistic views of the world, that of the Pythagoreans, is consciously incorporated with Socratism. The representative of this Socratism, thus apprehended from every side, is Plato; and it is no accident that he connects all his inquiries with the person of Socrates, in whom philosophy had become personal.

## FIFTH DIVISION.

### Plato.

#### § 74.

#### PLATO'S LIFE.

Diog. Laert.: Lib. iii. Olympiodori et Anonymi: *Vitæ Platonis*. (Also in Didot's ed. of Diog. Laert. etc., Appendix, pp. 1-14.) K. Steinhart: *Plato's Leben*, Leipzig, 1873.

1. ARISTOCLES, afterwards surnamed PLATO, was the son of Ariston and Perictione, and born at Athens in Ol. 87, 3 (429) or 88, 1 (427 B.C.), and, as was asserted by his admirers in later days, on the 21st of May, the day on which the Thargelia were celebrated in honour of Apollo. With this they connected all sorts of fables; and they used also to celebrate the birthday of Socrates on the day before, which was the feast of Artemis. Growing up in the midst of the artistic and scientific glory to which the forty years of the activity of Pericles had raised his native city, and a continual eye-witness of the abuses following in the train of a degenerate democracy, Plato would probably have become an aristocrat, even if he had not been a descendant of the noblest families through both his parents, and if his nearest relations had not belonged to the oligarchical party. The men also who had the greatest influence on his development, and above all Socrates, were not favourably disposed to the democracy. His Dorism is just as little a proof of lack of patriotism, as Niebuhr asserted, as the Anglo-mania of Montesquieu and other Frenchmen in the 18th century. That Plato, when he had attained military age, took part, like the rest, in the campaigns that happened at

the time, can hardly be doubted, although the direct assertion of Aristoxenus and Ælian loses its value with regard to the third campaign, because in regard to the first two it contains an impossibility. Whether Draco, his teacher in music, and especially Epicharmus, who had been trained by the Pythagoreans, contributed to the development of his philosophic ideas, or whether they merely stimulated him to poetical efforts, is difficult to decide. But it is certain that when, in his 20th year, he came to Socrates, he burnt his poems and henceforth devoted himself to philosophy alone. He seems to hint in the *Phædo*, that he had even before this time become acquainted with the doctrines of the Ionian philosophers, and of Anaxagoras, and received instruction from Cratylus, the Heraclitean. According to Aristotle, he must also have known the doctrines of the Pythagoreans and Eleatics, at least superficially, before he gave himself up to the man whom he has always celebrated as his true teacher.

2. After the execution of Socrates, which filled him with disgust at all the pursuits of politics, he retired to Megara, and was there induced to study the Eleatic doctrine more thoroughly than hitherto. Thereupon he travelled; at first probably to Ionia, then to Cyrene and Egypt, where he studied mathematics, but at the same time opposed the doctrine of Aristippus, which was chiefly established in these countries. But most important of all, was his journey to Italy, where he came into closer contact with Pythagoreans, to whose influence we may also ascribe the fact that he moderated his repugnance to taking part in political life. His relations with the elder Dionysius, brought about by his friend Dion, could not of course prove permanent. In consequence of a disagreement, Plato left Syracuse, and was thereupon robbed of his liberty at Ægina, in a way that is variously explained. He owed the recovery of his liberty to the intervention of the Cyrenaic Anniceris. After his return to Athens, he opened his school, at first in the groves of the Academus, though it was afterwards transferred to the garden he had bought on the hill of Colonus. Except for two interruptions, caused by two fruitless journeys to Sicily, the first in order to win over the younger Dionysius to the cause of virtue and science, the second in order to reconcile him to Dion, Plato continued his activity as a teacher of philosophy until his death in Ol. 108, 1 (348 B.C.).

## § 75.

## PLATO'S WRITINGS.

1. All Plato's writings are exoteric dialogues, intended for the public of cultivated readers rather than for his school, elaborated more or less carefully, and of mimetic and dramatic beauty, each forming a whole in itself, and yet also a member of a larger whole. It has always been the aim of the critics' efforts to separate the spurious from the genuine; but because they formed either too ideal or too low a conception of Plato's point of view, they have not always avoided one-sided judgments, so that in many cases doubts have been cast even on writings which Aristotle quotes or indicates as Platonic. Besides these writings, we have also some, although imperfect, information, especially from Aristotle, as to the esoteric lectures, of which the form, though not the content, was confined to the school; and these also must be taken into account.

2. The attempts to arrange the Platonic dialogues in a systematic order date back to ancient times. The curious idea of the Alexandrian grammarian Aristophanes, to combine them in trilogies from a theatrical point of view, was not entirely carried out, and only deserves mention, because some editions follow this order (*e.g.*, the Aldine, the Basel, and Tauchnitz stereotype edition). In favour of the arrangement in tetralogies made in the time of Tiberius by the Thrasyllus who also affixed the alternative titles to the dialogues, it may be urged that at least two such tetralogies were undoubtedly intended by Plato himself. This order is adopted by some of the earlier manuscripts and editions, and more recently by C. F. Hermann. Lastly, the arrangement of Serranus according to syzygies must be mentioned, as it passed into the edition of Henricus Stephanus, which was for a long time the only one quoted, and thence into the Bipontine.

3. In more modern times, it has been felt that an arrangement of the Platonic writings was valuable only if it was based on investigations into the genesis and the connection of his doctrines, and the honour of beginning these belongs to Tennemann (*System der Platonischen Philosophie*, 4 vols. Leipz., 1792-95), although his undertaking was bound to fail in consequence of his attempting to base everything on the chrono-



logical data given by Plato himself. The translation of Plato by Schleiermacher (*Platon's Werke*. Berlin, 1804-28, 6 vols.) marks an epoch in the history of the question of the order of the Platonic writings, as well as in their appreciation: for in the introductions that accompanied it, he justified the order he gave them, as well as their arrangement in three groups, the introductory, the dialectical, and the expository. (This order is followed in J. Bekker's edition.) The work of Ast (*Platon's Leben und Schriften*, 1816), and the much more sober, but often hypercritical work of Socher (*Ueber Plato's Schriften*. Munich, 1820), were composed with a reference to Schleiermacher. Socher's attempt to determine fixed points which might serve to distinguish the dialogues of different periods, was repeated far more successfully by C. F. Hermann (*Geschichte der Platonischen Philosophie*. The first and only volume, Heidelberg, 1839), who fixed upon Plato's voyage to Megara, and the beginning of his activity as a teacher, as such points. Hermann's arrangement, although it sets out from an entirely different principle than Schleiermacher's, since the latter tries to trace in the sequence of the dialogues the course of Plato's *teaching*, and the former that of Plato's *learning*, nevertheless displays many points of contact with Schleiermacher. The most important differences concern the *Parmenides* and the *Phædrus*. The first of these, Hermann puts in the same position that Zeller had previously assigned to it in his *Platonische Studien*, whereas the second was, according to him, written as a programme at the outset of Plato's career as a teacher, as before him Socher, Stallbaum, and others had already asserted. (In fact, Hermann has in general many points of contact with the contents of the introductions accompanying Stallbaum's critical edition of all the Platonic Dialogues [3rd ed., Erfurt and Leipzig, 1846]). The order given by Hermann is in part approved and in part rejected by the valuable introductions with which Steinhart furnished H. Müller's translation of Plato, which, appearing from 1850 onwards, is at length completed (8 vols. 1856-66). All these different opinions are carefully considered and modified in some points in F. Sussehl's: *Genetische Entwicklung der Platonischen Philosophie* (2 vols. 1855-60). Munk, starting from quite other points of view, arrives at partially different conclusions (*Die natürliche Ordnung der Platonischen Schriften*. Berlin, 1857). The same remark holds

good also of Ueberweg's: *Untersuchungen über die Aechtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriften*. Vienna, 1861. The writings also of Michelis and Ribbing, mentioned at the beginning of the next §, discuss more fully the question of the order of the Dialogues. The second volume, especially, of Ribbing's book is entirely devoted to it; and by his often very severe criticism of the works that follow Hermann, he tries to do justice once more to Schleiermacher.

## § 76.

### PLATO'S DOCTRINE.

Van Heusde: *Initia philosophiæ Platoniciæ*. Lugd. Bat., 1825; 2nd ed., 1842. Zeller: *Platonische Studien*. Tübingen, 1839. F. Michelis: *Die Philosophie Plato's*. 2 vols., Münster, 1859-60. H. v. Stein: *Sieben Bücher zur Geschichte des Platonismus*. Götting, 1862, 64, 75. S. Ribbing (Prof. at Upsala): *Genetische Darstellung der Platonischen Ideenlehre*. 2 vols., Leipzig, 1863-64. Ritter and Preller, §§ 244-280.

1. Before giving an account of the dialectics, physics, and ethics, into which Plato's inquiries are divided so naturally that this division of his system must be called the Platonic one (whether he expressly maintained it as the true one, or whether he only indicated it), it is necessary to consider the investigations scattered over the different dialogues, which have merely the propædæutic aim of raising the reader to the level of the Platonic standpoint. Their *negative* task is, to prove the untenableness of his readers' point of view, which thereby becomes as it were the starting-point which makes the jump possible (*Rep.* 511 B). Plato, like every philosophical writer, assumes in all his readers familiarity with the generally prevalent conceptions, and in those trained in philosophy an acquaintance also with the philosophy of the time. And since, in the case of the majority, the doctrine of the Sophists was esteemed such a philosophy, and that of Socrates and the Socratics was current only in a small circle, with which Plato was connected by bonds of reverence for his master, and of grateful respect for many of his disciples, the negative side of his propædæutic inquiries consists in open attacks on the ordinary conceptions and the doctrines of the Sophists, combined with more concealed polemics against the point of view of Socrates.

2. The inadequacy of the ordinary conceptions in their

theoretical aspect, is made evident by shaking the faith in sense-perception (the αἰσθησις of the *Theætetus* and the *Parmenides*), and by showing that its object is continually changing, and that hence it cannot afford any firm certainty, but at the most probability (the εἰκασία of the *Republic*). The case is not much better when the memory of several perceptions (*Phædrus*) produces that which Plato sometimes includes with sense-perception under the common name of δόξα, but again, distinguishes as higher or true conception, from the latter, and sometimes calls δόξα simply. Its certainty is indeed greater than that of perception, but none the less it is not certain, because it lacks the consciousness of the reason, and hence can only admit a thing as a fact. We are the more entitled to regard this πίστις (*Rep.* 534 A), or higher form of δόξα, as what we call experience, that Plato himself (*Gorg.* 465 A. cf. *Phædr.* 62) opposes it as an ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβὴ to the τέχνη which knows the reasons, and denies, just as Aristotle did later, that the man who has merely δόξα is capable of teaching others, and at the most admits that he can persuade them (*Tim.*). The aim of all these discussions is to produce a feeling of perplexity with regard to one's former conceptions, the "wonder" of the *Theætetus*, without which no one begins to philosophize, and which coincides with the consciousness of ignorance (*Alcib. I.*). Plato aims also at producing a precisely similar distrust of the practical content of the ordinary conception. The ordinary virtue, the ordinary judgments that a thing is good or bad, are the result of custom, and diametrically opposed to philosophic or self-conscious virtue (*Meno, Phædo*). The instinctive attachment to ancestral custom, and the statecraft of a genius like Pericles, are, like the sacred frenzy which overpowers the poet, the result of a happy accident. There is no security that one guided by such rules of thumb will remain virtuous or propagate his statecraft (*Protag., Meno*). Such a training, further, is lacking in that which alone constitutes the value of an action, viz., the insight that it is good, and its execution because it is good. In common parlance, men are called brave even if they fight from fear (*Phædo*). Genuine virtue, on the other hand, coincides with the consciousness of its reasons to such an extent that such knowledge, as Socrates had already taught, ennoble even wickedness, while its absence spoils the highest virtue (*Hipp. min.*). Hence, just as the theoretical opinions of the

ordinary consciousness are devoid of truth, so its practical principles are without value; and to the theoretic wonder there corresponds the practical perplexity which contains the admission that it is not known what is good.

3. Up to this point of perplexity with regard to the traditions hitherto considered valid on theoretical and practical matters, Plato's course differs so little from that of the Sophists, that he not only frequently makes use of their weapons, but expressly ascribes (*Soph.*) a purifying force to sophistry. But beyond this point he opposes it, because it inferred from this negative result that complete subjectivism was the only tenable opinion. It is not, as Protagoras maintains, the natural and individual element (the pig) in man, but the universal (the god) within him, the reason, that is the measure of all things. And he upholds this objectivism, as against the Sophists, in the theoretical as well as in the practical sphere. For in the first place, he always emphasizes the antithesis of opinion and knowledge, and the reality of the latter. He shows that, according to Protagoras, there is no truth, and no knowledge; and that by this assertion the latter involves himself in a conflict with reason, because contrary assertions can be made concerning one and the same thing, and with himself, because he now asserted the impossibility of getting hold of things, whereas before he had undertaken to lead on to the mastery of things (*Theat.*). Similarly, in the second place, he attacks the practical errors of the Sophists, especially in the persons of Gorgias and Hippias. He urges the difference between desire and rational will, and shows that wherever pleasure is made the sole principle of action, there results the self-contradiction, that it is really pain that is chosen: the true art of life, therefore, must aim at something else (*Gorg.*). In the same way, if the State is based, not on justice but on violence and injustice, the principle of separation is made into a principle of union (*Rep.*). This twofold aspect of Plato's attitude towards the Sophists, due to the fact that, like them, he perplexes his hearers, but with a different purpose, induces him repeatedly to designate sophistry as the caricature of true science (*Gorg.*, *Soph.*).

4. Up to this point Socrates and his adherents would have had to agree with Plato, and this entitles him to put the doctrines he has so far developed into the mouth of Socrates. Nevertheless the fact that in some of the Dialogues Socrates

does not guide the discussion, and that these do not treat of ethical questions, must be esteemed as a gentle censure of his master for having confined himself so completely to ethics. And if in this case he was prevented by a disciple's reverence from criticizing more openly, such consideration was not at all, or only in a less degree, shown towards the other disciples of Socrates. The *Theætetus*, which was perhaps written in Cyrene, is a polemical attack upon Aristippus as well as upon Protagoras. It is proved against him that he falls short of his master, who after all assumed a knowledge superior to *δόξα*, which was accompanied by a concept and an explanation, and hence could give reasons for and an account of itself (Cf. *Symp*). But on this same occasion a hint is given that there exists a knowledge still higher than that of Socrates. This is evidently intended for the knowledge by Ideas which is "dreamt of" in the contemporaneous *Cratylus*. And just as the *Theætetus* criticizes the Cyrenaic point of view, so the *Parmenides* contains fairly intelligible indications, that the Megarians, by regarding abstract universal concepts as alone containing truth, and to an equal degree also the Cynics, approximated too closely to the pre-Socratic point of view. So the practical doctrines also of the Socratic schools are attacked as inadequate and one-sided. This is done especially in the *Philebus*, in which Plato represents Socrates in conflict with Cynics and Cyrenaics. The existence of an inner contradiction is exhibited both in pleasure without insight and in insight without pleasure. The Good, which is the object of true philosophy, lies above both these one-sided views in a higher sphere.

5. The *negative* result of Plato's inquiries, so far, is that neither the generally current conceptions, nor the Sophists, nor even Socrates in theoretical matters, nor his disciples either in the theoretical or the practical sphere, have grasped the truth. It is completed by *positive* instructions as to how it is possible to rise to the true point of view. The subjective condition required is the philosophic impulse, the desire to enjoy knowledge oneself and to produce it in others, which is therefore called Eros. This neither an omniscient (*σοφός*) nor an entirely ignorant being (*ἄμαθής*) feels, but only the *φιλόσοφος*, who is midway between having and not having knowledge. Hence Eros, the conception of which it is attempted to determine in the *Phædrus*, while the *Symposium* is chiefly devoted

to its glorification, is the son of Poverty and Wealth. Its lowest stage may already be recognised in the pleasure taken in beauty of bodily form, a higher form in the desire of the true erotic to generate in fair souls the thirst for truth, and finally its highest form in the desire which aims at attaining for oneself immortality, the image of divine changelessness, by grasping the Beautiful-in-itself in its eternal self-generation. And because this impulse is a knowledge that knows not, it is also thought of as forgetfulness; and it is difficult to decide how far the splendid myth of the *Phædrus* is Plato's only way of attaining to clearness in his own mind, and how far a conscious allegory. Thus justice is done to the dictum caricatured by the Sophists (*e.g.* Euthydemus), that one can learn only what one already knows. The philosophic impulse is the innate germ from which there issue art, morality, and science. But it can and must be nourished. And since all learning nourishes the mind, the philosopher must needs be desirous of learning, not however desirous of seeing and hearing; for sense-perception was not found to instruct, but only to persuade. Hence his desire of learning is directed towards the beautiful. And every concern about the beautiful nourishes the impulse, and hence also music, which is the preparation for the true music, *i.e.*, philosophy (*Rep.*, *Phædo*). Mathematics also must be added, because it teaches us to abstract from the sensible, although its subject-matter is still only intermediate between the sensible and the Ideas. Thus, though it is already knowledge, it is not yet the highest knowledge, but rather reflective thought based upon hypotheses of which *διάνοια* is the faculty (*Rep.*). But above all, the perfection of the inborn impulse towards knowledge is formed by the art of Dialectic, the nature of which, together with its antithesis to the methods of other philosophers and to other sciences, is described at length, especially in the seventh book of the *Republic*.

6. Dialectic, as the art of conducting a conversation, is opposed to the rhetoric of the Sophists, which only teaches how to represent persuasively the individual opinion of the speaker. In the dialogue, on the other hand, which consists in thinking in common and in mutual conviction, universally valid conceptions are attained. And as dialectic has to bring out the universal conception, the dialectician must be able to combine the particulars and thus show his synoptic powers

(*Rep.*, *Phædr.*). And the procedure by antinomies is the means alike of forming and of correcting concepts, in that it tests the concept when determined by the consequences which result from its hypothetical acceptance, or of that of its opposite. Hence not only is the more subjective irony of Socrates put forward as an example worthy of imitation, but also, in the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*, the procedure of Zeno the Eleatic. At the same time, continual attacks are made on the Sophists and Eristics, who regarded this method not as a means but as an end, and who moreover do not discover the contradictions in the concepts themselves, but apply them, and indeed only to phenomenal things, by adscititious points of view. But the ascent to the right determination of the concept, as embodied in the definition, is not yet the final stage. Rather it is necessary, when the definition has been found, to divide the sphere which has been constituted by the concept, up into the species which exhaust it, according to reasons contained in the concept itself. Division, therefore, according to the concept, and by preference by dichotomy, is just as much the function of the dialectician, as the discovery of the universal conception. But while the eristic jumps from one thing to another, the dialectician descends gradually, through all the intermediate stages from the One to the Many. Finally, as regards the relation of Dialectic to mathematics, it is the aim of the former to do away with all assumptions in order to attain its principle, whereas the latter never gets rid of unproved assumptions.

7. It is only when it has been trained in dialectic that the philosophic instinct becomes true philosophy; and hence to philosophize dialectically is also to philosophize truly and rightly (*Soph.*). It is not therefore the Eros alone that produces the result. If, then, we remember, that in the *Symposium* Socrates is extolled as the very incarnation of the Eros, this must be considered a proof that Plato regarded the continuation and justification of Socratism by means of Dialectic as the essential advance he had to make. This also explains how Plato could come to regard the dialectical method as equivalent to true knowledge, to use dialectic and philosophy sometimes as synonymous terms, and again employ the word Dialectic to designate that portion of his doctrine which contained the logical basis of the rest. The last is the sense we shall henceforth give to the word.

## § 77.

## PLATO'S DIALECTIC.

1. Plato must have been impelled towards the acceptance of the identity of Knowledge and Being which Parmenides had asserted so energetically (*v.* § 36, 2), and of the consequent necessity of ontological inquiries, by the study of the Megarian and Eleatic doctrines, to which he devoted himself more seriously after the death of Socrates. And he must have been all the more induced to do so by the example of the Cyrenaics, which showed that with every approximation to the Heraclitean denial of Being even Socratics ran the risk of converting all knowledge into opinion, and of falling a prey to sophistry generally. We can therefore understand that Plato, in the *Theætetus*, the programme of his dialectical researches, opposed the Eleatic view to that of the Sophists and Cyrenaics, and derived their sensualism from the Heraclitean "flux of all things." Not, however, as though the Eleatics possessed the whole truth. Even in the fact that these opponents of the "Flux" philosophers are likewise characterized with a nickname, that of the "All-consolidators," later adopted by Aristotle (*v. Sext. adv. math.* x. 46), we have an intimation of what he afterwards expressly asserts, in agreement with the *Cratylus* (written at the same time or soon after), *viz.* that unmoved Being does not exist, but that everything partakes of change and spatial motion, and, therefore, of plurality. Hence, just as every sentence is a combination of an *ὄνομα* and a *ῥήμα*, and contains a movable and an immovable element, so also true knowledge must neglect neither of these factors. It is true, however, that both in the *Theætetus* and in the *Cratylus* this higher point of view is only hinted at; he says, he "dreams" of it.

2. In order to find it, it was necessary to subject the point of view of the Eleatics and Megarians to as severe a criticism as that so far passed on the Heracliteans and Cyrenaics, and further to compare them with each other more precisely. This is done by discussing the thought-determinations on which their antithesis rests, by the method of antinomies peculiar to Zeno; and in so doing it is natural that not Socrates but Eleatics should appear as guiding the conversation; and for this same reason the Socratic manner of furthering the matter in hand by a real conversation disappears, and



makes way for lecturing on the one hand, and mere assent on the other. These inquiries are, moreover, distinguished from those in the *Theætetus* by the fact that the ontological aspect is more prominent in them than the epistemological and psychological. In the *Parmenides* (against the genuineness of which many arguments have, it is true, been brought, and most recently by Ueberweg, amongst others), Plato tries to show that if Zeno's method of disproving assumptions by the contradictions to which they lead be admitted, Eleaticism (and therefore the Megarian doctrines also) may be defeated by its own weapons. For its assumption that the One which excludes all plurality is real, leads to just as many contradictions as the contrary assumption of the various Physiologers, that not such a One, but only its contrary, exists. Nor is the fact that the introduction and the first part of the dialogue promises to seek for the Ideas, really forgotten in the discussion of these antinomies; for the question of the relation of the One to the Many, *i.e.* of the highest Idea to the many subordinated to it, and of every Idea to the concrete individual, is really the cardinal problem of the theory of Ideas. Besides, the first part gives reasons to explain why the Ideas must not be regarded as universal conceptions entirely separated from the individual beings; while the second hints, it is true only very superficially, that the point of union of the One and the Many, which coincides with that of rest and motion, is to be conceived as timeless or "momentary." The *Sophist* treats of the same subject as the *Parmenides*. The fact that the course of the dialogue is guided by an unknown Eleatic, *i.e.* no real personage, but a Platonically-idealized type, seems to indicate that this dialogue makes an advance upon the *Parmenides*, and to tell in favour rather of the order of Steinhart than of that of Zeller. The expressions are slightly modified. Besides those employed in the *Parmenides*, there occur also Rest and Motion, and especially the Same and the Other, indicating correlation rather than contradictory opposition. And the result also confirms that their relation is such, that neither must be sought without the other, and that therefore the One must be sought in the Many, and the Same and the Permanent in that of which it is the nature to be always "Other," *i.e.* in the Changeable and Moving. With this result of the method of antinomies there is connected an attempt, not, it is true, altogether in earnest, at division into kinds

by dichotomy, which, as we saw (*v.* § 76, 6), supplemented the former in the complete dialectic.

3. Thus the Megarian and Eleatic doctrines, though they had not satisfied him, had impelled Plato to look for a point of union of the One and the Many; but he was enabled to find it only by a more thorough acquaintance with the Pythagoreans. It is only after his return from Italy that his doctrine appears fully established and rounded off into a complete system. This is the case already in the *Phædrus*, where he gives us to understand that literary activity no longer satisfied him, thus making one think of the purely oral tradition of the Pythagoreans, but also declares that only he should come forward to teach who had explored the whole of nature. And wherever we can trace distinct indications of Pythagoreanism in Plato, we find him in possession not only of a system of physics, but also of his theory of Ideas. That is to say, in the *Symposium*, and especially in the *Phædo*, in addition to the *Phædrus*. But none of his dialogues displays the grounds of his doctrine and its connection with his earlier inquiries more clearly than the *Philebus*. In the discussion whether the Good consists in pleasure or insight, Socrates, who here conducts the conversation because the question is an ethical one, at first sides with those who declare in favour of insight; afterwards, however, he proceeds to show that the doctrine of the Cynics, making insight the opposite of pleasure, is just as one-sided as that of their opponents, when they overlook the fact that pleasure is impossible without consciousness, and hence without insight. Thus the ethical antithesis of pleasure and insight is reduced to the same logical antitheses which had been discussed in the *Parmenides* and in the *Sophist*—that of the One and the Many, of Becoming (*γένεσις*) and Being (*οὐσία*). But Plato does not rest content with this Eleatic formula, but reduces it to the Pythagorean one of the unlimited and the limit. For as both are combined in the definite number, so Plato asserts that in spite of the preference he shows for the limit, the truth lies only in their combination, the μικτόν or μικτὴ οὐσία. This in its turn has for its principle (*αἴτιον*) the νοῦς, the fourth and highest form of existence. Thus not only is the result of these propositions, as bearing on the ethical and main question, that the νοῦς is the highest in the series of good things, and that the insight which is more akin to it receives a higher place than pleasure,

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but, apart from this, its importance for the subject of Dialectic is, that in a fairly explicit form it contains the sum-total of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas.

4. For it is this One in and above the Many, the Being in and above Becoming, the identical in and above the changing, that which is one as being definite, and which, just because definite, cannot be thought without an "other," a "many," or a "not-being"—it is this that Plato designates by the most various names; at one time by the ὄντως ὄν, at another by the λόγος and οὐσία, or as the αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, or the αὐτὸ τὸ . . . completed by the Idea in question, or again by the αὐθ' ἕκαστον, or the ὃ τί ἐστίν or ὃ ἐστίν ἕκαστον, or lastly as the γένος or εἶδος, or εἶδος νοητόν or ιδέα. The last of these names, though it occurs most rarely in the plural (*Rep.* vi. 507 B, etc.), is the one which in later times came in vogue most of all. But where we speak of Ideas, Plato generally speaks of εἶδη. His saying, that there were as many Ideas as universal names, already gives a clue to his meaning. If we combine with this the fact that he calls an Idea that which is arrived at by abstracting from individual differences, we may say that the Platonic Ideas are, as the name already indicates, species or genera, in short, universals. Considering further that the name is applied to that which makes the table a table and a man a man, we can appreciate also Herbart's expression, that the Platonic Ideas were pure qualities. And pure (εἰδικρινές) they may be called all the more justly that each describes a single quality only, whereas in the concrete things it appears mixed and polluted with others. But this essence, which is common to all things bearing a common name, must not be conceived as merely produced by the understanding in the formation of abstractions, and as being therefore a mere conception, but it subsists and possesses reality, nay, the individual being, *e.g.*, the *animals*, pass away, while the universal, the *animal*, persists. Thus, though the Idea is not here or there, or to be perceived by the senses, but νοητόν, and beyond the world of change, ἐν τόπῳ ὑπερουρανίῳ (cf. § 32, 4), it is nevertheless the truly (ὄντως) real, the only substantial existence, by participation in which alone individual things exist. But the description of the Idea as the universal in a class of individuals does not yet exhaust its nature. It must at the same time include the teleology of Anaxagoras and Socrates, since the Idea not only states as what, but also for

what, a thing exists. Hence Plato calls the Ideas *παράδειγματα*, and makes the *νοῦς*, the power that posits ends, their principle; they determine things both as their essence and their end. When therefore Herbart sets up his mathematical formula for Platonism, as being the Eleatic doctrine divided by the Heraclitean, he forgot to multiply by the chief factor, viz., the Socratic.

5. But if every Idea is not only the common essence and true being of the individual existences comprised under it, but also their end, the different expressions Plato uses in order to unify the whole complex of ideas, the *τόπος νοητός* as he calls it, are cleared up. Thus in the *Phædo* a warning is given, with an express reference to Anaxagoras, against regarding the conditions of a thing's existence as its cause (*αἷτιον*), on the ground that this was found only in its purpose. The purposes of the individual things are there described as the better and the best, i.e. as the relatively good; the ultimate purpose, on the other hand, which concentrates all the rest, is called the *ἀγαθόν*, not the comparatively, but the absolutely good. It follows from what has been said, that this is the *αἷτιον*, the ground and principle of all ends. And bearing in mind that the Ideas are ends, they are all subordinated to the highest end as their principle, i.e., to the Good. Accordingly, the Good, or the Idea of the Good, is everywhere represented by Plato as the Idea of Ideas, and the absolute Idea. (Especially in the *Republic*.) And it is the first principle of the universe because it is its final purpose. It moves all things because all strive after it, the unmoved. In the *Philebus* it is not mentioned; but *νοῦς* and also *σοφία* and *Ζεὺς* are found instead. For, like Socrates and the Megarians, Plato also treats *νοῦς* and *ἀγαθόν* as perfectly equivalent terms. Or if stress is laid on the fact that in the *Philebus*, the *νοῦς* is called the ruler (*βασιλεὺς*) of heaven and earth, it should be remembered that in the *Republic* also Plato says of the Idea of the Good, that it rules in the heavenly region (*βασιλεύει*). If then the Ideas were the *ὄντως ὄντα*, the Good or the Idea of the Good must be the *ὄντως ὄν*; if they were *οὐσίαι*, it must be *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας* as standing above them. And that Plato called this supreme Idea also the *εἷν*, we need not doubt, when we consider the example of the Megarians. For, just as the individual beings subordinated to an Idea partake of true Being by this participation, so the Ideas do so by partaking in the Idea of the Good, so that it can be called

the sun, whereby all things are endowed with growth and Being.

6. Plato's Dialectic, by regarding the one Idea (the final purpose) as manifesting itself in a plurality of Ideas (ends), combined all the achievements of previous metaphysics, and thereby also transcended them. For like the Pythagoreans and Eleatics he seeks the One and true Being, and succeeds in finding it. At the same time, he identified this conception with the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras and the Good of Socrates. So far he would not have achieved more than the Megarians, and would have arrived at an absolute end in the shape of a Being completely at one with itself. But as a matter of fact the investigations of the *Parmenides*, the *Sophist*, and the *Philebus* justified the claims also of plurality; thus by including this Heraclitean and Atomistic factor, the Monad is transformed into *μονάδες*, the mere *ἓν* into *ἐνάδες*, a name Plato actually uses in speaking of the Ideas, and this of course without losing their ethical (End-) character. All these Ideas (unities) form, by their subordination to the highest Idea including them all, a system, a *ζῶον* or organism; and for this reason it is possible to distinguish as the aspects of this whole truth, beauty and symmetry (*Phileb.*). By the Good, therefore, we must understand the principle of the order of the universe, both in nature and in morality. And this single purpose of the world is as the *ὄν ὄντως* the object of Dialectic, which enables us to rise from the Ideas, these essences and ends of things, to the Good, the essence of all essences, and essence and end of the All.

7. But according to Plato's own declaration, the dialectician is required not only to ascend from the particular to the universal, but also conversely to derive the particular from the universal. Hence an answer must be given to the question of how the single *νοητόν*, the Good, becomes the whole *τόπος νοητός* or *κόσμος*, as he called it in later times, the whole complex of relative ends. And if even to us, when in such derivations we speak of first and second order, number seems to be an indispensable factor, this must have been so to a far greater extent in Plato's case, seeing that he had arrived at his doctrine of Ideas with the help of the Pythagoreans, and in the *Philebus* had actually mentioned definite number as intermediate in this way between the indefinite and the limit. It appears from the accounts in Aristotle, which have been

carefully collected by Trendelenburg, Zeller, Brandis, and Susemihl, that Plato, especially in his later days, was fond of designating the Ideas by numbers. We can understand too, that these numbers were distinguished from the ordinary ones as Ideal Numbers, that he asserted that they could not be added together, that they stood in order of rank and in the relation of different powers, etc. The further accounts show great agreement with the Pythagoreans; for when we remember the infinitely small and the infinitely great, we can hardly call it a difference that the *ἄπειρον* of the Pythagoreans is in Plato called the *μικρόν καὶ μέγα*. The geometrical significance of the first four numbers is also quite Pythagorean, and his conception of the point, at the most, can be considered peculiar to himself. The same applies to the connection of the four first numbers with the degrees of knowledge (cf. § 32, 4, 5). But Plato, like the more sober Pythagoreans, probably did not go beyond the number ten in his deductions. It is, however, evident that a modification of view corresponds to the change of terminology. His greater desire to fill up the chasm between unity and plurality, and, in connection with this, that between the Ideas and sensible things, is in itself a proof that the latter have risen in his estimation, and proves therefore a greater estrangement from Eleaticism. That indeed this should be effected by a continuously increasing Pythagorizing, bears a resemblance, at least, to retrogression. But however this may be, we shall hardly be entitled to assert that everything that Aristotle reports concerning the Platonic doctrine of number, agrees wholly with what is found in his Dialogues.

8. In view of the identity of existence and knowledge mentioned above (§ 77, 1), the certainty of knowledge also must be rendered possible by the Ideas, as being the *ὄντες ὄντα*. For the objects of perception did not provide certainty; for, being themselves intermediate between Being and Non-Being, they could produce only appearances, and at the most belief in the latter (cf. § 76 2). Hence the knowledge of the Ideas and of their concentrated form, the Good, can alone give full certainty. And since they were the *νοητά*, such knowledge is called *νοῦς* or *νόησις*. Its object, therefore, is only that which has part in the Good, and in so far as it so partakes, and hence too the Idea of the Good is called the sun which makes things visible, *i.e.*, knowable. It follows as



a matter of course, that philosophical contemplation must be teleological. Between this knowledge and the two degrees of δόξα, lies what is sometimes coupled with the higher νοῦς under the common name of ἐπιστήμη, and then distinguished from it as διάνοια, and sometimes called ἐπιστήμη in opposition to the νοῦς, viz., discursive thought, as it shows itself especially in mathematical knowledge, but also in cases where a theory makes it possible to give a reason for phenomena. In the *Gorgias*, Plato, like Aristotle later on, calls it τέχνη. Its object, the permanent, stands midway between the eternal and the changeable, with which the νόησις and the δόξα are respectively concerned. In the famous allegory in the 7th book of the *Republic*, which however may contain other references besides, this gradation is illustrated by the seeing of the shadows of the statues cast by the sun, of the statues illumined by the sun, of the illumined originals of the statues, and finally by the view of the all-illumining sun itself.

9. But the Good is to be regarded not only as the highest and all-inclusive Being and object of knowledge, but also as that by the participation in which the thinking human mind can alone perceive it and all else. The sun is said to produce, not only the growth and visibility of things, but also the eye's power of sight, which being called the highest ὄν, the highest νοητόν, and lastly also the νοητικόν, and in the *Philebus* the νοῦς comes very near to the well-known Aristotelian definition. That the same name (νοῦς) should designate the object of our knowledge and our knowledge itself, is intelligible, because Plato regards our knowledge as partaking in the object of all knowledge, precisely as our soul is part of the world-soul and our body of the world-body (*Phileb.*). And as the One is the crown and essence of the Ideas, it goes without saying that our recognition of the Ideas is derived from ourselves. Hence it is not necessary to explain this fact, as the *Phædrus* does, by the pre-existence of the soul and its contemplation of the Ideas previously to its earth-life, of which it is again reminded by every sight of beauty. But for this very reason, and because pre-existence is very often brought into causal connection with the post-existence which Plato regarded as indubitable, and finally because, in a passage which does not at all deal with the doctrine of reminiscence, he asserts decidedly that the number of souls existing neither increases nor decreases, it is hardly

possible to assert that the whole content of that splendid myth of the *Phædrus* is merely ornamental setting. A great deal of it may be proved to be Pythagorean. What Egyptian, Phœnician, and perhaps even Indian elements have been intermingled with it, it would be difficult to decide. The substance of the Platonic Dialectic may thus be briefly stated by saying, that the Ideas give a support to the changing phenomena, and certainty to knowledge. They are arrived at by the balancing of fundamental antitheses. They culminate and are also rooted in the highest Idea, the Good, which is the true principle of all being and all knowledge, from which they can be systematically derived only by means of numbers. They live in the spirit of man; and his true attainment of knowledge consists in his becoming conscious of them.

## § 78.

### PLATO'S PHYSICS.

Böckh : *De Platonica corporis mundani fabrica*. Heidelb., 1809. The same : *Ueber die Bildung der Weltseele*, in Daub and Creuzer's *Studien* iii., 1 ff  
H. Martin : *Études sur le Timée de Platon*. Paris, 1841. 2 vols.

I. When Dialectic has shown that the Good is the only object of knowledge, the only task left to *Physics* must be to consider the Good in its sensible manifestations. But since phenomena are known by perception, we cannot expect as strict a deduction as in the case of Dialectic. Hence the express declaration that we must often content ourselves with probabilities, and admit myths instead of proofs. The first question then is, What must be added to the Good, or the body of Ideas, in order that it may become Nature, *i.e.*, the Good manifested to sense? Of course it must acquire predicates which are opposed to those of the Good, and therefore it is described as the mere means, as the many which never *is*, as devoid of order and restlessly moving, as utterly empty of Ideas, and capable only of being imagined, not of being known; and as standing towards the Idea, as the *ἐν*, in the relation of the *μικρόν καὶ μέγα*, and opposed to the always Identical as that which is always "other." This principle has been quite generally called, since Aristotle's time, *ὑλη*, or matter; and to judge by the use Plato himself makes of this word in the

*Philebus*, it may be conjectured that this was also the name given to it by Plato in his lectures. It is called the *συνάτριον* of the world, but must not be understood as a definite substance, as is proved by the negative predicates, of the void of quality, and form, and visibility which are ascribed to it. What then was it? According to Aristotle's assertion, which agrees with Plato's own explanation in the *Timæus*, it was Space. Or perhaps it may be still more accurately described as the form of outwardness; so that it would denote not only the form of co-existence but also of sequence, but not by any means time or measured sequence. Thus, if one bears in mind that the co-existence and sequence must not be conceived as ordered, one can understand how the Ideas which are pure unities can be transformed by the *ὕλη* into a thing, *i.e.* into a chaotic congeries of many ideas. But the chief point is, that we must not by any means understand by this *ἐκμαγεῖον*, which takes real shape when the Idea enters into it, in any way a definite substance, but only a mere form awaiting a content. Hence it is nothing taken in itself, and only a forcible abstraction from reality (*νόθῳ λογισμῷ ἀπτόν*). Although, therefore, the dualism of Plato is not as crude as that of Anaxagoras, he is nevertheless unable to transcend dualism for lack of the conception of concrete creation. He remains a dualist because he cannot show *why* the Ideas enter into the world of sensible appearance. That, however, he assumes a connection between the reason which divides the one Idea (of the Good) into a plurality of Ideas, and that which causes each Idea to manifest itself in its turn in a plurality of things, is clearly shown by the fact that in both cases he uses the expressions *ἄπειρον*, *μικρὸν καὶ μέγα*, *πλήθος*, *μέθεξις*, *μίμησις*, etc., and is also quite intelligible. For if there were not many Ideas, sensible things participating in many Ideas would be impossible. But it cannot be admitted without question, that together with the plurality of Ideas the plurality also of the copies of each Idea has been deduced, and that hence the sensible world has already been constructed in the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Philebus*, although important authorities assert this with reference to the two former, and almost all with regard to the *Philebus*. The more correct view perhaps would be to regard the *ἄπειρον* of the *Philebus* as the ideal basis merely of the *ἐν φ* of the *Timæus*, *i.e.*, as *extension as such*, into which there must enter a more precise determination (*πέρας*), if it is

intended to state in what extension a quality is intensified, a concept enlarged, or a space increased.

Cf. Siebeck, *op. cit.* § 64, 1. Pt. 2, Plato's doctrine of matter.

2. It is the point we have just brought out that displays the defect of the Platonic doctrine, which in the *Phædrus* removed the Ideas into a supra-cosmic place (*ὑπερουράνιος*, cf. § 77, 4). For because of this transcendence they cannot of themselves interfere in our world; they are devoid of energy, mere objects of contemplation that do not realize themselves. And what they cannot in themselves do can only be effected, if at all, by an extraneous power, *i.e.* the Deity, who is thus the artificer of things. The assertion, therefore, that in Plato the Idea of the Good coincides with the Deity, is only in so far correct, that in his Dialectic he really does not require a deity beside that Idea. The ultimate end of the universe is a sufficient reason for the existence of the Ideas, even though it was not shown why there should be any particular number of Ideas, since the end was found to be a reason. And for the same reason the *αἴτιον* also of the *Philebus* is not distinguished from the Idea of the Good, and its description by the term *νοῦς* is adopted from Socrates and the Megarians. But an entirely different face is put upon the matter when Plato passes over into physics. The more glaring the antithesis between the Good as the *ὄν ὄντως*, and matter as the *ἔτερον* and therefore *μὴ ὄν*, the more requisite, the less pronounced the antithesis, the less requisite, is a third factor, in order to explain the infusion of the Idea into matter. Hence Aristotle (v. § 87, 9), and also the Neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation, no longer requires a *Deus ex machina*, whereas Plato's physics does. The difference, moreover, between saying that the Deity in Plato is a being different from the Good, and that he is only another aspect of the Idea of the Good, is important only to those who approach Plato with questions like that *e.g.* of the personality of God, the understanding and still more the answering of which required the lapse of centuries. God contemplates the Ideas, the eternal archetypes of things, but contemplates them as a poet does his ideals, *i.e.* generating them himself (*Rep.*), and then implants them into matter. Thus we can understand the appellation of God as the *ὄθεν φύεται*, and of matter as the *ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον*, and that the part of the father is ascribed to the

former, that of the mother or the maternal nurse to the latter, and that God is the reason, matter the *συναίτιον* or condition of the world. For, according to Plato, the beginning of the world, both in time and in thought, takes place when the mediation of the Deity, itself good and free from envy, and desirous of making all things as like as possible to itself, implants or generates the Good in matter, and thus produces the world. Hence the world is the *υἱὸς μονογένεης* of the Deity and *εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ*, because, like the former, it is good : before its genesis it may be called the future, after its genesis the visible and created second God ; but in any case a blessed deity. And just as the whole system of Ideas had been called a *ζῶον αἰδίδιον* or *νοητόν*, an eternal or “intelligible” organism, so now that rational adaptation (*νοῦς*) has been implanted into matter, which is as such void of order and hence *ἄλογον*, dominated only by external necessity, and as it were incorporated in it, the world, as the image of the former organism, must be called a *ζῶον ἐννοῦν*. Everywhere therefore in this organism we must distinguish two factors : the divine element of adaptation on the one hand, and the merely necessary on the other, which serves the former as an indispensable condition.

3. To explain the first entering in of purposive connection into the disorder, Plato required a deity who should establish that order. But even the maintenance of this connection seems to him to require, not indeed the continuous intervention of the Deity, for this he denies, but an intermediate link. And in addition to the fact that the similarity of the two problems, indicated in the identity of the terminology, suggested the thought of appealing to the aid of number, in order to explain how each of the many Ideas in its turn existed in plurality, just as in the former case it had served to deduce the plurality of the Ideas themselves, and moreover that numbers had been repeatedly declared intermediate between the *νοητόν* and the *αἰσθητόν*, Plato was probably determined also by the fact that, like all men, he took pleasure in mathematical regularity, which is closely akin to that produced by purposive order. In short, he made harmony, swayed by number, the mediating bond which connects the *νοῦς*, or purposive order, with the *σῶμα*, or external world. We can understand too how the name given to that which holds this intermediate position is the same as that which combines body and reason in the human individual, viz. “soul.” and can hardly understand anything else by the

"world-soul," than the mathematical order that sways the All, or the harmonic relations prevailing in it. Thus it becomes quite intelligible why Plato describes the world-soul as combined out of a twofold nature, and represents it as a numerical series, formed when the powers of the first even (2) and uneven (3) numbers are put together into a series, to which the root of all numbers (1) is prefixed. This series, as explained by Böckh, presents a diatonic scale of a little more than four octaves, when the intercalations supplied by Plato himself have been effected.

4. The further account also, that the world-soul thus created received the form of two circles with a common centre, but not in the same plane, of which the inner one, divided into seven circles, moves in the opposite direction to the outer and undivided one, is also quite intelligible, if one refers it to the heaven of the fixed stars, the seven circles of the planets, and the earth fastened to the axis of the world. (Gruppe's attempt to vindicate Plato's far more developed astronomical conceptions, has been successfully combated by Böckh.) By means of this mathematical order it is possible that the sensible world is a manifestation of the absolute conformity to end, *i.e.* of the Good, and thereby similar to the Deity; and hence, in virtue of this similarity to God, that it partakes of the divine attributes, as far as its nature permits. Thus, though the world cannot partake of true eternity, it yet acquires the moving copy of eternity, *i.e.* time, in which the motionless "is," of eternity is drawn out into "was" and "shall be." But in order that time may exist, the heavenly bodies are attached to the circles of the planets, especially the sun and the moon, which for this reason are called the organs of time *par excellence*. But the world has other attributes also in virtue of its kinship to the divine. Its unity and the perfection of its form and motion are such. For the spherical form is the highest of all. Thus the all-embracing universe feeds upon itself by the circular motion of all things, and breathing in nothing foreign from without, maintains itself in a beautiful self-sufficiency. Lastly, the circular motion returning upon itself is the most perfect, because an image of thought in its identity with itself.

5. And just as these last assertions display Plato's accord with the Eleatics, so, when he treats no longer of the whole world but only one side thereof, the *σῶμα*, his treatment shows his dependence not only on the Pythagoreans, but also on the

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**Physiologers.** In fact, there is hardly any important point of doctrine in the earlier philosophies that Plato does not include in his own system. But what distinguishes him from them, and at the same time keeps him in harmony with his own attacks on the fundamental conceptions of the earlier philosophers of nature (e.g. in the *Parmenides*), is the thoroughly teleological foundation of his whole physics. And of that teleology man is the aim, as being the bearer of the moral order. Thus, though in form the *Timæus* is a continuation of the *Republic*, the real relation is, as Plato himself explains, that the *Timæus* shows how man is called into existence, and the *Republic*, how he is fully developed. The *Timæus* tries to show how the world, or the unconscious manifestation of the Good, finally arrives at man who consciously accomplishes it. At the very outset the derivation of the elements is teleological. Fire and Earth are necessary as means to visibility and tangibility; but two require a third to mediate between them, indeed two more, since Three forms only a plane, and it is Four alone that has complete corporeality (cf. § 32, 4). The best and most harmonious relation of the elements possible, is a continuous proportion, such that in the all-embracing world Fire is to Air as Air is to Water, and as Water is to Earth. And since Plato's primitive matter is nothing more than the form of spatiality, he must derive the differences of the elements from the configurations of spaces. Like the Pythagoreans, he ascribes to each of the elements its own atomic form; but he differs from them in regarding ether as being merely a finer kind of air, and hence has the dodecahedron remaining over, which is sometimes stated to be the form of the stars, but above all, by introducing his three-dimensional construction of the elements by one in two dimensions upon which it is founded. For since the side surfaces of the regular solids either are triangles or may be divided into them, he regards space as being primarily divisible into nothing but triangles. This two-dimensional atomism reduces the atoms of the Pythagoreans to molecules of secondary rank, and makes it possible not only to assume the transition of one element into another, in opposition to Empedocles, but even to make it clear to perception. On the other hand, he agrees with Empedocles in his denial of the void; and he so often uses its impossibility in order to explain certain phenomena, that he may be called the author of the theory of the *horror*

*vacui*. It reminds us too of Empedocles, that friendship is said to combine the smallest particles, while it seems a reminiscence of Anaxagoras and the Atomists that the parts so united are of the same nature. This attraction of like to like serves at the same time for deducing the properties of weight and lightness, which he identifies with density and rareness ; for since the heavens envelop the earth, they are just as much below as above it, so that this distinction of the earlier Physiologers becomes to him unmeaning. The various substances arise out of the combination of the four elements, and are considered especially with reference to the effects they produce on the organs of sense.

6. What has just been said is in itself a proof that Plato takes less interest in the inorganic than in the living. And just as the world, in order to be as like as possible to that which lives by its own power, had itself to be alive, so it must also include all kinds of living beings. And first of all, immortal beings, such as the constellations, the created deities which the people worship as gods, then the fixed stars, perfectly satisfied with themselves, and hence motionless, next the restlessly circling planets, and lastly the earth, the most venerable of the divinities generated within the heavens, of which the children are the Olympian gods, and further the dæmons. All these gods, as having come into being, are not indeed eternal or in themselves immortal, but they will never cease to be. To their activity is committed the production of the mortal beings that inhabit the air, the water, and the earth, with this single exception : that in man the germ of immortality is derived from the primary Maker, who created a definite number of souls, and then, setting himself at rest, abandoned them to the younger gods, in order that they might clothe them in a coarser soul and a body. This body then, with regard to its component particles, is as it were an extract of what the whole world is, with regard to its form, at least in its noblest organ a copy of the universe ; and since the same holds true of his reason and his soul, man is thus the world in miniature. To serve him is the destiny of all else, that of the plants to supply his food, that of the animals to serve as the habitation of unworthy human souls after death. In this, man is treated as teleologically as everything else. The purely physical explanations are not rejected but declared insufficient ; they inform us only of the

conditions under which an organ acts, but not of the true reason why it does so. Thus Plato lays far greater stress on the fact that sight opens the way to knowledge, the highest of goods, than upon the way in which it is produced.

7. And just as in the universe rational adaptation was combined with rigid necessity, so in man the reason attached to the head is connected with the desire which aims at the satisfaction of necessary wants, and has its organ in the abdomen, to which, however, the grace of God has given in the liver also an organ of knowledge, although of knowledge of the lowest kind, in the shape of prophetic presentiment akin to madness. And just as the chest is situated between these two organs, so the rational and the desiring parts of the soul are connected by the *θυμός*, the vigorous and manly part of the mortal soul prepared by the secondary deities, the destiny of which it is to be the instrument of the immortal part of man, the reason derived from the Supreme Maker, and at its command to bridle the desires, although indeed it often becomes subject to them. That this threefold division of the soul,—which from the nature of its problem the *Timæus* only considers from its practical side,—corresponds perfectly to the theoretical triad of perception, conception, and knowledge, has been expressly stated by Plato, very frequently with regard to the first and third, more rarely and indirectly with regard to the second. Further, since the soul is the true principle of life, it is a logical contradiction that it should not live. Hence Plato most emphatically asserts the continual existence of the soul, as post-existence as well as pre-existence. The chief reasons for this are collected in the *Phædo* and the *Republic*, from the law of the universe that all things issue from their opposites, and hence life from death, and the impossibility that a simple substance should be dissolved, down to the argument that the possession of eternal truth is a pledge of the eternity of that which possesses it.

## § 79.

### PLATO'S ETHICS.

Krohn : *Der platonische Staat*. Halle, 1876

1. Like the whole of philosophy, *Ethics* also must of course treat solely of the Good. But in ethics it is considered, as it

forms the content of human volition, and that gives what is generally called the highest good. In determining this also, Plato rises above the one-sided conceptions of his predecessors. In the *Theætetus* indeed he attacks the Hedonists so severely that he comes very near recommending the avoidance of pleasure. But this exaggeration he opposes in the *Philebus*, where he maintains, as against both extremes, that only that which is beautiful and moderated can be good. As regards this, therefore, he considers everything immoderate and exaggerated as a disease of the soul, the health of which he finds in pleasure limited by insight, in a happiness which coincides with virtue because virtue is sought for its own sake. This normal condition, the true virtue, is neither a gift of nature, for "no one is good by nature," nor the product of arbitrary willing, for then all would be virtuous, since no one is voluntarily evil; rather, as has been shown in respect of philosophy generally, so in the case of true, *i.e.* philosophic virtue, cultivation must come to the aid of moral instincts. Virtue must be taught; and education is one of the most important points in Plato's ethics.

2. Socrates had exhibited this virtue, regulated by the μέτρον ἄριστον, without harshness and exaggerations in his life, but at the same time laid stress on the fact that virtue being insight was only one. But Plato attempts to eliminate the abstract character from the definition also of the conception of virtue, and hence interprets this unity as concrete, *i.e.* as the conception of a sum-total and system of virtues. These are the famous cardinal virtues. The *Protagoras* still enumerates five principal virtues, and it is possible that these were really first brought forward by Protagoras, so that he led the way for Plato. The *Euthyphro*, however, reduces one of these virtues, οσιότης, to justice, and this explains how the *Symposium* is able to speak of four only. These four are then, in the *Republic*, connected with the Platonic psychology, so that σοφία arises from the rational regulation of the λογιστικόν, as opposed to μωρία, ἀνδρία from that of the θυμοειδές, as opposed to δειλία, and lastly σωφροσύνη from that of the ἐπιθυμητικόν, as opposed to ἀκολασία. The fourth virtue, δικαιοσύνη, consists in the right relation between these constituents, and may therefore be called the formal and also the all-inclusive virtue. Hence, in the *Republic*, Justice is called the health of the soul, and ethics are described as the inquiry into justice. And in

view of the identification of Justice and Holiness, it is no contradiction that elsewhere, *e.g.* in the *Theatetus*, and the *Phædrus* and even in the *Republic* itself, in the discussion of education, and most of all in the *Laws*, the greatest stress is laid on holiness and the likeness to God which coincides with it. And as, according to Plato, virtue consists in putting into activity man's own nature, or the functions which a man is alone or best fitted to exercise, it is the activity of that which constitutes humanity, *viz.* the λογιστικόν, which produces virtue. Hence virtue is φρόνησις. In its full development it is Justice, in its highest stage it is Wisdom, which manifests itself in philosophy, *i.e.* in the rationality of the entire man.

3. Plato, however, does not remain satisfied with this result, of representing the system of virtues in isolated individuals, but considers them also in the State, where they may be seen on a larger scale. The State he regards as an enlargement of man, and the parallelism between his account of man and his natural history of the State appears everywhere. Thus, the legislative and judicial activity in the State is exactly the same as hygiene and therapeutics in the treatment of the individual; for in both cases the protection of health (justice) is aimed at. If, moreover, man is the world on a small scale, the parallels between political and cosmic laws follow at once. Ethical and political problems are so connected that, on the one hand, the good is rendered possible only by the virtues of the individual, and on the other hand, only the good State has room for and makes possible complete virtue. The moral life in a good State is the highest morality conceivable. Plato begins his inquiries with the question why (not how) the State comes into being at all, even in the form of the necessary State. The reason of this he discovers in the various wants which lead to the division of labour, and thus, though to a minimum extent, to an arrangement whereby every one has a position to fill and a function to perform, which is just that in which justice consists. But this justice is realized to a far higher degree than in the necessary State, in the organic or rational State, which appears as a single just man, since there correspond to the three faculties of the soul the three classes of χρηματισταί, ἐπικούροι (sometimes called also φύλακες), and ἄρχοντες, the labourers, defenders, and leaders or teachers; and their justice is shown in that they especially represent, the first temperance, the second courage, and the third wisdom. Or, as he points

out in passing, these three orders may be detected in the national characteristics of the Phenicians, Scythians, and Hellenes respectively. Plato was impelled towards an anti-democratic view of politics, not only by his personal circumstances and experiences, but no less by his metaphysics, the substance of which was, that the individual was without value. Accordingly he decides in favour of aristocracy as the only reasonable constitution of the State; but regards it as an unessential difference whether or no it culminates in a monarch.

4. The more Plato perceived that Athens was perishing through the egotism of particular interests, the more necessary it appeared to him to cut this off at its source, and to devise institutions that should accustom men to forget themselves in the thought of the whole of which they were members; and it seemed to him an excellent means for effecting the latter part of his purpose, that the citizens should grow up in fixed orders, a proposal not perhaps uninfluenced by the caste systems of non-Hellenic peoples, although in Plato the position of the child is not so much determined by its birth as by the government, which takes talent also into account. The former object, on the other hand, seemed to be attained most surely by abolishing all distinctions of *meum* and *tuum*, i.e., private property and private households, exclusive property in wives and children, etc., in the case of the active citizens, the defenders and guardians of the State. These are the leading points of view in his proposals, which were already in his day derided by many, but which nevertheless were in no case quite baseless imaginings. On the contrary, he found approximations to them in the constitution which, without ignoring its defects, he always esteemed as the highest, viz., that of Sparta. At Sparta there were Helots and Periœci, like his labouring classes, mess-companionships, and lax marriage-customs; at Sparta the children became the property of the State at an early age, and the possession of money had originally been forbidden, etc. All these principles are now carried out with a consistency that borders on exaggeration; and in opposition to the encroachments of egotism, the demand is made that man should be a citizen pure and simple. And as this will take place only where the rulers at the head of the State are penetrated by the love of truth and of the Good, the education of these, i.e., of the guardians, is one of the principal topics of Plato's political philosophy. This

education commences with music, is followed afterwards by gymnastic, then by mathematics in all its branches. Finally, in his thirtieth year, the citizen is initiated into Dialectic. Thus trained, he takes part in the government of the State in his 50th year, not because he desires it, but because it is required by the welfare of the State. Everything that in any way excites the desires and passions must be kept at a distance in education, including dramatic representations and the repetition of the fables about the gods, which form the subject matter of the drama. So surprising a phenomenon as this at first sight is, that one who is the poet among philosophers should prefer mere useful handicraft to art (the τέχνη χρησομένη and ποιήσουσα to the μιμησομένη), is to be explained by the wild demoralization Plato noticed among the frequenters of the theatre. He had shown in the *Republic* how a State in which the philosophers rule, flourishes in times of peace, and combines justice and happiness; the fragmentary *Critias* was intended to show how it approved itself also in war, by an example taken from the history of Athens in an imaginary antiquity, when it conquered the far larger State of Atlantis, dominated by Oriental magnificence and sensuousness.

5. Plato very well perceives that aristocracy is possible only when the extent of the State is small. Hence he requires that the guardians, by their superintendence of the conclusions of marriage, should regulate not only the excellence of the births, but their numbers also, by prohibitions of marriage and in other ways. And apart from mathematical reasons indicated by the Platonic numbers, the difficulties of which have become proverbial (cf. Fries in his earlier treatise: *Platon's Zahl.*, Heidelb., 1823, and his *Geschichte der Philosophie*, i. 375 ff.), he regards (in the *Laws*) 5040 as the best number of households. Thirty-five of these would form a φρατρία, and twelve φρατρίαι a φυλή; and the whole State would consist of twelve φύλαι, or tribes. The neglect of necessary precautions with regard to the normal growth of the State, etc., causes the degeneracy even of the best States; and hence Plato adds a brief pathology of the State to his explicit physiology. The corruptions of the State accurately correspond to immoral conditions of the individual. Thus, Oligarchy, in which the rich rule, corresponds to the passionately ambitious character; democracy, with its equality and mere semblance of liberty, to the man distracted by conflicting

desires. Finally, just as in the ἀκόλαστος a single desire at last overpowers the man, so democracy everywhere ends in the tyranny, which is the worst form of State, just as the aristocratic monarchy is the best.

6. And yet this despotism, the worst of the corruptions of the State, contained features which were not displeasing to Plato. For although he does not admit that his State is absolutely impracticable, he yet perceived that the existing State of Athens did not afford the conditions of its realization. A new generation, educated apart from that then living, would alone be capable to submit itself voluntarily to a constitution such as Plato has in mind. But since the existing generation would already have to be reasonable in order to assent to such an education of their children, the only escape out of this circle would seem to be, that a despot who was also a lover of wisdom should introduce all these institutions by force. Perhaps, too, Plato had in his mind the attitude of Pisistratus towards the Solonian constitution, when he made an attempt to win over the younger Dionysius to philosophy. The failure of this attempt did not lead him to despair of the feasibility of his proposals. And that they might be adapted to the given conditions without the tyrant as the *deus ex machina*, was probably what the works which were either written or sketched after the Republic attempted to show. Thus the *Hermocrates*, which is connected with the *Critias*, was perhaps intended to show that, at least in the States of Doric organization, like the Sicilian cities combined by Hermocrates, this aim might be realized by wise reforms. And, just as though the older he became, the more he wished to see the germs of better things, which he could no longer hope to plant in Sicily, spring up nearer home, he finally makes an attempt to show, in the *Laws*, that, even in his own corrupt times, if in founding a Doric colony, regard is shown also for Attic culture, a State might come into being which would not indeed be the rational State described in the *Republic*, but the second best—a State based upon laws, in which good laws would take the place of the philosophic rulers that could dispense with laws. This attitude of concession to the evil of reality, displayed in the description of the State in the *Laws*, involving as its necessary consequence popular reflections in a style condescending to the level of the ordinary consciousness, must not be regarded as due merely to Plato's ex-



periences in the field of politics and hence as confined to this sphere. Rather it goes hand in hand with an increasing perception of the impossibility of attaining to the individual Ideas in a purely dialectical way, and of descending from them to things. The desire of filling up the gulf between the ideal and the real which had induced him (§ 77, 2) to obtain assistance from a science, mathematics, rooted only in *διάνοια*, causes him here also to lower his demands. The chief characteristic of the *Laws*, as compared with the *Republic*, is a gloomy view of the world that often borders upon bitterness, and finally goes astray even to the extent of supposing, although in brief hints, the existence of an evil World-soul, a principle of disorder by the side of the order that sways the world, confusing all things. This tone is generated by the distrust of the possibility of realizing the ideal which the Athenian lawgiver (Plato) produces in the Cretan and the Lacedemonian. And yet many things had already been given up which had still been required in the *Republic*. The community of property and wives is absent in the *Laws*, as is the caste-like separation of the orders, for which there is substituted a division into four classes based upon property. Other matters which, on a higher estimate of mankind, he might have expected as a matter of course, such as the participation of the higher classes in the elections, he finds it necessary to secure to his supposed State by the threat of punishments. In fact, so large a number of laws is enacted, that it is evident how little he thinks may be left to the native genius of the rulers. When one compares the *Laws* with the *Republic*, one can hardly be surprised that denials of the Platonic origin of the latter continue to be heard.

7. But even in moods like that in which the interpolated passage in the 9th book of the *Republic*, in which he resigns himself to the impracticability of his ideal, or like that in which the *Laws* were written, Plato does not attain to the same pitch of despairing renunciation with which Glaucus, in the second book of the *Republic*, lays down the principle that injustice leads to welfare, and that the wholly just man must be prepared to suffer ill-treatment of all sorts, and finally death on the cross. On the contrary, the disharmony between what is and what ought to be, is, to Plato, resolved by retribution after death. The possibility of this was established by his belief in immortality. And conversely Plato, like Cicero, and

later, Kant, regards the necessity of retribution hereafter as a fresh proof in favour of immortality. In the *Republic* this doctrine is chiefly established by the argument, that if even its own illness and corruption, viz., evil, does not destroy the soul, the illness and corruption of something else, i.e. the body, can do so still less. Hence, in addition to the reward which lies in virtue itself, and makes it impossible that the virtuous should ever be entirely miserable, it also involves the consequence that when the circle of life begins afresh, the truly virtuous man will choose such a lot as will really promote his progress. And the fact that it is not the fault of the gods but of the man himself, which dooms him to this or that lot, serves both as a consolation for and as an explanation of many a disproportion. Man's present lot is the result of his own choice, made in accordance with the nature he had acquired in a previous existence. The second half of the 10th book of the *Republic* may be called the first attempt at a theodicy, in which the Deity is secured against all appearance either of injustice or of an arbitrary interference with the sphere of human liberty, by means of the assertion of the pre-existence and future existence of the soul. The parallelism between the natural and the moral, which often comes into prominence in Plato, here rises to a real harmony.

### § 8o.

#### PLATO'S SCHOOL.

Plato's school, called the *Academy* after the locality in which it was first established, and the *older Academy* in opposition to later modifications of Platonism, was by his own wish handed over to the guidance of Speusippus, his sister's son. After seven years it passed to Xenocrates, who presided over it for fifteen years. The prominence of the doctrine of number and of a certain learned tendency common to both of these men, would perhaps appear less of a deviation from Plato, if more were known about his verbal lectures, especially in his later days, than it does while one thinks only of his dialogues. The greater stress laid upon the mathematical element compels the retirement of the teleological element into the background. Hence the reproach made against Speusippus at an early time, that he was a mere physicist. The division of philosophy into Dialectic, Physics, and Ethics, ascribed to Xenocrates, is

so clearly implied in the Platonic system, that it is hard to believe that it should not have been expressly stated by Plato. Even if it was not, we shall hardly be able to regard it as a great discovery. His assumption of a neutral intermediary between good and evil indicates a cautious man not to be satisfied by hap-hazard classification, as might have been expected from the disciple "who required the spur." Besides these there may be mentioned as personal disciples of Plato, Heraclides from Pontus, Philippus of Opus, the editor of the *Platonic Laws* and the author of the *Epinomis*, Hestiaeus of Perinthus, and Eudoxus of Knidus: Polemo, the successor of Xenocrates, Crates and Crantor already belong to the following generation, which had been educated by Xenocrates. The disciple of Crantor was Arcesilaus, who founded the new Academy (v. § 101).

*Diog. Laert. IV. c. 1-5. Ritter and Preller, § 281-292.*

### § 81.

The legacy of Greece to mankind for all time, the sense for beauty and for knowledge, is nowhere felt in a more concentrated form than in Plato. Platonism appears as the most Greek of all philosophies, since it does not, like the Ionian and Eleatic doctrines that preceded it, reflect merely a single peculiarity of a single stock, but has included within itself all previous philosophy, and reflects the Greek spirit as a whole. For this same reason it cannot arise until not only in the colonies of Ionia and Magna Græcia, but in Greece generally, the freshness of life is fading and dying away. And no regretful longing for the glories of the past, of which the plaintive elegy reaches our ears in the writings of Plato, can arrest the wheel of fate. The era of Greece has come to an end. To wrest from her hands the sceptre of the world, and thus to play the intermediary in its transition to Rome, was the destiny of the ephemeral supremacy of a people which was Greek and yet so unlike the Greeks, and which as in a dream anticipated the approaching universal empire of Rome. Philip, who deprived the Greeks of their reputation for invincibility, and his still greater son, who, by delivering the treasures of Greek culture to the East, robbed the Greeks of their true palladium, the consciousness of being the intellectual *élite* of mankind, both of these dealt a mortal blow to Hellenism.

But a time in which this new principle obtains acceptance can no longer content itself with the world-formula of a philosopher who dreams of a State great by its smallness. A thinker is required capable of educating a king who subjects three continents, and who, just as his pupil does not hold the East in too great contempt to reside in it, himself does not consider anything too bad to be investigated, nor regards the conquest and amassing of all the treasures of knowledge as a robbery committed on the genius of philosophy. The poetical creativeness of Plato must be superseded by the collecting industry of Aristotle.

### § 82.

But here also it must be shown, that in addition to the necessity of a new philosophic system in the history of the world, Platonism itself required to be transcended, and that in the direction of an advance towards Aristotelianism. The first requirement is satisfied as soon as it is shown that his system cannot fulfil the demands Plato himself makes upon the true system: the second, if it should appear that Aristotle fulfils them to a greater extent. In the programme of his dialectical investigations Plato had promised to go beyond all one-sided oppositions, especially that of physiologists and metaphysicians, whom he calls the adherents of the Many and of the One. Accordingly, when he attempts to mediate, not between the Eleatics as the representatives of the one extreme, and those of the other, such as Anaximenes, but between them and Heraclitus, to whom, in agreement with Plato's own example (*v. § 41, supra*), there had been assigned the position of a metaphysical physiologist, it is evident that even if this undertaking had proved successful, the metaphysical element would have been favoured, and the physiological neglected. Besides this, however, it cannot be denied that in combining the doctrines of the Eleatics and Heracliteans by far the greater stress is laid upon the Eleatic element, so that matter is the non-existent, just as with the Eleatics; and thus physics also, though not called a doctrine of false appearances outright, remains only a probable myth. Hence it is not surprising that Aristotle, who dislikes the Eleatics, whose favourite science is physics, and who in it makes so much use of Anaximander and Heraclitus that Schleiermacher might have extended the reproach he

brings against Aristotle, of plagiarism from Heraclitus, also to Anaximander, should look down upon the Platonic doctrine of transcendent Ideas as a one-sided exaggeration, and should condemn it with the same words Plato had uttered concerning the ultra-Eleatic Megarians.

## SIXTH DIVISION.

### Aristotle.

*Diog. Laert.*, v. 4. *Ritter and Preller* : § 293-355.

### § 83.

#### LIFE OF ARISTOTLE.

\**Ἀριστοτέλους βίος κατ' Ἀμμόνιον* (*Ammonii vita Aristotelis*) \**Ἀριστοτέλους βίος καὶ συγγράματα αὐτοῦ* (*Anonymi vita Aristotelis*). (Both in Didot's ed. of *Diogenes Laert.*). Franc. Patritius: *Discussionum peripateticarum tomi IV.* Basil. 1581, fol. A. Stahr: *Aristotelia*. 2 vols. Halle, 1830-32.

ARISTOTLE, the son of Nicomachus, was born in Ol. 99, 1 (385 B.C.), at Stagirus, afterwards called Stagira, a city of Thrace, and later of Macedonia. His father, and also his grandfather, Machaon, were physicians; and this profession, as is made probable by the legend of his descent from Asclepius, may long have been hereditary in the family. And just as this explains his early inclination to natural science, so the fact that Nicomachus had been physician to Philip's father explains his later connection with the royal house of Macedonia. Having early lost his father, Aristotle, at the age of seventeen, became the pupil of Plato, his senior by forty-five years, whose lectures at that time were probably strongly Pythagorean in tone. Aristotle's later attacks on the Platonic doctrine were a continuation of a tendency he displayed at an early age, of going beyond his master (who hence thought he required the "rein"), and gave occasion to the accusation of ingratitude frequently made against him. They refer, however, chiefly to the Platonic doctrine as it was developed in these lectures, and not as it exists in his writings. In Plato's lifetime Aristotle was a teacher only of rhetoric, in opposition to Isocrates. After Plato's death he went, together with Xeno-

crates, to Hermeias the tyrant of Atarneus, and afterwards married the daughter of the latter's brother. At Mytilene, whither he had retired after the death of Hermeias, he received Philip's request that he should undertake the education of Alexander, then thirteen years old. For four years Aristotle was something more than the tutor to a prince ordinarily is, and then remained in Macedonia for four years longer, as he was on very good terms with his pupil, although his *Natural History* does not exactly confirm the story that the latter sent him rare beasts from the East. This harmony seems to have been interrupted only when Callisthenes, the nephew of Aristotle, had fallen a victim to the king's distrust in Bactra, as an adherent of the old Greek party; but by this time Aristotle had exchanged his residence in Macedonia for Athens. There he presided over the Lyceum, or Peripatetic school, which received the former name from the temple of Apollo Lyceus, in front of which,—the latter from the colonnades in which,—he is said to have delivered his lectures; although it was formerly generally supposed that the name of the Peripatetics arose from Aristotle's habit of teaching while walking up and down. This, however, did not last for more than thirteen years. For when Eurymedon, to the delight of the enemies of Macedon, came forward with an accusation against Aristotle, the latter deprived Athens of the opportunity of "sinning for the second time against philosophy," by withdrawing from the city. He died at Chalcis not long after, in Ol. 114, 2 (322 B.C.).

### § 84.

#### THE WRITINGS OF ARISTOTLE.

Brandis: *De perditis Aristotelis de ideis libris*. Bonnæ, 1823. The same: *Ueber das Schicksal der Arist. Schriften*, in the *Rhein. Mus.*, 1827, I., pp. 236 ff. E. Heitz: *Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles*. Leipz. 1865.

The antithesis between Plato and Aristotle, which announced itself in their external appearance, is visible no less in their mode of feeling and thinking, and also in their style and their treatment of scientific problems. And it is shown also in the fact that while all Plato's writings are exoteric, *i.e.* works of art intended for a more extended public, Aristotle's are all esoteric, *i.e.*, intended for the school. Aristotle indeed wrote other works also, to which he frequently refers as "exoteric discussions"; but in spite of the laudatory testimony of Cicero

to the dialogues of Aristotle, and their masterly defence by Bernays (*Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*, Berlin, 1853), it was not perhaps an injustice of fortune that just these should have been lost. A great deal of what has been preserved was probably written down in brief during the lectures, and afterwards used to guide a new course, which would explain the cross references. Nevertheless, although the condition in which the Aristotelian writings have come down to us, is in some cases bad enough, it is better than might be expected, if the story told by Strabo of the fortunes of the manuscripts of Aristotle were true of the original from which our editions are copied. Even the *Metaphysics*, in the case of which Glaser is ready to admit the truth of the story, would, if it were so, probably present a still more melancholy spectacle than now. Brandis has shown by reference to ancient lists, and by other indications, how great a part of Aristotle's writings has been lost. Those that have been preserved cannot be arranged chronologically, but only with reference to their place in the system. The incorrect place assigned to the *Metaphysics* in all editions is past remedy, as it has given its name to the book. Of editions there may be mentioned the Aldine, the *editio princeps* (Venet. 1495-89, 5 vols. fol.), the Basel of 1531, the Paris Greek and Latin of 1629 (2 vols. fol.), that of Buhle (Zweibrücken, 8vo), which however came to a stand-still, and above all the one undertaken by J. Bekker and Brandis \* at the request of

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\* As the first two volumes of the Berlin edition, which contain the Greek text (the third contains a Latin version, the fourth extracts from the older commentators) are paged continuously, the quotation of references may be abbreviated by following the example of Waitz and others, and giving only the page. Hence, by supplying first the following list of all the writings of Aristotle, it becomes easy to see at once from the number of the page, from what writing a quotation is made.

(1) The so-called *Organon* of later times contains (p. 1-184) : κατηγορίαι α' (*Categorizæ*), p. 1-15; περὶ ἑρμηνείας α' (*de interpretatione*), p. 17-24; Ἀναλυτικά δ' (*Analytica priora et posteriora*) ; πρότερα β', p. 24-70; ὕστερα β', p. 71-100, Τοπικά θ' (*Topica VIII.*), p. 100-164; περὶ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων α' (*de Sophisticis elenchis*), p. 164-184. The physical writings come next (2), and contain : φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις θ' (*Physica auscultatio*, or *Physica VIII.*), p. 184-267; περὶ οὐρανοῦ δ' (*de celo IV.*), p. 268-313; περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς β' (*de gener. et corrupt. II.*), p. 314-338; Μετεωρολογικά δ' (*Meteorologica IV.*), p. 338-390, περὶ κόσμου (*de mundo*), p. 391-401; περὶ ψυχῆς γ' (*de anima III.*), p. 402-435; περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν, περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως, περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρεως, περὶ ἐνυπνίου, περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος, περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως, περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου, περὶ ἀναπνοῆς (*Parva naturalia*), p. 436-486; περὶ τὰ

the Berlin Academy (1831-35, 4 vols. 4to). The value of the last has been doubled by the excellent *Index Aristotelicus* of Bonitz (Berl. 1870).

## ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINES.

F. Biese: *Die Philosophie des Aristoteles*. Berlin, 1835-43. 2 vols. H. Bonitz. *Aristotelische Studien*, i.-v. Wien., 1862-66.

### § 85.

#### INTRODUCTORY. THE ARTICULATION OF THE SYSTEM.

1. ALTHOUGH those who reduce the difference between the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle to a merely formal one, and thus regard the latter as a mere re-modelling of the former, go much too far, this one-sided view must not be neglected in opposition to the contrary extreme, which sets them over against each other as the representatives of Idealism and Realism, of Rationalism and Empiricism. And it does not impair the respect due to Aristotle, while it facilitates the understanding of his doctrines, if it is shown in a greater number of points than is commonly done, that the philosopher, not the least of whose glory consists in having learnt much, should have learnt much from none other than Plato. Hence it will be necessary at the outset to refer to Plato's delimitation of philosophy (§ 76, 1), in order to appreciate

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ζῶα ἱστορίαι ε' (*Historia animalium X.*), p. 486-638; περὶ ζῶων μορίων δ' (*de partibus animalium IV.*), p. 639-697; περὶ ζῶων κινήσεως (*de motu animalium*), p. 698-704; περὶ πορείας ζῶων (*de incessu animalium*), p. 704-714; περὶ ζῶων γενέσεως ε' (*de generatione animalium V.*), p. 715-789. In the second volume there follow first some smaller physical treatises (περὶ χρωμάτων, περὶ ἀκουστών, φυσιογνωμικά, περὶ φυτῶν β', περὶ θαυμασίων ἀκουσμάτων, μηχανικά), p. 791-858; προβλήματα λη' (*Problemata* 38), p. 869-967; περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν (*de insecabilibus lineis*), p. 968-972; Ἀνέμων θέσεις καὶ προσεγορίαι (*ventorum situs et appellationes*), p. 973. Then after περὶ Ξενοφάνους, Ζήνωνος καὶ Γοργίου (*de Xenophane Zenone et Gorgia*), p. 974-980, there come (3) Τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά ν' (*Metaphysica XIV.*), p. 980-1093. Then follow (4) his ethical writings, p. 1094-1353, i.e., Ἠθικά Νικομάχεια κ' (*Ethica ad Nicomachum X.*), p. 1094-1181; Ἠθικά μεγάλα β' (*Magna moralia II.*), p. 1181-1213; Ἠθικά Εὐδήμια η' (*Ethica ad Eudemum VII.*), p. 1214-1249 (the 4th, 5th, and 6th books are wanting); περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν (*de virtutibus et vitiis*), p. 1249-1251; Πολιτικά θ' (*Politica VIII.*), p. 1252-1342; Οἰκονομικά β' (*Oeconomica II.*), p. 1343-1353. Finally (5) the writings on rhetoric and poetics; τέχνη ῥητορικὴ γ' (*Rhetorica III.*), p. 1354-1420; Ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον (*Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*), p. 1420-1447; περὶ ποιητικῆς (*Poetica*), p. 1447-1462.



properly the procedure of Aristotle in this matter. In connection with the fact that the instinct to know is naturally inherent in man, Aristotle shows (p. 980 f.) that perception (*αἴσθησις*) is the first grade of knowledge, and that it is concerned with the particular (*καθ' ἑκάστων*, the *τοῦτο* or *τόδε* of Plato). In consequence of repeated perceptions, and the re-cognition based on memory, this becomes experience (*ἐμπειρία*, a term already found in Plato). Experience is already concerned with the universal (*καθόλου*, p. 100), although the object of experience may in its turn be called particular, in comparison with the higher universal of knowledge proper. The defect of experience, which it shares with perception, is, that it deals only with the actual fact (*ὅτι*), not with its reasons (*διὰ τί*). Hence both are surpassed by theoretical understanding (*τέχνη*), which includes a knowledge of the reason, and hence already the possibility of instruction. (In dealing with this third degree of knowledge, Plato had always thought of the mathematician, whereas Aristotle thinks rather of the theoretically trained physician; in other respects his *τέχνη* corresponds pretty well to Plato's *διάνοια*.) If, however, one does not rest content with the first reasons reached, but seeks and finds the principles (*ἀρχαί*) underlying them, there arises knowledge proper, or philosophy. For Aristotle does not, like Plato, distinguish between *σοφία* and *φιλοσοφία*. Since, then, the principle is above all the universal, by which he means not only that which is common to all (*κατὰ παντός*), but also the thing as such, or the conception that creates it (the *καθ' αὐτό*), and since knowing a thing by its reasons, is equivalent to knowing that it cannot be otherwise, universality and necessity are the proper marks of philosophic cognition (p. 88). And, as in Plato, wonder, the feeling of not knowing and not understanding is to Aristotle also the beginning of philosophy, and philosophy that which puts an end to this feeling. And whereas wonder is an attitude of dependence, philosophic knowledge is free and independent, in which that which knows, knows only itself. Thus in a way cognition is identical with its object, and the *νοῦς* itself with the *νοητά* (pp. 429-431). Philosophy is, however, independent also in this sense, that it serves nothing, and therefore no practical purpose. And it arises, as Plato had remarked of the writing of history, only when men attain to eisure. Philosophy inquires for the sake of knowing alone, and hence, though there may be arts more useful, there is none

more excellent. Indeed, it may even be called divine, in the two senses that it is practised by the Deity, and that it is concerned about God.

2. And Aristotle, like Plato, not only defines philosophy as against the unphilosophic point of view, but also defines true philosophy as against other philosophic views. But in so doing he pays little attention to the sophistic position, as having been long ago refuted by Plato. He treats it contemptuously, regards the Sophists as mere money-makers, their fallacies as mere deceptions, etc. Similarly, the smaller Socratic schools are already sufficiently remote to be referred to but rarely. But the real opponent to be combated is the Platonic dialectician. He regards dialectic, not indeed as a false, but as a subordinate art, since it only attempts what sophistry pretends to be able to do, and what philosophy possesses and knows (p. 1004). Almost with the same words with which Plato had opposed the extravagant claims of mathematics, Aristotle reproaches dialectic with dependence on assumptions. Philosophy, on the other hand, made no assumptions; and thus dialectic could only make things probable, and persuade, whereas philosophy proved and convinced. Hence philosophy deals with knowledge and truth, dialectic with opinion and probability (p. 104). It is, however, indispensable in preliminary investigations, in which alone it finds a proper place. Thus, while in Plato to philosophize dialectically had been equivalent to philosophizing rightly, Aristotle used *διαλεκτικῶς* and *κενῶς* as synonyms. Thus Aristotle, adopting towards dialectic almost the same attitude that Plato had adopted towards the Sophists, or at least towards the Socratics, regards philosophy as the science of first principles, *i.e.* of universals, proceeding, not by the way of hypotheses, but by that of proof.

3. With respect to the articulation of his system, both the tradition that he divided his doctrines into theoretical and practical, and also the one that he divided them into logic, physics, and ethics, can claim the support of dicta of his own. The two, however, are reconciled by extending the first, so as to include a third science, that of production (*ποίησις*) (pp. 145, 1025), and by supposing that in the case of the theoretic science, which perhaps was alone called philosophy, and which was to include *Θεολογική* (in later times called *Λογική*) as the *πρώτη*, and *φυσική* as the *δευτέρα φιλοσοφία*, and *μαθηματική*

as the third (p. 1026), Aristotle left the last practically untouched, and that the same holds good of the third main division of the system which was to consider the *ποιεῖν*. In this way his actual doctrines would all be reduced either to logic, or to physics, or to ethics (cf. p. 105). His "analytical" investigations, however, do not fit into any of these three divisions. They do not, however, lose the great importance Aristotle attached to them, if one follows a hint given by himself, and the example of his successors, and regards them as the indispensable instrument (*ὄργανον*) of the scientific investigations proper. And they are connected in the following manner with the above-mentioned distinction of sophistic, dialectic, and apodeictic thought, *viz.* that the treatise on the Fallacies, shows how the Sophists are to be dealt with, the Topics how argumentation and discussion are to be managed, and finally the Hermeneutic and the two Analytics, what is the shape taken by scientific proof. The treatise on the Categories thereupon prepares the transition to the Fundamental Science, *i.e.*, to the sciences which Aristotle already includes in philosophy proper, and which for this same reason he no longer calls "analytical," but designates by other names, among which that of logical also occurs.

### § 86.

#### THE ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF ARISTOTLE.

Trendelenburg: *Elementa logices Aristoteleæ*. Berol. 1836 (5th ed. 1862). *Erläuterungen* to this, Berl. 1842. T. Waitz: *Aristotelis Organon*, 2 vols. Leipz. 1844-46. C. Prantl: *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*. 1st vol. Leipz. 1855 (2nd 1861, 3rd 1867) [Vol. IV., 1870.—Ed.].

1. As Aristotle does not distinguish thought and speech in the way now done, but includes both thought and language under *λόγος*, and moreover regards thoughts, and consequently also words, as *ὁμοιώματα τῶν πραγμάτων* (as Plato had called them the *δηλώματα*), we can understand that the rules discovered by the analysis of the sentence at once acquire a logical in addition to their grammatical meaning, *viz.*, that of being the forms of correct thought, and finally, more or less consistently, that of being regarded as the laws of real existence. This last aspect does not indeed altogether disappear, but is very much obscured, in the treatise *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, which would have been better rendered by *de enunciatione*, rather than by *de interpretatione* (pp. 16-24). In it, after defining a word as

α φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην, and thus distinguishing it from sounds merely expressive of feeling, Aristotle defines the sentence (λόγος), in verbal agreement with Plato, as a combination of words (συμπλοκὴ φωνῶν). He proceeds however at once to distinguish sentences which contain no assertion, such as requests, from those that do, and in which, consequently, the question of truth and falseness can arise. The latter he calls judgments (λόγοι ἀποφαντικοί, or ἀποφάνσεις, or in the Analytics προτάσεις, *judicia*) and proves of them, as Plato had done before him, that they necessarily consist of a name (ὄνομα) and a verb (ῥῆμα), of which the former expresses the ὑποκείμενον (*substant*, *subjectum*) the latter the κατηγορούμενον (*prædicatum*). It is shown at the same time, that a real connection between them only takes place when the verb has a πτώσις, i.e. is inflected; but that which is indicated by the inflexion may be effected also by a separate word (εἶναι), which in that case indicates merely that the subject and predicate belong together (συγκείσθαι, hence afterwards συνδὲν ἔν and ultimately *copula*), and hence belongs equally to the ὄνομα and to the ῥῆμα (hence, afterwards, *verbum substantivum*). If, then, the judgment consists of three words by the separation of the copula, the predicate may either include the subject as a part of itself, and is then asserted of the subject as something it embraces (καθ' ὑποκειμένον), or conversely it may state something which is found in the subject, and inheres in it as its substratum (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ). It is clear that in the former class of subsuming judgments, Aristotle is thinking of cases where the predicate is a substantive, in the latter, indicating inherence, of cases where it is an adjective. And according as in a judgment the predicate is asserted or denied of the subject, and a κατηγορήμα κατὰ or ἀπὸ τινος takes place, it is a κατάφασις or ἀπόφασις. The former is also called πρότασις κατηγορικὴ (*judicium positivum*), the latter στερητικὴ (j. *negativum*). The fact that Aristotle noticed that the place of the subject might be taken also by an ὄνομα ἀόριστον, such as οὐκ-ἄνθρωπος, and the place of the predicate by a ῥῆμα ἀόριστον, as οὐ-τρέχειν, and, that the first translators rendered ἀόριστον by *infinitum* instead of *indefinitum*, brought about the assertion of a third case (and why not a fourth?), in addition to the only two possible, which was called the *judicium infinitum*. Besides the distinction between affirmative and negative judgments, Aristotle also considers that between those that assert something uni-

versally (*αἱ καθόλου ἀποφάσεις καὶ καταφάσεις*) and those that do so only in part (called *ἐν μέρει* in the *Analytics*, *καθ' ἑκάστον* in the *de interp.*). By combining what is said about the quality and the quantity of judgments, the rules as to the opposition of two judgments are obtained. An affirmative and a negative judgment are *ἀντικείμενα* (*opposita*): this however they may be, either *ἀντιφατικῶς* (*contradictorie*), when one merely destroys the other, or *ἐναντίως* (*contrarie*), when it further substitutes another assertion. This latter opposition is also called *ἐκ διαμέτρου*, and takes place between the universal affirmative and the universal negative. At this point, too, Aristotle introduces the laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, which he generally justifies by the argument (always used by Plato), that otherwise the meaning of a word would not be fixed. Connected with the investigation of the opposition of judgments, and combined with it, is that of their modality. Stress is justly laid on the fact that modal judgments are really compound (*συμπλεκόμεναι*), and the question is thoroughly discussed, how the possible can have opposed to it, not only the impossible but also the necessary, etc. The fact that the word *ἐνδεχόμενον* is here used in opposition to *δύνατον* and *ἀναγκαῖον*, while it is used in the *Analytics* to designate the possible, has induced some to assume that Aristotle made a distinction between logical and real possibility. Others, however, dispute this.

2. With regard to the doctrine of the Syllogism, or inference, Aristotle was induced to lay such great stress upon it, not only by the fact that he was the first to work it out (p. 184), but also because his theory of demonstration is based upon it, and demonstration, as we saw, is the chief object of analytical inquiries. Hence the work in which he treats of the syllogism is called *par excellence* τὰ ἀναλυτικά. We shall consider, to begin with, only the Ἀναλυτικὰ πρότερα (p. 24-70). They are the most elaborated part of the whole *Organon*. The syllogism (*συλλογισμός*) having been first defined as a proposition in which a new result follows necessarily from certain presuppositions, inquiries are undertaken to determine what judgments may be converted, and how. Thereupon the essential elements of the syllogism are considered. The two *προτάσεις* (*præmissæ*) contain the *ἄκρα* (*extrema*) and the *ὅρος μέσος* (*terminus medius*). The former, the *ὅρος πρῶτος* or *ἄκρον μείζον* (*terminus major*), and the *ὅρος ἔσχατος* or *ἄκρον ἑλάττω* (*terminus minor*), form the predicate and subject, respect-

ively, in the *συμπέρασμα* (*conclusio*) ; the middle term, on the other hand, which contains the ground of their combination, disappears. It is the middle term, however, the soul of the syllogism, that determines the true nature of the process. According as it occupies the middle, the highest, and the lowest place in respect of comprehension and is *θέσει μέσος, πρῶτος* or *ἔσχατος* (i.e., *positione medius, supremus, or inf[er]mus*), there result the three different *σχήματα* (*figuræ*), of the syllogism, the only three possible. The first of these has the greatest scientific value, because it can produce universal affirmative conclusions, while the second can give only negative, and the third only particular conclusions, inasmuch as science is concerned with the universal, and the positive and direct proof has greater force than the negative and indirect. Hence Aristotle already strives to reduce the inferences of the other figures to the first. Reduction is effected by him in the case of all the four moods of the second and the six of the third figure by *ἀντιστρέφειν* (*conversio*) and *ἀπαγωγή εἰς ἀδύνατον* (*reductio ad impossibile*) ; thus the fourteen possible moods of the later logicians and the reductions of the ten later ones to one of the first four, are already found in Aristotle. A very thorough inquiry into the way the matter is affected by the varying modality of the premisses, shows how little he shrank from dry inquiries, if they went to the bottom of the matter. Connected with these are hints as to how to discover the right middle terms, and as to the way of discovering flaws in syllogisms, by resolving them, etc. They continue to the end of the first book, and in the second follow inquiries which belong no longer to elementary, but to applied logic. He there investigates whether a true conclusion can be derived from false premisses, why from a false conclusion the falsity of one at least of the premisses may be inferred, what are the cases in which, and the limits within which a conclusion may, in a circular proof, be made into a premiss, in order to prove a premiss, or its contrary be made into a premiss in order to disprove it. The error of the *ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι* (*petitio principii*; it should be called *conclusionis* or *in principio*) is also considered, and a transition is then made to the inferences which, without being strict demonstrations, nevertheless produce belief. The chief of these is *ἐπαγωγή* (*inductio*), which he compares with the third figure, as it infers the universal by means of the particular. Still less cogency

is conceded to the example (παράδειγμα), which he does not distinguish stringently from the procedure by analogy, and which in his view belongs especially to the domain of rhetoric, where it takes the place of induction, in a manner precisely similar to the substitution of the ἐνθύμημα, or probable inference, for the strict syllogism.

Cf. Heyder: *Kritische Darstellung und Vergleichung der Aristotelischen und Hegelschen Dialektik*. Erlangen, 1845.

3. The 'Αναλυτικὰ ὕστερα (pp. 71-100) display a degree of finish far inferior to that of the investigations so far mentioned, and were probably collected after Aristotle's death from his literary remains. They contain what has been aptly called his contributions to the methodology of science. Thus, since all scientific knowledge is demonstrative, *i.e.*, as we have seen, proved by syllogism, it must be preceded by one which is of acknowledged certainty, and on which it is based. In order to arrive at such knowledge, two methods are possible; one, when the starting-point is a datum of perception, from which an universal is inferred, which is the essence of inductive procedure, the other when the universal is the starting-point, from which a descent is made to the particular, which is what Aristotle designates as the syllogistic procedure. The two are opposed, in that the one starts from the πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρῶτον, that which is the first and most certain thing for the subject, and passes on to that which is the first in itself (φύσει or λόγῳ or ἀπλῶς πρότερον), whereas in the other, the reverse order is adopted. (Where πρότερον and ὕστερον are found without qualification, the πρὸς ἡμᾶς, not the φύσει, should be understood. Besides, Aristotle also formulates the antithesis of the 'first for us,' and the 'first as such,' so that what comes last in the analysis, comes first in its genesis [p. 1112].) But although the inductive procedure is more persuasive, the deductive is more scientific. It can moreover aim either at determining *that* a thing is, and then it produces a demonstration, or at determining *what* it is, when it leads on to its ὁρισμός (*definitio*). He considers first the demonstration, and shows that it is an inference from true and necessary premisses, and for this same reason is applicable only to things universal and eternal, and in every science rests upon certain principles and axioms which that science cannot demonstrate; and further that the universal and affirmative, and the direct, demon-

strations deserve preference, and also the reason why this should be the case, etc. Then he passes to definition, and justifies its inclusion in the syllogistic method by showing that true definition contains the ground of the thing defined, *i.e.* a middle term. Thus the definition of an eclipse of the moon, "darkness due to the interposition of the earth," may easily be brought into the form of a syllogism. To this requirement of definition is added the formal requirement which Aristotle does not seem to have attempted to connect with the former, *viz.* that the definition must contain the specific difference in addition to the genus. This presupposes division, which, though very important, cannot be substituted for deduction, as in Plato. There follow positive and negative rules respecting definition.

Cf. Kühn: *De notionis definitione qualem Aristoteles constituerit*, Halle. 1844. Rassow: *Aristotelis de notionis definitione doctrina*. Berol. 1845.

4. But there are limits to the process of demonstrating and defining, for no knowledge would be possible, either if it moved in a circle, or also if it continued *ad infinitum*, without end, purpose, or aim. These limits are twofold, since there exists that which stands above all demonstration and definition, and also that which lies beneath it. Thus, the object of sense-perception lies beneath both, for it cannot be demonstrated as being contingent, nor defined as containing innumerable characteristics (p. 1039). On the other hand, the most universal genera and principles, the simplicity of which does not admit of definition, and the indubitable axioms, possessing immediate certitude, transcend both definition and demonstration. And every science contains such immediate judgments, superior to demonstration; and this is the case also in the science of the ultimate grounds, which transcends all the rest and demonstrates the principles that could not be proved within the limits of the subordinate sciences. And just as perception was the organ for the particular and contingent, so it is the *νοῦς* that attains to these immediately certain judgments, and thereby transcends *ἐπιστήμη*, or mediate cognition. It grasps its object by an intuition which is not sensible, but rather comparable with that by which the mathematician masters his fundamental conceptions (p. 1142). And just as each sense is limited to the sensations peculiar to it; so the reason is limited to the *ἀπλᾶ*, which are incapable of further derivation. Moreover, there is



not in this sphere, in which the known is grasped immediately, a distinction between knowing truly and knowing falsely, as in the case of mediate cognition, but only a question of knowing or not knowing. Similarly, too, the distinction between the *that* and the *what*, the existence of a thing and its nature, here disappears, for in the moment that this highest knowledge is grasped its reality also is immediately certain (p. 1051, p. 203).

5. Although then the demand for proof of these first principles of all proof is irrational, they are nevertheless not altogether in the air, like innate conceptions and axioms; for these immediate judgments lie potentially in the knowing mind and are developed by means of sense-perception, out of which the mind selects the universal element, so that the inductive method cannot indeed prove, but can bring out clearly the principles of all demonstrative knowledge. Similarly to Plato, whom he commends for this reason (p. 1095), Aristotle also, maintains that science ascends to the universal, just as much as it descends from it to the particular. Induction, which starts from what is perceptible by the senses, as being the more certain for us, and passes on to the more certain in itself, would have to be complete, in order to have complete cogency. If indeed it were this, if we were acquainted with every particular thing, we should not require any demonstrative knowledge; and induction, which, as it is, resembles an inference in the third figure, would then be like one in the first. But as the case stands, probability only, and not certitude,—that which is common rather than that which is truly universal,—can be attained by the inductive method. And Aristotle shows in his practice, how it is possible to proceed from the former to the latter, in all cases where he brings what has been found by induction nearer to the level of scientific knowledge, by means of general argumentation. The TOPICS (pp. 100–164) give the theoretic instructions for this process, and contain rules for the guidance of the dialectical procedure and, in close connection with these, hints as to how sophistic plays upon words may be met (pp. 164–284). Accordingly, the proper sphere of dialectical, *i.e.* of argumentative reasoning, is the κοινόν and the ἐνδοξον. And just as it starts from this, so it aims also at finding ever *more* general and *more* probable truth. But it thereby approximates to philosophic knowledge, for that which is probable to all, is certain (p. 1172). The rules of dialectical procedure will therefore

have to bear this chiefly in mind, that an universal agreement has to be reached, and that accordingly they are rules for persuasion (rhetorical rules), and for balancing different views (rules for discussion). Hence it is intelligible that Aristotle calls rhetoric the complement of dialectic (p. 1354). Both aim at showing, in the service of science, how agreement may be attained as to the first principles of science. This however presupposes a desire to arrive at such agreement. Since, however, this would be impossible if the means of arriving at an agreement, viz., words, did not maintain their meaning, the principle of identity is the supreme canon in discussion, and the proof of its infraction a proof that the opponent must abandon his position (cf. p. 996). Conversely, it will be possible to show that in most of the cases in which the Sophists think they can prove contradictions, they failed to notice the different meanings of words. Hence he repeatedly insists on logical accuracy, *i.e.* such as respects the expressions of the language. Argumentation should start with something considered certain on the ground of authority. Hence Aristotle's industrious inquiries into the conclusions embodied in the writings of earlier philosophers, still more into what the spirit of the nation has embodied in proverbs and above all in language. His inquiries into the meaning of words,—which regard their etymological origin much more rarely than their present meaning from the point of view of a lexicographer,—are intended to determine how and what people think. The next point, however, is, that not only do the authorities contradict one another, but that reasoning which treats the subject from all points of view, discovers contradictions in that which appears quite certain. Hence there reappears in Aristotle that procedure by antinomies, representing the eristic procedure of the Sophists, the irony of Socrates, and the negative side of the Platonic Dialectic (cf. § 76. 6), which aims merely at producing *ἀπορία*, because without it there is no adequate solution possible (cf. p. 995).

6. Now, in order to appreciate properly the perplexity thus generated, and in order to escape from it, it is necessary that the questions should be rightly put; this however requires above all that there should be no delusion as to which class of categories the subject-matter of the sciences, and of the supreme architectonic science, belongs to. The different classes of categories are treated partly in the Topics, partly in the

writing on the *Κατηγορίαι* (pp. 1-15), the Aristotelian origin of which is however denied, wholly or in part, by weighty authorities. We can easily understand, in view of his opinion of the relation of language to thought, that Aristotle should discover these classes by analyzing thought, as expressed in the sentence, into its component parts. From this there results in the first place, that everything thought is thought either as a subject or as a predicate. The thorough investigations of Trendelenburg further render it very probable that reflection upon the attributive qualifications which the subject of a sentence admits of, and upon the various main grammatical forms of the verb, which, as we saw, occupied the place of the predicate, and lastly the possibility of determining it more closely by adverbs, was the reason why Aristotle assumed the ten *γένη τῆς κατηγορίας*, or *κατηγορίαι*, which he did. Thus *οὐσία* or the *τί ἐστι* would correspond to the substantive, *ποιόν* to the adjective attribute, *ποσόν* to a word of quantity, *πρός τι* to the words that require a supplementary case, further *ποιεῖν*, *πάσχειν*, *κείσθαι* and *ἔχειν* to the active, passive, middle, and preterit, while finally *ποῦ* and *πότε* would represent adverbs. (It is true, however, that authorities like Ritter, Prantl, Zeller, and Bonitz have declared against this interpretation.) This is easy to reconcile with the fact, that after it had appeared that the other categories only denoted conditions or activities occurring in the *οὐσία*, other conditions than those at first enumerated are sometimes called categories. For we must always remember, that since things are reflected in the thought of all men in the same way, and since language also reveals the thought common to all, the main classes, though primarily grammatical, and perhaps different from what they would have become if Aristotle had found a fully-developed theory of the parts of speech, and which moreover he also sometimes reduces (*v. p. 83*), at once acquire logical and also real import. Hence, because we must think everything either as *οὐσία* or as one of its *πάθη*, all reality must be subject to the distinction of the substantial and accidental; or rather, conversely, we think so because it is the case. The *οὐσία*, or substance, therefore has primarily a grammatical meaning, and denotes the possible subject of a sentence. For this same reason, that which can only be subject and never a predicate, the individual thing, *e.g.* something denoted by a proper name, is substance in the first place and *par excellence*. The genera denoted by general

names can occupy the place of predicate, as well as that of subject, *e.g.* in subsuming judgments: hence they are called, substances indeed, but second substances. Whatever, on the other hand, occupies the place of predicate in a judgment asserting inherence, is only a quality of a substratum, and hence not a substance at all, but a mere *how*. All science however is concerned with substance, or the *what* of a thing, and the different sciences have different substances for their object: geometry, *e.g.*, that of space, the οὐσία θετή (p. 87). And since substance and true existence are identical, the problem of each science may be defined as the consideration of a single kind of the existent, with a view to discovering what it includes. For this same reason also each science has its own axioms and theorems, which are of no importance for the rest. But there will stand above them all the science which treats not of any particular kind of substance, but of substance as such, nor of a being determined in any way, but of the Existent as such, the ὄν, ἢ ὄν, and will enunciate the laws which hold good concerning it, as universally binding upon all kinds of the existent, and therefore upon all sciences (p. 1003). This science is therefore called the πρώτη φιλοσοφία, the science of First Principles; and while this name corresponds best to its relation to the other sciences, its content is best described by the term Ontology. And in consequence of the importance which Aristotle attributes to this part of philosophy, he often calls it simply philosophy, which is just as intelligible as that Plato should often have applied the term to the dialectical part of his system.

Trendelenburg: *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*. Berlin, 1846. Bonitz: *Die Kategorien des Aristoteles in the Wiener Akad. Schr.* 1853.

## § 87.

### ARISTOTLE'S FUNDAMENTAL SCIENCE.

A. Schwegler: *Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles*. 4 vols. Tübingen, 1847-48. (Text, translation, and commentary.) H. Bonitz: *Aristotelis metaphysica*. Bonn, 1838-49.

1. The writing of Aristotle, which received the name of Τὰ (βιβλία) μετὰ τὰ φυσικά (p. 980-1093), because it was put after his physical treatises in the first edition of his works, and thus brought it about that the science of first principles it discussed was afterwards called metaphysics, contains in the

*first book* (A. pp. 980–993) a critical historical introduction. The second book (A. *ἐλαττον*) is apparently interpolated; the *third* (B. pp. 995–1003) proceeds to enumerate the perplexities in which thought finds itself involved in thinking on this subject. Among them is the question, whether it can be the task of one and the same science to state the more formal principles of demonstration, of which every science must admit the validity, and, more materially, to determine what holds good of everything existent. This question is answered in the affirmative in the *fourth book* (Γ. pp. 1004–1012), and there is established as the supreme principle of all demonstration, and hence as the formal principle of all science, the axiom that contrary things must not be predicated of the same thing, because this would destroy all definite substance. For this axiom holds good only of such substance, *i.e.* of everything that is really existent, as does similarly, that of excluded middle. This does not however involve a denial of the fact that the determinations of being and non-being are combined in the possible: it was by applying to actuality what is true of possibility that Heraclitus was led to assert the continual flux of all reality. The *fifth book* (Δ. pp. 1012–1025) contains a discussion of synonyms which interrupts the course of the inquiry, and may be put aside for the present if one wishes to get a view of Aristotle's metaphysic, together with the *eleventh* (Κ. pp. 1059–1069), which seems to belong to a different version of the whole metaphysics, as may the two last books (Μ. pp. 1076–1087, and Ν. pp. 1087–1093), which contain a criticism of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas. With the *sixth book* the inquiry reaches ontology proper, inasmuch as it attempts to solve the question as to what the really existent is, quite in the same manner in which Plato had considered this problem in his *Dialectic*.

- F. N. Titze: *De Aristotelis operum serie et distinctione*. Leipz., 1826.  
 Brandis: *Ueber des Aristoteles Metaphysik*. Akad. Abh., 1834.  
 Michelet: *Examen critique de l'ouvrage d'Aristote intitulé Métaphysique*. Paris, 1836. Krische: *Die theologischen Lehren der griechischen Denker*. Gött., 1840, pp. 246 ff. J. C. Glaser: *Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles nach Composition, Inhalt und Methode*. Berlin, 1841.

2. If ontology is to be a scientific inquiry, it must derive the existent as such from principles (cf. *supra*, § 85, 1). Accordingly the first, and one may say, initiatory, question is, as to what is meant by a principle. The answer which the usage

of language gives in the fourfold significance of the word *αἰτία* and *ἀρχή* (*causa*), Aristotle finds confirmed in history. For the Physiologers attempted to explain Being by means of matter, the Pythagoreans by form, Empedocles by the efficient cause, and Anaxagoras by the end or final cause (pp. 984, 985). Aristotle understands by *ὑλη* (*materia*) or matter every *ἐξ ᾧ*, or that *out of which* a thing becomes, while in Plato it had only been that *in which* it becomes. Hence not only is the bronze the matter of the statue, but the seed of the tree, the premises of the conclusion, the natural impulses of virtue, the tones of the octave, the lyre, even, of the tones it produces, the letters which compose and the sounds which generate it of the word. For the same reason matter in Aristotle coincides with the intermediate (*ἄπειρον, ἀόριστον*) capable of being determined, and hence in definition the genus, which has to be defined more closely, is the *ὑλη*. Similarly, matter is identical with that out of which purposive order is still to come, but which does not yet display it. It follows that mere matter cannot be an object of knowledge, that it does not lie above but beneath the knowable, so that it can be understood only by means of analogy (p. 207). And just as the last of these assertions reminds us of Plato's *νόθος λογισμός* (p. 78, 1), so we are reminded of other Platonic utterances when Aristotle calls matter the ground of all plurality, the concomitant cause, and the feminine principle. And also when, exactly like Plato, he distinguishes between the ground or reason and the indispensable condition, he uses the same expression to denote the latter: *αἰτιασθαι ὡς δὲ ὑλην* (p. 200). On the other hand, it is peculiar to Aristotle and contrary to the Platonic conception, that he always assumes matter as the *δύναμις* (*potentia*), i.e. as the possibility and capacity of becoming formed, and points out the difference between it and mere *στέρησις*, the Platonic *μῆδον*, inasmuch as it is that which only relatively is not (p. 192), i.e. that which is *not yet*, which is incomplete. Hence there is conceded to it far more reality than in Plato, and unlike Plato's treatment it has assigned to it a place among the principles of true being, in the science of first principles.

3. But if in his treatment of matter the divergence from Plato is especially prominent, the same may be said of his agreement with Plato, when Aristotle passes to the second principle. This agreement extends even to the phraseology, for instead of *μορφή* (*forma, causa formalis*), he as often uses

λόγος and εἶδος (pp. 198, 335), and even παράδειγμα is found. The Form is related to the Matter, the principle of passivity, as that which determines it. The shape of the statue which the metal receives, the ratio 1 : 2 into which the tones of an octave are fitted, the dominating mean to which the impulses are subjected, the whole into which the parts are combined, the law which regulates the arrangement, the specific difference which supplements the genus in definition, are all instanced by Aristotle as examples of the principle of form. Thus it bears towards the matter the relation of the πέρας to the ἄπειρον, of the εἰς ὃ to the ἐξ ὧ (p. 1070). The fact, moreover, that the form which is imposed upon the metal, previously existed in the sculptor, perhaps led to the expression τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, which Aristotle uses by preference to denote this principle, and which was not perhaps invented by him. (It was at first translated by *essentia*, afterwards always by *quod quid erat esse*.) And just as the conception of the indeterminate and of matter coincided with that of δύναμις, that of the form coincides with that of ἐνέργεια (*actus*). Hence we can understand that, during the supremacy of Aristotelianism in the Middle Ages, not only were the words *formalis* and *actualis* equivalent in meaning, but that upon the Aristotelian maxim that an ἄπειρον ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν was a *contradictio in adjecto* (p. 207 *et al.*), was based the unquestioned axiom, that *infinitum actu non datur*, which frequently is actually called as inviolable as *principium identitatis*.

4. The phrase τὸ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις, which Aristotle uses instead of the Platonic ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, to designate the third principle, is sometimes varied by τὸ αἷτιον τῆς μεταβολῆς, as his attempts to distinguish strictly between κίνησις and μεταβολή fail. It is also called more briefly ἀρχὴ or αἷτία κινουῦσα (p. 1044), and κινεῖν, also ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως or ἀρχὴ κινητικὴ καὶ γεννητικὴ (p. 742) and ἀρχὴ τῆς ποιήσεως (§192): ποιοῦν αἷτιον also occurs and explains the well-known translation of *causa efficiens*. In the case where the figure of a Hermes is imparted to a mass of metal, the sculptor is the cause of this transformation. But as he received the impulse to do so from the form he had beheld in his mind's eye, the latter is the true κινητικόν, and thus the *causa efficiens* coincides with the *causa formalis*. This is the case especially in living organisms; for that which impels the plant to grow is its λόγος. We can moreover, already at this point, understand why Aristotle called the soul,

the principle of motion in the living, its form (p. 414), and why he says of it that it is *κατὰ τρόπους τρεῖς αἰτία* (p. 415).

5. For the fourth cause also, the *οὐ ἕνεκα* or *τέλος*, the *causa finalis*, may be seen to coincide with the last two, when one considers that the sculptor aims at nothing else than the figure of the Hermes. For this reason, chopping may be defined as the *τί ἦν εἶναι* of the axe, so that the form and the end or aim become one, just as we also still consider aim and motive as synonymous. Hence also the conceptions of the indeterminate and the aimless coincide, and *ἄπειρον* and *ἀτέλες* become synonyms; while similarly it becomes self-evident that everything perfect is determinate and limited. Thus the four original principles reduce themselves to two, *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, the last of which is henceforth called *ἐντελέχεια*, on the ground of the element of determination by an end which has entered into it (p. 1115), and the antithesis of faculty and exercise of activity, of potentiality and actuality, of pre-supposition and perfection is the true result of the preliminary inquiries into the principles. But inasmuch as they are correlative, these conceptions acquire a certain amount of fluidity: thus one and the same thing may be an actuality in one respect, as *e.g.* the tree of the seed, and again a potentiality in another, as *e.g.* of a statue. Hence the distinction of first and second actualities is introduced, and the soul, *e.g.* is called the entelechy of the body, because it is the body in activity; but also the first entelechy, because its own activity is thought. Accordingly, first or pure matter would be something entirely devoid of form, something not yet at all actualized; and again, ultimate matter would be something to such a degree identical with form as no longer to afford the matter of a fresh actualization (pp. 1015, 1045). And just as the distinction is here made between primary and secondary matter, there is elsewhere found a parallel distinction between immediate and ulterior possibility (p. 735).

6. The foregoing explanations supply the data for an answer to the question of ontology; in the first place, in the negative result that neither mere matter nor mere form is substance or true being. This is maintained most decidedly with regard to the *ἄλγ*, and the position of the physiologists is thus rejected. Mere matter is intermediate between Being and Non-Being, is merely susceptible of actuality, merely its germ. If it happens once that it is called substance (p. 192),



a limiting *ἐγγύς* is added. But the form also possesses no substantial being, and a great part of Aristotle's polemics against Plato hinge on the point that the latter assumed the reality of mere *εἶδη*, and placed them beyond and outside of the many individual existences, separated from everything material, whereby it became inconceivable how the gulf between them and matter could be bridged, inasmuch as they were unable to acquire sensible existence for themselves (pp. 990, ff. *Met. M.* and *N.*). In spite of these polemics, however, it happens far more frequently than in the case of matter that he himself calls the mere form *οὐσία*, a fact to be explained partly by the higher position he also concedes to the form; partly by the circumstance that *οὐσία* means *essentia* as well as *substantia*, and that this, as was shown, really appeared identical with the form (p. 1032). If, however, the conception of *οὐσία* as real substance be strictly adhered to, it must be conceived as the union of matter and form, and as it were composed of them, as being materialized form or formed matter. Hence too the definition which is to express the whole essence of a thing, is equally composed of two factors, the *genus* and the *differentia*, corresponding to matter and form. But this union (*σύνθεσις*) must not be conceived as tranquil being, but rather as a transition, a word which may be the rather used to translate *κίνησις*, that Aristotle himself calls it a *βαδίζειν*, and that our term "motion," properly speaking corresponds only to the single kind of *κίνησις*, which Aristotle calls *φωρά*. To Aristotle, there is nothing real but that which is passing into actuality, and in opposition alike to the flux of Heraclitus and the unprogressive rest of the Eleatics, he regards development alone as real; for this is the conception which in Aristotle takes the place of an absolute Becoming. There is no transition from nothingness into Being, but only from that which is not yet, the matter or potentiality. (Cf. our phrase, "There's the making of a poet in him.") Thus he substitutes for the mere forms and genera of Plato the entelechies, *i.e.*, forms which no longer exist unchangeably beyond the sensible world, but active forces, universals which particularize themselves. And in this exercise of its inherent activities, which thus constitutes the essential nature of reality, it is possible to distinguish the two factors of the moving and the moved, the active and the passive. The latter is matter which moves towards its end like the iron towards the magnet;

the former, the end or form, moves it by attraction. Hence the real principle of all motion is always the end and the form; it posits the motion which the matter undergoes (p. 202).

7. And what is true of every real substance, of course holds also of the sum total of all things real, the universe. In this also there is no cessation, there are *κινούμενα* and *κινούντα*, i.e. purposive activity. But inasmuch as everything moved in its turn imparts its motion, there must be inferred a principle which only moves without being itself moved, a *πρῶτον κινῶν*, which, being itself *ἀκίνητον*, naturally excludes all matter or passivity, and hence is pure *ἐνέργεια* (*purus actus*), *ἄνευ ὕλης*; for otherwise it would be necessary to commit the absurdity of assuming the reality of an endless regress (p. 256). Hence in the last resort the reason of a transition into actuality always resides in something formed or actually existent. The objection that something unmoved cannot cause motion, overlooks the fact that this is refuted by every case of an end aimed at, and that the first Mover of the world is just the final end of the world, the Best (pp. 1072, 292). This does not however mean that Aristotle denies the causality of the end, for it had turned out to be the real efficient cause (p. 198). The dictum that the end is above all the Principle, is one that occurs more than once in Aristotle. Thus all reality is intermediate between the first matter after which nothing, and the first Mover after whom everything, strives. The latter on his part is free from all striving and all movement, and excludes all mere potentiality, and thus represents that which cannot be otherwise, is devoid of plurality and imperishable, one and eternal (pp. 1072, 1074, 258). For, after all, it is only because it is all this, that it can become the object of scientific cognition. But if this aim of all striving is eternal, the activity of the endeavour must be the same: the motion of the world is as eternal as the world itself.

8. But from the position hitherto developed, it further follows, that if the principle of motion in everything real was the *λόγος*, the one source of all motion must include all the *λόγοι* and ends; and the *νοῦς* had been defined as such an all-including End from the time of Anaxagoras, and also Plato in the *Philebus* had adopted it, instead of what he elsewhere calls the *ἀγαθόν*. Aristotle uses both these expressions (p. 1075) to denote the purpose of the universe and the object

of knowledge, and especially the expression of Anaxagoras, whom he accordingly praises very highly for having made the *νοῦς* the principle of motion, and having thereby shown himself superior to the "dreamers" before him (pp. 256, 984); and he hints further how much Plato was indebted to Anaxagoras. The question next arises as to how the *νοῦς*, the real Deity in Aristotle's system, must be conceived if He is to be really immaterial and devoid of all passivity. If He were conceived as engaged in moral action or artistic creation, He would be determined by an end outside himself (p. 1177). There remains, therefore, only the glorious leisure of theoretic activity in which the bliss, the immortality, and the eternal life of the Deity consists (p. 1072). But even this must be determined more closely. If the *νοῦς* were engaged upon anything else than itself, it would be limited thereby; hence, just as He cannot love, but only be loved, so He cannot think anything else than Himself without destroying the delight of being concerned with the most perfect thing. Hence the thought of the Deity, nay, its essential nature, consists in thinking upon thought; its pure and eternal pleasure consists in immutable self-contemplation (p. 1074). For this reason too the moments of speculative contemplation, in which our spirit re-discovers itself in the object of its thought, are the ones in which we attain to a feeble conception of the bliss which the Deity enjoys eternally. And since his inquiries into the existent have led to the result that the most real of things, the pure actuality and the principle of everything real, is the single eternal and absolutely necessary Deity, we can understand why Aristotle called his science of first principles theology. Similarly these latter determinations of the nature of the Deity are a confirmation of what was said above (§ 85, 9), that the Deity is the object and the subject of philosophic contemplation.

9. The determination of *νοῦς* as thinking upon thought, to which Plato had only approximated (cf. § 77, 9), is in Aristotle brought out with full consciousness and emphasized. Connected with this is the further advance, that the highest conception which the science of first principles arrives at, suffices for the understanding of the world that exists, and does not require the aid of an active principle in order to introduce the Good into the form of externality, nor an intermediate world-soul in order to maintain the connection (*v.* § 78, 2 and 3). Both these advances follow from the difference between

Aristotle's conception of ὄλη and Plato's. By becoming that which is not yet, instead of that which is not, and by thus having attributed to it a tendency towards being, matter supplies a metaphysical justification to plurality and sensible existence, and the form, which exercises this attraction upon it, is brought down from its supra-celestial sphere, and nearer to it. According to Aristotle, the εἶδος is not a ἐν παρὰ τὰ πολλά, but a ἐν κατὰ τῶν πολλῶν, or even ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς. Hence not only the classes of individual beings, but these themselves possess actual reality. Thus while Plato, with an exaggerated preference for the Eleatic Monism, regards the sensible world as, at least half, a delusion, and only takes to physics unwillingly, and even then is glad to cling to mathematics, Aristotle recognises the claims of plurality almost to the extent of atomism, and his favourite study is natural science, as the science of the qualitative, and thus emancipated from mathematics. But though in all these points his advance upon Plato is indisputable, he nevertheless in one respect remains too close to him to be able to free himself from inconsistencies. For it was only in virtue of the material element he included in the Platonic Ideas, that these became effective forces. And yet this element is excluded from that which is intended to be the most real of real things, viz., the Deity. This was unavoidable, for the time had not yet come for the Deity to be conceived as taking πόνος upon himself, without which God lives in heartless enjoyment, troubled about nothing, and through which alone He is love and the Creator. What Plato in the *Parmenides* had beheld only in a passing flash (ἐξαίφνης; cf. § 77, 2), viz. the union of rest and motion, enjoyment and labour, is a conception grasped only by the Christian spirit. In common with the whole of antiquity, Aristotle also fails to transcend dualism, because he excludes matter from the Deity, to which it therefore remains opposed, even though reduced to a mere potentiality.

## § 88.

### ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS.

G. H. Lewes: *Aristotle, a Chapter from the History of Science.* Lond., 1864.

1. The metaphysical first principles of natural science, as Aristotle's inquiries in his φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις have been aptly called, begin with an enumeration of difficulties, and attempts

at their solution. Then he passes on to determine the ideas of nature and the natural. This is effected by its antithesis to that which is produced artificially or forcibly, and leads to the result that only that is natural which takes place of itself, or contains the principle of change in itself; and similarly, the principle of *στάσις* or *ἡρεμεῖν*, as well as that of *κίνησις* or *κινεῖσθαι* (p. 192 δ, 1025 δ). Since, however, the end which coincides with the form had been recognised in the *Metaphysics* as the true principle of change, the true nature of a thing will lie less in its matter than in its conception and aim, for which the matter forms the material and the presupposition (pp. 194–200): agreeably to the practice of naming things after their form and aim. And like the nature of the individual beings, so nature as a whole is above all a system of ends, of which the efficient causes serve as conditions. This at once excludes the possibility that there can exist in nature anything without a purpose, and hence whatever is aimless is also unnatural. Nature acts not, indeed, with a consciousness of purpose, but in accordance with purpose,—not like a god, but nevertheless divinely, like the instinctive genius of an artist (p. 463). And as the end in its operation has been found to be motion, both the Eleatics, who deny motion, and the Pythagoreans, who, as mathematicians, ignore the conception of an end, are incapable of establishing a true science of nature. For the true mode of contemplating nature is teleological, but does not in any way exclude consideration of causal connections; only it does not regard them as the chief thing, but as contributory causes and a *conditio sine quâ non*. Although Aristotle's agreement with Plato in this extends even to the words he uses, it is diminished by the facts that in Plato the purpose of things is outside them, either in the transcendent archetypes, or even in the advantage of man; whereas Aristotle searches for the purpose immanent in them, and tries to conceive them as entelechies, and directly censures their reference to human purposes. This internal justification of sensible things which he concedes to them, is connected with the higher position he concedes to the *ἰδέα*, and as the *ἰδέα* coincides with the *ἀναγκάιον*, and the *εἶ* with the purpose, just as in Plato, it is self-evident that Aristotle must pay much more regard to the efficient causes, and approximate much more to the Physiologists than his predecessor. To the *ἰδέα* accordingly, as the mere *συναίτιον*, he refers all the phenomena in which the natural purpose

failed of attainment, such as monstrous births and miracles, which are irrational phenomena displaying the power of chance. When, therefore, he requires that the physicist should pass over such things and hold fast to cases in which nature attains her intentions, he anticipates the contempt which, two thousand years later, Bacon expressed for the freaks of nature (cf. § 249, 7). Aristotle, however, so often joins the conceptions of *τύχη* and *τὸ αὐτόματον*, the contraries of purposive order, with that of human will, that it is impossible not to suppose that the resistance of material would have supplied him with the basis of an answer, if the question of the origin of evil had been put to him. As purpose and form were found to be identical, nature of course avoids everything formless and indeterminate. Hence the more a thing is determinate, the better it is (p. 259). The axiom already laid down in the ontology, that infinity does not exist actually, is continually utilized in his physics, and it is everywhere maintained, *e.g.*, when infinite divisibility causes difficulties, that infinity is only possible and not actual (p. 204). And because of this impossibility of anything devoid of aim and measure, nature nowhere exhibits extremes without intermediaries : wherever anything tends to become immoderate, it is opposed by its contrary (p. 652). The inquiries which follow that into the infinite, are concerned with Space, the Void, and Time. The impossibility of a void is inferred from the most various reasons, while it is shown with respect to space and time that they are utterly unthinkable without motion. For every space must be conceived as the unmoved enclosing limit of something moving ; and space itself, therefore, as the unmoved limit of all things in motion, *i.e.*, of the universe. Time, on the other hand, is the number and measure of motion, and thus mediately also of rest. He concludes from this that there would be no time without a mind to count it, and that the circular motions of the planets supply the best unit for such counting of time, because of their constancy ; and moreover, that everything unaffected by motion and rest, the absolutely immovable, cannot be in time. This forms the transition to the books on physics, which Aristotle himself, and also his earlier commentators, used to oppose to the four books on the principles of science, under the name of the books on motion. If one ignores, as Aristotle himself often does, the distinction between change and transition (*μεταβολή* and *κίνησις*), there must be assumed four kinds of

motion, *i.e.*, (relative) generation and corruption, γένεσις and φθορά, which affect the substance ; change, ἀλλοίωσις, which affects the quality ; increase and decrease, αὔξις and φθίσις, which affect the quantity ; and lastly motion proper, πορεία, affecting the πῶν. The remaining categories are not regarded as applicable to change, nor the first category to κίνησις in the more restricted sense, on the ground that there cannot be any opposition of substances. All the different forms of change presuppose motion in space (p. 260), which for this reason must be considered the chief and primary kind in physics. This motion is eternal, and hence precedes all generation and passing away. But this eternal character can be ascribed only to circular motion, which returns into itself, for rectilinear motion is either endless, and hence imperfect, or proceeds up and down, and would therefore be interrupted by resting points. The transition is thereby made to the distinction between phenomena which display the imperishable constituents of the world, and those displaying its perishable elements. The former are not included in the general physical discussions, but treated in :—

Cf. C. Prantl: *Aristoteles acht Bücher Physik*. Leipz., 1854.

2. The treatise on the heavens, περὶ οὐρανοῦ (pp. 268–313), the first two books of which contain Aristotle's cosmological inquiries. Aristotle understands by οὐρανός, not a part of the world, like the Pythagoreans, but the whole, or sometimes, it is true, only the outer circumference of the All, and sets before himself the task of describing the system of all the spatial movements of the universe. To begin with, he reduces them to subjects of circular motion round a centre, and of rectilinear motion to or from a centre. The former is proper to the heavens, a divine body consisting not of fire, which has a rectilinear upward motion, but of the eternally circling ether. There are reasons of all sorts in favour of the supposition that the all is one, uncreated and imperishable, unchangeable in its eternal youth. It is limited, moreover, and spherical in form. Not, however, as though there existed anything outside it in space ; on the contrary all that falls beyond the outermost sphere partakes neither of Space nor of Time, and lives a life free from all suffering : it is the immortal and divine principle, which every point of the universe aims at. Hence it is un-

necessary to assume a special indwelling soul of the world to set it in motion. The inner border of the unmoved is space, which is not therefore in the world so much as the world is in it. The world, which is the highest thing after the Deity, and hence divine, has, like everything that naturally moves itself, not only an upper and a lower part, but also a right and a left side. And as we live on the lower half of the earth, and hence in the lower half of the universe, seeing that the polar star indicates the lower end of the world's axis, the motion of the universe, which to us appears to go from left to right, really goes from right to left. It is most rapid in the outer circle, the sphere of the fixed stars, and hence they are the most serviceable for the measure of the movements. Within this there are the spheres of the planets, which are firmly fixed in them and do not rotate: in addition to the westward movement of the universe, they share also in a contrary one, and thereby are apparently left behind by the fixed stars. But, as Eudoxus has shown, a third movement also must be ascribed to the planets, and in some cases even a fourth, in order to explain the constellations as given by experience. Even this, however, was found insufficient: according to Callippus, the assumption of four spheres sufficed to explain the motions of only two planets, while the rest required more. Aristotle adds fourteen others to these thirty-three spheres, in order to save the concentric character of the planetary spheres. Each of the planets, moreover, possesses an unmoved mover, for which the expression of a soul of the planet is sometimes substituted. Perhaps these spirits of the stars enabled him, much as they had done Plato, to come to terms with popular religion. The spherical earth in the centre of the universe is stationary: it forms the centre without which circular motion is unthinkable. Thus the centre of the earth is at the same time the centre of the universe. This posits in the universe an antithesis between the centre and the circumference, which forms the basis of the strictly *physical* doctrines which Aristotle develops in the two following books of the *περὶ οὐρανοῦ*, and of which the *περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς* (pp. 313-338) almost forms a continuation, so that the whole would have for its subject the world of change. The discussions begin with a refutation of the geometrical atomism of Plato and the physical atomism of Democritus, and also of the doctrines of Empedocles and Anaxagoras: then they pass on to connect with that problem



the antithesis of centripetal and centrifugal motion, *i.e.*, of gravity and lightness, which these atomistic theories are said to be just as little able to explain as the other physicists. All attempts at explanation either lead to the contradictory assumption of void space, or are at least unable to explain why the larger mass of fire tends upwards more intensely than the smaller. As a matter of fact a thing is absolutely light when it tends upwards as such, and relatively light when it does so more than another by its own nature. Of the former, fire is an example, just as the earth is of the absolutely heavy; and hence the antithesis of the two coincides with that of the warm and the cold. They are related as Form and Matter, since the form is the enveloping and the light tends to the circumference. And since there is added to the antithesis of the two active principles, the Warm and the Cold, that of two passive ones, the Dry and the Moist, there arises four possible combinations, which are the four apparently simple bodies. These, which held the first place in Empedocles, in Aristotle come only third, as the antitheses must be regarded as prior to them, and to these again the wholly indeterminate Matter, which never actually occurs in itself, and only exists in a way. The resemblance to Anaximander (§ 24) is here evident. Besides these four "elements," which, as derived from an antithesis, are subordinated, each to the antithesis predominating in it, there is assumed an Ether as the "fifth substance," which is not opposed by any antithesis, and the motion of which also does not coincide with rectilinear but with circular and hence perpetual motion. This most volatile of substances plays an important part in generation, etc., and, as was shown above, also in the construction of the heavens. There is an especially sharp antithesis between fire and water on the one hand, and air and earth on the other, although this does not render the transition of each element into every other impossible. Thus fire is generated out of smoke, a mixture of air and earth, by the addition of warmth, etc. When the elements not only interpenetrate one another (σύνθεσις), but mix with true *μίξις* so intimately that they no longer exist actually but only potentially, there arise the more complex substances and things. This process of generation, to which there corresponds a similar process of dissolution, is eternal like the universe. Its continuous course is however changed into a periodical one by the inclination of the ecliptic, in such

a way that everything recurs from time to time, not indeed numerically the same, but the same in kind.

Cf. C. Prantl: *Aristoteles vier Bücher über das Himmelsgewölbe*. Leipz., 1857.

3. The *Μετεωρολογικά* form in a way a connecting link between the general physical doctrines and physics in particular, in their first three books (p. 338-378). As they consider the phenomena which take place between the region of the constellations and the earth, it is evident that the two elements intermediate between fire and earth must play the most important part, especially in the shape of the atmosphere and the ocean. The two kinds of evaporation, moist and dry, *ἀτμίς* and *ἀναθυμίασις*, serve to explain not only all watery precipitations, but also the winds, electrical phenomena, earthquakes, etc., in short everything included in the atmosphere impregnated with vapours, among which Aristotle reckons not only shooting stars but also comets. Schleiermacher has reason to be astonished that in this portion of his work Aristotle does not quote Heraclitus as an authority. Above the atmosphere, in the direction of the constellations, that which is assumed to fill space is neither fire nor air, but something purer than either. The *fourth book* of the *Μετεωρολογικά*, which was hardly intended to form part of the samewhole as the others, contains inquiries that form the transition to organic nature. They concern the changes produced by heat and cold in moist and dry substances, which are supposed to show themselves in melting, boiling, and drying, and also in begetting, digesting, ripening, and decaying; then they pass on to the substances Aristotle calls *ὁμοιομερῆ*, homogeneous, meaning thereby mixtures so intimate that their parts are always like the whole, however far the process of mechanical division is carried. Substances like wood and bone are to be thought of; for though water also is sometimes called *ὁμοιομερές*, yet it generally means something which is on the one hand a mixture, primary or secondary, etc., of the elements, and especially of water and earth, and on the other is not yet articulated like a countenance, which when cut up does not consist of countenances. Thus all the metals are homogeneous. This kind of substances, then, forms the matter and the material out of which the *ἀνομοιομερές*, the organic existence composed of different members, is formed.

4. Aristotle's biology is developed especially in the two first books of his work, *περὶ ψυχῆς* (pp. 402-424). The material condition of life is a body not homogeneous but organic, *i.e.*, composed of members, and differing from a machine in being organic by nature and not by art. But such a body by itself is not yet alive, for a corpse is only improperly called man or animal. Rather there must be added to it the end immanent in this organism, which makes a body which is potentially alive, actually so. Hence the soul or principle of life is the entelechy or function of a naturally organic body. The condition further of its combination with the body is warmth, which is akin to the ether. The soul, therefore, being the form and the immanent end of the body, is neither itself body, nor conceivable without the body; it is to the body what sight is to the eye, and a separation of the two, and still more a combination with another body, is just as impossible as that the art of flute-playing should become active in anvils, or the smith's art in flutes. But the soul itself in its turn enters into activity; and as these activities, like sensation, etc., again stand in the relation of "energies" and "entelechies" to it, it is called the first entelechy of the body. Its functions form a gradation, the lower being the presupposition of the higher, and contained in it like the triangle in the polygon. The lowest manifestation of a soul, which is therefore found also in the lowest forms of life, is the *θρεπτικόν*, *i.e.*, nourishment, growth, and the propagation of the species. This is not lacking even in the plants, which are also animate and alive, but rank far below the animals; among other reasons, also because they show only the difference of upper and lower, of mouth, *i.e.*, the root, and excretory and propagatory organ, *i.e.*, the flower, which is necessary for their nourishment; but not that of front and back and right and left. Aristotle did not, however, write a special work on plants, or, if so, it has been lost, for the *περὶ φυτῶν* is not genuine: there are only isolated remarks about them in the discussion of their distinction from the animals. To this lowest grade of life, which is also sometimes called the first soul, there is added, in the case of animals, sense-perception; and together with this, since feeling, which forms the foundation of all perception, produces sensations of pleasure and pain, an instinct to get rid of the latter; so that the *αἰσθητικόν* and *ὀρεκτικόν* must be found in all, and the *κινητικόν κατὰ τόπον* in most, animals. With

the first of these factors, the distinction of the front, *i.e.*, the perceiving side, and the back; with the second, that of the right and chief, and the left, side, acquires a meaning. In the case of man, who is the most perfect of beings, his upper and lower coincides with that of the world, in virtue of his upright posture. The single senses are thereupon discussed in great detail, and the finer development of the sense of touch in man is connected with his greater reasonableness. For this, the *περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν* (pp. 436–449) should be compared; according to which there is this common to all sense-perceptions, that the form of the object is therein perceived without its matter; that motion is involved, and that the organs of sense are affected by means of a medium. The senses “of taste also and of touch form no exception to the last of these requirements,” for their proper organ is to be found in the region of the heart. Further, we perceive by means of the general sense that we feel, and we are able to refer the sensations of several senses to the same object. The periodical cessation of all sensations is sleep, which accordingly occurs in all animals. The traces of past perceptions are presentations, their retention produces memory, *μνήμη*. This, which is shared also by the animals, must be distinguished from the greater combining power of recollection, *ἀνάμνησις*, which is possessed by man alone. Thus this growth in intensity corresponds to that of impulse, which in the lower animals was mere desire, in the more perfect also temper, and in man in addition also will.

Cf. Trendelenburg: *Aristotelis de anima libri tres*. Jena, 1833.

5. Connected with the researches in the second and in the beginning of the third book of the work on the soul, are Aristotle's achievements in zoology. The nine books of his *History of Animals* (*περὶ τὰ ζῷα ἱστορίαι*, pp. 486–638), for the tenth does not belong to him, are intended to arrange and to give a general view of the historical material; but contain also numerous remarks of permanent value for a philosophic observation of nature. (Schneider's edition, Leips., 1811, contains a very valuable commentary.) Above all, there should be noticed the idea, destined to form the foundation of all subsequent comparative anatomy, that the organs proper to a type occur, at least in a rudimentary form, even where external

circumstances render them useless ; further, that the structure of the most perfect, *i.e.* of the human, body should always be kept in mind, to guide the inquiry into that of animals, etc. The division of animals into mammals, birds, fish, and amphibia, insects, crustacea, shell-fish, and molluscs, of which the first four are grouped together as sanguineous, and the last four as bloodless, has marked an epoch in the history of zoology. The writing *περὶ ζώων μορίων* (pp. 639-697), not only contains preliminary researches for a philosophy of living nature, but such a philosophy itself. The first book treats of the method, the following ones give an account of the organs of animals, the tone of which is throughout teleological, without however neglecting a reference to efficient causes, especially in the explanation of more accidental differences. The distinction between the organs of sense, composed of homogeneous substances, and the remaining organs, formed of heterogeneous matter, an antithesis which does not apply to the heart, because of its function, and the importance ascribed to the blood as being that out of which the whole organism is at first formed, and by which it is afterwards nourished, deserve especial mention. There follow upon this work the smaller treatises on the motions of animals, on their gait, and the larger writing, *περὶ ζώων γενέσεως*, (pp. 715-789), as well as a few other treatises in the *Parva naturalia*. Procreation is regarded as the means whereby plants and animals, which individually are subject to death, partake of immortality at least in their kind. There is also assumed a gradation in the means of generation, in which the univocal form is preferred to the equivocal, and the highest place assigned to generation by means of separate sexes. In this, the altogether more imperfect female supplies the matter in the menses and the male the form in the seed, which contains an ether-like breath. And as in the act of generation, so in its product also, the corporeal element is to be derived from the maternal, and the psychical from the paternal element. In connection with this doctrine of generation, which is different according to the different classes of animals, there follow inquiries into the development of the fetus and the growth and maturing of the young. The treatises on the length and brevity of life, on youth and old age, on life and death, are so closely connected with these, that one need not be surprised that Aristotle should describe these small treatises in the *Parva*

*naturalia* as completing what was to be said about animals (p. 467).

Cf. F. N. Titze : *Aristoteles über die wissensch. Behandlung der Naturkunde*. Prague, 1819. Wiegmann : *Observationes zoologicae criticae in Aristot. histor. anim.* Berol., 1826. J. Bona Meyer : *De principiis Aristotelis in distributione animalium adhibitis*. Berol., 1854. Also : *Aristoteles Thierkunde*. Berl., 1855.

6. Anthropology proper, *i.e.* the specific difference between men and all animals, is treated in the *third book* of the *De Anima* (pp. 424-435). The difference consists in the *Noûs*, which is not merely an intensified form of the vital principle, which is combined with the bodily organs, but which may be called a divine principle, because it is superadded to the mere activities of the soul and initiates an entirely new series of phenomena. Hence the expression *θύραθεν* (p. 736). It modifies everything in man which he has in common with the animals, in a peculiar manner. Thus its movements are prompted by purpose and rational deliberation, its perceptions and conceptions are accompanied by judgments as to their truth and certainty, etc. The *νοûs* alone, being something more than a function of the body, is separable from it (*χωριστός*), imperishable and eternal. This remark, however, requires qualification. For there must be distinguished in the spirit also, as in everything else, the potentiality and the activity; and as the former has been found to be the principle of passivity, it is accordingly necessary to distinguish between a passive and an active *νοûs*, the latter being exempt from suffering anything. The former, the *νοûs παθητικός*, which includes also that portion of thought which is dependent upon presentations and hence ultimately upon perceptions, *i.e.* empirical thought, is not independent of its organs; hence it and its memories, etc., are as perishable as the organs. The *νοûs ποιητικός* stands related to it like a kingly master who, as he is in a way what he knows, is determined by nothing, but is perfectly free, immortal and eternal. Nor can we doubt that it is this active spirit that is called into play in the moments of man's absorption in speculative thought. But there is room for much doubt as to the limits between the active and the passive *νοûs*, and still more as to the relation of the former to the divine. For the view that only the divine spirit is quite free from all suffering, and hence the only pure exercise of activity and immortal, that it is combined with a single individual only

for the space of the latter's earthly life, and on his death combines with another, and that hence there can only be a question of its immortality, not of that of the individual personality—for all this it is possible to appeal to the older Aristotelians. On the other hand, many authorities in recent times, e.g. Schelling, Brandis, etc., have laid stress on the expressions of Aristotle which seem to conceive the active spirit as personally determinate, from which personal immortality would follow as a matter of course. And if one compares the point of view of Aristotle with that of Plato, and reflects that the latter was certainly in earnest in maintaining personal immortality, the presumption in favour of this view must be still greater in Aristotle, in proportion as he conceded more to the claims of the individual than Plato did. To decide, indeed, how he conceived of immortality is impossible, seeing that he expressly declares memories, presentations, etc., to be dependent on the body and perishable: we can only assert that he conceived the theoretic and speculative nature of the spirit as its proper and therefore inalienable character.

Cf. L. Schneider: *U<sup>n</sup>sterblichkeitslehre des Aristoteles*. Passau, 1867. Fr. Brentano: *Die<sup>16</sup>psychologie des Aristoteles*. Mainz, 1867.

7. That Aristotle, if he had given a detailed account of *Mathematics*, would have placed it after his ontology, goes without saying. But physics also, as is indicated in the name of the second, and not third, philosophy, has been put before mathematics, of which it would form the natural presupposition. For not only is the fundamental idea of mathematics, viz., space, fully treated in his *Physics*, but all mathematical ideas are not, according to Aristotle, generated by an *a priori* construction, as the modern view holds, but by abstraction from the sensible, ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, so that in his view they do not, like the conceptions of ontology, denote anything really distinct from the corporeal, but only something which the mathematicians regard as such. Of course, therefore, Aristotle combats those who would substitute mathematics for metaphysics. The object of mathematics is the quantitative, which is number or magnitude according as it is to be counted or to be measured, and in this consists the distinction of arithmetic and geometry. The former is concerned with that which is not, the latter with that which is, in space. For this reason, too, the first element of each, the point and unity, are respectively defined

as *μονὰς θέσιν ἔχουσα*, and as *στιγμὴ ἄθετος*, definitions suggested by the connection of geometrical and arithmetical methods so habitual in antiquity. Among the many differences between *πλῆθος* and *μέγεθος*, he mentions together with others, that in numbers there is no greatest number, but only a smallest, viz., unity, while among magnitudes, there is no minimum or atom, but only a maximum, viz., space. Thorough researches into continuous and discrete quantities, undertaken it is true in the interest of physics rather than of mathematics, are found in the seventh book of the *Physics*. In addition to the passages concerning pure mathematics, his writings also contain hints about its applied parts, *e.g.*, optics, mechanics, the art of overcoming natural difficulties, etc.

## § 89.

## ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

C. Garve: *Die Ethik des Aristoteles übersetzt und erläutert*. 2 vols. Breslau, 1798-1801. Michelet: *Die Ethik des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältniss zum System der Moral*. Berlin, 1827. J. Walter: *Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft in der griechischen Philosophie*. Jena, 1874.

1. Like Plato, who for this reason had treated of ethics under the names of the Statesman and the State, Aristotle also is convinced that man can realize his moral destiny only in the State, which he cannot dispense with because he is not a god, and in separation from which he becomes the most malignant and dangerous of beasts. Hence he often calls all inquiries into virtue political (p. 1094). This however does not prevent him from beginning by inquiries into the destiny of individual men, which cannot indeed be fully realized except in the State, and into the subjective conditions required for such realization. These are laid down in the ten books which he himself repeatedly quotes as his *Ἠθικά* (pp. 1094-1181). Their relation to politics in the narrower sense is that of the general to the applied portion. In the *first book*, he begins by determining the problem in such a way, that it is not so much a question of setting up the idea of an absolute good, as of giving an account of the good which is attainable, and that hence regard should be paid to casual circumstances and changeable elements, involving a renunciation of scientific precision. And as ethics, regarded as a science, aims only at discovering the reason for a fact, it goes without



saying, that the subjective experience that this or that is good, forms a precondition of its proper understanding. It is necessary in the first place to answer the question as to what is the highest good attainable by action. Universal agreement, together with the ambiguity of the expression *εὐπράττειν*, induces Aristotle to admit without further doubt, that happiness, *εὐδαιμονία*, is this good. The further difficulty, that some understand thereby pleasure, others practical political activity, and yet others wisdom, is put aside for the moment by the remark that these alternatives do not exclude one another. The *second book* investigates what activity leads to this end, *i.e.*, in what Virtue consists. And as this end is an end for man, it can consist only in a specifically human activity, and therefore not in mere vegetating or living, but in the exercise of the activity of a rational being as such. If, however, it is necessary to distinguish in man two elements, that of the *πάθη*, akin to the nature of the beasts, *i.e.*, the practical affections which are accompanied by pleasure and pain, and that of the reason, there result two classes of virtues; first the *ethical* or practical virtues, which consist in the supremacy of the reason over the sensual impulses, and secondly those which consist in the vivifying and intensifying of the reason. The latter, the dianoetic, or logical virtues, are put aside for the time being, and it is shown, in agreement with Plato, who had conceived the good as *σύμμετρον*, that if virtue is produced by applying to the material of the natural impulses an *ὀρθὸς λόγος*, as the form to determine them, a mean between two extremes must result. This mean is not given by nature, but issues from deliberate purpose, nor yet is it one that occurs only once, but one that has by repetition become a permanent condition and habit. In short, virtue is *ἐξ ἑξ προαιρετικὴ ἐν μεσότητι τινι οὖσα*, with the addition, intended to preserve individual differences, *τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὀρισμένη*. The conception of purpose involved in this explanation leads on, in the *third book* (pp. 1109–1119), to the more detailed discussion of it, together with the cognate conceptions of the voluntary and involuntary, of inadvertence and intention, in which connection Aristotle directly attacks Socrates for having denied freedom, and indirectly also Plato, for not having asserted it with sufficient decision. Then there follows in the *fourth book* (pp. 1119–1128), the table of the ethical virtues. The psychological basis tacitly  
 for them seems to be the various forms of self-love and

affection. There are added to the two Platonic virtues of courage and temperance, liberality, magnanimity, sense of honour, gentleness, frankness, and courtesy, and they are each opposed, not to one extreme as in Plato, but to two, as the mean, moreover, not between but above them. The reason why justice is treated by itself in the *fifth book* (pp. 1122-1138) is, partly that Aristotle cannot entirely free himself from the Platonic conception of justice as the basis of all ethical virtues, and partly that the formal determination assigned to it, seems to make it the connecting link with the second class of virtues, and finally, in part that by its reference to the legislator it extends altogether beyond the doctrine of virtues. The mathematical formula for the conception of justice, however, in which distributive and equalizing justice form kinds corresponding to geometrical and arithmetical proportion, is a proof how unable Aristotle is, in spite of his polemics against the Pythagoreans on this very point, to repress, even with respect to them, the nature of an all-comprehensive philosopher. Like the conception of justice, and indeed to a greater extent, the idea of equity also, as supplementing legally defined duties, involves a reference to political conditions. The *sixth book* (pp. 1138-1143) is devoted to the *dianoetic* virtues. It gives not so much an account of separate forms based upon an explicit principle of division, as a gradation of the conceptions of truth, in which the preference is given to the *νοῦς* with its immediate grasp of the truth. Wisdom, which combines what is taught by the *νοῦς* and demonstrative science, is true happiness and the proper aim of human effort. For the practical life, however, reasonableness and right counsel (*φρόνησις* and *εὐβουλία*), both of which are concerned with the particular, are of more immediate importance. By their means art itself becomes a virtue (the art of a *virtuoso*?), and it is possible to compare the three stages of *dianoetic* virtues, *τέχνη*, *φρόνησις*, and *σοφία*, with the *ποιεῖν*, *πράττειν*, and *θεωρεῖν*, and ascribe them to the artist, statesman, and philosopher respectively. All these forms, which the Sophists had not got beyond recommending, are however only preliminary steps, and the road to wisdom, as the goal which is attained only by individuals in isolated moments, leads through them. The *seventh book* (pp. 1145-1154) investigates conditions under which the ordinary human virtues cease, as in brutalization, in which no law is any longer recognised, and as in heroic

virtue, in which the law,—which is valid only where there is injustice,—is transcended and a man becomes a law to himself. Besides, the conditions of endurance and continence, together with their opposites, are discussed in such a way that it appears doubtful whether they are really virtues or only similar to them. There follows an inquiry into pleasure, which has been suspected by the critics, both on account of the position it occupies and of its contents. The *eighth* and *ninth books* (pp. 1155–1172) contain a treatise on friendship, both in its intimate and its more external and social forms, which presents much excellent matter, although to some it appears to be but slightly connected with what precedes and follows, so that doubts have been raised whether it belonged to Aristotle at all, or whether it had been intended for insertion in the *Ethics*. In addition to a man's relation to his friends, that to himself is here discussed, and it is pointed out that the *σπουδαῖος ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ*, while the *φάυλος* lives in contradiction with himself and is his own enemy, a formula which agrees perfectly with that of the Stoics in later times. The *tenth book* (pp. 1172–1181) returns again to the question as to happiness. The first five chapters contain a treatment of the pleasure into which every moral mode of action must be transformed, and which must accompany every virtue. Then Aristotle returns to the highest dianoetic virtue, and once more extols contemplative virtue as the highest happiness, of which it is true only the pure spirit can partake, and not the soul, which is bound to the body by its sensual instincts. And if Aristotle's *Ethics* discuss many subjects that do not fit in with the ethical virtues into which Plato's courage and temperance had been developed, nor yet with the dianoetic virtues (the "wisdom" of Plato), this may once more be regarded as a confirmation of the view, that he took up into his system everything his predecessors had achieved. Thus the quality of being steeled against pain and delight, which the Cynics esteemed so highly, is found in Aristotle's continence and endurance; again, one must recognise resemblances to Aristippus in his remarks on pleasure, and on friendship in so far as it aims at gratification and profit. Aristotle's negative determination, that all these did not belong to the ethical and dianoetic virtues, any more than the more physical state of shame, found a positive complement in later times in the addition of a third class of virtues, the physical or bodily, in

a way very nearly suggested by him, Aristotle having indeed himself mentioned health as such a one (p. 408).

2. The conclusion of the *Ethics* clearly shows that the Πολιτικά (pp. 1252-1342) are intended to consider not so much a different subject, but the same subject from another point of view; for the problem is, to find, by means of a critical comparison of different forms of State, the one in which man can be most virtuous. In the *first book* (pp. 1252-1260), which Aristotle, referring back, calls *περὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ δεσποτείας*, he goes back to the simplest constituents of the State in the shape of the union of man and woman, who cannot live without each other, *i.e.*, to the household. Among the household furniture, without which a household cannot exist, Aristotle counts also the slaves, who receive but their due when, in view of their internal lack of independence, they are treated as such. For the same reason he, like Plato, regards it as wrong to enslave Hellenes, and it is also a barbaric fashion to treat women like slaves. The household is completed by the children, and then contains, in the relation of its master to his wife, his children, and his slaves, an image of the life of a republican, a king, and a despot respectively. The household is preserved by earning and by administering what is earned. The hints Aristotle gives with regard to both these activities have been spun out by later authors in the *Οἰκονομικοίς*, attributed to him. Agriculture, commerce, and the wage-labour of the artisan intermediate between them, belong to the art of acquiring; the rule of the slaves, the education of the children, and the guidance of the wife, to that of administering. As the village-commune arises out of the union of several households, so the State arises out of that of several communes. The State is, as man's capacity for speech shows, the end to which he is naturally destined; and though its origin was conditioned by necessity, it is yet no mere matter of necessity, as in that case animals also and slaves could form States. Nor again is it merely a device for security, like a defensive and offensive alliance. Its end and principle are the happy and virtuous life. Moreover it is prior to the household and the commune, just as a whole composed of members, is everywhere prior to them, because it is only the whole that makes them members at all. The whole of the *second book* (pp. 1260-1274) is devoted to a criticism, partly of political theories, partly of existing constitutions. Plato's

theory especially is discussed, and reproached with not paying sufficient attention to the independence of the members of the State, and hence by its communistic proposals making impossible a number of virtues which are based upon private property and separate households. Besides Plato, the Chalcedonian Phaleas, and the Milesian Hippodamus are considered, and also the Spartan, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions. In the *third book* (pp. 1274–1288) the State is defined as a body of citizens, and by a citizen is meant one who, unlike a slave, knows how to obey and to command with a view to the Good, and who accordingly has a share also in the activities of deliberating and judging. An intermediate position between the citizen and the slave is given to those who work for wages as the slaves of the public, the *βάνανσοι*. As the virtue of citizens consists in doing all things for the sake of the constitution, the question as to whether a good citizen is necessarily also a good man, leads on to that of the best constitution. And in the first place that constitution alone can lay claim to the name of good, which aims at the welfare of the citizens and in which the law rules. Both these requirements, however, may be fulfilled in the *βασιλεία* and in the *ἀριστοκρατία*, and lastly also in the *πολιτεία*, which are accordingly called good constitutions. According to the varying character of the members of a State, each of them may be the best and most suitable; each, moreover, can degenerate, when it aims at the benefit, not of the whole State, but of the dominant part, into the corresponding *παρεβάσεις* of the *τυραννίς*, the *ὀλιγαρχία* and the *δημοκρατία*. Aristotle proceeds to enumerate reasons and counter-reasons for the preference for one or other of the constitutions, but emphatically asserts that whenever there appears a god-like and heroic virtue raised far above the rest, the democratic expedient of ostracism is immoral, and submission to such a king is the best course. (The order of the eight books of the *Politics* in all the manuscripts, which is defended by scholars like Götting, etc., should, according to the researches of Barthélemy St. Hilaire and Spengel, be exchanged for that proposed by them, viz., 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 4, 6, 5; but Hildebrandt and Zeller have brought forward no contemptible reasons against the transposition of the 5th and 6th books, as has Bendixen repeatedly,—most recently in *Der alte Staat des Aristoteles*. 1868—against the insertion of the 7th and 8th

between the 3rd and 4th. Leaving, however, the final decision to better qualified authorities, we may continue our sketch of the contents of the separate books.) In the *fourth book* (pp. 1288-1301) preparations are made to discover in the case of what constitutions the requirements just explained can be fulfilled; and it is here that the real principle of classification appears. For it is necessary to distinguish different functions in the life of the State, such as deliberation (*βουλευόμενον*), and judging (*δίκαν*), above which stands the *κύριον*, or power of deciding peace or war. And according as this function (which it should be said is sometimes called *δύναμις*, sometimes *τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς*, and by various other names,) is exercised by one man, by the rich and noble, *i.e.* by several, or by all citizens, there results a monarchy, either in its sound form of kingship, or in its corruption of tyranny; an aristocracy, and its corruption an oligarchy; or a polity, together with its corruption of democracy. Aristotle is, however, so far from obliterating actual distinctions by this division, that just as he had enumerated five different forms of kingship in the third book, so he gives in the fourth the characteristics of as many more, or according to another interpretation, of four forms of democracy and of four forms of oligarchy, evidently with a continual reference to States actually in existence. The *fifth book* (pp. 1301-1315) engages in an inquiry closely connected with this, and makes remarks based on the closest observation of the grounds and occasions of revolutions, stating at the same time the means by which they may be met, especially in monarchies; and just as it has often been noted in recent times that the fame of Montesquieu has been partly acquired by what he borrowed from Aristotle, so, if we seek a predecessor for the expedients given by Machiavelli, reference might be made to the fifth book of Aristotle's Politics. In the *sixth book* (pp. 1316-1323), Aristotle states the circumstances under which, and the means by which, the different kinds of democracy and oligarchy may be established, firmly holding fast in so doing to the principle that there are no worse crimes than those against the constitution of the State. The *seventh and eighth books* (pp. 1323-1342) discuss the conditions under which the citizens of a State can partake of true happiness, by the complete coinciding of personal and civic virtue. The indispensable natural conditions for this are a certain character of the land, the proximity of the sea, the

population neither too dense nor too sparse, a certain natural temperament of the inhabitants, connected with the geographical situation—all of them circumstances combined in Greece. The other indispensable requirements must be provided by legislation. Thus, it has to regulate the holding of property; there should be public in addition to private lands, and both cultivated by slaves, as the citizens must have leisure. Similarly, the law must provide that good citizens issue from the younger generation. The conclusion of marriages is already regulated by the law, which, it is true, only interferes to prohibit certain marriages; and this should be still more the case with education. Education becomes a matter for State control from the eighth year onwards, and is at first mainly physical: gymnastic produces a continence and hardiness; music, good manners (modesty?). But, above all, it is necessary to aim at the development of justice and moderation, as courage finds a field for its exercise only in times of war, and theoretical wisdom only in times of peace, whereas the two former are always in demand. All the citizens are, according to their different ages, externally protectors of the State, and internally upholders of the law, hence there is no warrior caste, or caste of any sort. With regard to the final decision as to the best constitution, this can only be given with reference to a definite nation and a definite time, *e.g.* for the Greece of his day. In his political views Aristotle thus diverges decidedly from the Platonic aristocracy, and that in the direction of democracy, in so far as he is willing to concede the greatest share of power to the very middle class which Plato had condemned to the position of helots; and, again, in the direction of monarchy, when he remarks that the pre-eminent excellence, which is really the sole claim to rule, is more easily found in one man than in many. And when he desires to see the rule of the king limited by the rule of the middle classes, one cannot help thinking of the modern formula of a monarchy with democratic institutions. In other passages, however, he seems more in favour of a compromise between democracy and oligarchy; in short, the times do not seem to him to be ripe for a pure constitution, and hence it is necessary to content oneself with the best mixture possible. The permanent value of Aristotle's political philosophy consists in its adherence to certain principles found by philosophic reflection, combined with its respect for

actual conditions. Neither unreflecting routine nor Utopian projects of *doctrinaires* will find any support in Aristotle.

Cf. Hildenbrandt : *Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie*. Leipzig, 1860.

## § 90.

### ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART.

G. Teichmüller : *Aristotelische Forschungen*. 3 vols. Halle, 1867, 69, 73  
J. H. Reinkens : *Aristoteles über die Kunst*. Vienna, 1870.

1. The third main division of the Aristotelian system (cf. § 85, 3) is formed by his reflections upon artistic products and art itself. And since the *Ποιητική* (§ 1447-1462), which comes chiefly under consideration from this point of view, remained a fragment, it must be supplemented by the isolated remarks which are found chiefly in the *Ethics* and *Politics*, but also in the *Metaphysics*, *Rhetoric*, etc. *Ποιεῖν* or productive activity (*factio*) is distinguished from action (the *πράττειν* or *actio*) by the fact that in the latter the act itself is the chief thing, and for this reason the "how" of the action, or the feeling that produced it, gives it its value, while in the former the work or the result (*ἔργον*) alone matters, so that it is indifferent with what feelings a house was built or a picture painted, so long as they turn out well and beautiful. And as rational action, become a habit, resulted in virtue, so rational production, become a *ἔξις*, results in art. Art therefore is distinguished from virtue as production from action. It is also distinguished from the action of natural forces, e.g., from that of generation, which it most resembles, by the fact that the end which the artist realizes lies in something other than himself. For the physician aims not at his own health but at that of some one else, and it is to the bronze that the sculptor gives its form, while the plant forms itself and man begets man. In spite of these differences, however, artistic production agrees with moral action and the working of nature in many points; especially, for instance, in their all aiming at the highest end, the *εὖ*. And this is the reason why art follows nature. But because this is possible in two ways, art is divided into two kinds. There are two kinds of art, as Plato already taught, and as Aristotle agrees, down to the very phraseology Plato had used. For art *either* aims at per-



fecting that which nature intends, but which it cannot without aid complete, *e.g.*, making man healthy, protecting him from bad weather, etc. In such cases it becomes useful or necessary art, like the arts of healing, architecture, etc. Statesmanship also belongs to this class, since we saw that man is destined by nature for a community, and likewise the applied form of dialectic which belongs to statesmanship, and is called oratory. *Or again*, art aims at representing a world like nature itself, which, as it cannot create a real world, must become a world of appearances. The name Aristotle gives to this free art, that of imitative (*μιμητική*) art, is explained in the first place by the fact that he found it in Plato, and secondly that he does not regard imitation as the opposite of original activity, to nearly the same extent that we do, but is thinking rather of the fact that what is produced is no mere symbol (*σημείον*, *σύμβολον*), but a real image of what was to be portrayed. Thus it comes about, that whereas we are wont to instance music against the view that all art is imitation, Aristotle quotes it as being imitative above all others; for it produces in its matter, the tones, something quite analogous to the feelings it attempts to express, *i.e.*, the most perfect *ὁμοίωμα* or *μίμημα* thereof. Although, then, the imitating arts are to be placed higher than the useful ones, because the latter produce only the means and conditions of happiness, and they, on the other hand, enjoyment and delight, *i.e.*, essential constituents of the highest end, the useful arts must nevertheless not be degraded to the extent of being counted among the mechanical handicrafts. For the imitative arts also may be carried on as a trade and handicraft, while on the other hand the arts of healing and architecture are occupations that do not disgrace the free citizen.

2. As might be expected, Aristotle chiefly concerns himself with the imitating arts; in the Poetics that have come down to us this is done almost exclusively. The content or subject of all art is the beautiful, which is opposed to the good or *ἀγαθὸν πρακτὸν* as the *ἀγαθὸν ποιητὸν*, just as production generally is to action. Both, however, are forms of the *εἶ* or the good in a wider sense, and are distinguished by the fact that the moral good shows us the highest end in its Becoming (*κίνησις*), while the beautiful exhibits it in its perfection, as it is when no more hindrances have to be surmounted. The character-

istic marks of the beautiful, which may equally well be first perceived in nature and then represented by an artistic copy, and first exist in the subject and then be developed out from within, are given as order, symmetry, limitation, and magnitude. These objective determinations are completed by the subjective requirement that it should cause pleasure or please, as the beautiful is only perfect when it is enjoyed. Neither of these factors must be wanting; and Aristotle is clearly conscious that the beautiful coincides neither with the pleasant nor with the true, if it leaves us cold, nor with the good if it does not please us. Not only do his remarks lead to these definitions in spite of their fragmentary character, but they contain instructive hints on the subject of the most important æsthetical conceptions, many of which remained untouched for more than a thousand years after his time. Thus his remarks about the power of size to arouse wonder, about the tension and emotional perturbation it produces, about the *κατάστασις* following upon this *ἐκστασις*, really contain the whole of the later theory of the sublime, etc. Because the beautiful exhibits to us the highest aims in their completion, concern about the beautiful, either when it is produced or when it is enjoyed, *i.e.*, both artistic activity and the enjoyment of art, is akin to theoretic activity; art occupies a position midway between theory and practice, between science and life. And as the former deal with the universal, the latter with the particular, the object of art must be the particular in the universal. Hence Aristotle opposes the representation of the artist to that of the historian, and places it above the latter. For the latter is said to stop at the particular, and to describe things merely as they are, while in the work of art the universal element is brought out, and things are described *οἷα ἂν γένοιτο*, *i.e.*, idealized. And this assertion does not forget that art imitates, for what it imitates is the universal element in things, their *παράδειγμα*, their idea and essence. Hence too it is guided by right insight (*λόγος ἀληθής*), and leaves out what is a deformity and therefore accidental. But, on the other hand, Aristotle decidedly disapproves of the representation of abstract universals, such as form the object of science, by the artist. A didactic poem like that of Empedocles, he does not regard as a poem, but as a scientific work. The *καθόλου* proper he regards as lying too high for artistic representation, and as the exclusive possession of

science, which stands above art. Art is concerned only with the ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, the general rule, and for this very reason is liable to prefer the probable to the true. If therefore Aristotle calls the representation of the poet more philosophic than that of the historian, he does not at all imply thereby that one who represented philosophic doctrines would on that account be the greatest artist. As in his Politics, so in his philosophy of art, Aristotle is a mortal enemy of all doctrinairism. The close connection between art and science, rendered intelligible by its intermediate position indicated above, is displayed in the first place, in the fact that art is based on an inborn impulse towards imitation, which is nearly identical with the similar impulse to know, that forms the foundation of science; and there is added to it an original feeling for harmony and rhythm. Moreover, both art and science belong to the luxuries of life and are capable of causing the purest pleasure, which does not admit of excess. But, like Plato, Aristotle also demands that the enthusiasm which produces the work of art, should be distinguished from frenzy by its self-control; like Plato, he regards harmonious proportion as the essential character of beauty. His demand too, that every part should be organically combined with the whole, agrees with his own principles and those of Plato.

3. Of the individual arts, to the consideration of which Aristotle passes after his general remarks on artistic beauty, he has treated, within the limits of the fragments we possess, only of poetry, and in poetry, especially of the drama. Epic poetry is noticed rather by the way, and lyric poetry not at all. The most important point in the drama, and as it were its soul, is the plot, which is said to be more important even than the delineation of character. It matters not whether it be historically true or invented, as it is not a question of correctness but of internal truth and probability. The unities of the action are the prime requisite: those of time and place, which alone limit the historian, are mentioned by Aristotle,—if indeed he really speaks of them, as is very doubtful,—rather as an observance than a strict law. Tragedy and comedy transcend mere fact in different ways; the former describes its heroes as better, the latter as worse than they are. But only tragedy is discussed in the Poetics, although inquiries into comedy are promised. (Some of them have been discovered by Bernays in a later grammarian, and

published.) Pity and fear are stated to be the means by which the spectator identifies himself with the action ; and the purification of (or perhaps, from) such passions is defined as the effect aimed at by the drama. This dictum, which has been generally referred to the effect on the spectator, was applied by Goethe, and after him by Stahr, to the passions represented, although not without being attacked on the ground of the meaning of the words. Their opponents, however, have fallen out among themselves ever since the view championed by Lessing, that it was a question of the moral effect, suffered contradiction. Weil was the first to lay stress on the medical meaning of the word *κάθαρσις*, and his conclusions were supported independently by Bernays. This view, though combated violently by Stahr, and energetically yet in moderate language by Spengel, has found more or less acceptance from Ueberweg, Susemihl, Döring, and Reinkens. According to it, the stirring up of fear and pity becomes the means of soothing them and draining them off, and therefore causes satisfaction. Stress is also continually laid on the fact that the satisfaction of tragedy is possible only when the sufferer is both guilty and innocent. Besides the plot and the characters, the diction is discussed, and grammatical inquiries are returned to with that view. It must be confessed that although the French classicists went astray in making the rules of the Aristotelian Poetics their standard in so slavish a fashion, an offence against their spirit has always brought with it its own punishment. Aristotle is the father also of the philosophy of art, as of so many other sciences.

Cf. F. v. Raumer : *Ueber die Poetik des Aristoteles*, 1828 (*Abh. d. Berl. Akad.*). A. Stahr, in the Notes to his Translation. Stuttgart, 1860. Spengel : *Ueber Aristoteles Poetik*, 1837 (*Abh. der Münchener Akad.*) J. Bernays : *Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über die Wirkung der Tragödie*. Breslau, 1857. Against this : Spengel, in the *Abh. der Münchener Akad.*, 1859.

## § 91.

### THE ARISTOTELIANS.

Theophrastus, of Lesbos, born in Ol. 102, undertook the guidance of the Peripatetic school after Aristotle's death, and is followed by Eudemus of Rhodes ; some of the works of both have been preserved. Those of Theophrastus, which have been edited by Schneider (Leips., 1818), and by

Wimmer (Leips., 1854), contain the characters extracted from an ethical writing, and also a work on sensations and the sensible. The *Metaphysics* which bears his name was not perhaps written by him; on the other hand, some of the writings attributed to Aristotle, as the *De Melisso Zenone et Gorgia*, on the colours, etc., may perhaps be by him. Of Eudemus we possess the *Ethics* called by his name in the collections of the Aristotelian works, and also some fragments collected by Spengel. Both of them show but little originality, and are akin in the learned tendency of their philosophizing. Their logical researches were perhaps the most important, as they examined the hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms, and added to the four moods of the first figure five others, the indirect moods arising out of subalternation and conversion of the premisses and the conclusion; in later times, especially after Galen had transposed their premisses, they formed the fourth figure. Besides this, Theophrastus studied physics, and Eudemus economics and politics. The Peripatetics that followed seem to have laboured less at the whole system than at isolated portions, especially that part of physics that concerns the soul. At the same time, their doctrine becomes more and more naturalistic, which we can understand when we think of some of the sayings of Aristotle about nature, the life of the universe, etc. Thus Cicero testifies, that the Aristotelian Aristoxenus, called the musician, who had originally been impressed by Pythagoras, conceived the soul as the *perfectio corporis*, that Dicæarchus of Messene inferred from this conception its mortality, and that, finally, Strato of Lampsacus, in agreement with them as to the soul, substituted a blind force of nature for the Deity; and this development is confirmed also by other authorities. Critolaus, who belonged to the embassy which introduced the study of philosophy into Rome, seems, like his predecessors, Lycon, Aristo, and others, to have popularized the Ethics of Aristotle and to have treated it more rhetorically. His successor Diodorus of Tyre, the still later Staseas of Naples, Cratippus, and the unknown author of the pseudo-Aristotelian writing *περὶ κόσμου*, mix up the Aristotelian doctrines with other views, especially those of the Stoics. The later Peripatetics also devoted themselves to the task of expounding Aristotle's writings; e.g., Andronicus the Rhodian, his pupil Boëthus, and others.

## THIRD PERIOD OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

THE DECAY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY; OR

GRECO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY.

### § 92.

ARISTOTLE by defining spirit as thought thinking itself, and making it at the same time the principle of all things, as being their final end, has substituted a complete definition for the vagueness of Anaxagoras, and the one-sided definitions of his successors. Thus the Hellenism manifested in the philosophizing of Anaxagoras, of the Sophists, etc., is comprehended in Aristotelianism. But the limitation of this system and the necessity of going beyond it, also lies in this same fact. The fact that Aristotelianism comprehends only Hellenism, indicates the necessity of such an advance in the history of the world; the fact that Hellenism recognises itself as having been understood, indicates its necessity in the history of philosophy (cf. § 11).

### § 93.

A philosophy like that of Aristotle cannot continue to be a formula for the world, when the sceptre of the world's history, which the Macedonian supremacy had wrenched from the hands of Greece, is transferred to the Romans, *i.e.*, to a people that, alike in the myths which it invents in order to comprehend its own character, and in the jurisprudence by which it became the instructor of all future ages, alike in its solemn and prosaic character and in its lust of conquest, ever betrays this single characteristic; that it regards the individual person and his practical problems as having absolute value,

and the whole as arising out of the adding together of individuals. Hence, because the times have become Roman, there must be substituted for a philosophy which, in true Hellenic fashion, represents the whole as prior to its parts, and consists of speculative devotion to the universal reason, one in which the isolated subject receives absolute value, and never quite loses himself in any cause, but always considers also his own relation to it. The place of a philosophy which regarded contemplation as the highest activity, must be taken by another which subordinates it, as the means, to the realization of ends. Only a reflective philosophy which is mainly ethical can please the Roman spirit, for only such an one can be called the comprehension of the Roman character.

### § 94.

The same result is reached also when one considers without reference to the changes of the times, that the essence of Hellenism is the immediateness and naïveté with which the individual allows himself to be penetrated by the spirit of the universal, and that like everything naïve, it also must disappear as soon as it is understood. Hence there begins in Aristotle the separation of the greater and the smaller *νοῦς* (cf. § 53), which Anaxagoras had asserted to be the same, and which in Plato so interpenetrate each other, that he would have found it impossible either to have considered subjective thought by itself, as Aristotle does in his "analytical" researches, or to be intently occupied with mere reality, as is Aristotle in whole sections of his *History of Animals*, without inquiring whether they fulfilled also the requirements of our thought. The frequent argumentative discussions, also, by means of which Aristotle in every inquiry reaches the point Plato starts from, are a practical proof of his assertion that the spirit enters man from without, *i.e.*, that the subject is not immediately at one with it. The discrepancy between the subjective and objective elements continually increases after Aristotle's time, and leads, by reason of the separation of factors combined in Plato and continually re-united in Aristotle, to the generation of one-sided tendencies. And these must show great similarity to the lesser Socratic schools, since, as we saw, Plato and Aristotle only taught a glorified and perfected Socratism. And just as the lesser Socratic schools had exhibited

Socratism in its dissolution, so these display that of Greek philosophy generally ; not indeed that they simply returned to an earlier point of view, but, just as the earlier retrogressive developments had supported themselves by Socrates, so the later ones may be shown to do so by Aristotle. But what is merely decay from the point of view of Greek philosophy, appears also as progress from that of the world's history. For the systems which arise at this point, though first asserted by Greeks either by birth or education, find their greatest support and their most eminent representatives in the Roman world. They formulate the dissension and the inner misery of mankind before the entry of Christianity. And in the first place it is necessary to consider the two dogmatic systems of Epicureanism and Stoicism.

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## FIRST DIVISION.

### The Dogmatists.

#### § 95.

In spite of the subjectivism which was shown to exist in the doctrines of the Cyrenaics and Cynics, they alike continued to think the subject as concrete, in union with a whole, so that the practical question was how to live in peace with society or with nature, while in theoretical matters the former did not doubt that Sense and the latter that Thought produced true knowledge. But after the decay of Aristotelianism the two tendencies they respectively supported again become prominent, but in an abstract form and with the stamp of a philosophy of reflection. Hence a point that Aristotle took for granted as self-evident, viz., that our perception and thought reflect reality, is now questioned, and there arises a demand for what Aristotle had expressly called a futile question, viz., that of a criterion of truth. And similarly Aristotle's conviction, that man is naturally destined to live in moral societies, and degenerates into the most pernicious of beasts outside them, is also given up, and the sage becomes self-sufficient in his solitude, and is conscious of this isolation as likeness to God. Both the Epicureans and the Stoics agree in this, and also in regarding such self-sufficiency as



the final end, to which all theoretical inquiries also are referred as mere means. Their diametrical antithesis lies in the fact that the Epicureans conceive the subject as feeling and the Stoics as thinking, and that hence the former look out for a criterion of truth in the senses and for the satisfaction of the senses, while the latter desire only to find such a criterion and such satisfaction as will suffice for man as a thinking being. And, as everywhere, a diametrical antithesis is possible only through the fact that their manifold agreement reduces both systems to the same level.

#### A.—THE EPICUREANS.

##### § 96.

P. Gassendi : *Syntagma philosophiæ Epicuri* (1647). Amstelod., 1678.

1. EPICURUS, the son of an Athenian colonist, born at Samos in Ol. 109, 3 (342 B.C.), came to Athens in his eighteenth year, when Xenocrates was teaching there and Aristotle at Chalcis. Although he was fond of regarding himself as self-taught, he owed much to both of them, and at least as much to the study of the Cyrenaics and of Democritus. In his thirty-second year he began to teach at Mitylene, and four years later at Athens. His life in his gardens has been idealized by his friends and abused by his enemies to a greater extent than is just. Fragments alone of his numerous writings have come down to us, and they contain nothing of importance. The Herculanæan rolls have, however, enabled Orelli, Petersen, Spengel, etc., to clear up many points previously obscure. Diogenes Laertius, who devotes the whole of his tenth book to Epicurus, not only gives the titles of many of his works, but transcribes two of his letters and gives a detailed account of his doctrines, into which, however, there has crept a good deal that evidently belongs to his opponents, the Stoics.

2. As philosophy, according to Epicurus, is not to be anything else than the capacity and art of living happily, it would require no physics, if superstition did not frighten and torment mankind, nor any instruction in correct thinking, if errors did not bring woe upon men. As things are, they must both be premised to the main part of philosophy, viz., ethics; it is natural that, in so doing, Epicurus should, in view of their

subordinate position, have lightened the burden of original invention by borrowing from others. The Logic, or *Canonic*, as the Epicureans called it after the works of their master, supplies a theory of knowledge, aiming at the discovery of a sure criterion of certainty. But the *αἴσθησις*, which with Aristotle is taken as the first form of knowledge, in Epicurus also acquires the highest dignity. In its purity and when bringing only the affection of the organ into consciousness, it excludes all error, and produces manifest evidence, *ἐνάργεια*. The repetition of sensations leaves traces in us, in consequence of which we expect the recurrence of similar events. These *προλήψεις*, which are also said to be connected with the designations of words, vividly remind one of "experience" in Plato and Aristotle, arising with the help of recollection. Whatever agrees with sensation and these anticipations may be regarded as certain, and forms the subject of an *ὀρθὴ δόξα* or *ὑπόληψις*, and hence all precipitancy must be avoided, in order that this previous anticipation may have time to become something really acceptable, *δοξαστόν*, when it has received its confirmation. Epicurus does not seem to have entered upon any other logical inquiries. He seems to have rejected definitions and to have said nothing about divisions and inferences, all of which is severely criticized by Cicero (*De Finib.*, I., 7).

3. The avowed aim of his *Physics* is to afford protection against the terrors of superstition. And as he regards religion as coinciding completely with superstition, and as every teleological method, certainly, and every reference of phenomena to a few similar laws, very easily, leads to a religious view of phenomena, he ridicules the first,—language, *e.g.*, is the effect and not the purpose of the tongue,—and advises us to remember, in the case of every phenomenon, that it may be explained in the most various ways—a sunset, *e.g.*, either by the sun's circular motion or by its extinction. Hence he regards the atomistic theory of Democritus, which makes all things arise out of the accidental meetings of atoms moving in the void, as the most sensible. He modifies it, however, by attributing also weight to the atoms, in addition to shape and size (cf. § 47, 4), and by letting them deviate from the straight line; the former in order to explain their motion, the latter because it alone explains their conglomeration, and in order to acquire a basis already at this point for

the free caprice that would else be inexplicable. It is also in the interests of freedom that the Epicureans will not hear of the providence of the Stoics. In this manner there arise innumerable worlds differing in size and form, while in the spaces between them dwell the gods, caring nothing for the worlds nor interfering with them. They are assumed to exist partly because of the *consensus gentium*, partly in order to supply ideals of the life of mere enjoyment. With regard to the myths of the popular religion, it appears that the Epicureans, where they did not deny them outright, followed the example of Euhemerus (*vid.* § 70, 3), who accordingly is said to have belonged to the school. Man, like everything else, is an aggregate of atoms; both the breath-like and fire-like soul are composed of fine atoms, and its envelope, the body, composed of coarser particles. Both body and soul are dissoluble, like all else, and although only fools seek death, it is also folly to fear it, since he upon whom it comes has ceased to exist. The part of the soul which has its seat in the chest is the noblest, as being the rational part, in which the *εἰδωλα* emitted by things, produce sensation, after hitting the organs of sense.

4. The reduction of affections to pleasure and pain gives the transition to *Ethics*. It is assumed as self-evident that pleasure is the only true good, and that all the virtues praised by the Peripatetics, are valuable only as leading on to pleasure. Pleasure, however, is sometimes defined negatively as freedom from pain, in opposition to the Cyrenaics, and also as the product of reflection, consisting as it does of the greatest possible sum of enjoyments, which may, if necessary, be purchased even by suffering. The eudæmonism of Epicurus is not the reckless hedonism of Aristippus, but sober and premeditated. And because the pleasure he seeks is found by calculation, he calls it spiritual pleasure or pleasure of the soul; but when one considers everything that is included under this spiritual pleasure, it is possible to doubt whether the Cyrenaics, with all their preference for sensual pleasure, do not after all occupy a higher moral position than the Epicureans. Virtue is practised by the sage only as a means to pleasure, and not for its own sake; if the indulgence of all lusts liberated him from fear and disquiet, he would give himself up to it. Similarly it is only the consideration for his safety which leads the sage to live in a State, and by choice in a monarchy, and induces him to respect the contract which is called law.

Marriage is treated with considerable indifference, and the highest place assigned to friendship, the most subjective and accidental of all bonds; but to this also there is attributed a basis in advantage. The practice of Epicurus was better than his theory, and his successors attempted to tone down the latter also.

5. Among his disciples may be mentioned, his favourite Metrodorus, whom he survived, and Hermarchus his successor. At Rome, Amafanus and Rabirius are mentioned by Cicero as the first Epicureans. After them may be mentioned Cicero's teacher Zeno, and Phædrus, to whom a writing found at Herculaneum was at first attributed. It is now, however, regarded as the work of another Epicurean, Philodemus. But the most important among Roman Epicureans, not only for us, because of the preservation of his work, but probably also intrinsically, is Titus Lucretius Carus (95-52 B.C.), who in his famous didactic poem (*De rerum natura*, *Libb. VI.*) aims chiefly at freeing the world from the terror with which superstition, *i.e.*, religion, fills it. He attempts with all the fire of poetic force, to transform the dry matter of atomist physics; and hence Nature, his only goddess, often appears as an all but personal being, while the deviation of the atoms almost seems like the effect of a vital principle within each of them. On the other hand, he lays more stress than Epicurus on the strict subjection of phenomena to laws. In ethical matters, he, like the Romans generally, shows greater earnestness, often at the expense of consistency, although he does not, it is true, diverge so far from the spirit of the Epicurean doctrine as others, who are said by Cicero to have counted disinterested joy in virtue also among the pleasures.

*Diog. Laert. X.*, Ritter and Preller, I., c. 354-372.

## B.—THE STOICS.

Tiedemann : *System der stoischen Philosophie*. 3 Pts. Leipz., 1776. Petersen : *Philosophiæ Chrysippiæ fundamenta*. Altonæ, 1824. M. Heinze : *Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie*. Oldenburg, 1872.

## § 97.

1. ZENO, born at Citium in Cyprus, in 340 B.C., and hence a Hellenized Phenician, is said first to have become acquainted with the Socratic doctrines and writings, and then to have

been a pupil of the Cynic Crates, the Megarian Stilpo, and the Academic Polemo, and after twenty years to have come forward as a teacher of philosophy in the *στοὰ ποικίλη*, from which the school derives its name. After actively teaching for more than fifty years, he is said to have ended a life distinguished for its temperance by suicide. Of his writings hardly anything has been preserved. It is probable that his disciples departed farther from the doctrines of the Cynics than he had done himself: this appears to have been least of all the case with the Chian Aristo. Among his disciples should be mentioned Cleanthes of Assus in the Troad, who was distinguished by his zeal and became his successor. There followed him the most eminent of the Stoics, especially in the matter of logical keenness, Chrysippus of Soli, 282-209 B.C., called "the knife of the Academic knots," an extremely fertile writer. His fragments were collected by Baguet in 1821 and supplemented by Petersen with the help of papyrus rolls that had been discovered. They occupy the same position in our knowledge of Stoicism that those of Philolaus do in our knowledge of Pythagoreanism (*vid.* § 31). The seventh book of Diogenes Laertius also gives detailed accounts about these and some other Stoics. The first knowledge of Stoic philosophy was brought to Rome by a disciple of Chrysippus, Diogenes, who, together with Critolaus (§ 91) and Carneades (§ 100, 2) was a member of the famous Athenian embassy. But it was first really transplanted to Rome by Panætius (175-112 B.C.), who was a pupil of Antipater of Tarsus and inclined to eclecticism. His pupil was the learned Posidonius (135-51 B.C.), one of Cicero's instructors. There follow the Roman Stoics, L. Annæus Cornutus (20-48 A.D.), C. Musonius Rufus, his friend the satirist A. Persius Flaccus; also the pupil of Musonius, the freedman Epictetus, whose lectures, delivered at Nicopolis after his expulsion from Rome, were much frequented. We are acquainted with his doctrines by the dissertations (*Διατριβαί*) taken down by Arrian, and also by the far more concise *Ἐγχειρίδιον*. Lastly, there is the emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (121-180 A.D.), with whose views we are rendered familiar by the writings he left behind.

2. In complete antithesis to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the Stoics so subordinate theory to practice that they not only define philosophy as the art of virtue, or the effort to

attain it, but give as the reason of its division into logic, physics, and ethics, the fact that there are logical, physical, and ethical virtues. And in their desire to arrive as quickly as possible at ethics and the soul of their system, they, like the Epicureans, avoided the labour of original invention, and depended on Aristotle for their logic, and on him and Heraclitus for their physics. This last selection, as well as their attraction towards the pantheism of the Eleatics, quite corresponds to their antithesis to the Epicureans and their atomism. Some of them indeed, like Aristo, entirely rejected logic and physics, on the ground that the former did not concern us, while the latter transcended our powers. The first part of the system, to which the Stoics, in agreement with the later Peripatetics, gave the name of *Logic*, because it treats of the λόγος, i.e., thought or the word, together with the production of both, is divided into *Rhetoric* and *Dialectic*, the arts of monologue and dialogue respectively, because it is possible to speak either for oneself, for others, and with others. It is, however, a science subsidiary to ethics, as teaching how to avoid errors. This is effected in the first place by the theory of knowledge, in which the soul is conceived as a blank tablet in the first instance, upon which the object produces a conception (φαντασία), either by actual impressions (τύπωσις) or by altering the psychical condition (ἐτεροίωσις), from which there is subsequently generated by repetitions, first expectation and finally experience. For this same reason the Stoics asserted that genera were merely conceptions of ours and nothing real. But to these points, which were assumed also by the Epicureans, there is added, in cases of real certainty, the assent or acceptance and affirmation, συγκατάθεσις, in virtue of which the affection of the soul is declared to be an object. And though this assent may be withheld in many cases, it is not possible to do so in all, as the Sceptics assert. A conception of which this is impossible, and which thus compels us to affirm it objectively, is accompanied by conviction (κατάληψις). Thus the real criterion of truth lies in the quality of compelling assent, i.e., in what the Stoics called ὀρθὸς λόγος, and others at a later time, logical necessity. And such a criterion must exist, because there would otherwise be no certainty of action. Hence it is by no accident that the Stoics attached so much importance to the *consensus gentium*, for it leads to the conjecture that it is an utterance of the universal reason, which

has convinced all. Science arises out of these convictions by their methodical form, the consideration of which forms the second part of the logic of the Stoics. In this, no separation is made between what refers to the formation of correct thought and its expression (the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός); and with a detailed theory of the parts of speech, five of which are assumed, and with inquiries into solecisms and barbarisms is combined that of fallacies, for the establishment of which the doctrine of the syllogism is thoroughly examined. In addition to a few alterations in the Aristotelian terminology, it is worthy of mention that the hypothetical syllogisms and those with more than two premisses, which, after their neglect by Aristotle, had been noticed already by his successors, now become most prominent. The latter especially, in order to save the inductive proof, for the sake of which also there is added to the criterion of truth just stated the logical determination, that only such things could be esteemed true as admit of a contrary. This assertion, however, follows at once from the Aristotelian doctrine, that only a judgment, and not a mere conception, can have truth. And in the Stoics, as in Aristotle, the transition from the formal and logical investigations to real cognitions, is formed by the doctrine of categories. That this doctrine retains, under changed names, only the first four categories of Aristotle, which correspond to the substratum and its states, while the others which express activities are omitted, is characteristic of a system which in its *Physics* arrives at a materialism distinguished from that of the Epicureans only by being more full of life.

3. The assertion that nothing has reality and efficacy except the corporeal, which is extended in three dimensions, is extended even to physical states like virtues, because they are active, *i.e.*, produce motions. The corporeality of space, time, and the things existing only in thought, alone is denied, and hence also their reality, as is certain in the case of the last and probable in that of the first two. But inasmuch as a finer and a coarser matter is distinguished, and an active character attributed to the first, a passive character to the second, it becomes possible to find room for the Aristotelian antithesis of Form or End and Matter, without impairing the complete materialism of their doctrine. The principle of Form, which is called indifferently soul, Zeus, nature, or ether, is conceived as resembling fire, and is sometimes called

fire outright; only it is, in antithesis to ordinary fire that merely devours, thought of as an architectonic force that also produces growth. This fire, then, which is identical with warmth, and is the real deity of the Stoics, allows things to pass out of and to return to itself in alternating forms; the deity is thus both their seed and their grave. Hence their doctrine of the λόγος σπερματικός and of ἐκπύρωσις. Sometimes it also happens that the four contraries of Anaximander and Aristotle are combined into two combinations, one active and the other passive, the warm called πῦρ, the cold called ὕλη. The modifications of the deity, however, form a gradation, according as they possess only ἕξις, or also φύσις, or ψυχή besides, or lastly also νοῦς, in addition to the rest. Even the rational soul, however, is a fire-like body, as being part of the universal reason, and the breathing in of the cooler air plays an important part in its generation and preservation. This pantheism, to which the Phœnician origin of the founder of the school probably contributed, and which, *e.g.*, inspires Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus, was harmonized with the religious conceptions of the people by physical interpretations of the myths; and this again displays the antithesis to the Epicureans with their Euhemerism. In consequence of this interpretation, they were enabled in all seriousness to see a deeper meaning in many of the views and customs of the people, which were ridiculed by the enlightened few. This irritated the Epicureans and the Sceptics against them, and even Cicero. The Stoic pantheism was accompanied by complete fatalism, for their providence is nothing but an immutable fate. The strictest causal connection dominates all things; its interruption is as impossible as an origin out of nothing. Hence the possibility of divine prevision and divination. It also follows from this, that after every ἐκπύρωσις and the ἀποκατάστασις that ensues, all things repeat themselves exactly as in the past period, and nothing new happens. Moreover, a conflict between causal connection and teleology is denied, again in antithesis to Epicureanism.

4. In their *ethics*, in which their system culminates, the Stoics first approximated to the Cynics, but gradually diverged further and further from them, in the direction, moreover, of a greater isolation of man. For the formula of Zeno and Cleanthes, that man should live in agreement with nature, receives already in Chrysippus, the narrower interpretation of



agreement with one's own nature only ; and in consequence of this, the sage need no longer know nature generally, but only his own nature. And thus, through the maxim that one should live in harmony with reason, there is gradually made a transition to the wholly formal definition that one should act harmoniously, *i.e.*, consistently, a formula which does not in this case, as in Aristotle, accompany the one with the fuller meaning, but is substituted for it. This consistency is the *recta ratio* extolled by the Roman Stoics. And by more and more regarding the thinking side of human nature alone, the Stoics come to connect with this formal the material determination, that the *πάθη* cannot, as Aristotle had taught, become morbid through exaggeration, but are from the very first exaggerations and morbid. Hence there arises an approximation at least to the conception of duty, until then unheard-of in Greek philosophy, which explains the relation of Stoic and Christian conceptions, and the origin of many fables, *e.g.*, of the intercourse of Seneca with Paul the Apostle. The Stoic *καθήκον*, which Cicero can only translate by *officium*, differs essentially from the Aristotelian virtue by negating and not merely regulating the natural impulse. Its distinction from the *κατόρθωμα* displays not only a difference of degree, but also an approximation to the antithesis of legal and moral. And since all *πάθη* excite either pleasure or pain, there follows from their morbid nature the worthlessness of their results, and the Stoic is indifferent to what was most important both to the Cyrenaic and the Cynic. He extols *ἀπάθεια* as the highest state, much as the Epicureans had extolled freedom from pain. It renders man unassailable, for he who is indifferent is conscious of his superiority to all things. Man attains *ἀπάθεια* and becomes a sage, by giving importance only to that which is independent of all external circumstances and entirely dependent on himself. Hence the sage bears his happiness within himself, and it can never be impaired, not even if he should be inclosed within the bull of Phalaris. This knowledge, harmonious with itself and supreme over all things, is of such cardinal importance that it is only through it that individual actions acquire any value ; the sage does everything best, and knows how to do everything, he envies no one, not even Zeus, he is king, he is rich, he is beautiful, etc. The fool, on the other

The sage and the fool are diametrically opposed, and hence there are neither individuals who stand midway between wisdom and folly, nor periods of transition. The transition from one to the other takes place suddenly. All differences of degree also of wisdom and folly are denied; a man is either wholly and altogether a sage or a fool. Some of these harshnesses of the system were in later times mitigated by a distinction among the things in themselves indifferent, whereby some are yet "preferred" and others "postponed"; the quantitative distinction among good things, which had just been denied, is, as Cicero already pointed out, thereby again smuggled in. Similarly, their boastful assertion that pain is no evil, is rendered fairly futile by the qualification that it must nevertheless be avoided, because it is disagreeable, contrary to nature, etc. Because the only end is existence for one's self, life in moral associations appears as a mere means, even when it is not regarded as a hindrance altogether. Thus Epictetus answers in the negative the questions as to whether the sage should be a husband or a citizen. The requirements of respect towards custom and tradition, such as care of the dead, are derided. Cosmopolitanism and close friendship between like-minded sages, which Epictetus conceives as a true brotherhood, in which what benefits one benefits all, here takes the place of the natural and moral bonds. (For Epictetus' doctrine of morality, cf. G. Grosch in the *Jahresbericht des Gymnasiums zu Wernigerode*, 1867.) In many, perhaps in most, of the dogmas of Stoic ethics, it would be easy to show forebodings, although often in caricature, of what was afterwards esteemed true in the Christian community; and it is this which has at all times inspired earnest Christians with respect for the Stoic doctrine. On the other hand, it contained very much that was certain to commend it to the most selfish of all nations, the Romans. Such were its pride in virtue, its resignation to the course of the universe, accompanied, however, throughout by the consciousness that suicide put an end to all suffering. The stress laid on the disposition, as being what alone lies within man's power, the recognition of man's impotence in his relation to the Deity and His action, etc., is formulated by the later Stoics, as Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, in sayings which have often been regarded as borrowed from the Gospels. This was not, however, the case, at least consciously. Nor

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need we be astonished that Marcus Aurelius, approximating so nearly to Christianity, should detest it. For such phenomena recur everywhere.

Diog. Laërt. Lib. VII., Ritter and Preller, l.c. § 373-413.

### § 98.

The doctrine of the Epicureans and Stoics, as contrasted with the speculations of Plato and Aristotle, must be called dogmatism, requiring as it does a criterion of truth and resting upon fixed assumptions. This had not been the case, either in Plato or in Aristotle, because they included as an essential factor in knowledge, what was afterwards excluded from dogmatism as scepticism. Respecting themselves, Stoicism and Epicureanism are diametrically opposed, and for this very reason involve a reference to something beyond both. The reasonable calculation from which the happiness of the Epicureans results, shows that thought is immanent in their pleasure; and again the Stoic cannot do without delight, in order to know himself superior to all the delights of life. Hence the Epicureans, especially at Rome, were reasonable men, and the Stoics knew how to enjoy their life tastefully. The theoretic completion of this *rencontre* in life, which is really a practical refutation of both, is, that they are met by a view which combines them in such a manner that the fixed assumptions of each are refuted by those of the other, in the course of which every positive result, it is true, is lost. This is *Scepticism*, which occupies precisely the same position relative to Plato's and Aristotle's inquiries into antinomies and apories, that dogmatism did to the positive elements, in their speculations. The Cyrenaic and Cynic elements, which had interpenetrated each other in Platonism, and hence also in Aristotelianism, had on their liberation transformed themselves into the dogmatic philosophies of reflection just considered. A perfectly parallel change is exhibited in this case, where the part of dialectic that dealt with antinomies, experiences a retrogression into mere eristic. The *Sceptics* are related to the Megarians, much as Epicurus was to Aristippus, and Zeno and Chrysippus to Antisthenes.

## SECOND DIVISION.

## The Sceptics.

## A.—PYRRHO.

## § 99.

PYRRHO of Elis was originally a painter, and took part in Alexander's campaign to India, and then came forward as a teacher in his native city. He is said to have been influenced not only by the earlier Elean and Megarian School, but also by a disciple of Democritus, who had utilized the latter's doctrine of the deceptiveness of the senses in the interests of scepticism. As all our information concerning him has come down to us through the medium of the physician, and composer of *σάλλοι*, Timon of Phlius, it is impossible to distinguish what belongs to the master and what to the pupil. A great deal of what Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus state as the doctrine of Pyrrho, belongs to the later Sceptics. What is certainly his may be reduced to the following maxims: He who would attain the aim of life, *viz.*, happiness, should consider these three points; how things are constituted, what should be our attitude towards them, and finally, what will be the success of such a right attitude. The problem of philosophy is formulated almost in the same words by Kant after 2,000 years (*vid.* § 302, 1). As to the *first* point, nothing certain can be said, as every assertion may be met by its contradictory with as good reason, and neither sensation nor reason supply a sure criterion, and it is absurd to appeal to both at once. It follows with regard to the *second*, that the only right attitude is to say nothing of things (*ἀφασία*), or, to withhold one's judgment about them (*ἐποχή*), for he who pledges himself to anything is nigh unto ruin. Hence every decision must be rejected, and every question be answered by an "I assert nothing definitely," or by a "perhaps," and instead of asserting "things are so," by saying "so it appears to me." And this is true of moral precepts as well as of cognitions, for just as nothing is true for all men, so there is nothing good or shameful in itself. And the more this advice is followed, the more surely, in the *third* place, will imperturbability (*ἀταραξία*) be attained, which alone deserves the name of *ἀπάθεια*. Further,

as ordinary men are always guided by their *πάθος*, the task of the sage may be defined as putting off the man. This form of scepticism is quite harmless for practical life; for here there is recognised the maxim of following what is universal custom, *i.e.*, appears good to all.

Diog. Laert., IX. 11, 12. Ritter and Preller, l.c. § 345-353.

### § 100.

Although the doctrines of Pyrrho and Timon found some support, especially among physicians, the whole tendency nevertheless sinks into greater obscurity for a time, until, occasioned by the discussions of the dogmatists as to the criteria of truth, there arises a scepticism developed into a regular school. This takes at first the milder form of the New Academy, which however in its turn approaches, in the course of time, nearer and nearer to dogmatism, and calls out as a reaction against it a renewal of the Pyrrhonic scepticism, enriched by a strictly scientific form. Hence the New Academy and scepticism, though related with each other in many points, are yet contrasted so antagonistically in many respects, that they must be kept apart in our narrative.

## B.—THE NEW ACADEMY.

### § 101.

1. ARCESILAUS (Ol. 115, 1—138, 4), born at Pytana, in Æolia, is said to have been trained first by rhetoricians, then by Theophrastus (§ 91), and finally by the Academic Crantor (§ 80), but at the same time to have conversed with Menedemus, Diodorus, and Pyrrho. He came forward as a teacher in the Academy after the death of Crates. (Cf. Geffers: *De Arcesila*, Götting., 1842.) The form of dialogues attributed by some reports to his teachings, consisted perhaps in speeches for and against; no writings of his have, however, been preserved. He was praised for his good-natured character, but various discreditable stories were, nevertheless, told about him. By reason of his divergence from Plato, he is called the founder of the new, the middle, or the second Academy, according to the manner of counting the various modifications of the doctrine. His scepticism was developed chiefly in

opposition to the Stoics, whom he censures, in the first place, for having put conviction as a third form, by the side of opinion and knowledge, seeing that it may accompany both; secondly, for setting up a conviction (*φαντασία καταληπτική*) at all. There can be no conviction, for neither sense, perception, nor thought affords security. It is, however, an error to suppose that the certainty of action ceases in the absence of a criterion of truth; as for this probability suffices. The suspension of judgment leads to imperturbability, which is true happiness. The immediate successor of Arcesilaus is stated to be Lacydes, from whom some wish to date the beginning of the later Academy, because Arcesilaus still taught at the old place. Lacydes was succeeded by Enander and Hegesias.

2. But all these are thrown into the shade by CARNEADES (Ol. 141, 2—162, 4), who was the probable founder of the third Academy, and was highly honoured at Athens, and sent to Rome at the head of the embassy in the year 158. Here he called down upon himself the belated wrath of Cato by his show-speeches for and against justice. All his writings have been lost. In addition to Diogenes Laertius, Sextus gives information about him based on the accounts of his pupil Clitomachus, and above all Cicero. Carneades also comes to sceptical results by combating the Stoics, especially Chrysippus, on whom he often jestingly asserts himself to be entirely dependent. In order to illustrate the impossibility of a criterion of truth and of conviction based upon it, he analyzes conception, and discovers that it stands related both to the object and to the subject in which it arises. Its agreement with the former produces truth, its probability depends on its relation to the latter. To decide the former, we have no means, either in perception or in thought. In fact, a comparison of a conception with its objects is an impossibility, for whenever we attempt it, it is always with the object as conceived already, that we make the comparison. Hence the idea of a true *κατάληψις* must be renounced, even in the mathematics, and we must content ourselves with probability (*πιθανότης*), which has different degrees, since it is possible to distinguish probable and indubitable conceptions, and again those which have been tested in every way. The contradictions arrived at, if one requires more than probability, are exemplified by the Stoics, especially in the conclusion of their Physics,



in their teaching about the Deity. The assumption of an imperishable and unchangeable being is said to contradict not only the other Stoic doctrines, but also itself. And it is just as little possible to assert of a practical maxim that it possesses absolute truth as of a theoretic dogma. Nothing is good by nature or for all men, but everything by enactment, and according to the differences of the subject. Although, therefore, the sage will everywhere be guided by the existing custom, he will yet abstain from expressing any opinion upon all practical as upon all theoretical questions ; he will consider nothing certain, not even that everything is uncertain. This reticence, which results in imperturbability, Carneades is said to have himself practised to such an extent that Clitomachus asserted that he had never been able to discover to which of two contradictory assertions his master inclined.

Cf. Geffers : *De Arcesila successoribus*. Götting. 1845.

3. PHILO of Larissa, who taught at Rome, is often mentioned together with Charmidas as the founder of a fourth Academy. In Antiochus of Ascalon, whose lectures were attended by Cicero at Athens, and who is regarded as the founder of a fifth Academy, the continuous polemics against Stoicism produce the natural result, that scepticism becomes mixed with Stoic elements. This approximation to Stoicism, he justifies by denying the difference between the original and the later Academy, and makes the Stoics agree with the former to a greater extent than their change of terminology would appear to permit. This fusion, which, it should be said, was very favourably received, provoked the stricter scepticism as a reaction.

Cf. C. F. Hermann : *De Philone Larissæo*. Götting. 1851. d'Allemand : *De Antiocho Ascalonita*, Marburg. 1856. Diogen. Laert. IV. 6. Ritter and Preller, L.c. § 414-428.

## C.—RETURN TO THE PYRRHONIC SCEPTICISM.

### § 102.

#### ÆNESIDEMUS.

1. ÆNESIDEMUS of Cnossus, a younger contemporary of Cicero, who taught at Alexandria, was led back to the more

consistent Scepticism of Pyrrho by the manner in which Antiochus combated the Stoics, which seemed to him perfectly dogmatic. Hence he called the eight books of his inquiries Pyrrhonian. They have been lost, and the only reliable information about him we owe to Photius, for Sextus does not always distinguish between what was said by Ænesidemus and what by his pupils and successors. Thus his statement that scepticism served as a preparation for Heracliteanism can be true only of the latter, if indeed the whole assertion did not arise out of a misunderstanding. Ænesidemus, on the contrary, regarded strict scepticism as the aim, and the academic doubt as a mere preliminary exercise for this. The true sceptic does not permit himself to assert with the Academics, that there exists only probability and no certainty; for this already would be a *δόγμα*. He neither affirms, nor denies, nor doubts, but merely investigates; and *σκέψις* is not denial but inquiry. The essential point is, that he asserts nothing whatever, so that the expressions, "perhaps," "I determine nothing," etc., are the only ones he permits himself. Now this cautious reticence is most readily reached, if one considers all things from certain points of view (*τόποι*, or *τρόποι τῆς σκέψεως*), of ten of which Ænesidemus or his school made use, and which are enumerated by Sextus. Thus the difference of the same sense-organs in different subjects, the conflict between the perceptions of different senses, the relativity of most of the predicates we attribute to things, etc., are said to be reasons why there can be no objectively certain assertions, and why every one really has only a right to describe and to make assertions about his own condition, and as to how something appeared to him. Among these common-places, which are theoretical, practical, and religious in character, there is found also that of the untenableness of the conception of cause, a point of attack also for more than one form of scepticism in much later times. Some of the reasons against this conception appear rather weak, but others, e.g., the assertion of the simultaneity of cause and effect, go more deeply into the matter.

2. A successor of Ænesidemus, Agrippa, is said to have reduced the ten modes of scepticism to five, and to have stated them as, the variety in the meanings of words, the progression of all reasoning to infinity, the relativity of all things, and their dependence on disputable assumptions, and lastly, the

fact that all reasoning is circular. Diogenes Laertius gives a list of names which are said to fill up the gap of nearly two centuries between *Ænesidemus* and *Sextus*.

### SEXTUS EMPIRICUS.

1. *SEXTUS* the physician, called *Empiricus* because he was an adherent of the method initiated by *Philinus*, lived towards the end of the second century after Christ, probably at Athens and afterwards at Alexandria. Since his writings have been preserved, he is certainly the most important of the Sceptics for us; as probably he was intrinsically. The three books of his Pyrrhonic *ὑποτυπώσεις* contain an account of the characteristics of the sceptical point of view, and discuss the chief philosophical conceptions from this basis. His main work is more important only for the history of philosophy generally, and not for a knowledge of the sceptical standpoint in particular. It consists of the eleven books *Against the Mathematicians*, i.e., against all dogmatists: the first book criticizes grammar and represents it as uncertain, the second does the same to rhetoric, the third to geometry, the fourth to arithmetic, the fifth to astronomy, the sixth to music, the seventh and eighth to logic, the ninth and tenth to physics, and the eleventh to ethics. The last five books are also frequently quoted as the discourse against the philosophers; and J. Bekker in his edition of *Sextus* (Berlin, 1842), put them before the rest with the title of *πρὸς Δογματικούς*. The writings of *Sextus* are generally quoted according to *Fabricius'* edition of 1718 (Leips. Fol., with a Latin translation). A good reprint of this edition was published by *Kühn*, at Leips., in 1842, in 2 vols. 8vo.

2. *Sextus* begins by fixing the idea of scepticism in such a way as to oppose to the dogmatists who, like *Aristotle* and the *Stoics*, maintain the knowableness of things, *Academics* who assert their unknowableness. Distinguished from both of these are those who assert nothing at all, and may be called *Ephectics*, because of this suspense of judgment, or *Sceptics* and *Zetetics*, because they neither think they have found truth nor despair of doing so, but seek it, or *Aporetics*, because they search out the difficulties in every inquiry. The true sceptic does not assert that to every assertion a contrary

assertion may be opposed, but looks to see whether this cannot be done. And in this testing investigation the different modes of scepticism are subsidiary means; they may be reduced to three, according as they concern either the relation of a conception to its object, or to its subject, or lastly to both, or they may all be considered as varieties of the mode of relativity. The subject of inquiry is both the *φαινόμενα* and the *νοούμενα*; and since in the course of investigation it appears that in respect to both it is necessary to admit the equal force (*ἰσοσθένεια*) of contrary assertions, scepticism leads to suspension of judgment, and this to imperturbability. The true sceptic regards everything as undecided, even this, that everything is undecided. Elsewhere, indeed, this assertion is qualified, and the dictum that everything is uncertain, is compared with the one that Zeus is the father of all the gods; since the latter also contains in itself one, and only one, exception. Instead therefore of asserting anything whatever about objects, the true sceptic describes only how he is affected by them, and says nothing about phenomena, but only a little about how they appear. And he shows the same suspense in practical matters. Thus, although he will everywhere do what is required by the usage of the country, he will yet take great heed not to say that anything is intrinsically good or bad. The usual sceptical answers, "perhaps", "not more than the contrary," "I know not," etc., are discussed very thoroughly, and it is shown that if they are taken seriously complete unassailableness must result.

3. In the larger work of Sextus, his attacks on logic, physics, and ethics are especially important for the proper appreciation of his scepticism. The first of these is reproached with the untenableness of all criteria of truth and the uncertainty of the syllogistic method, the second with the difficulties and contradictions in the conceptions of space and time. Ethics finally have to endure an enumeration of the differences of moral precepts in different nations, from which the result is said to be, that there is nothing good or bad by nature and for all. In short, the result arrived at is complete subjectivism in theory and practice.

## § 104.

Scepticism, by attacking both forms of Dogmatism at one and the same time, was certain to bring them nearer to each other and to render them conscious of how numerous their points of agreement were. Hence the longer this contest lasted, the more pronounced did the eclectic colouring of the doctrines of the Epicureans and Stoics become. And it has already been shown how the conflict with the Stoic dogmatism impelled the Academics to syncretism (§ 101, 3). The later Peripatetics too had betrayed a similar tendency (§ 91). And this tendency was certain to show itself still more strongly among the Romans than among the Greeks. The fact that the Roman mind, on its introduction to philosophy, comes to know scepticism at the same time, so that philosophy is not generated by the Romans themselves, but put before them in the shape of complete systems, systems moreover of foreign origin; and that, further, their whole nature impels them to pursue speculation, not for its own sake but for the sake of practical aims, such as oratory or enlightenment, and hence to regard as acceptable whatever can be utilized for those aims, makes it intelligible that there arises in the Roman world a syncretism in which scepticism has to exhibit itself as the sole cement that can combine the different elements, all the more because of their disparity. All those who philosophized at Rome have been more or less syncretists; only in some there predominated the Stoic element, as *e.g.* in Lucullus, Brutus, and Cato; in others the Epicurean, as in Pomponius Atticus and C. Cassius; in others the Platonic, as in Varro, or the Peripatetic, as in Crassus and M. P. Piso. But syncretism is dogmatism as well as scepticism, and it is just in this that the chief weakness of the system, and its formal inconsistency, consists.

## THIRD DIVISION.

## The Syncretists.

## § 105.

The rise of syncretism, however, is not only explicable, as indeed even morbid phenomena are, but it is also a necessity in

the Roman world, and this is the reason why syncretism in Roman times produced such great and lasting effect. The principle of the Roman mind (cf. § 93) compels it, in its aspirations after greatness, to aim at making the Roman people the sum of many and, if possible, of all nations. But a nation which boasts of its origin from a *colluvies* and never wearies of growing by the absorption of neighbouring peoples, which regards the whole globe as its promised inheritance, of which the temple is a pantheon, such a nation can regard as its own and its true philosophy only one that finds room for all doctrines, however different. It is only under a rule like the all-embracing empire of Rome that philosophical syncretism is the secret of all thinking men, that it has a justification in the world's history, that it is a great and therefore a permanent phenomenon. But this syncretism makes its appearance in two substantially different forms. In the one case it may be called the Roman syncretism, after its chief abode, or the Ciceronian, after its chief representative, or the classical, after the elements which are mingled in it. And since it only mingles ideas already possessed by philosophy, its merit does not consist in the novelty of its ideas, but in the good taste of its manner and in the beauty of the form of its philosophizing; and it is in consequence of these qualities that Cicero could be pointed out as the true anti-barbarian (§ 239, 2), at a time when the later Middle Ages had reduced philosophy to the extreme of tastelessness. In its second form the position of syncretism is widely different; it may be called Alexandrian, after its chief seat, Philonian, after its chief representative, and Hellenistic, after its contents. The inclusion of religious ideas, and especially of Oriental ideas, in philosophy so enriches it that the doctrine of Cicero may often appear shallow in comparison with the frequently profound content of the Alexandrian Syncretists. But as these ideas grew up in an entirely different soil from that of those with which they were to be afterward fused, the combination becomes formless and tasteless, and often monstrous, and Cicero is far superior to Philo in matters of form. For this reason, when, also at the end of the Middle Ages, philosophy had almost completely lost its content, and revelled in merely formal trifling, a remedy was found in the recollection of the Alexandrian and other kindred doctrines (*vid.* § 237).

## A.—CLASSICAL SYNCRETISM.

## § 106.

## CICERO.

1. M. TULLIUS CICERO, born at Arpinum 106 B.C., and murdered in 43 B.C., owed, as he has frequently admitted, his culture to Greece, where he resided for several years in his youth. He became famous above all as an orator, but also as a statesman and philosopher; in respect of the last, with posterity more than with his contemporaries. He was introduced to philosophy by the Epicurean Phædrus, and afterwards enjoyed the instruction of the Epicurean Zeno, the Academics Philo and Antiochus, and the Stoics Diodotus and Posidonius, and in addition, was a prodigious reader. His philosophic activity, to which he continually recurred whenever he was driven away from the public service, chiefly aimed at making known to his countrymen in their own language and in a form freed from exaggerations, the results searched out by the Greek philosophers. Hence he often merely translates. At the same time he never conceals the orator in the form of his writings nor the practical Roman in their tendency. The public to which he imagines himself as appealing, consists of the educated and sensible men of the upper classes, together with whom he indulges in ingenious discussions. Thus, even as the Athenian Sophists prepared the ground for the seed of true philosophy, so Cicero accomplished a similar task for a larger public and for different times. His works have been schoolbooks for thousands of years; and even in the darkest ages they kept alive a knowledge of and an interest in the subjects that had occupied the philosophers of Greece.

2. As the *Hortensius*, in which Cicero discussed the value of philosophy generally, has been lost, his most important philosophical works are: (1) As to his whole standpoint, the *Academica*, which were combined out of two versions into but two books of the original four, and which have not been preserved entire; (2) as regards theoretical philosophy, the *De natura Deorum* in three, and the *De divinatione* in two books; (3) as regards practical philosophy, the *De finibus bonorum et malorum* in five, the *Tusculanæ quæstiones* in five, and the *De officiis* in three books, and also the fragments of the *De re publica*. His other writings of a practical character are to

be called popular declamations rather than treatises. There are, as is well known, very many editions of his works. In the same way he himself and his importance have formed the subject of much discussion, as is proved by the copious bibliography found in Ueberweg, etc. The right mean between the over-estimation of many older judgments and the depreciation which is fashionable in these days, is preserved by the detailed and excellent account of Ritter. Herbart also appreciates Cicero's services to philosophy as they deserve.

3. A moderate scepticism was most consonant with Cicero's whole temper and also with the task he had imposed upon himself, for it is always wont to be the theory of men of the world. This is the reason why he calls his philosophy that of the New Academy, and says it enables him to enter into isolated inquiries and to accept whatever seems most probable without committing himself to any system. Hence the method of the new Academy, viz., that of inquiring for the reasons for and against everything, meets with his complete approval; it permits urging one point or another according to circumstances, a licence especially valuable to an orator (cf. *De fato*, I.; *Tusc.*, II. 3). Finally, and this is not the least of its excellences, it tends to modesty, and is a protection against the absurd exaggerations in which the other systems revel, because they pay no heed to common sense. Among these exaggerations Cicero includes the declamatory descriptions of the sage among the Epicureans and Stoics, the final result of which is, that no sage ever existed. And in such a sense he himself neither is a sage nor wishes to be one. Nor does he wish to describe all that the complete sage knows and is capable of, but only what is probable to a reasonable man, and how such a one has to bear himself. His task is, not that of setting up a new system, but, by embarking on logical, physical, and above all ethical inquiries, of helping to bring it about that the supremacy in the sciences also, and especially in philosophy, should be added to the many crowns of victory which Rome had wrested from the Greeks (*int. al.*, *Tusc.*, II. 2). Next to Plato and the Academics, Cicero esteems Aristotle and the Stoics most highly, while he has the lowest opinion of the doctrine of Epicurus. He regards it as so frivolous, and hence as so un-Roman, that he asserts that the Epicureans did not at all dare to speak openly in Roman



society. Their real instructor, Democritus, he places far above them.

4. If one considers separately what Cicero has said about the several branches of philosophy, one finds that his statements about *Logic* are mostly negative. He blames the Epicureans for neglecting definition, division, and the art of syllogizing, and praises the Peripatetics by way of contrast. He combats the opinion both of the Epicureans and of the Stoics, in that they imagine themselves to possess a certain criterion of truth: such a criterion does not exist, although the senses, and especially sound common sense, afford a degree of probability sufficient to enable one to act with certainty.

5. With regard to *Physics*, Cicero is fond of pointing to the gaps in the science, and to the fact that there is hardly any point in it that is not disputed. But this is the very reason why he wishes the subject to be studied, in order that it may dampen the conceit of knowledge and produce modesty. Besides, one must admit that even the Epicureans are right on this one point, that the study of the science of nature is the best means of liberating men from superstition. Only the effect of the study must not be limited to this, for it also elevates and improves. In this respect the Stoics have fallen far short of what Cicero expects from sensible men, to say nothing of philosophers. For greatly as he himself approves of sparing the religious conceptions of the people, because they are necessary for the masses in the interest of the State's welfare, he yet has no idea of regarding as truths the stories of the many gods, the trustworthiness of the auguries and all the other oracles: hence the Stoics, with their philosophic justification of polytheism, appear to him the patrons of bigotry and the enemies of enlightenment. Similarly, even more ethical reasons induce him to regard the fate of the Stoics as a delusion, seeing that it is incompatible with freedom. He himself arrives at a belief in a Deity by means of a teleological contemplation of the world, although the occurrence of purposeless phenomena causes him the gravest scruples with regard to this point. He conceives the Deity as one, like in nature to our own spirit, and dwelling in the world just as our spirit does in our body. This similarity is often emphasized to such an extent as to sound almost pantheistic. The fact that the Deity is sometimes described as an immaterial being,

and sometimes identified with a fire-like substance, or even with the ether of Aristotle, is explained by a precisely parallel indecision with regard to the human spirit. Cicero, however, does not at all wish to refer every particular to divine action: for there is much that is effected by nature, or that happens of itself. Besides the Deity, Cicero finds nothing in physics so important as the human spirit. He is convinced that it is something more than the coarse material particles of the world, and he is equally certain about its freedom. Immortality also he regards as probable in the highest degree, although he gives a warning against attaching too much credence to its philosophic proofs. With regard to the character of the future life, he considers it as happy; all the tales of punishments and tortures he declares to be superstitions.

6. But his favourite study is *Ethics*: every inquiry sooner or later leads him on to ethical questions; and he repeatedly declares that philosophy is the art of life, and that the inquiry into the highest good is the cardinal problem of philosophy. The attitude he takes up in so doing closely approximates to the view of the Stoics. Thus in his paradoxes he comments on their pet formulas, as if he quite belonged to them. At the same time, however, he tones down their harshnesses by the inclusion of Peripatetic elements, and hence often appears to be undecided. He is consistent in one thing alone, and that is in his attacks upon the Epicurean doctrine, to the representation and refutation of which he has devoted the first two books of the *De finibus*. For, says he, even in the case of the sub-human beings, it is possible to prove the existence of something higher than mere pleasure, how much more then in man, who even in eating requires something more than pleasure. His censure of the Peripatetics, for having placed virtue in the moderation rather than in the suppression of the instincts, the assertion that all passions are morbid, that with one virtue all the others are given, that virtue has its reward in itself, that the truly happy man could descend even into the bull of Phalaris, etc., all this reminds one of the Stoics and their declamations. Afterwards, however, Cicero comes to himself again: all this is said to be applicable only to the true sage, who is nowhere found, and of whom alone the *recte factum* (κατόρθωμα) can be predicated, while with ordinary men it is sufficient if they do not fall short of the *officium* (καθήκον); in

life as it is, happiness is not conceivable without the addition of luck ; moderate pleasure is by no means to be despised ; at bottom pain is an evil after all, etc. In short, one fancies one is listening to a Peripatetic. He himself does not regard this as inconsistent, for he considers the difference between Peripatetics and Stoics to be chiefly a question of words. What, however, he marks out for special censure in the Stoics is, that they do not direct their attention towards the whole of man, but only towards a single part, viz., his intellectual nature ; and thereby impair the highest good, which can only then be fully conceived, when it includes the life agreeable to (the whole of) one's nature.

7. It is characteristic, moreover, that the Roman translator translates all the doctrines of the Greek philosophers, not only into the language, but also in the spirit of his nation. Thus where the artistic Greek used to say, the "beautiful," the words "honourable" and "decorous" (*honestum, decorum*) are invariably found in Cicero. He does, indeed, protest against the subordination, in this phraseology, of the value of an action to the estimate others form of it, seeing that what is praiseworthy remains praiseworthy though it is not praised ; but a proof of the prominence of the civic point of view and the element of public recognition, is to be found not only in the use of the term *turpe* for wrong-doing, but also in the way in which he finds the first traces of virtue in boyish love of honour, and ascribes to fame a similarity to virtue. The inclusion of this civic point of view also modifies the distinction between what is legally and what is morally reprehensible, as is exemplified, e.g., in his calling literal obedience of the *lex Voconia* a shameful action, while elsewhere excuses are made for those who interpret the laws in a quibbling manner in the interest of friends. For the one is contrary to *consuetudo*, the other is not : it is not decent to act like the former, it is noble to act like the latter. The perfectly pure subjectivity of the modern conscience is here still wanting, and the proverbial phrase he applies to a man of honour, that one could play dice with him in the dark, remains a mere phrase.

## SENECA.

## § 107.

Böhm: *Seneca und sein Werth.* Berlin, 1856. Holzherr: *Der Philosoph L. Annaeus Seneca.* Rastatt, 1858.

1. LUCIUS ANNÆUS SENECA, also, who was born at Corduba in 5 A.D. and put to death in 65 A.D., is, as he repeatedly confesses, a Syncretist; for although the Stoic element is the prevalent one in him, he yet borrows much from others, especially from the Platonists, and he expressly boasts that he derived instruction even from Epicurus. The great reputation he enjoyed in the first centuries of the Christian epoch originated the legend of his conversion by the Apostle Paul; and this in its turn was the support of his authority in the Middle Ages, in which he, together with Pliny, was the chief instructor in physics. On the awakening of the interest in classical studies, towards the end of the Middle Ages, Seneca was cultivated almost as much as Cicero. And, as upon Cicero, there came upon him an epoch of exaggerated contempt, which to some extent still continues. Among the numerous editions of his works, the older one of Lipsius (Antwerp, 1605), and the most recent one of Haase (Leips., 1852), may be mentioned. Most of his writings are popular treatises on ethical questions (*De ira, De consolatione, De animi tranquillitate, De constantia sapientis, De clementia*), others are concerned with physics (*Quæstiones naturales*), and yet others with religious problems (*De providentia*). But he displays the greatest versatility in his chief work, the 124 letters *Ad Lucilium*.

2. The supremacy of the reason over the senses, the similitude to God to be reached by moral action, which is displayed in the equanimity which endures all circumstances, so that the characteristics of the sage are the *leta paupertas* and the *pati posse divitias*, the self-sufficiency which can exist even without friends, these are the qualities he is continually recommending, and in favour of which he appeals almost as often to the authority of Epicurus as to that of the Stoics. Above all, philosophy is practical; *facere docet, non dicere*, he says; it is the *studium virtutis*; while virtue or wisdom lies above all in consistency; *sapientis est semper idem velle atque idem nolle*. This, as well as his frequent assertions that pain matters not, and that suicide is the *ultima ratio*, is purely

Stoic, as is also the one, that there is one point in which the sage is superior to the Deity, viz. that he is wise not by his nature but by his effort. Then again, however, he frequently decides against the Stoics, and his practical temper leads him to blame their hair-splitting inquiries, and, in the theoretical part of his philosophy especially, he shows a tendency towards the scepticism of the new Academy.

3. But what characterizes him most of all is his separation of morality from the naturalistic basis it had among the Stoics, and its connection with religious motives, with an innate moral sense, and with indignation at the corruption of the world. All this produces, in his view of the world, a colouring that reminds one of Christianity, which surprises all and dazzles many. The way in which Seneca rises above the limitations of nationality to the idea of a purely human virtue, nullifying differences of rank and setting up none between foes and friends; his recognition of the weakness of human nature, which he sometimes calls *caro*, and of the necessity of divine assistance in virtue; his doctrine that perfect submission to God constitutes true freedom, etc.; all this has induced not a few, especially in France, to call him a man stimulated by Christianity. We should, however, prefer to assign to him the position of a fore-runner, which accords with his calling the Christians a *gens sceleratissima*. The remark of Erasmus; *si legas eum ut paganism scripsit christiane, si ut christianum scripsit paganice*, is very much to the point.

Ritter and Preller, § 452-453.

#### B.—HELLENISTIC SYNCRETISM.

J. A. B. Lutterbeck: *Die neutestamentlichen Lehrbegriffe*. Mainz, 1852.  
2 vols.

#### § 108.

Alexander's brief dominion over the world was out-lived by the eternal achievement, of which his espousal of an Oriental woman has become the symbol. By founding Alexandria, a foundation which has become almost as important as that of Rome, he created a neutral ground on which Hellenism could meet Orientalism, and meet it especially in the shape in which it forms the harshest antithesis to Hellenism. For while

the beauty of the Greek character is rooted in the delight in the sensible, and is inseparable from the belief that whatever may happen happens of itself, and in the course of nature, the sublimity of Judaism consists in the fact that it regards a non-sensible Deity as creating all things as he pleases, so that there does not exist any nature properly speaking, and the world and everything within it is only a single and ever renewed work of the Almighty. This antithesis, which leads the Greek to aim at conformity to nature, the Jew at super- (*i.e.* non-) natural holiness, must render each a stumbling block and an absurdity to the other. But under the protection of the Ptolemies, upon whom Alexander's partiality for the Jews had descended, there is developed in the Jews a desire to assimilate all the conclusions the Greek spirit had arrived at, which was called forth especially by the fact that they had begun to speak, and therefore to think, in Greek. And the Greeks, on the other hand, deprived by the two great Macedonians of the glory of being alone unconquered, and alone cultured, whose wisdom had in the Sceptics declared itself bankrupt, now seek to relieve this poverty by the appropriation of Oriental ideas. This reciprocal desire generates an entirely new spirit, which, by a slight extension of the common meaning of the word, may be called *Hellenistic*: it is the consciousness of the impulse which drove Alexander to found his world-empire, and cannot but find fresh nourishment when the mission of Alexander is inherited by Rome

## § 109.

When the Greek exchanges the Hellenic and the Jew the Oriental ideas for the Hellenistic ideas commingled out of Hellenism and Orientalism, the former acquires an interest in that which seems to interrupt the course of nature, in miracles and prophecies. This conflicts just as much with the genuine Hellenic spirit, in which Aristotle put miracles on the same footing with abortions, and Plato assigned prophetic powers to the lower part of man, as it is contrary to the old Jewish spirit, that the ablest intellects among the Jews commence to concern themselves with natural science and medicine, that they develop a tendency towards fatalism, and that the Apocrypha, which arose about this time, contain panegyrics on beauty. And as in every mixture, there is here also a possi-

bility of the predominance of one of the two elements, and hence orientalizing Greeks as well as hellenizing Jews must be reckoned among the phenomena of the Hellenistic spirit. And it results from the nature of things, that in the case of the former it should be philosophy, in that of the latter, religion which forms the basis; that in the one philosophic doctrines should acquire a religious colouring, while in the other speculation should attach itself to religious dogma. It is natural too, that in either tendency the adventitious element only gradually becomes visible and prominent.

### ORIENTALIZING HELLENES.

#### § 110.

The name of NEO-PYTHAGOREANS, by which the orientalizing Greeks of this period are usually denoted, is only correct within the limits within which one may call Cicero an Academic. For, in addition to that which they really derive from Pythagoras, one finds in them Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and even Epicurean elements. There were also Oriental elements, especially in the display of dualism, with which it was easy to combine both the Pythagorean doctrine of number and Platonism. For indeed Persian, and above all Egyptian, doctrines were certain to recommend themselves to men most of whom were educated at Alexandria. If Röth's opinion (*vid.* § 31) were correct, this would be the time when the genuine doctrine of Pythagoras first began to preponderate over that of his spurious disciples, which alone had hitherto been active. Cicero gives us a scanty account of Nigidius Figulus, Seneca of Sextius, and of his disciple Sotion. Both seem to have received their inspiration from Alexandria, where Pythagoreanism had sprung up in great vigour, and where the writings attributed to Archytas, Ocellus Lucanus, etc., arose. At the same time, the movement seems soon to have separated into two different tendencies, of which, it is true, those representatives whom we know belong to a later period. Moderatus of Gades and Nicomachus of Gerasa in Arabia laid more stress on the doctrine of number, while Apollonius of Tyana seems to have developed rather the ethical and religious elements of Pythagoreanism. Of the latter we know little; for the romance of Philostratus, of which he is the subject, is a source rather of our knowledge of the later Neo-Pythagoreanism of the

second and third centuries after Christ, in its reaction against Christianity. The greater part of the Orphic writings also probably arose about this time, or even later.

Baur: *Apollonius von Tyana und Christus*. Tübingen, 1852.

### § 111.

1. But the most definite conception of an orientalizing Hellenic philosopher is afforded us by the writings of PLUTARCH of Chæronea (50–120 A.D.), which, in spite of the loss of a large part of them, distinctly show us how there mingle with his Platonic, Pythagorean, Peripatetic, and—in spite of his polemics against them—also Stoic doctrines, religious conceptions which betray a Persian and Egyptian origin. And as Plutarch does not even know the Jews accurately enough to distinguish their religion from that of the Syrians, and could still less take notice of Christian doctrines, he must be separated from many men in other respects resembling him in temper, as, *e.g.*, Numenius, and be counted wholly among the ancients. He stands, however, on the border line of antiquity; and this position explains the fact that, just as some were impelled towards a living Christianity by the study of Seneca, Plutarch affected a still larger number. His works have frequently been edited. The editions of H. Stephanus, in 13 vols., 1572, of Reiske, 12 vols., 1774–82, and of Hullen, 14 vols., 1791–1804, are the most famous.

2. Although Plutarch counts himself among the Academics, and, like his teacher Atticus, whose philosophizing seems to have been rather a philological commentary on Plato, often shows an almost slavish dread of departing from Plato, he nevertheless deviates from him, partly by re-interpreting his doctrines in an Aristotelian sense, partly by subordinating theory to practice in the spirit of Post-Aristotelian philosophy, and finally, in part by his dualism, the connection of which with Persian and Egyptian doctrines he himself confesses. According to this, the Deity is opposed to matter, which by its irregular motion makes evil possible, and acts on it as a forming principle. Or again, he regards a good and an evil original being as acting upon neutral matter. The principle of motion which is contrary to the divine he calls soul. Hence the evil world-soul which Plato had spoken of in the *Laws* (§ 79, 6), is very welcome to him. The power of the good original



being, which, it follows, is not so much a motive power as a guidance of the lawless motion, is the greater, and hence it is the highest god. His forming power consists in implanting into matter the ideas which he also conceives in Pythagorean fashion as numbers, or in Stoic fashion as *σπέρματα*, and his rule is providence. Below him there stands, as it were, as a second providence, the dominion of the subordinate gods, the constellations; below these again, the activities of the good and evil *dæmons*, to which Plutarch concedes a great deal in spite of his polemics against all superstitions, especially in the way of oracles and prophecies. Spirit, soul, and body, the three constituents of man, show how he is the product of all the powers ruling above him. At the same time, he distinguishes a higher and a lower principle in the soul, to the latter of which is ascribed the irregular motion of the passions; for virtue is conceived in an Aristotelian rather than in a Stoic fashion. A double death converts man out of his threefold state, first into a twofold being, and finally into a single spirit. As all the constellations must from time to time return to their positions, there follows from their influence the periodical return of all occurrences, which Plutarch asserts in agreement with the Stoics. And the same thing happens to him with regard to the Epicureans and Sceptics; he combats them, and yet borrows much from them.

3. Kindred spirits of Plutarch's, though far from being his intellectual peers, were the philosophizing rhetoricians living in the reigns of the Antonines, Maximus of Tyre and Apuleius of Madaura, with whom may be classed Celsus, the assailant of Christianity in later times. The latter's *Truth about the Christians* was gathered together from fragments translated and commented upon by Keim in 1873. Epicurean elements are very prominent in him.

Ritter and Preller, § 496-500.

### HELLENIZING JEWS.

Gfrörer: *Philo und die alexandrinische Theosophie*. Stuttgart, 1831. Dähne: *Geschichtliche Darstellung der jüdisch-alexandr. Religionsphilos.* Halle, 1834. Cf. the review of Baur in the *Jahrb. für wissenschaft. Kritik*, 1835 (Nov.), and Georgii in Illgen's *Zeitschr. für histor. Theolog.* 1839, 3rd No.

### § 112.

The Hellenizing Judaism has become more important, not only for the development of Christian dogma, but also for the

further development of philosophy. The educated Jews assimilated many ideas of Greek philosophers, especially of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, which they derived at first from the general culture, and afterwards, in consequence of the interest thus generated, out of books. And as at the same time they hold firmly to the belief that the Jews are in exclusive possession of revealed truth, this produces a contradiction in their consciousness, the solution of which is found in the idea, arising not out of reflection, but naturally and concurrently with their interest in philosophy, that the Greeks derived their wisdom from the Old Testament, though, it might be, by a round-about way. And similarly the doctrine derived from Plato as to the worthlessness of everything material, that of Aristotle as to the exclusion of all matter from the Deity, that of the Stoics as to the value of mere inward feeling and the indifference of every external action, all these contradict many of the stories in the Old Testament as to appearances of the Deity, etc., and also the value which it attributes to many entirely external acts. And here again it is not reflection but instinct that discovers an escape: for the allegorical method of exegesis, according to which the Biblical stories are supposed to contain a deeper and particularly an ethical, in addition to their literal, sense, is not a piece of disingenuousness, but a perfectly natural way of connecting Greek philosophic doctrines with the traditional religion.

### § 113.

1. Traces of Hellenizing are found already in the Greek translation of the Old Testament, called the Septuagint because it was probably undertaken at the command of the council of the seventy. The Septuagint in its turn becomes the starting point of further Hellenizing, which has gone very far already in the Apocrypha of the Old Testament, especially in the Wisdom of (pseudo-) Solomon. Aristobulus, the tutor of the seventh Ptolemy, from whose *Ἑλληνικά* Clement and Eusebius have handed fragments down to us, was animated by very similar opinions, even if he was not the author of the above book. It appears that he did not shrink even from interpolations in order to prove that Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato derived their doctrines from the Old Testament, and further that he read many Platonic, Peripatetic, and above

all Stoic doctrines into his sacred writings by means of allegories. And perhaps because the physical re-interpretations of the Stoics had shown him the way, he expresses the allegorical method by "*φυσικῶς*." It can also be regarded as proved, that the Egyptian Therapeutæ appropriated many elements out of the Hellenizing Theosophy, especially in its Pythagorean tendencies. But this is doubtful with regard to the Essenes, since weighty voices have been raised on behalf of the view that their standpoint displays only a consistent carrying out of a purely Jewish idea, or at the most only a combination with other forms of Orientalism. But in their later fusion with the Therapeutæ they also will have to be regarded as the bearers of the Hellenistic spirit. Productions of the same spirit are the book of Enoch, the greater part of the Sibylline prophecies that have come down to us, and perhaps also the very oldest elements of the Cabala, which was not however completely developed until more than a thousand years later.

2. In part at least it is necessary to class among these the writings of an alleged contemporary of Moses, HERMES, named TRISMEGISTUS, as being the greatest philosopher, priest, and king all in one. But only in part, for they belong to different authors and times. Their point of view is also in so far the same that they all show a mixture of Greek and Oriental ideas. But not only does the proportion of the elements vary, but they do not all display the influence of the same forms of Orientalism. Thus the *Ποιμάνδρος*, with which all the editions begin, and after which the whole collection is generally, but quite groundlessly, called, first by the *αἰξανεσθε καὶ πληθύνεσθε*, derived from the Septuagint of Gen. i. 22, further by its constitution of man, regarded like his creator as androgynous because he is a union of soul and spirit, just as the latter is of life and light, and lastly by many other points, so greatly reminds one of the method of Philo (*vid. infra*, p. 114), that the supposition that the name of "shepherd of men" for the *τῆς αὐθεντίας νοῦς* (λόγος) was suggested by one of Philo's expressions, deserves consideration. Similarly in the following piece, the *λόγος καθολικός*, the tone in which it is emphasized that father means nothing but creator, and the exhortation added, that the production of children is a duty to be fulfilled on pain of damnation, originated entirely from Jewish ways of thinking. But far different is the re-

markable essay called the *κλεις*, in which God is always called the Good, which wishes to be known by all, yea and to be all, while to know it is equivalent to goodness and blessedness, whereas not knowing it is equivalent to wickedness and misery, etc. With continual reminiscences of what one reads in the *Timæus*, the *Gorgias*, etc., the world is designated the son of God, and man as its offspring, who through his (spherical) head is also its image; punishment is regarded as expiatory, and godlessness as a punishment; and finally, with truly Stoical pride, the true man is exalted above the gods, and the saying of Heraclitus, that man is a mortal god, and the gods immortal men, is quoted as the word of a good *dæmon*. In a kindred and wholly Greek spirit, it is assumed in two other pieces (*ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀπόλλυται* and *περὶ νοήσεως καὶ αἰσθήσεως*), that in the world, the second god, there is only perfection, while imperfection exists only on earth, and while lastly, there is attributed to the third, viz., man, the wondrous power of converting even evil into good. Quite different again does it sound when, instead of the former denial of any intermediate being, there is interpolated, in the *Νοῦς πρὸς Ἐρμῆν*, between the creator and world the *αἰών*, who bestows eternity upon it, or, in the *περὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ*, the *νοῦς*, the first-born of God, related to the latter as the light to the sun, who in man becomes his spirit and the impelling force in the remaining beings. What, finally, is one to say to this, when, in the *Μονάς*, it is asserted that not all possess *νοῦς*, but only those who hate the body, and in the faith (*πιστεύοντες*) of their return to God dive down into the basin of the spirit (*βαπτίζειν*); when the better choice and the heavenly way are praised, on which the invisible is preferred to the visible and unity is attained, unity which is the root of all things? Or again, What shall we say when the curious *ἐν ὅρει λόγος* teaches the doctrine that no one can be saved without a new birth, in which silence is the mother that conceives and the good the seed that begets, and the will of God that whereby the birth takes place in the spirit, and the instrument of this birth is even called *θεοῦ παῖς εἰς ἄνθρωπος*? Compared with this agreement with the expressions of the New Testament, it almost seems a trifle, that in other pieces the *λόγος* is called *ὁμοούσιος* with the Deity, and the *καρδιά* of men and their eyes are often spoken of, etc. And yet it would be hasty to conclude that the author was a member of the Christian com-

munity. For in this very Sermon on the Mount we find trifling plays with the numbers twelve, ten, and eight that would cause no surprise in a Neo-Pythagorean, and at the end a panegyric on the All and One such as would befit a pagan pantheist. In the *Asclepius* we listen to a vegetarian like Porphyry, who at the same time praises men for constructing wonder-working images of gods and therefore agrees with Jamblichus (*infra*, § 129). If, then, these writings, in addition to containing elements akin to the Therapeutæ and Neo-Pythagoreans, contain also points of correspondence with Gnostic (§ 122), Neo-Platonic (§ 126), Patristic (§ 131), and Cabalistic ideas etc., we can understand their lasting authority in the most various circles. Thus Lactantius esteems them very highly, and Stobæus has included extensive extracts from them in his collection. The veneration they enjoyed in later times is shown by the pains taken about them in the times of the Renaissance (§ 236), and above all, that as recently as 1610 it was possible to print a commentary of the extent of that of the Franciscan Hannibal Rossel. Besides the writings which have been preserved in Greek,—for it is a fiction that their author composed them in Egyptian,—which are generally included under the name of Poimander, Pœmander, Pymander, Pimander, etc., there has come down to us a Latin translation of the *Asclepius*, falsely ascribed to Apuleius. The others were first translated into Latin by Marsilius Ficinus (§ 237), and hence appeared in the Bâle edition of his works in 1576, together with the *Asclepius*. The Greek text appeared first in Paris in 1554 (Turnebus, 4to), then together with a Latin translation in the edition of Franc. Flussus Candulla, Bardig. 1574, which was reprinted in the six fol. volumes: *Divinus Pymander Hermetis Mercurii Trismegisti cum commentariis, R.P.F. Hannibalis Rosselii*. Cologne, 1630. The merit of having brought to light the quotations in Stobæus from the *κόρη κόσμου* (*ἱερὰ βιβλος*), in which Orientalism is displayed more plainly than anywhere else, belongs to Francisco Patrizi (*vid.* § 244). He further improved the earlier translations and showed that there was no justification for extending the title of the first piece to the following thirteen. Accordingly his collection, which he published two years before his death as an appendix to his *Nova de universis philosophia*, was inscribed *Hermetis Trismegisti libelli et fragmenta quotcumque reperiuntur*. It included also the old trans-

lation of the *Asclepius*. This edition, which in some specimens is dated *Romæ* 1591, in others *Venetia* 1793, seems soon to have become scarce. At least Tiedemann complains, in the German translation of these writings undertaken in 1781, that he does not possess it, and translates according to Marsilius Ficinus, retaining also as the title of the whole: *Hermes Trismegists Pœmander*. Berlin, 1781. The newest and most correct edition, also, that has appeared in Germany, that of G. Parthey: *Hermes Trismegisti Pœmander*. Berl., 1854, betrays already in its title that it contains neither the fragments from Stobæus nor the *Asclepius*. On the other hand, there is to be found a French translation of all the Hermetic writings, together with a valuable introduction originally published in the *Revue de deux mondes*, in Louis Ménard: *Hermès Trismegiste, traduction complète précédée d'une étude sur l'origine des livres Hermétiques*. 2me. éd. Paris, 1867.

## § 114.

## PHILO JUDÆUS.

Grossmann: *Quæstiones Philonææ*. Leipz., 1829. Steinhart: *Art. Philo* in Pauly's *Real-encyclopædie*. Vid. p. 1449. Joël: *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie*. Breslau, 1876. 2 vols. [J. Drummond: *Philo Judæus; or, The Jewish Alexandrian Philosophy in its Development and Completion*. London, 1888.—ED.]

1. The Jew PHILO is not only the main authority for our knowledge of this tendency, but probably was also its most important representative, a position for which he was adapted by the fact that he had a genius for collecting and compiling rather than for invention. He was born at Alexandria a few years B.C. Although many of his writings have been lost, the larger and probably more important portion has nevertheless come down to us. The Paris edition of 1525, by Turnebus, was reprinted in 1691 at Frankfort. The best are the London edition by Mangey, 2 vols., 1742, the Erlangen by Pfeiffer, 5 vols., 1785, and the Leipsic by Richter, 8 vols., 1828.

2. Generally in allegorizing commentaries on the Old Testament, Philo develops the following doctrines. As the senses are deceptive, and as rational grounds also do not afford complete security, the certainty of knowledge rests in the last resort on the illumination that will be received

together with faith, a divine gift of grace to which the attitude of man is purely receptive. The instrument whereby God has given this revelation was above all Moses, and hence the Jewish priests can most easily attain to true philosophy. The Greeks also, however, attained to it through Moses, only indirectly, as Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and the rest derived their doctrines from Moses. The content of revelation, and hence also of philosophy, is concerned above all with the divine nature. It must be conceived as absolutely unchangeable, since every change involves an imperfection, and hence also as in a state of absolute Being and not Becoming, the One that excludes all plurality. Hence *Ἐν*, *ὅν*, or better still *ὁ ὢν*, are the best appellations of God. And as the absence of differences in His unity excludes all quantitative, so he excludes all qualitative determinations also from the Divine nature; God is *ἄποιος*, and it follows from this that the contemplative spirit also can distinguish nothing in Him, *i.e.*, cannot know Him. The prohibition against naming God by His true Name is justified by the plea that His true *ὑπαρξίς* ever remains concealed. The fourth Aristotelian category also, like the second and the third, does not apply to God: as the absolute as such, God stands in no relation of any sort; hence things do not exist *δι' αὐτοῦ*, for this would bring Him, the Holy One, into a polluting proximity to matter.

3. The apparent contradiction, that Philo nevertheless infers the existence of God teleologically from the order in the world, and for this reason calls the world the gate of entry into the heaven of truth, is solved, in the first place, by his avoiding the inference from the existence of matter to its cause, and rather inferring from the order in matter a cause of that order, and thus making God only the orderer of the world; in the second place, moreover, by the fact that he does not permit the ordering activity of God to act directly upon matter, but interposes an intermediate being between them as the instrument through (*διά*) which the order posited by (*ὑπό*) God enters into matter. This intermediate being is the Logos, the sum of all the Ideas or archetypes of things, which as the *λόγος γενικώτατος* contains all conceptions within itself, and in which, therefore, things pre-exist immaterially. According as this plan of the world is conceived as thought by God or as already declared, Philo calls the Logos either the Wisdom or the Word (*σοφία* or *ῥῆμα*), a distinction corresponding to that of the Stoics between

ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός. The relation of the Logos to God is often described as a radiating out and emanation ; and the world, which is formed after the image of that archetypal κόσμος ἀσώματος, is more that once called the singly-born son of God, as in Plato. The agreement with Plato, however, ceases, when Philo personifies all the pre-suppositions of real things and puts them into connection with the angelology, which had reached a high degree of development in his time. Thus it is requisite, in addition to the archetypes of things themselves, that God should have the power and the will to create them, etc. These qualities of God, His ἀρεταί, δυνάμεις, ἐξουσίαι, are thereupon at once hypostasized, and combined with the Essene conceptions of angels and angelic beings, in the gradation which is mentioned also in the New Testament. And thereby Plato's doctrine finds room not only for the conceptions of Hellenizing Jews, but equally well for those of orientalizing Hellenes : the constellations become god-like beings, the dæmons become spirits of the air, the heroes become demi-gods; and he explains idolatry as an exaggerated esteem for things really deserving of veneration. And as this whole gradation forms part of the conditions anterior to the world, the word Logos, i.e., the regular name denoting this instrument, acquires sometimes a wider, sometimes a narrower meaning. The Philonian doctrine is, however, essentially distinct from the later Christian doctrine of the Logos in that its Logos is only the idea of the world; and he therefore expressly declares that this shadow of the Deity must not be called God.

4. The degrees of Being Philo represents as diminishing like the intensity of light radiating into ever larger circles, until at length it finds its limit in matter, which he conceives sometimes in the spirit of Plato and Aristotle as merely μὴ ὄν, at others, more in agreement with the later physiologists and the Stoics, as a mixture of the inert and inanimate principles which the orderer of things subsequently brings into conformity with law and form by separation. According to the predominance of matter or of form there results the hierarchy of beings, which had been already established by the Stoics (§ 97, 3). He combines with this the biological doctrines of Aristotle in such a way as to ascribe to the plants not only ἔξις, but also φύσις, and also the θρεπτική, μεταβλητική and αὐξητική (sc. δύναμις), and while the ἐμψυχα are in addition said to have



also αἴσθησις, φαντασία, μνήμη and ὁρμή, while νοῦς or λόγος pertains only to the ψυχὴ λογικὴ, sometimes called ψυχὴ simply. And because man, the rational being, also partakes of all the subordinate states, he is called the microcosm; and Philo develops in detail how inorganic, vegetable, etc., characteristics are displayed in man. And he not only opposes the human to the sub-human as the whole to its parts, but in order to lay the proper stress on man's specific dignity, he sometimes represents a special principle in the shape of the πνεῦμα θεοῦ as being active in his creation, or at others calls in the aid of Essene conceptions of spirits of the air circling round the earth. And in harmony with his practice of always conceiving logical sequence as a succession in time, Philo represents the genera as issuing out of the Logos before the species, and in the case of man also the generic and sexless ἀνθρώπος γενικός or οὐράνιος as being created before the sexual and specific man.

5. Matter, being that which limits Being, *i.e.*, all perfection, is consistently conceived as the hindrance to perfect action also, and the whole of Philo's ethics really reduces itself to the admonition to free oneself from matter. This object suicide, the expedient of the Stoics, would not accomplish; on the contrary, since it is desire alone that binds us to matter, it is necessary to kill this first, and to aim at a condition in which it is necessity alone, and no longer our own inclination, that chains us to the body. And as, according to Philo's allegorical interpretations of the Scriptures, the stories of the Old Testament contain also deeper ethical truths in addition to their historical accuracy, that which is related of Adam and Eve is at the same time the history of the spirit, as it is led astray by sensuality. And as Egypt is the symbol of carnality, he can also express his ethical requirements to this effect: that every one should aim at becoming a Moses, living in Egypt only on compulsion, whose will is set upon wandering forth into the land of the spirit, etc. The main stages to be traversed up to this perfection are recognised in the histories of the chief patriarchs.

## CONCLUDING REMARK.

## § 115.

Just as the world-empire of Rome includes the East and the West, in short the whole civilized world, so syncretism includes everything that oriental and occidental wisdom had produced. This union, in the one case of the empire, in the other of the most various doctrines, was achieved mechanically; and hence those who like Cicero or Philo affect it, seem on account of this variety to be inconsistent thinkers. But the same thing holds good in this case as was shown in the case of the Sophists (§ 56 and § 62), viz., that a mixture of the most various views had to come first, before their organic fusion became possible. Such a mixture of wholly different doctrines makes each appear a necessary supplement of the rest, makes it as impossible in future that one of them should be alone held valid, as the Sophists rendered it impossible that Eleaticism should thenceforth rule supreme. The political parallel of this phenomenon is to be found in the fact that after the sway of the abstract civism of the Romans, all attempts to obtain exclusive recognition for a single nationality alone, where all were justified, were sure to fail. But it is a further point that as all syncretism involves a degree of scepticism, the intermixture of Eastern and Western wisdom raises a distrust against all the existing forms of science, just as within the Roman world-empire men were not only rendered free from all the limitations of nationality, but also doubtful about all the aims and interests which until then had swayed them. It is, however, necessary that both the truth and also the untruth of all previous wisdom should be admitted, if a mode of regarding the world, to which all previous ones stand in the relation of immature beginnings, is to prevail. And such a view of the world, transcending both Orientalism and Occidentalism, is the Christian, which arose in the East and was developed in the West, and to the superior position of which even the story it gave birth to, viz., that Seneca and Philo were converted by the Apostles Paul and Peter, testifies. Christianity shows itself as an all-transforming principle also in the field of philosophy. For, as far as philosophy could penetrate, without receiving an impulse from this new principle, so far it

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has succeeded in advancing, in a way that irresistibly brings before our eyes, as we look back, the course of many a far-famed stream. For in the first period we saw what had sprung from the most various sources, gradually drawing nearer and nearer ; in the second all these branches had united into a great stream flowing along in majesty ; in the third it once more separated into many branches, which seem to lose themselves partly in the sands of scepticism, partly in the marsh of syncretism, but which nevertheless are really tributary to the ocean of Christian philosophy.

**PART SECOND.**  
**MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.**



# MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

## INTRODUCTION.

### § 116.

THE way in which Roman imperialism breaks up national lines, from above by the formation of a world-power, from below by the emphasis of private interest, may be regarded as a type of that which Christianity accomplishes. The latter goes further in one respect, for it denies the distinction not only between Greeks and Jews, but also between the free and the unfree, between the old and the young, and does not stop with vindicating man's value considered merely in one aspect, as a subject of the State, but recognises the worth of his personality as a whole. In another respect, however, Christianity does not go so far, since in its view age and property are not sufficient to give man true worth, but it is necessary that the individual be filled with an objective, divine content. This twofold relation of Christianity to Roman imperialism is due to the fact that, while the latter wavers between two extremes, at one time (proudly) assigning to the individual man a divine worth, at another time (in self-renunciation) denying to all that is human any value whatever, Christianity unites both in the (humbly-proud) thought that man, without value in himself, attains to the dignity of a child of God by giving up his worthless individuality. This righteousness is distinguished from the haughty self-righteousness of Hellenism by its element of renunciation, and is the consciousness of a regained unity with God, that is, of reconciliation with Him. This consciousness is the (new) spirit, which knows itself to be in opposition to the (heathen) flesh and the (Jewish) letter.

## § 117.

Christianity, as a conscious reconciliation of mankind with God, may be called a union of the two, or divine humanity, expressions which correspond with the Biblical "Kingdom of Heaven." The aim of Christianity is that no one shall be outside of this union except by his own fault, and hence the reconciliation of mankind with God must begin in such a way that it can be made certain to all, without distinction of talents or of education. That is to say, the divine humanity must first appear as a God-man, discernible by the senses, whose person and history form the whole content of the message of salvation, and who, since He is Christianity *in nuce*, for that very reason is the (*i.e.* the only) Christ, of whom it is therefore said that He (alone) *is* the Spirit. But by this it is not meant that this original mode of existence is adequate to the conception of Christianity. On the contrary, this beginning, like every other, must come to an end. The condition in which Divine-humanity exists as a God-man must, as the lower, give place to the higher (humility to exaltation and glory), where Christ exists in Christians as man in men, where the Gospel of Christ has become the Gospel of the Kingdom, and the saying, There is none other Name whereby we must be saved, is replaced by the necessary supplement *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*. Both sayings mean the same thing : that reconciliation with God is all in all.

## § 118.

If the consciousness of reconciliation with God is the peculiar principle of the Christian spirit, or of Christianity, every age in which this idea agitates men's minds will have to be regarded as coloured with this spirit, or designated as Christian. The same thing must be said of philosophy, when the idea of reconciliation wins a place in it, and when the conception of sin at the same time gains importance, a conception which points back on its part to that of creation. Every philosophy in which this takes place is an expression of the Christian age, and can no longer be reckoned among the systems of antiquity. At the same time it is not only possible, but antecedently probable, that the first who philosophize in this new spirit will be not at all, or at least not very closely, connected with the Christian community. Those members of the com-

munity who possess mental endowments great enough to become philosophers, are busied with the proclamation of salvation. And again, the cool reflection, without which a philosophical system cannot be produced, is a proof of lukewarmness in a time when only reckless and fiery zeal (divine foolishness) is considered a sign of the true Christian. In its early days a congregation must be hostile to philosophy; and apostolic natures always will be. Therefore Paul and Luther were its antagonists, and the opinion, originally Jewish, that philosophy is a work of evil demons, found favour in the early Church even among the most highly educated, as, for instance, the "Satire" of Hermias proves. Centuries later, Descartes and Spinoza (*vid.* §§ 266, 267, 271), that is, a Catholic and a Jew, were the first to introduce the spirit of Protestantism into philosophy. For the same reason, heretics and heathen were the first whose philosophy betrays the influence of the Christian spirit.

Cf. Mussmann: *Grundriss der allgemeinen Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie*. Halle, 1830. H. Ritter: *Die christliche Philosophie nach ihrem Begriff und ihren äusseren Verhältnissen und in ihrer Geschichte bis auf die neueste Zeit*. 2 vols. Göttingen, 1858.

### § 119.

Christianity, the greatest of all innovations, like every epoch-making principle, assumes at its appearance a negative attitude toward that which has hitherto existed (Christ brings not peace but a sword). If the complex of all that exists be called the world, the new (the Christian) spirit will thus reveal itself as the world's antagonist, and therefore must be an object of hatred to those who are conscious of being children of the (natural and ethical) world. It is easy to explain the hatred of a Seneca, a Tacitus, a Trajan, a Marcus Aurelius, a Julian toward a religion which boasts that its founder was born in opposition to the course of nature, and died the most ignominious death known to the State. The demand to be (this new) spirit by means of the denial of the world coincides with the demand to be clerical. It appears as the highest in the first period of Christianity, the *Middle Ages*. The following period, the modern age, first recognises the higher command, to transfigure the world through the spirit, that is, the command to be, not clerical, but spiritual



§ 258). To those with mediæval ideas, to whom alienation from the world was the highest thing, this spiritualization of the world appeared as a retrogression to the position of antiquity, as a secularization. It unites, in truth, that which the ancient and the Middle Ages aimed at and should have attained.

### § 120.

The philosophy of the Middle Ages cannot make its principal divisions physics and politics, as had been done by the philosophy of antiquity, which was throughout secular. These subjects lose their importance, while all those investigations which have to do with the relation of the individual to the Godhead, or with the Godhead itself, come into the foreground. Religion and theology become the chief thing. In addition to these, ethics comes into prominence. It is marked very early with an ascetic colouring, which, in opposing the ideas of antiquity, allows, at most, links of connection with that which had made its appearance during the decline of Greek speculation. It is likewise one of the important differences between ancient and mediæval philosophy that the philosophizing is no longer done, as in antiquity, by men experienced in worldly affairs, but by unpractical students, and, especially later, by the clergy.

## FIRST PERIOD OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY.

PATRISTICS. (Cf. § 148.)

E. W. Möller: *Geschichte der Kosmologie in der griechischen Kirche bis auf Origenes.* Halle, 1860.

### § 121.

THIS negative attitude which the Christian spirit assumes toward the world shows itself first as flight from the world. From this arises the tendency to supernatural (or rather unnatural) monastic holiness, as well as the disposition to stand without the bounds of all civil communities. In this position, so secluded from the world, the little flame, grown from the kindling spark, must increase in order to be able later to set the world on fire. The first Christians are like homeless strangers in the world. Their fundamental principles do not accord with existing conditions, and therefore, when they come into contact with those conditions, they attack them and experience their vengeful reaction. To this contrast between the new principle and the existing state of the world corresponds in the realm of philosophy a similar contrast between the new ideas and the wisdom of the past. Where they first come into contact a mighty fermentation must result. This fermentation, arising from the contact of the new ideas with the old world of thought, is, in respect to its form, a strife between history and philosophical propositions, since these new ideas become manifest at first only as history. It is thus clear why this standpoint in the history of philosophy should be represented by two diametrically opposite tendencies, in which, *on the one side*, the philosophical form is sacrificed to the new ideas, and logical processes are transformed into history, and, *on the other side*, the respect for the form of philosophical propositions causes the

merely historical to be despised and thus undervalued in comparison with the new ideas. Doubt may therefore arise whether the exponents of the first, the *Gnostics*, are to be classed among philosophers, and whether the others, the *Neo-Platonists*, are to be regarded as belonging to the Christian age. These two lines of thought, with that of the *Church Fathers* who go beyond them both, and in whom the turbid fermentation clarifies itself, form the content of the first period.

## FIRST DIVISION.

### The Gnostics.

Massuet : *Dissertatt. prævia in Irenæi libros*. Paris, 1710. Beausobre : *Histoire critique de Maniché et du Manichéisme*. 2 vols. Amst., 1734-39. Mosheim : *Institutiones historiæ ecclesiæ christianæ*. Helmst., 1748. Neander : *Genetische Entwicklung der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme*. Berlin, 1818. Matter : *Histoire critique du gnosticisme*. 1828. 2nd ed. 1843. v. Baur : *Die christliche Gnosis*. Tübing., 1835. Lipsius : *Der Gnosticismus, sein Wesen, Ursprung und Entwicklungsgang*. Leipz., 1860.

## § 122.

The desire to justify to the reason that which faith accepts must give rise to reflection upon the relations of the different religions, since even those who are not Christians are not devoid of understanding. The elements which have been pointed out by various scholars as the most essential in Gnosticism thus belong of necessity together. These elements are the relation of πίστις and γνῶσις, and the relation of Christianity to heathenism and Judaism. The Gnostics are, therefore, the originators not only of a rational theology, but also of a doctrine of comparative religion, and they may therefore, since both of these fall within the province of the philosophy of religion, be called religious philosophers. It may be regarded as unphilosophical, and as such blameworthy, that the content of belief should everywhere be made the norm, and accordingly, that content being history, historical accounts (genealogies of the æons and the like) should take the place of mental deductions, and theology be made a history of the development of the Godhead. But while Gnosticism, in the opinion

of the philosopher, does too little, that little appears to the believer altogether too much. It is an offence to the Christian community that there should be philosophical speculation, even in the form of history; and at a time when philosophizing about belief is considered heretical, as calling faith into question, the Church rightly sees in every religious philosopher a heretic. The earliest traces of Gnostic heresies make their appearance in the apostolic age, not, however, in their later scholastic form, but rather in the garb of esoteric doctrines, since their antinomian tendency causes them to shun the light. Here belong the erroneous teachings of the Simonians, who were connected with Simon Magus, as well as the false doctrines which Paul combats in Corinth, Thessalonica, Ephesus and Colossæ. Cerinthus also belongs to this class, and many of the positions which the early Church comprehended under the name Ebionism come under this head. They are all distinguished from the Jewish teachings of the Essenes and of Philo by the doctrine of the Incarnation, whether it be of the Godhead, of the Logos, or of the Holy Spirit—a doctrine peculiar to Christianity and irreconcilable with Judaism.

### § 123.

1. As a public sect demanding a place in the Church, Gnosticism first makes its appearance in the second century, and at about the same time in Egypt and Syria. Egyptian Gnosticism which develops in Alexandria, not without dependence upon Hellenizing Orientalism (§ 112), is the most interesting from a philosophical point of view. It accords Judaism a comparatively high position, and we may, with Neander, call it *Judaizing* Gnosticism. Basilides, the first to be mentioned in this connection, reminds us of Philo, not only by his unnamed God whom he places at the summit, but also by the various personified powers, every seven of which constitute one of the Sonships emanating from the supreme God. The Holy Spirit also, who here forms the bridge from the divine πλήρωμα to its opposite, had already occupied a place in Philo's system (§ 114, 4). The doctrine, however, that matter considered as a chaos is disposed by God, is peculiar, and goes beyond the standpoint of Philo. It is true, that this procession of the seed of all things from the (because not existing, hence also)

Unnamed is not to be identified with conscious creative activity. Nor can it be called emanation, for Basilides conceived of the process as a progress, and thus teaches a doctrine of evolution whose end is redemption, pictured, to be sure, in a very physical manner. That an *ἄρχων*, subordinate to God, is ordained to form this chaotic mass, is not to be looked upon as an innovation. It had already been taught by Cerinthus that such an *ἄρχων* unconsciously carries out the plans of the highest God, and is considered by the Jews (with a few exceptions) as identical with Him. Below the Archon stand the subordinate beings, likewise divided into sevens, and forming with him the number 365 (*ἄβραξας*), by means of which providence (*πρόνοια*) carries out its designs. It is probable that there is a connection here with theological doctrines of Egypt which Basilides learned from Egyptian priests, either directly or through the medium of the teachings of Pherecydes, from whom he borrowed a great deal. Jesus, also, is a work of the Archon. At His baptism, however, to the astonishment of His Creator, the first emanation from the highest God, the *νοῦς* or *διάκονος*, joins itself to Him, and having accomplished the work of redemption, afterwards deserts the man Jesus and leaves Him to suffer. Man applies the work of redemption to himself by means of belief, which Basilides conceives of in a purely theoretical way, while his son and pupil Isidore attempts to add the practical element.

Cf. Uhlhorn: *Das Basilidianische System*. Göttingen, 1855.

2. A much greater reputation was gained by Basilides' contemporary, VALENTINUS, perhaps because he taught in Rome as well as in Alexandria, and was there excluded from the Church as a heretic. He teaches that the powers which proceed from the Original Father or the Deep (*προπάτωρ*, *βύθος*) and which he calls *αἰῶνες*, on account of their eternity, underlie the distinction of sexes, and emanate from the original source in pairs. This view arose under Pythagorean influence. To the original source is given at one time no one, at another time Silence as a consort, to the *νοῦς* Truth, to the *λόγος* Life, while the lowest place is occupied by *θελητός* and *σοφία*. As a result of the ungoverned desire of the latter for a union with the Highest, there springs up the lower wisdom (Achamoth), which is contained and acts in matter, the latter being conceived of quite in the Platonic way. Achamoth causes the

Demiurge, the God of the Old Testament, who stands in a subordinate position, to accomplish, unconsciously to himself, its own return and the return of all things into the fulness of Being. To this end, man is especially useful. Achamoth first leads him, through the enjoyment of the forbidden fruit, to make himself ἑλίκος, but by that means places him in a position to sanctify material being. According to his relation to matter, man is ἑλίκος, ψυχικός, πνευματικός. From the last class the Demiurge (himself psychic) chooses by instinct the kings and prophets, and finally the Christ promised by the prophets, who, by union with one of the highest Æons, becomes the Redeemer through whom the Achamoth and all the πνευματικοί go over into the Pleroma, while the Demiurge assumes the place of wisdom, and remains there until matter falls into non-existence. Among the numerous followers of Valentinus the names of Ptolemæus, Heracleon, and Marcion are prominent. The differences between the representatives of the oriental and occidental tendencies were looked upon as so important, that the former were regarded as quite un-Christian, the latter, as only heretical. These differences also explain why the notices in Irenæus, Hippolytus, Clement, and Origen agree neither with each other, nor with the extant fragments of Gnostic works.

Cf. Heinrici: *Die Valentinianische Gnosis*. Berlin, 1871.

3. The Syrian Bardesanes, born at Edessa, probably in the year 154, who enjoyed the name of Confessor on account of his zeal for the extension of Christianity, approaches Valentinus in many points. He is said to have preached the doctrines of the latter, according to some only in his earlier years, according to others in later life, while still others maintain that he taught them all the time, but in a form peculiarly modified, so that they really constituted for him only a point of departure. The acceptance of Judaism reaches its extreme in the *Homilies* and *Recognitions*, falsely ascribed to Clement of Rome, which are probably the work of various authors. In these the Apostle Peter is introduced as the teacher of a Jewish Christian Gnosticism, which emphasizes so strongly the sole causality of God, that, in opposition to all dualism, matter becomes an expansion of God, and the Devil his left hand, with which He punishes, as with His right hand, the Son of God, He rewards, Hatred for the heathen

becomes often in these works hatred for the Apostle to the heathen.

Cf. Hilgenfeld : *Bardesanes der letzte Gnostiker*. Leipz., 1864.

### § 124.

A position diametrically opposed to that of the Judaizing Gnostics is occupied by those who may be called *Paganizing*, since they were led by their hatred for Judaism to substitute purely heathen ideas for Christian doctrines. This is especially true of Carpocrates and his followers, who, on the one hand ascribed to Pythagoras and to Plato a dignity equal to that of Jesus, and on the other despised the Jewish standpoint. It is also true of the school of Mani which arose somewhat later. Mani's doctrines, drawn partly from Parseeism, partly from Buddhism, were the cause of his execution as a heretic. His efforts toward a reformation had as their object the elevation of Christian doctrine to the higher knowledge promised by Paul, by means of the exclusion of Jewish and the introduction of dualistic elements. His sect, the Manichæans, endured for a considerable time. The Ophites, related to Valentinus, and the Cainites, perhaps connected with Basilides, went far in their paganizing tendency. They ascribed to those things pictured by the Old Testament as especially bad, *e.g.* to the serpent, to Cain, etc., the possession of true wisdom. The discovery of the lost books of the work of Hippolytus (*vid.* § 135, 3) has contributed greatly to our knowledge of the various sects which are customarily embraced under the name Ophites, as has been shown by Möller in his work mentioned in § 121, as well as by others. In other respects these heretical tendencies have less of speculative than of practical interest. Their negative attitude toward the Old Testament led some of them to complete antinomianism. Others, especially the Manichæans, declared war only against the ceremonial law, while at the same time they enjoined strict morality. But with them, as in Parseeism, the ethical is confounded to a great degree with the physical, and the process of redemption exhibits itself almost as a process of nature.

v. Baur : *Ueber das manichäische Religionssystem*, Tübingen, 1831.

## § 125.

Finally, the *Christianizing* Gnostics are to be mentioned as a third class. While assigning to Judaism a very subordinate position, they do not wish thereby to give prominence to heathenism, but only to the specific worth of Christianity. To this class belong Saturninus and especially Marcion. The latter's abstract conception of Paulinism brings him into a relation with Paul similar to that which Antisthenes occupied toward Socrates (*vid.* § 71). As nature reveals to the heathen at most only the Almighty, so the law reveals to the Jews only the Righteous One. The revelation of the Good and the Compassionate One in Christianity is to be looked upon as absolutely new, and therefore sudden. Christianity stands here in an entirely negative relation to heathenism as well as to Judaism. From the former follows Marcion's Docetism, which goes so far as to deny the birth of Christ, from the latter his contempt for the Old Testament conception of God and of the Messiah. The death of Christ and the persecution of the Christians are looked upon as the work of the Demiurge, *i.e.* the Jewish God. Great as is Marcion's significance in Church history, his peculiarly practical tendency makes it unnecessary to consider him at length in a history of philosophy.

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## SECOND DIVISION.

### The Neo-Platonists.

J. Simon : *Hist. de l'école d'Alexandrie*. Paris, 1843, 2 vols. Vacherot : *Histoire critique de l'école d'Alexandrie*. Paris, 1846-51, 3 vols. Steinhart in Pauly's *Realencyclop.* Vol. v.

## § 126.

Precisely that which might lead superficial observers to identify Gnostics and Neo-Platonists makes them diametrical opposites, namely, that the same elements are contained in the teachings of both. Although by many modern scholars the oriental, and further, the Christian element in Neo-Platonism may have been too strongly emphasized, it can be entirely denied least of all by those who call Neo-Platonism



a reaction against the intrusion of the new spirit. The name Neo-Platonism, which may be retained, since its use is so firmly established, is really too narrow, and it has been rightly remarked that its representatives might as well be called Neo-Aristotelians. But this designation, too, is insufficient, for ante-Platonic and post-Aristotelian elements are to be found in their teachings, and they combine all that philosophy has worked out before them in a peculiar theory of the universe, and that not as syncretists, like Cicero and the Sophists, but in a systematic form, as Empedocles and the Atomists had done. Nevertheless, those who have tried to represent them as the culmination of ancient speculation are wrong. They overlook the fact that Plotinus, Jamblichus and Proclus are widely separated from the representatives of classic Greek philosophy in time, in nationality, and in residence, but above all by their relation, partly negative and partly positive, towards ideas with which the human reason has been busied only since the introduction of Christianity. Doctrines of emanation and of ascetic morality can, if necessary, be united with the letter but never with the spirit of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy.

### § 127.

As Gnosticism had its immediate predecessors in the Hellenizing Jews, so Neo-Platonism has its in the orientalizing Greeks (§§ 110 and 111), as well in the more mathematically educated Pythagoreans as in the philological commentators of Plato. If Christian or even Jewish elements could be demonstrated to exist in Plutarch, he would have to be assigned the place which now belongs to NUMENIUS, a Syrian born in the reign of Antoninus Pius. It is characteristic of his position that the Church Fathers call him a Pythagorean, while he calls Plato a Greek-speaking Moses. Between the first God, or the Good, and the third God, or the world, whom with Plato he calls the only begotten son of the first, he inserts the Demiurge, related to both of them, and thus approaches so near to the teaching of Plotinus that the latter was early accused of plagiarizing from him. The scanty notices which we possess in regard to Numenius we owe to Eusebius, who has preserved fragments from the work *περὶ τὰ γενικά*. In many respects, e.g., in the idea that the irregular

movement of matter breaks itself as it were, upon the One, the Good, he reminds us of Plutarch, in other respects of Philo and of Valentinian Gnosticism. Still more than upon Numenius Christian ideas worked upon AMMONIUS SACCAS (§ 243), who, according to a tradition, was an apostate from Christianity, from which he became estranged on account of the hostile attitude of its followers toward arts and sciences. As his principal doctrine, is to be regarded the complete agreement of Plato and Aristotle, to both of whom it seems he wished to give their full dues. Probably many orientalizing elements, especially doctrines of emanation and of asceticism, were mingled with his interpretation of them, and certainly a polemical tendency against the religion from which he had separated himself. Not only has his activity in Alexandria therefore caused him always to be regarded as the real founder of Neo-Platonism, but he deserves this position also because the various tendencies which soon made their appearance within the circle of his successors depend all of them alike upon him, and emphasize each a particular side of his teaching. In *Roman* Neo-Platonism, as represented by Plotinus, Greek elements prevail, and among these the Platonic occupies an especially prominent position, so prominent that injustice is often done to Aristotle in a way that reminds us of Numenius. In the *Syrian* school, of which Jamblichus is a type, orientalizing Pythagorism has most weight, together with an equally oriental leaning toward theurgic practices. Finally, in the scholastic *Athenian* Neo-Platonism, represented by Proclus, who, in one of his chief works, simply makes extracts from Plotinus, while in the remainder he follows Jamblichus, the Aristotelian element, on account of the formal completion which is here given to the system, occupies the most prominent place. All three tendencies share, however, in hatred or contempt for Christian teaching, whether Gnostic or anti-Gnostic, and regarding it as the enemy of science they place over against it heathenism as the ground of science. To heathenism, then, science owes so much that she comes to its defence with rational grounds, and seeks to point out in its myths combinations of ideas in historical garb. The logical metamorphoses which Homer thus undergoes are exactly opposite to the transformation of abstract logical conceptions into fantastic narratives among the Gnostics.

## A.—PLOTINUS AND ROMAN NEO-PLATONISM.

Steinhart: *Quæstiones de dialectica Plotini ratione*, 1829, and: *Meletemata Plotiniana*, 1840; also in Pauly's *Philol. Real-Encyclopædie*, Art. *Plotinus*  
 Kirchner: *Die Philosophie des Plotin*, Halle, 1854. Arthur Richter: *Neuplatonische Studien*, 1-5 Heft. Halle, 1864-1867.

## § 128.

1. PLOTINUS was born in the year 205 in Zykopolis in Egypt. After he had in vain sought to satisfy his scientific aspirations with various teachers, he became, in his twenty-eighth year, a pupil of Ammonius, and remained such until the death of the latter. In order to become familiar with oriental wisdom, he is said to have taken part in the campaign of Gordian against Persia. In his fortieth year he founded his school in Rome, and remained at the head of it until his death (270 A.D.). The promise which he had made his master, to spread his teaching only orally, he is said to have first broken when he saw that his fellow-pupils, Herennius and Origen, had not kept theirs. Longinus also transgressed the commands of Ammonius. Porphyry collected the twenty-one treatises which had been written before he came to Plotinus, as well as the thirty-three later ones, and arranged them according to their subject-matter in groups of nine (*Enneads*), indicating at the same time their chronological order. The Latin translation of Marsilios Ficino, in which Plotinus' works first appeared (1492), and the Greek edition of P. Bema (Basel, 1580), were for a long time the only editions. In 1825 Creuzer published the text, with the translation of Marsilios, in the Oxford edition of three quarto volumes, and in 1855, with the support of Moser, he had Didot of Paris issue a much cheaper and at the same time more correct reprint. The edition of Ad. Kirchhof, *Plotini opera recogn.*, Lips., 1856, 2 vols., 8vo, much better meets the demands of philological criticism. In this the Greek text alone is given; the chronological order is restored, but at the same time the *Enneads* as well as the pages of the Oxford edition are indicated, so that it is easy to find a passage whenever it may be cited in the ordinary way. A praiseworthy attempt to arrange the treatises of Plotinus according to their subject-matter, and at the same time to preserve in so far as possible the chronological order,

has been made by Richter in the fourth instalment of the work mentioned above. His monograph on Plotinus is the best that we have.

2. Inasmuch as Plotinus does not, like Plato and Aristotle, approach his peculiar principle gradually, but grasps it immediately by intellectual intuition, and starts from it as from the surest of all things, he must necessarily urge still more strongly than his predecessors that that principle is absolutely unconditioned, is in no way relative. Unity, Being, Good, God, are the various expressions for this highest principle, which is touched neither by the Platonic categories, rest and motion, egoism and altruism, nor by the Aristotelian substance and accident; but is rather the *ὑπερούσιον* in which no opposition exists, not even of willing and being. It is because it wills, and it wills because it is. This *πρῶτος θεός*, who is not to be conceived of as transcendental, but so exists in all, and embraces all, that when he wills and loves himself he loves and wills all—this God is what Plato called at one time the Good, at another time God (*Εην.* iii. 8, vi. 8). As the expression, First God, indicates, Plotinus does not stop with this first principle. Although he does not mistake the difficulty which lies in the way of a procession of plurality from unity (v. 1, 6), he yet attempts to solve it. Sometimes he proceeds in a strictly logical way, pointing out that plurality excluded from unity must on that very account be from it and outside of it; ordinarily, however, he conceives of the First as a producer which, in the same way that flame emits light and snow cold, sends forth from itself, neither unconsciously nor in a wholly arbitrary way, a Second as an eternally begotten. The expressly stated principle, that the second always contains less than the first (iii. 2, 7), makes his system contrary to every doctrine of evolution; makes it, that is, a system of emanation. The first decadence of being, the first begotten of God, is, according to Plotinus, the *νοῦς*, who, inasmuch as he proceeds from the One, but at the same time has the One as his true ground, and therefore object and end, becomes in this reflexive relation (*ἐπιστροφή*) a knowledge of the One; so that although the One itself does not think, nevertheless the one thinking it is to be designated as its *εἰκών* (v. 1, 7). When, then, Plotinus characterises the thinking of the *νοῦς* as free and pure thinking, which has to do with itself alone, in distinction

from the unfree which busies itself with another, it is clear that the combination of Plato and Aristotle, derived from Ammonius, is so arranged by him that Plato's *ἀγαθόν* occupies the first, the *νοῦς* of Aristotle the second place. If the former was of such a nature that none of the categories applied to it, the latter, on the contrary, the *νοῦς*, is said to be rest as well as motion, to combine in itself unity and difference. Each first one of these categories belongs to the *νοῦς* as thinking; each second one to it as the thing thought; and therefore it is no leap when the *νοῦς* becomes the content of all thought and of all types of things (v. 9, 6), in which content all conceptions are contained, as species in a genus; so that in it, as the *κόσμος νοητός*, all things, even the mortal and the temporal, exist in an eternal, ideal way (v. 8). The resemblance to Philo's doctrine (*vid.* § 114), as well as to Plato's, is striking at this point; only it must not be forgotten that in the latter every individual being has its idea. From the *νοῦς* proceeds now, as the third and therefore still more subordinate principle, the *ψυχή*, that is, the general life-principle or world-soul, a faded out copy of the *νοῦς*, working on that very account rationally but without reason, that is, in the way which Aristotle had called demoniacal (*vid.* § 88, 1). As thoughtless children work more outwardly than those who are absorbed in themselves, in the same way things fall as it were out of the general soul, which does not retain them for itself, but puts them to work at once (iii. 8, 3). In all natural occurrences there is therefore thought (*θεωρία*), that is, the ideas which the soul receives from the *νοῦς*, and which she sows or plants in matter, as *λόγους σπερματικούς*. The intermediate position which is thus assigned to the soul causes Plotinus to speak often of an upper soul related to the *νοῦς* and of a lower one approaching matter, to which he gives the names of the heavenly and earthly Aphrodite, in accordance with his custom of employing myths. To the earthly Aphrodite he gives also the special name *φύσις*.

3. The (Platonic) Good, the (Aristotelian) *νοῦς*, and the (Stoic) Universal Life, which is sometimes named Zeus, form what has been called the trinity of Plotinus, which actually approaches nearer than that of Philo to the Christian doctrine, in so far as the *νοῦς* is not only *κόσμος νοητός*, but also *νοητὸς θεός* and the world is known not only as set in motion by an outside power, but as possessing inherent principles of motion.

Nevertheless the internal relations are those of emanation, and therefore subordination, and hence the difference remains very great. Plotinus does not succeed in overcoming those relations because he does not yet venture to put the negation, the *ἐρερότης*, in God Himself. This makes it impossible for him to rise above not only the relation of subordination, but also the Platonic-Aristotelian dualism. It is true that matter, which he places over against God, is with him as little as with them a corporeal stuff. It is without qualities, without nature, unreal, the limit of being, the not-yet being, which is known only in the sense that darkness is seen, for whose knowledge a sort of ecstasy is necessary, etc. Indeed, Plotinus goes beyond Plato, since he looks upon space as something formed, and therefore matter as something still more abstract. He goes beyond Aristotle when he denies that matter is *στέρησις* (*vid. inter al.*, ii. 4 ; iii. 6). But he, too, fails to reach the point of showing whence matter is. It must be regarded as a vacillation between dualism and monism, when at one time he conceives of matter as a lapse from being, at another time as postulated only by our thinking. He appears to avoid these extremes best when he says that the soul, not being able to endure the sight of emptiness, has helped out the poverty of matter. Here, however, the figurative expression proves his incapacity for consistent logical thought, apart from the fact that the question still remains : Whence that emptiness ? It is of a piece with such indetermination that Plotinus comes to the defence of the beauty of the material world, upon which is based especially his polemic against Gnostics and Christians, and yet at the same time considers it a disgrace to be born, and conceals his birthday as a day of shame. The entrance of being into not-being is not comprehended, and therefore nothing remains but to bewail it.

4. But although the ground of it is concealed, the entrance has nevertheless taken place, and therefore among the hitherto considered principles there exists a gradation of natures, to whose consideration the *Physics* is devoted. A new proof of the subordination of Aristotle to Plato is the fact that the categories of the latter are held to have value in the realm of the intelligible ; those of the former, on the contrary (their number being reduced), only in the realm of the physical. The highest grade of these beings is formed by the gods, the

lowest by inorganic natures in which life only slumbers. The gods are the stars, whose souls swell in the contemplation of the good, but whose bodies work upon the world surrounded by them (ii. 3, 9, cf. vi. 9, 8-9). Under them are the demons, dwelling in sublunar space, among whom Plotinus often reckons the popular gods (iii. 5, 6; ii. 9, 9). Finally, the world penetrated with a rational soul (iv. 4, 27) bears in addition to inorganic beings and to plants, in which λόγος already appears, and in addition to beasts, in whom διάνοια is seen, also man, a picture of the universe, the world in miniature. As in all substances the form is the highest, so also in man the soul, whose immortality is thoroughly discussed. Originally one with the universal soul it first became bound to a particular part of the corporeal All by its ceasing to contemplate the νοῦς alone, and beginning to think and crave itself (iii. 9, 2). The act of incarnation therefore coincides with the attainment of individual consciousness; it is freely willed, and at the same time it is punishment (v. 8, 7; iv. 8, 4). With its entrance into the body the soul too is seized by the revolution of the All to which it belongs as a part. It cannot complain because it has itself chosen its place there (iv. 3). Freedom and necessity are not at strife here, for the lot of man is his self-chosen demon; the part which each one plays in the drama of the world is entrusted to him because he has wished it (iii. 2). The descent of the soul into the earthly body takes place moreover gradually, so that it binds itself first (as divine) to the heavenly body, then (as demoniacal) to the fine atmospheric body, finally (in the incarnation) to the coarse earthly body (iv. 3). In consequence of this union man is a complex, κοινόν, whose body is a part of the corporeal All, and whose soul is related to the universal soul, be it as species to genus or as a part to the whole, and who moreover with his highest element, the νοῦς, reaches beyond nature, indeed, beyond the universal soul, even to heaven (iv. 7). The relation of these three principles, which are often called directly the first, second, and third man (vi. 7, 6), forms the chief content of the Plotinian psychology. The body, which is a part of the All, and stands in sympathy with it (iv. 5, 3), makes the soul, which without it would live entirely within the rational sphere, into a nutritive, sensitive, and in every way lower one. In it, as the bond between body and spirit, the impressions of the senses meet

the ideas which stream into the spirit, the ideas of which the νοῦς had been the content, and which we discern when we consider the latter. From this double relation, in which the soul stands toward the external world and toward the νοῦς, result three spheres, the lowest or sensuous soul, whose highest function is the φαντασία (iv. 3, 99), the intermediate or properly human soul, to which reflexion belongs, διάνοια and λογίζεσθαι, by virtue of which not only the lower δόξα, but also πίστις and science originate (i. 1, 7 and 3, 4; v. 8, 7); finally, the highest part of the soul, that with which it attains to heaven, that is, to the νοῦς. In virtue of this participation in the νοῦς man raises himself to the immediate, motionless contemplation of ideas, and possesses in this what reflexion and science strive after (iv. 4, 12), is pure νοεῖν or φρόνησις, and grasps the eternal in immediate contact (vi. 8, 11; i. 2, 6). But if now the intermediate sphere, the λόγος, to which λογίζεσθαι belongs, is at the same time the proper seat of self-consciousness, it follows that there is unconscious knowledge which is higher than conscious. This appears in moments of ecstasy, when the self-activity of the soul entirely ceases, and the soul completely becomes the ideas which it contemplates, the material for the νοῦς which acts in it (iv. 4, 2). In these moments of ecstasy the soul contemplates the One, not as something strange or external, but as in itself, and rests in it, inasmuch as it loses itself in complete union with it, a condition which goes beyond all reason and science (vi. 9; v. 5, *et al.*).

5. It is this elevation to the inner or spiritual man which the *Ethics* of Plotinus represents as the end of all conduct. Evil does not consist in being material, but in inner dependence upon matter. Therefore the highest end, the freedom from matter, is not attained by suicide as the Stoics think. The soul on account of its material inclinations would immediately enter again into a form of material existence, since it is only what it thinks, and only as it thinks (i. 9). True freedom exists when the dominion of the lower (material) man is broken and the higher man comes into power. This takes place first through the subjection to the reason of the desires and affections which have been called forth in the soul by the body. Since this was the Platonic conception of virtue, Plotinus agrees completely with Plato as far as the four cardinal virtues are concerned. In one point only does



he disagree with the latter, in the fact, namely, that those virtues which he calls also political, are for him only the first step in the solution of the ethical problem (i. 2, 7). We are brought much nearer the proper end, a likeness to the Deity (*ὁμοούσιος*), by ascetic purifications (*καθάρσεις*), which are aimed not so much at the regulation as at the rooting out of the struggle (i. 1, 2). In the *ἀπάθεια* exists the true likeness to God, and it is at the same time freedom, for only the *νοῦς* is free and self-contained (*ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ*), and only he who has taken the *νοῦς* as his divinity (i. 2, 3 ; iii. 4, 6). Not in the fact that man lives in accordance with nature, for plants also do that, but in the fact that the *νοῦς* rules in him, consists his true blessedness (i. 4, 1-4). With Plotinus, however, the theoretical side of blessedness is much more prominent than the practical. It is not conduct which makes blessed, but possession, thought and inner activity. The last end is and remains the contemplation of the eternal. All practice is for the sake of theory (iii. 8), and the wise man is blessed in his self-proficiency, even if no one should see his blessedness. He has grasped the eternal, and in that satisfies himself, and no loss nor pain touches him. Whoever still fears anything is not yet complete in true virtue (i. 4). Of the three ways which lead to this end those of the erotic poet and musician need a sign-post, that of the dialectician or philosopher is surer (i. 3), leading as it does from the external and material to the inner and spiritual, namely to the contemplation of ideas. But since the *νοῦς*, which embraces the ideas, is not the highest, there goes beyond *νοεῖν* and philosophy love for the One and the Good, in comparison with which even dominion over the world is to be thrown away as nothing (vi. 7 ; i. 6). Retirement from the whole external world is necessary for the attainment of this standpoint. We must wait quietly until God comes, or rather until He shows that He does not need to come, since He has always been in us (v. 5, 8). We must believe in this illumination, in which, daring as it sounds, the contemplated and the contemplating become one, so that ecstasy, devotion, actual union take the place of contemplation of another (v. 3, 14 ; vi. 9, 10). In this union consists true blessedness, which cannot be interrupted by death. As thinking of the material makes the soul material, so that the one who can think only of vegetation condemns himself to the life of the plant (iii. 4, 2), in the same way the one who forgets

the earthly and attains to complete inwardness, being raised, as more than an individual man, above all change, will live to the All and to the One (v. 8, 7). As already here below, the more perfect a man is the more does he forget fatherland, friends, etc., in that condition he will still more have forgotten all, yea, even himself (iv. 4, 1 ; i. 5, 8). There nothing will disturb or interrupt the contemplation of the One ; time will vanish in eternity, and blessedness become pure presence (vi. 9 ; i. 5).

6. Among those who, with Plotinus, represent Roman Neo-Platonism, Amelius, Eustochius, and others sink into insignificance when compared with Malchus, who was born in Phœnicia (in Tyre or Batanea), in the year 232. While he was in attendance upon the school of Longinus, he had changed his name into the Greek form PORPHYRY. In his thirtieth year he became a pupil of Plotinus, later his biographer and the editor of his works, and after his death taught in Rome until the year 304. Besides his *Life of Plotinus*, with which he accompanied his edition of the works of his master, we have from his pen a *Life of Pythagoras*, which is perhaps a fragment of a lost history of philosophy. It has been often printed, among others by Didot in his edition of *Diogenes Laertes*. His critical spirit, which had been still more sharpened in the school of Longinus, caused him to differ with his master whenever the latter appeared to be uncritical. He therefore came to the defence of the categories of Aristotle, and wrote (perhaps before he came to Plotinus), his *Εἰσαγωγή περὶ τῶν πέντε φωνῶν* (reprinted in many editions of Aristotle's *Organon*), in which are treated the five conceptions (later called *Prædicabilia* and also *Universalia*), γένος, διαφορά, εἶδος, ἴδιον and συμβεβηκός, and from which particularly two points are brought into especial prominence in the following age : first, the so-called *Arbor Porphyrii*, that is the gradation from the most general (γενικώτατος) conception of the οὐσία, through the subordinate conceptions σῶμα, ἔμψυχον, etc., down to the εἰδικώτατον (ἄνθρωπος), and finally to the ἄτομον (Πλάτων), since which it has been the custom of logic to repeat, that *ens* is the highest of all conceptions. The second point referred to is the fact that at the outset of the work it is mentioned, as a very important problem, not however to be solved here, whether species and genera are something actual outside of ourselves or are mere ideas ; further, if something actual, whether corporeal or incorporeal ; finally, if

incorporeal whether *χωριστά*, or existing only in things. The answer to the first question would have shown the relation of Porphyry to the Epicurean sensualists, to the second his relation to the Stoics, to the third his relation to Plato and to Aristotle. The way in which he answered the first and second can be gathered from the climax which the three form. The problem stated by him plays a very important part in subsequent ages (*vid. infra* § 158 ff.). Though Porphyry in this introduction shows himself more closely related to Aristotle than his master was, he nevertheless agrees entirely with the latter in his *Αἰ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ ἀφορμαί* (first printed in the Latin paraphrase of Marcilio Ficino; later, in Greek, with most completeness in the Paris edition of Creuzer's Plotinus), which contain an extract from Plotinus' doctrine of spirits. In regard to religion also they agree perfectly, as appears from Porphyry's transformation of the Homeric myths into logical processes, and further from his attacks, not only upon the Gnostics, but upon the Christians in general. The thirty-two chapters of his *Homeric Studies* (Venet., Ald., 1521), as well as the allegorical interpretation of a Homeric passage in the *Nymph's Grotto*, are still extant. The fifteen books against the Christians, on the contrary, have entirely vanished, in consequence of the fact that by command of Theodosius II. they were diligently hunted out and destroyed, and also because of the loss of the replies of Methodius and Eusebius. A few unimportant patristic notices alone remain. Porphyry's religion, like that of Plotinus, was above all ethical, and had, when compared with contemporary phenomena, a purely Greek character. To this is due his polemics against the theurgic tendency which was pressing itself forward, and with which was combined a Platonism perverted by Egyptian, magical and other elements. As a result he composed late in life his *Epistle to the Egyptian Priest Anebon*, which called forth the reply to be mentioned below.

Cf. Gust. Wolff: *Porphyrii de philosophia ex oraculis haurienda librorum reliquia*, Berol., 1826.

## B.—JAMBLICHUS AND THE SYRIAN NEO-PLATONISM.

## § 129.

1. JAMBLICHUS, of Chalcis in Cœlesyria, distinguished alike for his learning and his genius, is connected not so much with the more philological Platonists, such as Plutarch, as with the mathematically educated Neo-Pythagoreans. He introduced into Neo-Platonism, not without the influence of oriental ideas, a speculation in which mathematics and mystics are mingled in a peculiar manner, and which led him to a bitter criticism of Amelius and Porphyry. On this account many ascribe to him a work which was first noticed by Marcilio Ficino in a Latin report: *De mysteriis Ægyptiorum*, and afterwards published in the Greek original by Gale. In this work a priest Abamon, espoused the cause of his pupil Anebon, to whom Porphyry had written. Jamblichus is hardly the author. Of his numerous undoubted works the most are lost; thus his commentaries on the Platonic Dialogues, of which we know only through Proclus, and likewise his commentary on the *Analytics* of Aristotle. All that is extant seems to belong to one larger work, the first book of which, *περὶ βίου Πυθαγορικοῦ*, was first edited in 1598 by Arcenius Theodoretus. This was followed by a second book, the *λόγοι προτρεπτικοὶ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν*, which contains a mixture of Platonic and Pythagorean doctrines. It was also edited by the same man, and later and much better by Kiessling. The third book, *περὶ κοινῆς μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης*, has been edited by Fries (Copenhagen), as well as by others; the fourth, *περὶ τῆς Νικομάχου ἀριθμητικῆς εἰσαγωγῆς*, by Tennulius, 1668; and the seventh *Θεολογούμενα τῆς ἀριθμητικῆς*, best of all by Ast, Leipsic, 1817.

2. The unlimited respect with which Jamblichus is called master, not only by less weighty men, such as Chrysanthius and Maximus, the teachers and friends of the emperor Julian, and by the emperor himself, but also by Proclus, testifies to the importance of the man. In fact, the greater part of that which appears in Proclus as an addition to the teachings of Plotinus, was learned from Jamblichus; and this has been overlooked merely because it could be discovered, in the absence of Jamblichus' works, only by close attention to every

hint of Proclus. (Kirchner has bestowed upon the subject the attention required.) As the most important innovations of Jamblichus, must be regarded the detailed execution of a logical process moving in triads, which will be noticed in connection with Proclus (§ 130), and in the second place, his theory of the orders of gods, which has made him especially famous, and which for a long time was a favourite doctrine, particularly with those who fought Christianity on philosophical grounds. When, according to Plotinus, the soul had participated in the *νοῦς*, and this in the One or the Good, Jamblichus believed that this participation itself disturbed the unity, and he raised himself, therefore, to the thought of the still more abstract *ἐν ἀμεθεκτόν*, and assumed still further such an absolute supra-mundane (*ὑπερούσιος*) unity (*ἐναδής*). These unities are in the highest sense his gods. Inasmuch, however, as he then always distinguishes the individual elements of a conception according to the scheme of trinity, he is led to discriminate, in correspondence with the three conceptions *νοῦς*, *ψυχή*, and *φύσις*, between *θεοί νοεροί*, *ὑπερκόσμοι*, and *ἐγκόσμοι*, which stand, as actual gods, below the *ἐνὰς ἀμεθεκτός*. This entire series of gods is so placed above the series fixed by Plotinus (One, Spirit, Soul, Nature), that everything is really thought twice, —once in the reality of the present, and again in the supra-reality of the future.

3. Among the successors of Jamblichus, Theodorus seems to have gone still further in the threefold division, and to have given offence to the others by an altered terminology. The most of Jamblichus' followers seem, however, to have been won much less by his scientific importance than by the fact that he attempted, in his work on the statues of the gods, as well as elsewhere, to furnish a philosophical basis for the belief in magical influences, in the power of theurgy, etc., which then ruled everywhere, even among the Christians. The modern age also has often noticed and blamed in Jamblichus only this weakness, which was common to the whole period in which he lived.

## C.—NEO-PLATONISM IN ATHENS.—PROCLUS.

## § 130.

1. IN Athens, where, since the time of Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius, the various schools of Greek philosophy had been continued under teachers paid by the State, Plutarch, the son of Nestorius, founded, in addition to the State schools, a private institute, where he commented upon both Plato and Aristotle, according to the method of Ammonius and of the more philological Neo-Platonists. His successor, Syrianus, leaned more toward the Neo-Pythagoreans, treating both philosophers, particularly Aristotle, as a mere preparation for the true wisdom, which is especially proclaimed in the *Orphica*. PROCLUS, or Proculus, a pupil of the former, though only for a short time, and a member and very soon an assistant in the school of the latter, was the man through whom Neo-Platonism received its highest formal development,—a work for which his entire training had fitted him. Born in Byzantium, in the year 412, he was brought at an early age to Lycia, and there prepared for the rhetorical profession. He then continued his studies in Alexandria, and won great fame as a rhetorician and a master of style. The Aristotelian Olympiodorus induced him to give up this calling and mathematics and philosophical studies then became his sole pursuit. The analytical investigations of Aristotle, whose *Organon* he is said to have known by heart, especially fascinated him. As long as he lived he called Aristotle, as well as Plato, “the divine.” With the latter he first became acquainted in Athens, where, as remarked above, he first had Plutarch as his teacher, and Syrianus as assistant in his studies. He became the successor of the latter, to whom, according to some, is to be referred his cognomen Διάδοχος, while others refer it to Plato. In addition to Plato, whose exegete and paraphrast he remained until his death, he assigned to the *Orphica*, and to the other productions of the Neo-Pythagorean spirit, a very high rank. At the same time he was initiated into all sorts of mysteries, and fostered his glowing piety by the celebration of festivals of all kinds, so that he boasts himself a hierophant of the whole world. This has reference only to pre-Christian religions, for Christianity he hated and fought. An excuse for

this may be found in the fact that in his day Christianity had assumed the rôle of persecutor, and it was perhaps due only to the monophysitic controversies that he himself was left in peace. Before the death of this *θεοσεβέστατος ἀνὴρ* (as the bombastic biography of Marinus calls him), which took place in his seventy-third year, it is said to have been revealed to him that he belonged to the hermetic chain of bearers of mystical wisdom. In addition to his hymns in honour of various gods, and his mathematical and grammatical works (the latter of disputed authenticity), Proclus produced much of a philosophical character, for the most part in the form of commentaries upon Plato, where he shows himself most of a philosopher when his interpretation is worst. Cousin's *Procli philosophi Platonici opera* (Paris, 1820) contain his commentaries upon *Timæus*, *Alcibiades*, and *Parmenides*, also his (youthful) works upon Fate and Providence in the Latin translation of Wilhelm von Moerbeke. Entirely independent works are his *Στοιχείωσις θεολογική*, and the six books *εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος θεολογίαν*, which have been edited by Æmiliius Portus (Hamb., 1618). The former work (*Institutio theologica*) contains an outline of Neo-Platonism as represented by Plotinus, and is therefore given quite suitably in Didot's edition of Creuzer's Plotinus. On the other hand, the second work (*Theologia Platonica*) contains the changes made by Jamblichus which Proclus adopts. In these two works, therefore, the elements appear sundered which Proclus was destined to combine, and on that very account, in spite of his dependence upon both, he represents a third tendency in Neo-Platonism.

2. That Proclus calls science theology cannot be looked upon as a departure from Plotinus; and his frequent use of *ἐν* instead of *ἐνωσις* is only a verbal difference, and that all the more since *ὄν*, *ἀγαθόν* likewise occur. On the other hand, it is an actual variation when, with Jamblichus, he takes the first principle itself as a trinity, representing, in agreement with the *Philebus* of Plato, the *ἄπειρον* and *πέρας* as bound in concrete union, by means of which concretion absolute unity becomes the content of all unities, Deity the content of the gods. These three elements, of course, do not stand toward one another in a relation of deterioration, but show rather an evolution, since the third is the highest. On the other hand, according to Proclus as well as Plotinus. that. in consequence

of which the second proceeds from the first (trinitarian) principle, is a deterioration (*ὑφεσις*). As to its relation, the second has as predicate what the first is ; but it is a general rule that having is lower than being (*Theol. Plat.*, 130). Proclus seeks to make clear to himself the necessity of this *πρόοδος*, and employs for that purpose a hint given by Plotinus, namely, that since unity excludes plurality, the latter must stand over against the former ; the negation of plurality which lies in unity is not to be conceived as *στερητική*, but as *γεννητική* (*Theol. Plat.*, 108). Being, as the predicate of all, stands naturally before and above all. Since, however, life as well as being belong to the *νοῦς*, the *ζωή* (as Plotinus himself has pointed out) must be placed before the latter, and thus obtains here the *second* place. This, too, must be thought of again as a system (*διάκοσμος*), therefore as a triad, in which *δύναμις* and *ὑπαρξις* are the elements which unite themselves in the *ζωή νοητή*. As Plato was the guide in the first triad, Aristotle is in the second. The *νοῦς* then follows life as the *third* principle. It is intelligible, after the way in which Aristotle and Plotinus had thought of the *νοῦς*, that the three elements in this should be given as *μένειν*, *προιέναι*, and *ἐπιστρέφειν* ; still more so, when we think of what Jamblichus had taught. These three triads, which reveal to the initiated, that is, in a mystical way, the life of God, and which are sometimes designated as God, most godlike, godlike, contain the content of all true being, the first *ὄντως*, the second *ζωτικῶς*, the third *νοερῶς*. The content of the unities is therefore brought into connection with the gods, the content of the life-principles with the demons, and finally the system of the *νοῦς* with the spirit world. As Jamblichus had united the number four with the trinities, for the purpose of bringing out the number seven, Proclus does the same, and thereby the twelve gods obtain their rights, although they remain always subordinate gods. If we compare the teaching of Proclus, as we did (§ 128, 3) that of Plotinus, with the Christian doctrine of the trinity, the greater resemblance will be seen to lie, not in the fact that Proclus assigns to the spirit the third place, but in the fact that he is at the point of dropping emanation (*ὑφεσις*), and thus the relation of subordination. He says often (*e.g. Theol. Plat.*, 142) that in the three triads the three elements of the *νοῦς* repeat themselves, as also the three of the *ὄν*. If this were carried out, the *νοῦς* would have to be thought of as the highest and



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thus deterioration give place to advancement, emanation to evolution. This, however, does not take place. These remarks are isolated gleams of thought, and the *ἔννοια* is always treated as by far the highest in the system.

3. In *Physics* Proclus differs very little with Plotinus. Like him, he agrees with Aristotle, that in every being matter and form are united. The Platonic distinction between the temporal, the sempiternal, and the eternal, which corresponds with the Aristotelian division of theoretical philosophy (*vid.* § 85, 3), is adopted by Proclus, and connected with the distinction between the somatic, psychic, and intellectual (pneumatic). The former stands under fate, the latter under providence. The soul has the power to place itself under fate or under providence, according as it becomes bad by a leaning toward the one, or good by a leaning toward the other.

4. With Proclus also the highest *ethical* aim is the apprehension of the divine. None of the four Platonic-Aristotelian degrees of knowledge is sufficient to reach this. The divine must be experienced, grasped with the entire essence (*ὑπαρξίς*) of the soul. The latter, in going into itself and burying itself in its own *ἄδυτον*, grasps God who lives in it. This moving in the hidden man is called enthusiasm, also holy frenzy. Since the knowledge of self and the contemplation of God are treated in the Platonic *Alcibiades*, this dialogue is valued very highly by Proclus. But with him the *μανία*, also called *πίστις*, which rests not upon reason, but upon immediate inspiration, holds the highest place. This is in striking contrast with the Platonic and Aristotelian statements, but so much the less in contrast with what the apostle says of divine foolishness and of the certainty of that which is not seen. This certainty is to be increased through appeals to the gods, and through theurgic practices, which Proclus honours perhaps more than Jamblichus and the author of the Egyptian mysteries, while his true dependence upon Plato associates him with Plotinus; and in his respect for Aristotle he surpasses the two former as well as the latter. In him Neo-Platonism reached its culmination. This remains true even if the mental endowments and the originality of Plotinus, as well as of Jamblichus, be ranked above his.

5. Besides Proclus are to be named his biographer Marinus. and in addition to him Isidorus, Zenodotus, and Damas-

cious, men without originality, who transmitted, commented upon, or at most spun out what their predecessors had produced, until they made it ridiculous. When Justinian, in the year 529, closed the schools of philosophy through anxiety for the Christian doctrine, he did not realize that if he had let them continue, the anti-Christian philosophy would not have been in the least dangerous, because it would have perished of itself, but, being compelled to emigrate toward the Orient, it would, centuries afterward, exercise an influence upon Christian thought more powerful than he had ever feared.

### THIRD DIVISION.

## The Church Fathers.

Chr. Fr. Rössler: *Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*. Leipz., 1776–86. 10 vols.  
 J. A. Möhler: *Patrologie, herausg. v. Reithmayr*. Regensb., vol. i., 1840.  
 Joh. Huber: *Philosophie der Kirchenväter*. München, 1859.

### § 131.

The Christian community, grown strong in its retired position, is able to pass on to a second mission without ceasing to stand in a negative attitude toward the world, in which attitude we found above (§ 119) the distinguishing characteristic of the Middle Ages. This second mission is the attack and the subjugation of the world. To this end, however, it is necessary that it place itself upon a level with its opponent and exist as an institution recognised by the world, and in so far worldly. It must become first of all, therefore, a *Church*. What the early *Congregation* does not have and does not need, is inseparable from the conception of the *Church*; namely, a doctrinal formula by means of which the conceptions, orthodoxy, heterodoxy, and heresy may obtain a fixed meaning. For the apostolic activity, which embraced only the preaching of salvation, scientific confirmation and the help of worldly power would have been unnecessary, indeed a hindrance; but for the transformation of the *κῆρυγμα* into a *δόγμα*, science is needed; for the introduction of the *δόγμα* as a valid statute, the help of the State; and if the statute is to rule everywhere (i.e. be catholic), the aid of the universal

State. By means of these two agencies the congregation becomes the Church, or the Church as such takes its rise. Those who assist in this transformation are therefore rightly designated as (co-) producers, or *Fathers of the Church*. The position of mother was occupied by the State.

### § 132.

The formation of dogma, the transformation of history into eternal truth as such, takes place by means of philosophy; and those who accomplish this transformation are philosophers. From this, however, it does not follow that the dogmas are philosophical propositions. From the latter they are distinguished,—to leave out of consideration the sanction which the highest authority of the congregation gives to them,—by the fact that they express only the result, not at the same time the process; therefore they are only assertions, not arguments. Inasmuch as the Church Fathers always make the historical revelation their starting-point, and proceed thence to the eternal truth which follows from it, their relation to history is at the same time positive and negative. These points of contact with the Gnostics as well as with the (Neo-Platonic) philosophers, which are at the same time points of difference, have obtained for them the name of the true Gnostics, the genuine philosophers, and at the same time explain the fact that they lean upon both and attack both. It can scarcely be asserted that without the Gnostic identification of the theogonic, cosmogonic and incarnation process, the congregation would have come to the point of maintaining so energetically that God is not inanimate and indifferent to the fate of the world. Likewise only the enthusiasm for the world felt by their heathen models prevented them from conceiving of the temporal as one with evil, a conception to which their ascetic disposition rendered them very liable.

### § 133.

Inasmuch as the point is to fix the content which is to be regarded as true, the Church Fathers must naturally lean upon that philosophy which had come nearest, as far as its content is concerned, to the Christian ideas. This is in practice eclectically moderated Stoicism, in theory the eclecticism and Neo-

Platonism which proceeded from Alexandria. There is therefore no inconsistency to be seen in the fact that at this time mistrust toward the Anti-Platonists prevails, and the word "Peripatetic" passes for an heretical designation, while a thousand years later the state of things is exactly reversed. It is the true discernment which assigns to different ages different missions. This fine sense for that which is premature or untimely, and for that which is adapted to the age, must be considered more than anything else,—often indeed more than the content of the condemned doctrines itself,—in connection with the way in which the contemporary and later Church judges a person. Slowly and as it were hesitatingly does the Church give up her distrustful attitude toward science. At first she endures it as a necessity, when it seems the only means of defending the congregation against attacks of all sorts. The *Apologists* for Christianity against Judaism, heathenism, and heresy are therefore the first in whom philosophy is permitted and not branded as heresy.

Cf. Otto: *Corpus Apologedarum Christianorum sæculi secundi*. Jena, 1845-65. [3 ed., 1876 seq.] 9 vols. (In the ninth volume are printed the prolegomena of Prudentius Maranus.)

### § 134.

1. The first to be mentioned in this connection, and at the same time the most important, is JUSTIN, the philosopher and martyr (103-167). Justin's works were first edited by Rob. Stephanus in 1551, and since then very frequently, among others by Prudent. Maranus, Paris, 1742, and by Otto, Jena, 1842, in 3 vols. (also in his edition of the *Apologists* mentioned above). In J. P. Migne's *Patrologiæ cursus completus* they fill the sixth volume of the *Patr. græc.* Among the writings ascribed to him, the two Apologies and the Dialogue with the Jew, Trypho, are certainly from his hand. The former are apologies for Christianity, addressed to the emperors Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius, in which the author, who had been educated in the Stoic and Platonic philosophy and had afterwards become a Christian, refutes the slanders against the doctrine and the life of the Christians, and displays, on the other side, the theoretical and practical weakness of heathenism. The impossibility that the Unbegotten, the Underived is not One, is placed over against

polytheism. At the same time, Justin is far from wholly denying to the heathen, and especially to the philosophers, the possession of truth. He sees in Socrates a revelation of the Logos. He calls Plato, and even Heraclitus, like the pious Jews Abraham and Elias, Christians, and ranks them together also because the Greek philosophers have known the sacred books of the Jews. In the third work the non-observance of the Jewish ritual is especially defended, as well as the doctrine,—so offensive to the Jews,—of the death of Christ upon the cross. The doctrine of the Divine Logos, which works in every rational being and became flesh in Christ, the doctrine, further, of the Fall, which proceeded from the freedom of the will, and the doctrine of Original Sin resulting from the fall, and finally the doctrine of the New Birth, are developed, the first two according to the principles of Platonism, the last in close agreement with Stoicism. Inasmuch as the genesis of the Son, while placed indeed before the creation, is yet not decisively conceived as eternal, and inasmuch as the Holy Spirit is put even below the angels, there exists in Justin's trinity a relation of subordination which resembles the doctrine of Plato at least as closely as it does the later Catholic doctrine. Likewise, in his doctrine of the  $\omega\lambda\eta$  he does not go beyond Platonic dualism. The later Church, however, balances against such divergencies the fact that his Apologies were adapted to the age, and that he suffered martyrdom as a result of the second one.

Cf. Semisch : *Justin der Märtyrer*. 2 vols. Breslau, 1840, 42.

2. Intellectually related to Justin is ATHENAGORAS, whose apology, addressed to Marcus Aurelius, and whose work upon the resurrection are found in Maranus' edition of Justin's works, and in Otto's *Corpus Apologetarum*, as well as elsewhere. The former work was first published by Petrus Nannius in Paris and in Lyons in 1541, the latter by Rob. Stephanus in Paris in 1551. The former seeks to prove from the conception of self-existence that monotheism is the only rational religion. At the same time it is shown that the doctrine of Father, Son, and Spirit is not in conflict with monotheism, while polytheism rests upon a confounding of God and matter, which has been fostered by the deceit of demons. Like Justin, Athenagoras sees in the teachings of the philosophers the activity of the Divine Logos. The

philosophers, however, thought that they had themselves found the truth, while the prophets and apostles knew that they were only like mouthpieces for the breath of God. In the work upon the resurrection the leading thought is, that man is not soul alone, that a mass of faults and of virtues presuppose the bodily element, and that reward and punishment must have reference to the whole man.

### § 135.

1. Related to the writers already named, whose apologies are especially directed toward influencing the powers of the State, are those who are led to defend Christianity on account of scientific attacks made upon it. Among these a worthy place is occupied by THEOPHILUS, who wrote three books against Autolycus, a scientifically educated heathen. He was born a heathen, and died in the year 186 as Bishop of Antioch. (His work was first published by C. Gesner in Zürich in 1546, and since then frequently, among others by Prud. Maranus, 1742, and by Otto in his *Corpus Apol.*) The doctrine of the Trinity in God, here for the first time designated as *Trias*, further the doctrine of the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός are very ably defended. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit, however, is very indefinite, since the Spirit is at one time co-ordinated with wisdom, at another time distinguished from the latter. On the other hand, an essential advance upon Justin's dualism is to be recognised in the fact that the source, whence things were created, is no longer called *μὴ ὄν* but *οὐκ ὄντα*.

2. IRENÆUS, who was a pupil of Polycarp, and was executed as Bishop of Lyons in the year 202, defends the Christian doctrine, in partial dependence upon Theophilus, not so much against heathen philosophy, as against the Gnostic heresies which had proceeded from the latter. His principal work, *Against the falsely so-called Gnosis*, in five books, is extant only in an ancient, verbally faithful, Latin translation (*Adversus hæreses*, first published by Erasmus in Basel in 1526, since then frequently, among others by Massuet in 1710, and latest by Stieren, Leipz., 1853, in 2 vols. [still better by Harvey: *S. Irenæi libros quinque adversus Hæreses*. Cambr., 1857, in 2 vols.—Tr.]. In Migne, vol. vii.). Although in his argumentation he appeals chiefly to Scripture



and tradition, he does not despise reasoning, for the purpose of showing the untenableness of the Gnostic doctrines of the Æons, which he compares with the heathen theogonies, and for the purpose of exhibiting the correctness of apostolic teaching.

3. Of a pupil of Irenæus, HIPPOLYTUS, who suffered martyrdom as Bishop of Portus Romanus, no more was known for a long time than the fact that he had written a work against all heresies, in which the composition of Irenæus had been used. Bunsen (*Hippolytus und seine Zeit*, Leipz., 1852) has proved that the *Philosophumena* which were formerly ascribed to Origen form the first book of this Ἐλεγχος, and that the books published by Ern. Miller in 1851 form the last six. There are wanting only the second, third, and half of the fourth book, in which, as in the first, the Greek systems were exhibited from which the heretics were said to have drawn. In the last book Hippolytus' own opinions are set forth. The principal points are the doctrine of the one God, to whom the four elements do not stand in opposition, but to whom they rather owe their origin, and the doctrine of the Logos, who is at one time in God, and then expresses, as a revealing voice, the thoughts contained in Him, and finally appears in visible form. (The best edition of Hippolytus is that of Dunker and Schneidewin, Götting., 1830.)

4. At about the same time that these apologetico-polemical works were composed in Greek, MINUCIUS FELIX, a Roman Jurist, wrote a Latin work, which describes the conversion of the heathen Cæcilius by the agency of the Christian Octavius. The author, who had been educated in Stoicism and had afterward become a Christian, defends Christian opinions, taking his stand mainly upon their moral character. This and the euhemeristic interpretation of polytheism the later Latin apologists, to be mentioned below, have borrowed from him. His *Octavius* was published first in Heidelberg in 1560, since then frequently (e.g. Zürich, 1836, Vienna, 1867). QUINTUS SEPTIMIUS FLORENS TERTULLIANUS (born at Carthage in the year 160) is the first to draw from him. His temperament and position as convert caused him often to exchange apology for polemics, and to condemn, like all else that is heathen, philosophy, with whose weapons nevertheless he himself often fights. At first he contends against Gnostic heresies, then, in the interest of Montanism,

against Catholic doctrine. Oehler's edition of his works in 3 vols. (Leipz., 1853) is the most important. His countryman THASIVS CÆCILIUS CYPRIANUS, who was likewise born a heathen and suffered martyrdom in the year 258 as Bishop of Carthage, follows, full of respect toward his "Master." In his apologetico-polemical productions he imitates Minucius Felix and Tertullian closely, but he is of particular importance in connection with the constitution of the Church. His works, often printed, have been most recently published by Hartel in 3 vols. (Vienna, 1868-71). ARNOBIUS, who lived half a century later, was likewise an African. His work *Adversus nationes Libri VII.*, has been published by Oehler (Leipz., 1846) and others. It impresses one often with the feeling that it was rather the untenableness of heathenism which alienated the author from it, than the glory of Christianity which won him. FIRMIANUS LACTANTIUS, according to Jerome a pupil of Arnobius, although he studied in Africa, was of Italian birth, which made it easier for him to earn the name of "the Christian Cicero." None of his contemporaries in fact approaches him in elegance of style. His works have been published many times. The most important are the *Divinarum institutionum Libri VII.* The first edition of the *Institutēs (in venerabili monasterio Sub-lacensi)* appeared in 1465, fol. Among recent editions is to be mentioned *Firmiani Lactantii Opera ed. O. F. Fritzsche*, Lips., 1842-44.

Cf. Ad. Ebert: *Geschichte der christlich-lateinischen Literatur von ihren Anfängen bis zum Zeitalter Karls des Grossen.* Leipz., 1874 (pp. 1-86).

### § 136.

Not only during particular persecutions and attacks, but continually, on account of their calling, the teachers of the *Catechetical School of Alexandria* had cause to represent the Christian doctrine as in accord with reason. Like Pantæus, who is commonly designated as the first of the line, his great pupil CLEMENT (called Alexandrinus, to distinguish him from the Roman Clement), was born a heathen, but early in life became a Christian. In the year 187 he became the successor of Pantæus, and died about 217. His works were first published in Greek and Latin by Petrus Victorius, in Florence, in 1550, better by Fr. Sylburg in Heidelberg

in 1592, and by Dan. Heinsius in Leyden in 1616, and still better by John Potter in Oxford in 1715. In Migne's *Patrologia græc.* they fill vols. 8 and 9. His λόγος προτρεπτικός, or *Cohortatio ad gentes*, seeks to demonstrate the irrationality of heathenism. Its continuation, the Παιδαγωγός, shows the true guide to virtue to be Christ, who under the old dispensation had led by fear, but under the new by love. Finally, the third and most important, the Στρωματεῖς in eight books, seeks to show that Christianity is the highest philosophy, and that the Greek philosophy, like the Jewish law, is related to it as a fragment. Belief in the revelation (πίστις) is conceived as the root, knowledge (γνώσις) as the crown; and the means of attaining to the latter is the comprehension (ἐπιστήμη) of that which is believed. The true Gnosis is distinguished from the false by the fact that it produces fruits of morality and true brotherly love, but does not therefore look down upon belief with contempt. Nor is it inconsistent with this, that he assigns to it superiority over belief, which he often compares to the "persuasion" and "wonder" of Plato, and thus identifies it with his "true opinion" (*vid.* § 76, 2). As to the content of this true Gnosis, life and motion are assigned to God without identifying the process of world-growth with that of divine growth. A great many points of contact are to be seen, not only with Gnosticism, but also with the teaching of Numenius (*vid.* § 127) and of Plotinus.

Lämmer: *Clement. Alexandr. de λόγῳ doctrina.* Lips., 1855.

## § 137.

1. That ORIGEN (185-254), a pupil of Clement, probably also one of Ammonius Saccas' listeners, does not bear so good a reputation for orthodoxy as his teacher, is not to be explained by the content of his doctrine, for he agrees much better with later Catholic teaching than Justin Martyr does, nor by the fact that Arius has borrowed extensively from him, for this is far out-balanced by the circumstance that very prominent heretics were converted by him, *e.g.* Beryll of Bostra, and that Dionysius the Great and Gregory the Miracle-worker, were his personal pupils and honoured him highly, and that Athanasius owes much to his works. It is to be explained rather by the fact that he was the first

who, led by his own inner impulse, attempted to represent the Gospel as a system of doctrines. From the Catholic standpoint, therefore, his youthful work upon the fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion ranks far below his later apologetico-polemical work against Celsus (in eight books). The former, in four books, is extant only in the very free translation of Rufinus. After a number of his writings had been separately published, the first complete edition of Origen's works was issued by Merlin in Paris in 1512. The edition of Huet, begun in 1668, was never finished, but contains a very valuable introduction by the editor. The Greek and Latin edition of the Benedictine de la Rue, 1733-39, fills four folio volumes. Lommatzsch published a reprint of it in Berlin, in 25 vols., 1831-47. In Migne's *Patr. græc.* vols. 11-17 are devoted to Origen. The greater part of his works (which are said to have been six thousand in number) have disappeared.

2. The fact that Origen, in addition to the historical sense of Scripture, which he calls the somatic, accepts not only a moral sense (psychic), as Philo does, but also a speculative (pneumatic) sense, puts him in a position to constitute, in addition to the *πίστις*, a *γνώσις*, and nevertheless to combat the perverted interpretations of the heretical Gnostics. The series just mentioned shows that the theoretical side of religion lay nearest his heart, and similarly his conversions consisted for the most part in the refutation of doubts. In the doctrine of God, as well as elsewhere, he holds fast, in agreement with the great philosophers of antiquity, to the superiority of definiteness over indefiniteness, and therefore constitutes limits to the Divine omnipotence. In the doctrine of the Trinity he makes an advance upon Justin, in considering the genesis of the Son as eternal, and the Holy Spirit as raised above all creatures; and yet even he does not wholly overcome the relation of subordination. As regards the revelation of God *ad extra*, Origen teaches, not indeed the eternity of the present world, but the previous existence of many other worlds, so that the creative activity of God has never had a beginning. At the same time he maintains decisively that God found no existing material, but created all from nothing. The spirits, created before all other beings, have fallen, and have been placed, according to the degree of their guilt, in various spheres of existence, some as souls in human bodies.

(In place of the separate fall of each soul, was put later that of the entire race, which it is difficult, it is true, to combine with the pre-existence of individual spirits.) Material existence is therefore not the ground but the accompaniment of sin. Christ, with whose soul, likewise pre-existent, the Logos is joined, becomes flesh in order to give Himself to Satan by His death as a ransom for man. His work is appropriated through belief, which alone justifies, but which has holy works as its fruit. At the same time, belief is never thought of as only a personal relation to Christ, but always as membership in the community of believers. As all are destined for this community, it appears to Origen to be a failure of the Divine purpose if a restoration of all things does not bring all into the right way. Even the last enemy will be destroyed, not in substance, but only so that he will cease to be an enemy of God.

Cf. Redepenning: *Origenes, eine Darstellung seines Lebens und seiner Lehre*. Bonn, 1841-46.

3. A half-century after Origen, METHODIUS suffered martyrdom. He was a bitter opponent of Origen, and yet intellectually much like him. His profound utterances concerning Adam and Christ, Eve and the Church, as well as his statement that every one is to a certain extent a Christ, are among the most interesting things of the third century. His works were edited by Combefis in 1644, and again in 1672; and by Allatius in 1656. In Migne, *Patr. gr.*, vol. 18.

### § 138.

When the feeling of belonging to a small chosen company vanishes in the Church, and persecutions do not again call it forth, a life absorbed in mere memories and hopes ceases more and more, and the desire arises to trust oneself to that part of the accounts and promises of the apostles which is true eternally and therefore true in the present. Since many answers are given to the question as to what that is, there arises in the congregation the need of having expressed in fixed formulæ not only what has actually happened, but also what is true and is considered so by all. This need is met on the other side by the desire of the State, which must know

what the fundamental convictions of so large a part of its citizens are, before it can put them on a plane with all the rest, and which moreover will work with all its means toward a unity of opinion, since religious strifes are against its own interest. When, at such a time, men arise who, like Origen, feel the internal impulse to make a doctrine, containing formulated truth, out of the historical accounts of the evangelists, this attempt will not only meet with the approval of the State, but will also be welcomed now by the congregation. With the persecutions the need of apology ceases, and in the place of the apologists, who had been endured by the congregation, arise the *framers of dogma*, who are honoured by it. This does not take place suddenly. The doctrinal formula ripens gradually, and he is looked upon as its author who reaps the harvest which had been cultivated by his predecessors.

## § 139.

The more the circumstances just mentioned (§ 138) work together, the more normal will be the progress of the formation of doctrines. Therefore the most pleasing spectacle is afforded by the rise of that dogma, with whose rational formulation the beginning must be made, because it forms the pre-supposition of all others: viz., the *dogma of the Trinity*. The diametrically opposite extremes of Judaizing Monarchianism, as represented among others by Sabellius, and of paganizing Arianism, make a decision necessary. At the same time an emperor reigns at whose summons more than three hundred bishops assemble, and who, entirely in the interest of the State, wishes above all a fixed formula which is declared as binding by all, and promises in return to secure, indeed, if necessary, to compel, its acceptance throughout the educated world. Finally, the greatest Church Father that the Orient has produced labours as an organ of the congregation. With apostolic zeal Athanasius grasps the message of salvation. Ready for martyrdom, he defends all that the apostles and prophets have recounted and promised, and is thereby safe against the perversions of the heretical Gnostics. Profoundly initiated, however, into the true Gnosis of a Clement and an Origen, he proves himself mentally related to the latter, when he is not satisfied with the use of biblical expressions alone in the formulation of a dogma. He is

quite right in this, because the very point is to formulate that which the Bible has left unformulated. The strictness, often approaching despotism, with which he insists upon order and agreement in doctrine and worship, gives him a resemblance in disposition to Cyprian and other Occidental teachers of the Church. Finally, he has enough of true worldly wisdom not to despise the assistance of worldly power in establishing the formulated dogma. He opposes, however, all meddling with the process of formulation itself, while the Arians, on the contrary, become more or less court theologians.

### § 140.

#### ATHANASIUS.

J. A. Möhler: *Athanasius der Grosse und die Kirche seiner Zeit*. Mainz, 1827. 2 vols. H. Voigt: *Die Lehre des Athanasius von Alexandria*. Bremen, 1861. F. Böhringer: *Athanasius und Arius*. Stuttg., 1874.

1. ATHANASIUS was born in Alexandria in the year 298 or 299, became bishop there in 328, and died in 373. Although he was five times sent into exile, and was thus separated from his bishopric twenty years, he yet laboured in that position with the greatest zeal and effect, and at the same time carried on his work as an author. His extant writings enable us to form a judgment as to what he accomplished in the latter respect. His works were published in Heidelberg in 1601 (*editio princeps*), 2 vols. fol.; in Paris by Montfaucon in 1698, 3 vols. fol.; *Emend. cur. Giustiniani Patav.*, 1777, 4 vols., fol. In Migne, vols. 25-28.

2. Before the outbreak of the Arian strife, Athanasius, in his attacks upon heathenism, that is the deification of the creature, and in his defence of the doctrine of the Incarnation, aimed against the Jews, had already shown himself to be a man who knew how to penetrate, in spite of an Origen and more deeply than he, into the fundamental questions of Christian doctrine, without weakening his reverence for the letter of Holy Scripture and of tradition. He was deacon and private secretary of the Bishop Alexander of Alexandria, at the time when the latter declared himself against the heresy of Arius; and in the epistle of the Bishop addressed to the Catholic Church his spirit may be recognised. Arius was a

presbyter who had been educated in the school of Antioch, and was distinguished for learning, sharpness in dialectics, and strictness of morals. Inasmuch as a direct relation of the God-head to the world seemed to him to dishonour the former, he saw in the Logos a demiurgic intermediate being who is not eternal, and does not possess and cannot communicate adequate knowledge of God. This highest of all creatures, whose unity with the Father consists in agreement with His will, is incarnate in Christ, and therefore represents in Him the place of the rational soul. Asterius, a related contestant, taught a similar doctrine, but equalled Arius neither in ability nor in earnestness of disposition. At the Council of Nice, which was called especially on account of Arius, Athanasius was present in attendance upon his bishop. He contended orally with Arius, and contributed most to the acceptance of the formula *ὁμοούσιος*, and to the defeat of a formula composed of Biblical expressions such as was desired especially by Eusebius of Cæsarea, the most learned man of his age, and such as would have been welcome to the Arians also. His greatest activity begins however after the council, when he defends, in numerous works, the decisions of Nice against the Arians as well as against Eusebius, who inclined toward the latter. Among these works the principal ones are that upon the decrees of the Nicene Synod, and above all, the four Orations against the Arians. These two, as well as the work upon the synods of Seleucia and Rimini, unfold the dogma itself. The history of it is treated more fully in the Apology against the Arians. The chief point is, that Arius is accused of a leaning toward heathenism, therefore of agreement with the dualism of Plato, and of the heathen Neo-Platonists. The assertion, that an intermediate being must be assumed between the eternal God and temporal things, is said to be senseless, because, if this intermediate being were temporal, another intermediate being would be needed between him and God, if eternal, another between him and finite things, and so on indefinitely. Without the correct doctrine of the Logos, the true conception of the creation cannot be formed. If God were not (eternally of Himself) manifest, He could not become (outwardly) manifest without a change of nature. Genesis is thus a pre-condition of creation, but essentially different from it. The Logos, through whom therefore the world is created, is not a



demiurge, but the eternal Son, of like nature with God; the forming power, who must neither be thought of as a creature nor be confounded, as by Sabellius, with the Father. As the genesis of the Son is not temporal, neither is it arbitrary. It is necessary, *i.e.* it is not compulsory, but follows from the nature of God, like His goodness, which is a product neither of His will, nor of a compulsion exercised upon Him. In the epistle of Athanasius to Serapion, the Holy Spirit, like the Son, is conceived as God and as of like nature with the Father, and therefore the expression Triad is adopted, with which the distinction of persons (*ὑποστάσεις*) can be very well joined. In the work against Apollinaris, which some deny to have been written by Athanasius, *ὑπόστασις* denotes nature and *πρόσωπον* is used as the designation of person. It is not a creature therefore, but the eternal Son of God that has become man in Christ, and has thereby made possible an actual knowledge of God. It is He who, through incarnation, death, and resurrection, has delivered man from the death to which he had become subject by sin. The creative power, which the Son of God reveals in becoming incarnate, He has exhibited further in His miracles, and finally in the effect of His work. The time had not yet come to frame dogmatic definitions of the way in which the Divine in Christ is related to the human; and Athanasius, feeling this, desires to have the Biblical expressions retained upon this point. That the ground for this did not lie in his own uncertainty is shown by the decision with which he maintains against Apollinaris, that in Christ the eternal Son of God does not occupy the place of the rational soul, nor is joined to a supernatural body, but that the entire man (flesh) has been put on by Him, and therefore God and man are united in Him, not mixed and not separated.

### § 141.

The Trinitarian strifes did not come to an end with the Council of Nice. Through the influence of the court, at one time the decided Arians, among whom Eunomius was afterwards especially distinguished, at another time the less decided Eusebianists succeeded in driving Athanasius and the bishops that were of his mind from their congregations, and in inventing, at Antioch, Philippopolis (Sardica), Sirmium,

Rimini, and Seleucia, constantly new compromising formulæ to which court favour lent a brief life. With the apparent victory of Arianism, when even the Roman Bishop Liberius yields to the imperial commands, begins its definite fall. In the Occident Hilary, Bishop of Poitiers, in the Orient the great Cappadocian Bishop Basil arise as allies of Athanasius. But not until seven years after the death of Athanasius and two years after the death of Basil is the Nicene symbol, supplemented by the adoption of the homoousie of the Holy Spirit, confirmed at the synod of Constantinople. This result is due chiefly to the efforts of the two Cappadocian Gregories (of Nyssa and of Nazianzus) and of the reigning emperor. In the doctrine of the Holy Spirit not all that Athanasius had already dogmatically established was adopted. From this omission resulted an uncertainty in regard to this dogma, which later gave rise to strifes, and finally to the separation of the Roman and Greek Churches. It is no superiority in the doctrine of the latter, that it holds more closely to the indefinite expressions of the Bible.

### § 142.

The definitions in regard to the revelation of God in Himself are followed naturally by definitions in regard to His eternal manifestation, that is, His manifestation to man. Since this has its culminating point in Christ, these statements have to do with *Christ's Person*. The two extremes, the mixture and the severance of the Divine and human in Him, appear already, in the time of Athanasius, in the heresies of Apollinaris and of Photinus. A leaning toward the former one-sidedness is seen in subsequent ages, especially among the theologians educated in the Alexandrian School. The Antiochian School, on the other hand, its diametrical opposite, tends more toward the latter extreme. The fact, however, that Athanasius and Theodore of Mopsuestia declare themselves in the same way against the mixture and the severance, proves that deep piety and earnest scientific zeal can flourish in both schools and lead to the same end. When Nestorius, educated in the school of Antioch, and still more his follower Anastasius, advanced, in their polemics against the expression "God-bearer," to a complete separation of the Divine and the human, unfortunately no Athanasius arose to refute them.

The impure zeal of Cyril of Alexandria and of his successor Dioscuros, and the fact that Eutychius, occupying an extreme position exactly opposite to that of Nestorius, joined himself to them, make this episode in doctrinal history one of the saddest. Despotie emperors are influenced by money, women and eunuchs, and in turn work upon a clergy, for the most part blameworthy, who allow their belief to be dictated to them. After Nestorius has been condemned at Ephesus, Eutychius suffers the same fate at Constantinople; both justly. On the other hand the result gained at the second synod of Ephesus (the "robber-synod"), at which the Monophysites took revenge upon the Nestorians, was purely a party victory. The statements to which Leo the Great gives utterance in his epistle to Flavian, and which obtain symbolical authority at the synod of Chalcedon, are word for word those of Athanasius and of Theodore. The compromising formulæ dictated by the emperor, such as Zeno's Henotikon and Justinian's Edict *de tribus capitulis* have rather impeded than hastened the general recognition of the dogmatic formula, which constitutes, not a mean between Nestorianism and Eutychianism, but a higher unity above them both.

### § 143.

The Occident, in the beginning, shares in the formation of doctrine only by sanctioning what the Greeks have already determined. This takes place especially in connection with the Bishop of Rome, who throws the weight of his position in favour of the established formula. In rarer cases a tendency to speculation, as among the Greeks, leads the Occidentals to participate in the work. Among those who thus participated was HILARY of Poitiers. He defended the Trinity against the Arians with the weapons of speculation, breathing, it is true, the Greek atmosphere. As speculative grounds had led him from heathenism to Christianity, he made use of them until his death (366) for the defence of the Nicene symbol. (His works were published by the Benedictines, Paris, 1793, and fill vols. ix. and x. of Migne's *Patr. lat.*) Otherwise the Occidentals are led chiefly by practical interests, and thus pass quickly from objective doctrinal definitions to the task of exhibiting their practical usefulness to the individual. This is especially true of the

three Africans, and of Lactantius who was influenced by them. They have already been mentioned in connection with the apologists (§ 135, 4). It is yet truer of the two men whom their contemporaries, and still more subsequent ages, have rewarded with the greatest honour, ST. AMBROSE (340-397, Apr. 4) and ST. JEROME, who died at a great age on Sept. 30, 420. The former was above all a priestly statesman and an ecclesiastical prince. He knew how to join to the nobility of high birth the nobility of a lofty mind, and to immovable strength the greatest mildness of character. His chief effort was to advance religious life and worship in the congregation (particularly in that of Milan); and he is especially distinguished for his directions for the clergy and his lyric performances. His works were published by the Benedictines, Paris, 1686, in 2 vols., and are contained, of course, in Migne's *Patr. lat.* Jerome, the most learned man of his age and a pioneer in widely various directions, lent his favour especially to asceticism. He has besides exerted a tremendous influence by his critical work and his activity in translation, above all by his Latin translation of the Bible (the Vulgate). He was a man of great talent and a distinguished master of style. Speculation was more foreign to him. His works were published in Venice in 1766, in 11 vols., and are contained in Migne's *Patr. lat.* A fine characterization of the two men is given by Ebert in the work cited in § 135, 4. The man who was to be the organ of the Western Church, when she finally came to take part in the establishment of dogma, owes very much to both of them. The Western Church, in accordance with Occidental subjectivity, takes a part in this labour, when the relation of the individual to the Deity which works in him, therefore the relation of freedom to grace, is to be formulated. Looked at in a purely theoretical manner, this problem is the most difficult, and its solution is impossible where there is lacking a clear insight into the nature of Deity and into its union with humanity. It was necessary that Athanasius and Theodore of Mopsuestia should have accomplished that in which their service lies before he could arise who, in formulating the *Anthropology* of the Church, brings its theology and its christology at once to their conclusion. Augustine is the greatest and the last of the Church Fathers. In him are found at the same time the beginnings

of an activity which goes beyond that of the Church Fathers and forms the vocation of the next period.

### § 144.

#### AUGUSTINE.

C. Bindemann: *Der heilige Augustinus*. Vol. 1, Berlin, 1844; vol. 2, Leipzig 1855; vol. 3, Leipz., 1862.

1. AURELIUS AUGUSTINE, born in Tagaste in Numidia, on the thirteenth of November, 354, received from his mother Monica a religious education. Nevertheless evil tendencies showed themselves very early. Brought back by earnest study, especially of Cicero, from moral delinquencies, into which he was betrayed while in Carthage, he fell into religious doubt which threw him into the arms of the Manichæan sect (§ 124). He belonged to this sect at the time when he began work as a teacher of rhetoric at Tagaste, a calling which he afterward followed in Carthage. He first became dissatisfied with the physics of the Manichæans, because they busied themselves with astrology, and was still more weaned from the sect when their celebrated bishop Faustinus was unable to solve his difficulties. In the year 383 he went to Rome, where he gradually fell completely into the scepticism of the new Academy. In the following year he obtained a position as teacher of rhetoric in Milan, and here the sermons of Ambrose, particularly his interpretation of the Old Testament, which was rejected by the Manichæans, completed his estrangement from the latter. He entered again the ranks of the catechumens which he had left to join the heretics. The study of Latin translations of Platonic and Neo-Platonic works was the means of convincing him that theoretically the teaching of Scripture was the most satisfying. He made the blessed experience of its practical power when it led him to put on Christ. After he had given up his position as teacher, he lived for a time in and about Milan. To this period belong the works: *Contra Academicos*, *De vita beata*, *De ordine*, *Soliloquia*, *De immortalitate animæ*. Others were commenced at the same time. He then spent a year in Rome, where he wrote *De moribus ecclesiæ*, *De moribus Manichæorum*, *De quantitate animæ* and the first book of *De libero arbitrio* (the second and third books were written in Hippo). In the year 388 he

finally returned to Africa, and in his hereditary home in Tagaste led a sort of convent life which was devoted to pious practices, conversation with friends, and literary activity. The works *De Genesi contra Manichæos*, *De musica*, *De magistro*, *De vera religione* were written here. Upon a journey to Hippo Regius (to-day Bona) he was consecrated presbyter, against his will, by the bishop Valerius, and became preacher in the principal church there, but at the same time continued his convent life with friends of a like disposition. In his sermons he discussed all the points of faith, even to the subtlest dogmatic definitions. He did the same in his catechisms, whose purpose he expresses in the later written work *De catechizandis rudibus*. His literary activity at this time is directed partly against the Manichæans (*Liber de utilitate credendi ad Honoratum*, *De duabus animis*, *Contra Adimantum*), in the endeavour to separate from them those whom he had himself formerly induced to join them, and partly against the Donatists (e.g., among other works, *Liber contra epistolam Donati*, *Psalmus contra partem Donati*). He composed in addition his interpretations of the Sermon on the Mount, of some portions of the Epistles to the Romans and to the Galatians, and the works *De fide et symbolo* and *De mendacio*. In the year 395 he was appointed, at the wish of Valerius, associate bishop; and, although in this position he himself always regarded Cyprian as his model, he can be as well compared with Athanasius. Among the works which he wrote as bishop are to be mentioned the four books *De doctrina christiana*, the *Confessiones*, the *Disputationes* against the Manichæans Faustus, Felix, and Secundinus, the fifteen books *De trinitate*, the four *De consensu Evangelistarum*, *Libri tres contra epistolam Parmeniani Donatistarum episcopi*, *De baptismo contra Donatistas libri septem*, *De bono conjugali*, *De sancta virginitate* and *De genesi ad literam libri duodecim* against the Donatists Petilianus and Cresconius. To this period belong also the works against the Pelagian heresy, first the three books *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, which do not attack Pelagius directly, then *De fide et operibus*, and *De natura et gratia*. His *De civitate Dei* occupied him thirteen years, since he could work upon it only at intervals. It contains, besides a refutation of the heathen theory of the world, an exhibition of the relation of the *civitas Dei* to the *civitas mundi*, and has been not incorrectly called, at one time a

theodicy, at another time a philosophy of history. *De gratia et originali peccato libri duo*, *De anima et ejus origine libri quattuor*, *Contra Julianum Pelagianum libri sex*, *De fide spe et caritate* and *De gratia et libero arbitrio* were also written at this time. In the revision of his works (*Retractationes*) accomplished shortly before his death (which took place on Aug. 28, 430), Augustine counts ninety-three in all, which does not of course include his epistles. His extant writings are given in the various editions of his complete works, among which the best known are the *editio princeps*, Basil., 1506, xi., fol.; *ex emend. Erasmi*, Basle, 1523, x., fol.; Antw., 1577, xi., fol.; Paris, 1679-1700, xi., fol.; Paris, 1835-40, xi., 4to. In Migne's *Patr. lat.* they fill vols. 32-47. Of separate works the *Confessions* and the *Civitas Dei* have been oftenest published.

2. In order to rescue himself from the scepticism of the Academy, Augustine seeks for an immovable point of departure for all knowledge, and finds this in the self-confidence with which a thinking being asserts his own existence, which remains certain in spite of all doubts, indeed, becomes certain through them. From this starting-point, which he asserts to be incontrovertible, particularly in the *Soliloquia* (ii. 1 *et al.*), in *De libero arbitrio* (ii. 7 *et al.*), and in *De vera religione* (72 *et al.*), he proceeds, especially in the second work mentioned, to distinguish in this self-assurance certainty of being, of life, of feeling, and of rational perception, and thus gives to it a fourfold content. If now we reflect upon the highest grade of being, it is found that our reason, when it knows and judges, presupposes certain principles common to all, in short that it is ruled by the one unchangeable truth, which for that very reason it places above itself. This unchangeable truth, which is at once the system of all rational truths, coincides for Augustine with the divine Logos; and he thus comes, as Descartes later (*vid.* § 267, 2), from the assurance of self, which is free from doubt, to the certainty of God, in whom we know and judge all (*Confess.*, x. 40, xii. 25). In this identification of knowledge with the divine Logos in us, Augustine is conscious of his agreement with the Platonists, whom he very often characterizes as the true philosophers, and considers far superior to the Aristotelians; and at the same time the opposition between revelation and reason, belief and knowledge, vanishes for him. His method is confessedly to pro-

ceed from the former and to raise himself to the latter. Everywhere belief is the beginning. In so far belief and authority go before reason. This, however, is true only in respect to chronological order; judged according to their worth, knowledge and insight stand higher, but they are not for the weak, and will not be completely attained in this world even by the most gifted (*De util. cred.*, c. 9, 21; 16, 31; *De ord.*, ii. 9, 26; *De Trinit.*, ix. 1). Divine grace and man's own assent, which lies in the will, are often given as the essential elements of belief (*De prædest. sanct.*, c. 2). To the former we owe also the gift of the infallible Scriptures. Since the name philosopher denotes a friend of wisdom, and God is wisdom, the philosopher is the lover of God. Scripture commands to flee, not from all philosophy, but only from that of this world (*Civit. Dei*, viii. 1, 10). Whatever leads to the knowledge of God has value, and therefore Physics is justifiable, which, if it did not lead to this result, would be quite useless (*Confess.*, v. 7, x. 55). God, as the proper object of all knowledge and of all philosophy, cannot be grasped by means of the ordinary categories. He is great without quantity, good without quality, without space present, without time eternal, etc. (*Confess.*, iv. 16, 28, 29). Indeed, He is never to be called substance, because no properties belong to Him. He is perhaps better called *essentia*, because nothing except Him deserves this name (*De Trinit.*, vi. 5). Inasmuch as His being transcends all limit, His nature is better described negatively than positively. With limit is excluded from God also all manifoldness. He is the absolutely simple, and a distinction of properties in Him must never be made. Being, knowledge, will, are in Him one. But if nothing is to be distinguished in Him, He is of course the hidden, the unknowable.

3. Augustine however does not stop with this hidden God, but proceeds to conceive Him as He reveals Himself. This takes place in the doctrine of the Trinity, which Augustine frees from the last remnant of subordinationism, inasmuch as he conceives as eternal not only the Son or the Logos, in whom the eternal Being is Himself revealed, but also the Holy Spirit, that communion of the Father and the Son, in whom they both meet each other in love, and who for that very reason proceeds from them both. The divine substance exists only in the three Persons, but exists in each entire; and Augustine repeats, often at the expense of the distinction



between the Persons, that in every divine work all these act together. He does not, however, stop with accepting the doctrine of the Trinity upon the authority of Scripture and of the earlier Church Fathers, but endeavours to make this doctrine (as in general all the doctrines of faith) comprehensible (*vid.* § 151), an effort which becomes later the sole occupation of philosophers. He necessarily regarded the doctrine as in accord with reason, all the more since he conceded the possession of it to the Neo-Platonists, who had no revelation. This he grants especially to Porphyry, in whom the error of Plotinus is made good, inasmuch as the *postponere* of the third element gives place to the *interponere*. It is a necessary consequence of the fact that Augustine sees in the world a self-revelation of God, and in man especially His likeness (*Civit. Dei*, xi. 24), that, in his endeavour to make the doctrine of the Trinity comprehensible, analogies should be employed, and reference should be made to the trinity of general, particular, and related being in all things (*De vera religione*, vii. 13), and particularly to the *esse*, *nosse*, and *velle*, or to the *memoria*, *intelligentia*, and *voluntas* of man (*De Trinit.*, x. 8-9), as a witness for the divine triuneness.

4. The Godhead does not stop with being eternally manifest to itself, but proceeds to reveal itself likewise *ad extra*. This takes place in creation, which Augustine so unites with the eternal generation that his doctrine of the Logos becomes the link between theology and cosmology. He thereby succeeds in avoiding both rocks upon which theories of creation are wont to be shattered. The *first* is Dualism, which necessarily appeared especially dangerous to him after his own personal experiences. In opposition to the assertion of matter independent of God, he maintains that the world was created from nothing, and, aside from the divine will, is absolutely nothing. In verbal agreement with the Old Testament, he asserts that if God should withdraw His creative power, the world would immediately vanish (*Civit. Dei*, xii. 25), and thus the conception of preservation is absorbed by that of creation. He distinguishes with emphasis the Son, the *de Deo genitus*, from the *mundus de nihilo factus*. He therefore denies a generation of the world; that is, since *genitura* = *natura*, he denies, as does the Jew, that the world is more than a thing made by God, that it is nature. With this conception agrees his later opposition to the assumption

of a world-soul (formerly accepted by him), which would give the world too much independence. The danger of Pantheism lies very near the assertion of the complete nothingness of all things. This is the *second* rock to be avoided in a theory of creation. Augustine is less studious to avoid it, and therefore remains nearer to it than to the opposite extreme. In spite of all difference between the eternally begotten Son, without whom God would not be, and the world, created not in but with time, there exists a relation between the two. The Logos, namely, as the complex of collective ideas, which the unenvious God actualized in the world, is the prototype of the world, while the latter is the image of divine wisdom. But the former, besides being the world-idea, is also the idea of God, the *alius Dei*, while the world is the *aliud Dei* (*Civit. Dei*, xi. 10, xii. 25; *De genes. ad lit.*, iv. 16, etc.). The answer to the three questions *quis*, *per quid*, and *propter quid fecerit*? shows how the entire Trinity is active in the creation of the world. Although Augustine guards against asserting that the creation of things is necessary, or that God needs them, nevertheless it cannot be denied, on the other hand, that he ascribes to things, more than Pantheism would admit, not only an apparent, but a real existence.

5. The fact, however, that Augustine remains much nearer Pantheism than Dualism is shown especially in his doctrine of man. The latter is the centre of creation because he joins what the angels are with visible corporeality composed of elements. The spirit or soul of man is a substance different from the body (*De anima et ejus origine*, ii. 2, 2), at least relatively simple (*De Trinit.*, vi. 6, 8), and therefore immortal (*Soliloq. de immort. animæ*). It is so united with the body that it is everywhere wholly present, although certain organs serve for certain functions, as the cerebrum for feeling, the cerebellum for voluntary motion, etc. (*De genes. ad lit.*, vii. 13). But the spirit appears, besides, independent of the body, so that seven different grades can be distinguished in it. The three lowest, *anima de corpore*, *in corpore*, *circa corpus*, have been already correctly distinguished by Aristotle, but there must be added to them *anima ad se*, *in se*, *ad Deum*, *in Deo* (*De immort. animæ*, *De quantit. animæ*). The proper kernel and centre of the spiritual personality is formed by the will of man; man is properly nothing else than will (*Civit. Dei*, xix. 6). Since man, like all things, is a product of being and of non-being,

his will can either allow that of the former, that is the divine will, to operate in itself, and then it is true or free will, or it can turn itself from being, and then is empty (self-)will and unfree. If, with Augustine, we understand by freedom the being filled with the divine will, the *bona boni necessitas*, it is not impossible, nor even difficult, to reconcile man's freedom with divine omnipotence and omniscience. It is this conception of freedom which must of necessity have made the strife with Pelagius an irreconcilable one, even if the interference of a jurist (Cœlestius) had not embittered it. The glaring contrast between a life entirely outside of grace and of the Church, and a life in both, was less familiar to the man educated in monkish asceticism than to Augustine; but the danger of a proud sanctification by works threatened him far more. To the member, further, of the British Church, which held itself always open to Oriental and especially to Antiochian influences, a Theodore's or a Chrysostom's formal conception of freedom was of necessity the familiar one. This formal freedom, the *æquilibrium arbitrii*, in which every man can decide for the good as well as for the evil, is in Augustine's opinion an unchristian delusion. Unchristian; for, if every one could choose the good, what need of a redeemer? A delusion; for in reality the conduct of man is the necessary fruit of a good or bad tree. The natural man,—that is, the man who wills of himself and wills his own will,—is evil, is a slave. Only divine grace makes man free, grace partly as prevenient, partly as active, partly as supporting, and partly as bestowing the gift of perseverance (*donum perseverantiæ*), which seals all previous effects. Whoever becomes free, depends therefore solely upon God. He predestinates thereto whom He will. The remainder have no cause for complaint if He leaves them in the state in which they are. Only God's continuous activity enables man to do good; properly, indeed, not to do, for man is entirely passive, grace is irresistible (*De corr. et grat.*). God does not give grace because we wish it, but we wish it because He gives it (*Ep.*, 177, 5). All this is a necessary consequence of the view that preservation is a continued creation from nothing. In a completely dependent world no part of it can show independent activity. These assertions appear milder when Augustine says: *qui te creavit sine te non te justificabit sine te*; and so too when he gives utterance to other similar expressions, to which his practical nature, averse to all quietism,

leads him. Whether a man belongs to the elect cannot be determined by single good works; the best proof of it is the *donum perseverantiæ* (*De corr. et grat.*, 12, 13).

6. The inability to do good, and therefore the rejection of all those whom God does not make free from sin, is a fact. This however is not the relation originally established by God. In the beginning man, who at first, in order that all men might be blood relations, existed as one man, was in a condition in which it was possible for him not to sin. Destined to attain to a position where he can no more sin, to pass from *posse non peccare* to *non posse peccare*, he should, by obedience to God, have wiped out the *posse peccare* in himself, and with it mortality (*De corr. et grat.*, 12, 13; *De pecc. mer.*, i. 2, 2). This however did not take place. On the contrary, the love of God grew cold in man, and the temptation of the devil who had fallen before him brought him, already fallen, to a complete apostasy. His punishment, inability to do good, was handed down to all men, who had existed in Adam in germ, and therefore had sinned (*Civit. Dei*, xiv, 11; *De corr. et grat.*, 12, 37; 6, 9). That Augustine expresses himself only with hesitation for Traducianism (propagation of the soul), which fits so well his theory of original sin (cf. *Ep.*, 190; *Ad Opt.*, 4, 14, 15), and often wavers between it and Creationism or even Pre-existence (cf. among other passages *Retract.*, i. 1), has its ground, perhaps, in the fact that the example of Tertullian seemed to show that Traducianism involved the corporeality of the soul. The descendants of fallen man, begotten in lust, and thus at the same time poisoned, are incapable of good. It is more difficult to comprehend how the original man, born sinless, could fall away from God. In the same degree in which Augustine denies to man all independent activity, must the rise of evil, that is of self-seeking, appear impossible. Consistent Pantheism has in fact always experienced this. Augustine, although he does not go so far as the latter, nevertheless often approaches the denial of evil, as for instance when he shows a tendency to conceive of it as an absence of good, not as its opposite (*Civit. Dei*, xi. 9), or when he says that evil exists only in the good (*De lib. arb.*, iii. 13), that it is nothing positive and therefore needs no *causa efficiens*, but has only a *causa deficiens*, is an *incausale*, that evil is not commission but only omission, that evil cannot be perceived for the same reason that darkness cannot be seen, etc. (*Civ.*

*Dei*, xii. 7, 9, *et al.*) The tremendous power of sin forces him indeed often to the (anti-pantheistic) confession that evil is a positive power over against God. But the fear of assuming a being outside of God causes him always to return to the conception of it as a mere shadow in the picture of the world, as a thing necessary for the sake of contrast, that is, in fact, to deny its reality. The difficulties, which resulted from the Augustinian doctrine of the absolute self-nothingness of the creation, furthered the spread of Semi-Pelagianism. In the form indeed in which the latter arose in the teaching of Cassianus, it was condemned; but at the same time the Predestinationists, probably pure Augustinians, were declared heretics. The Augustinianism of the Church is already moderated in the work *De vocatione gentium*, probably by Leo the Great. Later it became an ecclesiastical rule: *Augustinus eget Thoma interprete*.

7. Belief, the means by which man becomes a participant in grace, is, according to Augustine, not a self-active appropriation but a pure gift of mercy, a supernatural illumination (*De pecc. merit.*, i. 9; *De prædest. sanctt.*, ii. 12), in which man is certain of his state of redemption. For this very reason the proper content of belief is formed by the doctrine of the incarnate Son of God. The heathen philosopher did not, as in the case of the Trinity, have any idea of this doctrine. Since, now, only that conduct has value which is an action of belief, it follows that even the most highly extolled virtues of the heathen are worthless, indeed crimes (*Civ. Dei*, xix. 25). Only among Christians does boldness, in virtue of the true foundation, become the martyr's joy, and temperance the destruction of passion, etc. The Incarnate One however is not only the liberator of the individual from sin and guilt, but also the proper centre of mankind as a whole, and for that reason appears in the middle of its history, a goal for those who lived before Him, a starting-point for those who live after Him (*De vera relig.*, 16; *De grat. et lib. arb.*, 3, 5). The history of mankind is divided into six periods, corresponding to the six days of creation, and in the last of these we live. Through this whole history runs the contrast between the redeemed, who form the kingdom of God, the *civitas Dei*, and those who have condemned themselves, and thus form the kingdom of the world, or of the devil. The former are vessels of mercy, the latter vessels of wrath (*Civ. Dei*, xv. 1 ff.). Among those

rules the love of God, among these the love of self (*Ibid.*, xiv. 28). Cain and Abel (after the death of the latter, Seth) represent in the beginning this contrast, which finally reaches its culminating point in the moral corruption of the Roman Empire, and in the Christian Church which makes stand against it (*Ibid.*, xviii. 2). The State, which is necessary only to fallen man, is destined to become useless. But as long as it has its use, the Church, an institution of peace standing above it, is to promote peace between ruler and subjects. The last judgment, and after it the new earth inhabited by those who have risen, is the goal of history. Condemnation, both bodily and spiritual, is, like the blessedness of the elect, eternal (*Ibid.*, xxi. 9, 10, 23, 28, xix. 28). The latter consists in perfect knowledge of God and of His government of the world. For this reason, neither the recollection of one's own suffering, nor the punishment of the condemned will trouble him who shall see all with the eyes of knowledge (*Ibid.*, xxii. 29, 30).

### § 145.

With the victory of (moderated) Augustinianism the activity of the Church in forming doctrines ceases. It was not necessary to establish further dogmas, for those which were to be regarded as constituting unchangeable truth had been already discovered. Nor was it any longer possible; for, with the disappearance of the republican form of Church government, there vanished also the assurance that the dogma alone would secure canonical authority and not at the same time the method by which an individual proved the dogma. When, later, at a time whose mission was not to make dogmas but to give them a definite form, papal authority attempted to establish dogmas (*e.g.*, transubstantiation and the *conceptio immaculata virginis*), it was desired to stamp theological speculations as dogmas. It was forgotten that in dogmas the *κήρυγμα*, the original revelation, offers the material for philosophical reflection, while in theological speculations, on the contrary, the material is furnished by the dogma framed from that revelation. Therefore dogma and theological proposition are related as doctrine and proof, as judgment and the reasons for the judgment. The first duty of the Church, after the establishment of dogma, is to enter into the doctrinal conception and to accustom itself to the constitution which it has formed for itself, and through

which it has formed itself. It must grow stronger in itself, as the congregation formerly, before it became a Church, had to grow stronger in order to be able to begin external activity. He in whom a philosophical spirit lives, that is, he who understands his age, will therefore devote himself not so much to the solution of new problems as to the conservation and establishment of that which has been hitherto discussed in philosophy. This is accomplished when the results of past speculation, by means of compilations, of commentaries, and of translations, are made accessible to ever-enlarging circles, and become more and more generally recognised truths.

### § 146.

The activity which collects and discusses dogmas is formal when compared with that which produced them. From this results the respect for those writings of antiquity which establish the rules of scientific form, and for that philosopher who was the all-embracing polymathist. Plato, over against Aristotle, especially Aristotle the logician, begins to take a subordinate place; and where Platonism remains the highest authority, it is in the form which it had received from Proclus, with whom the Aristotelian element played so prominent a part (*vid.* §§ 127 and 130). In the Oriental Church are especially prominent Nemesisius (*De natura hominis*, published in the *Bibl. vet. patr.*, Paris, 1624, vol. ii., as well as elsewhere), whose Aristotelian arguments and Biblical expressions are mingled in a curious way; Æneas of Gaza, who, in his dialogue *Theophrastus* (written in 457), most often attacks Nemesisius with Platonic, but also combats the Neo-Platonists with Biblical, arguments; and Zacharias Scholasticus, who took part in the Council of Constantinople (A.D. 536) as Bishop of Mitylene, and whose dialogue *Ammonius* is chiefly devoted to a refutation of the doctrine of the eternity of the world. The latter doctrine is also combated by the Alexandrian John, although he was much more of an Aristotelian than those just named. He called himself Grammaticus, but was called in the Middle Ages Philoponos. His commentaries on the works of Aristotle, written in the sixth century, are extant and have often been published, especially in Venice. His somewhat younger contemporary, Simplicius, interprets Aristotle more after the manner of the Neo-Platonists. He is of

great value for the history of philosophy so far as his works are extant. The author of the works which are known under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite was not, as some have thought, Augustine's younger contemporary Synesius, but a Christian, educated in the school of Proclus. This is the opinion of Engelhardt (*Die angeblichen Schriften des Areopagiten Dionysius*, 2 vols., Salzbr., 1823). Franz Hipler, on the contrary (*Dionysius der Areopagite*, Regensb., 1861), seeks to prove that the author of these works must have taught earlier, since he was known to Gregory Nazianzen. E. Böhmer (*vid. Damaris*, 18. 64. Stettin, 1864) agrees with him and gives an excellent outline of the doctrines of the remarkable ascetic, monastic philosopher. The Pseudo-Dionysian writings have been often published. In Migne's *Patr. curs. compl.* they fill two volumes. The extant epistles of this Pseudo-Dionysius, upon mystical theology, the names of God, the heavenly hierarchy, the ecclesiastical hierarchy, attempt to construct, with the help of the triads which were borrowed from Porphyry, Jamblichus, or Proclus, the esoteric portion of Christian doctrine, whose goal is represented to be complete union with God. As is usual, mysticism shows here traces of Pantheism. God is conceived as the only being, to whom therefore all definitions are denied as limits. It is in this sense that the negative theology is placed above the positive, because it denies to God, as the absolutely positive being, the predicates of the temporal, which as such designate limits. In opposition to Him, evil is mere limit, want, and has no existence. Especially celebrated is the division of the angel-world into three triads, or the heavenly hierarchies. In respect to this the fullest information had been given to the pupil of that apostle who had been carried up into the third heaven. The decreasing series *Seraphim Cherubim Throni, Dominationes Virtutes Potestates*, finally *Principatus Archangeli Angeli* stands unchangeably fixed. But by some, e.g., by Gregory the Great, the *Principatus* are assigned the place before the *Potestates*, so that the *Virtutes* stand at the head of the third order (hierarchy). The Old Testament has provided the Seraphim and Cherubim, the Epistles to the Colossians and to the Ephesians the five following grades. To them are added the archangels and angels often mentioned not only by Christians but also by Porphyry. Dionysius however does not wish to have the series explained by successive



which it has formed itself. It must grow stronger in itself, as the congregation formerly, before it became a Church, had to grow stronger in order to be able to begin external activity. He in whom a philosophical spirit lives, that is, he who understands his age, will therefore devote himself not so much to the solution of new problems as to the conservation and establishment of that which has been hitherto discussed in philosophy. This is accomplished when the results of past speculation, by means of compilations, of commentaries, and of translations, are made accessible to ever-enlarging circles, and become more and more generally recognised truths.

### § 146.

The activity which collects and discusses dogmas is formal when compared with that which produced them. From this results the respect for those writings of antiquity which establish the rules of scientific form, and for that philosopher who was the all-embracing polymathist. Plato, over against Aristotle, especially Aristotle the logician, begins to take a subordinate place; and where Platonism remains the highest authority, it is in the form which it had received from Proclus, with whom the Aristotelian element played so prominent a part (*vid.* §§ 127 and 130). In the Oriental Church are especially prominent Nemesius (*De natura hominis*, published in the *Bibl. vet. patr.*, Paris, 1624, vol. ii., as well as elsewhere), whose Aristotelian arguments and Biblical expressions are mingled in a curious way; Æneas of Gaza, who, in his dialogue *Theophrastus* (written in 457), most often attacks Nemesius with Platonic, but also combats the Neo-Platonists with Biblical, arguments; and Zacharias Scholasticus, who took part in the Council of Constantinople (A.D. 536) as Bishop of Mitylene, and whose dialogue *Ammonius* is chiefly devoted to a refutation of the doctrine of the eternity of the world. The latter doctrine is also combated by the Alexandrian John, although he was much more of an Aristotelian than those just named. He called himself Grammaticus, but was called in the Middle Ages Philoponos. His commentaries on the works of Aristotle, written in the sixth century, are extant and have often been published, especially in Venice. His somewhat younger contemporary, Simplicius, interprets Aristotle more after the manner of the Neo-Platonists. He is of

great value for the history of philosophy so far as his works are extant. The author of the works which are known under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite was not, as some have thought, Augustine's younger contemporary Synesius, but a Christian, educated in the school of Proclus. This is the opinion of Engelhardt (*Die angeblichen Schriften des Areopagiten Dionysius*, 2 vols., Salzbr., 1823). Franz Hipler, on the contrary (*Dionysius der Areopagite*, Regensb., 1861), seeks to prove that the author of these works must have taught earlier, since he was known to Gregory Nazianzen. E. Böhmer (*vid. Damaris*, 18. 64. Stettin, 1864) agrees with him and gives an excellent outline of the doctrines of the remarkable ascetic, monastic philosopher. The Pseudo-Dionysian writings have been often published. In Migne's *Patr. curs. compl.* they fill two volumes. The extant epistles of this Pseudo-Dionysius, upon mystical theology, the names of God, the heavenly hierarchy, the ecclesiastical hierarchy, attempt to construct, with the help of the triads which were borrowed from Porphyry, Jamblichus, or Proclus, the esoteric portion of Christian doctrine, whose goal is represented to be complete union with God. As is usual, mysticism shows here traces of Pantheism. God is conceived as the only being, to whom therefore all definitions are denied as limits. It is in this sense that the negative theology is placed above the positive, because it denies to God, as the absolutely positive being, the predicates of the temporal, which as such designate limits. In opposition to Him, evil is mere limit, want, and has no existence. Especially celebrated is the division of the angel-world into three triads, or the heavenly hierarchies. In respect to this the fullest information had been given to the pupil of that apostle who had been carried up into the third heaven. The decreasing series *Seraphim Cherubim Throni, Dominationes Virtutes Potestates*, finally *Principatus Archangeli Angeli* stands unchangeably fixed. But by some, e.g., by Gregory the Great, the *Principatus* are assigned the place before the *Potestates*, so that the *Virtutes* stand at the head of the third order (hierarchy). The Old Testament has provided the Seraphim and Cherubim, the Epistles to the Colossians and to the Ephesians the five following grades. To them are added the archangels and angels often mentioned not only by Christians but also by Porphyry. Dionysius however does not wish to have the series explained by successive

emanations of the one class from the other, but maintains that each has proceeded directly from God, or rather has been created by Him. The conception of creation is in fact maintained with the greatest decisiveness; and Dionysius therefore in subsequent ages is always cited as an authority against the Neo-Platonists. The Abbot Maximus (580–662), adorned with the well-earned title *Confessor*, follows the Areopagite as a zealous votary. In his writings he shows the last but brilliant flaming up of the speculative spirit in the Greek Church. His works have been edited by Combefisius, Paris, 1675, 2 vols., supplemented by Oehler, *Anecdota græca*, Tom. I., Hal., 1875. That God reveals Himself in the books of nature and of Scripture; that He is to be described only by negative predicates; that the Logos includes in Himself the first causes of all things; that all true being is good, and therefore evil is neither a being nor an object of divine knowledge and will; that the Incarnation would have taken place even without the fall of man, because it is only the culminating point of the previous revelation; that sense, understanding (*ratio*), and intellect (*intellectus*) form the three grades of knowledge; that the final goal is the general Sabbath, on which all will pass into God, etc.,—all these are assertions of Maximus which play an important rôle in the following age. John of Damascus, who died in the second half of the eighth century, does not owe the great reputation, which he still enjoys in the Oriental Church, to his depth and originality. On the contrary, his works, (ed. Lequien, 2 vols., Paris, 1712) reveal the mere industry, often mechanical, of a compiler. He shows, in his compilation, how the philosophers have defined, how the Peripatetics have divided, what categories the Fathers have employed, what heresies have arisen, finally what doctrines are regarded as orthodox. He did not wish to contribute anything of his own, and there were needed at that time no new productions of the philosophic spirit. A repertory of the doctrines of the Fathers was wanted, and this want he met by making a final summary of the results of patristic activity. Subsequent Greek theologians busied themselves greatly, as he did, with polemics against Mohammedans. Polemics and apologetics are all that the Greek Church still produces.

## § 147.

In the Occident also the creative activity of the philosophic spirit ceases at this time. The work of Claudianus Eccidius Mamertus, a presbyter at Vienne in Gaul, in which he combats the doctrine of the corporeality of the soul, employing the categories of Aristotle, is without importance and influence. The title of the work is *De statu animæ*, and it has been published by Mosellanus, Basil., 1520, and by Barth. Cygn., 1655. Martianus Mineus FELIX CAPELLA of Carthage exerted great influence upon the Church, although he did not himself belong to it. His *Satyricon* contains in nine books a brief outline of all the sciences known at his time. The work was written, according to most authorities, in the year 460, possibly some decades earlier. It was published in Venice, 1499, and since then has been issued frequently. This outline, clothed in the form of an account of the marriage of Mercury with philology, is a compilation from the works of Aquila, Aristides Quintilianus, Pliny, and above all Varro. —A short time later lived Anicius Manlius (Torquatus?) SEVERINUS BOËTHIUS (478–525). His great influence upon later philosophy is due, not so much to his own ethical work, *De consolatione philosophiæ Libri V.*, written in the eclectic spirit, as to his translations of all the analytical writings of Aristotle, his commentaries upon some of them, and his commentaries upon the work of Porphyry. By means of these translations he became one of the framers of the later terminology, which in part is still used. The work *De Trinitate*, prized very highly in the Middle Ages, does not belong to him. Nor is he the author of the works *De hebdomadibus*, so called because it treats of seven difficult questions, *De fide christiana*, *De duabus naturis in Christo*. It has been doubted whether he was a Christian. Even those who maintain it admit that he was not a very zealous one (cf. F. Nitzsch: *Das System des Boëthius*, Berlin, 1860). His complete works appeared first in Venice, 1492, then in Basel, 1546, and since then have often been published, and are contained in Migne's *Patr. curs. completus*. —Magnus Aurelius CASSIODORUS (469–508) has also given, like Martianus Capella, an encyclopædic outline of the sciences. The Geneva edition of his works (1650) publishes the notes of Fornerius, taken from the *editio princeps* (Paris, 1588), as well as those of Brosseus

(1609). From their time onward every educated person regarded it as an accepted principle that systematic instruction must embrace first the three *artes* and then the four *disciplinæ*, in other words, must take the form of *trivium* and *quadrivium*. The three *artes*,—*grammatica*, *dialectica*, *rhetorica*,—were also called collectively *logica*, as well as *scientiæ sermocinales*; the four *disciplinæ*,—*arithmetica*, *geometria*, *musica*, *astronomia*,—were called *mathematica*, and also *scientiæ reales*, by Bede and Alcuin and, especially later, *physica*. Subsequently the names and the object of these “seven free arts” were stamped, for the sake of aiding memory, with the verses: “*Gram. loquitur, Dia. verba docet, Rhet. verba colorat, Mus. canit, Ar. numerat, Geo. ponderat, Ast. colit astra.*”—What John of Damascus was for the Oriental Church, that and much more the Spaniard ISIDORE was for the Occidental Church. He was born in the year 560, and was called Hispalensis because he was Bishop of Seville, as successor of his brother, during the last thirty-six years of his life, until 636. Remarkable for genius, piety, and ecclesiastical zeal, he made himself master, by his untiring industry, of all the knowledge accessible to the Latin-speaking world, and passed for so high an authority that later popes could think of ranking him as the fifth *doctor Ecclesiæ* with Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, and Leo, or even, in place of Ambrose, as the fourth. So, too, historical and medical works of a much later date sought to adorn themselves with the glitter of his name; and it is to this that the familiar Spanish collection of ecclesiastical *canones*, the so-called *Isidorian decretals*, owe a part of their effect. His *Sententiarum libri tres* (the fourth book is falsely ascribed to him) contain the entire doctrine of salvation, in a series of propositions formulated partly by himself, partly by earlier ecclesiastical teachers (Augustine, Leo, etc.). The work is therefore often cited as *De summo bono*. It gathers together the decisions of the great councils, that of Laodicea included, and recognises especially the Athanasian symbol. The aim is not, as in the later summaries (*vid.* § 167), to include controversial points and hints for their solution, but only such things as pass unchallenged among all the orthodox. For this reason it is not said who has given to each proposition its particular form. It is a mosaic picture, but at the same time a most excellent one, of what was regarded as ecclesiastical doctrine soon after the

death of Leo the Great. It aims to give only what is believed, and not to explain how it is related to reason. He who takes up Isidore's *Synonymorum libri duo* hardly expects to find in it an ascetic dialogue between a man, in despair on account of his sin, and reason which encourages him. The additional titles *De lamentatione animæ* and *Soliloquium* are manifestly better chosen. The historical writings, the practical advice to clergymen, the apologetic observations addressed to the Jews, have exerted by no means so great an influence as Isidore's chief work, to which *De natura rerum* and *De ordine creaturarum* are related as physical and theological introductions. This work also bears a title, suggested by its author's favourite studies, which promises much less than it accomplishes. The *Etymologiarum libri XX.* (also better called *Origines*) contain a complete encyclopædia, which for centuries was almost the only source from which general information was drawn. The subjects treated are grammar, rhetoric, and dialectics, the four mathematical branches, medicine, laws, composition, and bibliography, God and angels, Church and sects, peoples and languages, man, beast, the world and its divisions, the earth and its parts, buildings, stones and models, agriculture, war, navigation, household furniture. If one seeks, as some editors have done, to find the classical or ecclesiastical writer from whom the author drew for each subject, one will be astonished at the man's learning. It was natural that, under the influence of this thesaurus, it and the remaining works of its author should have found at first many copyists and afterwards many publishers. If we consider only editions of the complete works, that of de la Bigne, Paris, 1550, is to be named first, for the Basel edition of 1477, which is often cited as the *editio princeps*, appears to contain only the *Etymologiae*. After de la Bigne's is to be mentioned that of Jo. Grial, who, at the command of Philip II., published the more complete Madrid edition, 1599, 2 vols., fol., reprinted in 1776. In 1602 the edition of du Breul appeared in Paris, and was reprinted in Cologne in 1617. Finally, in the year 1797 the beautiful Roman edition was issued in seven quarto volumes at the expense of Cardinal Lorenzana. The editor, Franc. Arevalus, gives in the first two volumes, under the title *Isidoriana*, very thorough critical, biographical, and bibliographical studies, and has added in the seventh a complete index. Vols. iii. and iv. contain the *Etymologiae*, vol. v.,

almost exclusively allegorico-mystical observations on Scripture, and in addition the *Differentia verborum et rerum* and *De ortu et obitu Patrum*. In vol. vi. are found *Contra Judæos*, *Sententiæ*, *De officio ecclesiasticarum synonyma*, *Regula monach.*, *Epp. de ord. creat.*; in vol. vii. the historical writings, *Chronicon*, *De regib. Goth.*, *De viris illustr.*, and, in the appendix, spurious works.

### § 148.

With the philosophy of the Church Fathers the first period of mediæval philosophy comes to a close. Since in their philosophy Gnostic and Neo-Platonic thought are contained as elements, the period may be *a potiori* designated as the *patristic period* or the *period of Patristics*. The relation of the three tendencies to each other, not indeed the tendencies themselves, may be compared with what the first period of Greek philosophy had shown (§§ 18-48). When Origen combats the Gnostics with weapons whose use he had learned from Ammonius, and Athanasius combats the Arians with arguments drawn from Origen, when Augustine is freed from Manichæism by Plotinus and Porphyry, and the Areopagite endeavours to prove, by means of formulæ learned from Proclus, that Christian doctrine contains the true wisdom; and when, on the other side, the greatest Neo-Platonists, drawing no distinction between Gnostics and Church Fathers, complain of the latter also on account of their hatred and contempt for the world and on account of their want of appreciation of the beautiful and the like; all this is to be explained by the fact that the Church Fathers stand above both, as Empedocles stood above the Eleatics and physiologists.

## SECOND PERIOD OF MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY

### SCHOLASTICISM.

C. E. Buläus: *Historia universitatis Parisiensis*, etc. Paris, 1665. 6 vols. fol. Hauréau; *De la Philosophie Scolastique*. Paris, 1850 (2nd ed. 1872). By the same author: *Singularités historiques et littéraires*. Paris, 1861. W. Kaulich: *Geschichte der scholastischen Philosophie*. I. Th. Prag, 1863. Alb. Stöckl: *Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*. 3 vols. Mainz, 1862-66. (Stöckl has made extensive use in the first part of his work of Kaulich's book.)

### INTRODUCTION.

#### § 149.

NOT until the Christian community has secured worldly existence, or has become a Church, can it begin to conquer the world. But inasmuch as it owes to the world-power, at least in part, that change of condition, this filial relation to the State prevents the reckless struggle without which victory is impossible. In the Greek Church this relation continues, and the imperial primacy never entirely ceases. The Roman Church, on the contrary, in its relations with the plundering heathen, and still more in its relations with those Barbarian peoples to whom it sends its messengers, appears as the giver not only of belief but also of civil order and morality, and thus assumes rather a maternal relation toward the State. Where this is recognised, Church and State follow one path and find mutual recognition; but where it is not, there the Church rightly makes stand against such impiety. In contrast with the Oriental State-Church there is developed in the Occident the ecclesiastical State. The watchword now is to spread and to increase the power of the Church, or to bring all under clerical rule, extensively by means of missions, for which in the main the sword of the plunderer breaks ground, intensively by means of the efforts of energetic popes.



## § 150.

The work of the missionaries of the Roman Church is entirely different from that of the Apostles. It is not their mission to proclaim the glad message of salvation, but to make the doctrinal system of the Roman Church accessible to the minds especially of the Germanic peoples, and to accustom them to its constitution. For this is needed not only apostolic zeal, but also a thorough insight into the whole system of dogmas, and in addition great dialectic skill, in order to explain to the natural, untutored understanding of rude peoples doctrines produced with the help of a philosophy which has united the results of the combined efforts of classical and oriental minds at the zenith of their culture. As a consequence, mission schools arise, whose pupils, wandering from one to another, are often teachers and scholars at the same time, and are early given the name *scholastici*, which had long been used for school teachers.

## § 151.

As patristic philosophy had corresponded to the impulse of the Christian community to become a Church, a philosophy now arises which meets the desire of the Church to obtain entrance for its dogmas and its constitution among men of untrained intellects. This philosophy, on account of the similarity of its aim with that of the missionaries mentioned, has rightly received the name of *Scholasticism*, or *Scholastic Philosophy*. Its representatives do not have to help the Church into existence, but to work over the Church's doctrines. They are therefore not *Patres* but *Magistri Ecclesiae*. Their aim and that of the Church Fathers can, it is true, be brought under one and the same formula, since both wish to make accessible to the understanding that which belief possesses; but "belief" signifies to the latter that which stands in the Bible as the message of the Apostles, while to the Schoolmen, on the contrary, it signifies the dogmas established by the Fathers. The Fathers have produced the dogmas, the Schoolmen have to systematize them and to make them comprehensible. When, therefore, the philosophizing of the Schoolmen always takes its departure from the propositions established by authority, this is not narrowness on their part, but their necessary confinement

to their vocation. The philosophy of the Schoolmen is ecclesiastical, and therefore their language the (ecclesiastical) Latin, the peculiarly catholic language by means of which the members of the most various peoples simultaneously receive and interpret the Gospel in the Church's own language. It may be regarded as characteristic, that, as the Church is ruled from the one centre which binds all together, science too has soon a recognised centre. Italy possesses the papal chair, Germany the imperial throne, France scholarship. With this difference between the missions of the Church Fathers and of the Schoolmen is connected the fact that, while the former necessarily adhered most closely to those earlier philosophers whose teachings showed the greatest similarity to the Gospel in respect to their content, the latter rank those writers highest from whom most is to be learned in respect to form. From this results their great veneration for logical and encyclopædic works, and this explains why, when later the complete Aristotle was again known, this father of logic, this living encyclopædia of all sciences, became the recognised master of the Schoolmen. In the beginning, however, some of the analytical writings of Aristotle and the Introduction of Porphyry, in the translation, with commentary, of Boëthius, occupy the first rank among the few books of antiquity which have not been forgotten. The *Analytica* and *Topica* remain for a long time unknown. The treatises of Boëthius upon the categorical and hypothetical conclusion, as well as upon topics, are obliged to fill their place.

## FIRST DIVISION.

## The Rise of Scholasticism.

## § 152.

THE aim of the mediæval spirit is to make the world serviceable to clerical interests. This appears so fully attained in the remarkable phenomenon of the Carlovingian empire, that all later attempts to approach it are directed, more or less consciously, toward the reproduction of that monarchy. The last Christmas of the eighth century witnesses a marriage of world-monarchy and of world-hierarchy such as the Middle Ages do not see again. Almost unprepared, Charlemagne finds himself faced by a problem which is solved only through the might of his genius, and that genius itself presents other problems which only after many centuries appear again. For this very reason, however, his work is only a temporary phenomenon, which, as epoch-making, places before the eyes of later ages the unattainable goal of their struggles, a prince of Christendom, namely, who is at the same time feudal lord and dearest son of the Catholic Church.

## § 153.

Scholastic philosophy, as the universal formula of this period, begins, likewise, with a man who grasps immediately by the power of his genius that which his successors are obliged to work out gradually. The complete unity of the ecclesiastical faith, as fixed by the Oriental and Occidental Fathers, with the results of rational investigation, is so certain to him that he offers to refute every doubt in relation to the former by means of the latter. It cannot be regarded as accidental that this epoch-making man, who promises what scholasticism in its completest form accomplishes (*vid.* § 205), belongs to a people who received their education from Rome. It was however especially important to them that such an agreement should be pointed out. To this is to be added the fact that in his fatherland, at a time when scientific culture was everywhere at a low ebb, the clergy formed a praiseworthy exception. Irish wisdom was celebrated. The method of instruction which began with the *trivium* and ended with the *quadrivium* was called Irish. From Ireland it spread to Scotland

and England, and from there to the Continent. The names of BEDE (673-735) and of ALCUIN (736-804), which adorned the schools of Wearmouth and of York, belong not to their land alone but to the world. The learning of the former was so celebrated that posterity ascribed to him an alphabetically arranged *thesaurus* of philosophical, principally Aristotelian, sayings, from which they were accustomed to draw quotations, although men are cited in it who lived a long time after him, as Gilbert, Avicenna, Averroës, Marsilius, and others. These *Axiomata philosophica venerabilis Bedæ* (published at Ingolstadt, 1583, and elsewhere) have appeared very often under other names. Prantl, in the *Sitzungsb. d. Münchner Akademie*, July 6, 1867, has discussed most thoroughly their relation to the more complete, but not alphabetically arranged *thesauri* of somewhat later date, which have very often been printed under the name *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, or similar titles. In this study Prantl has pointed out the scholastic, especially Thomistic, reaction against the renaissance. The fact that Bede gave one of his works the title *De rerum natura* would seem to prove his veneration for Isidore of Seville. Charlemagne employed Alcuin to educate in his palace school and elsewhere (especially in the school founded by Alcuin in Tours) teachers for his people. His pupil and successor Fredegisus, likewise RHABANUS (Hrabanus) MAURUS (767-856) were the chief agents in arousing, the one in France, the other, through the school at Fulda, in Germany, an interest not only in learning but also in philosophy. Among the works of Alcuin are to be mentioned as not lacking in influence *De ratione animæ*; among those of Rhabanus, the encyclopædic work *De universo libri XXII.*, also called *De naturis*, as well as his commentaries upon the Introduction of Porphyry and upon Aristotle's work on the Proposition (whose genuineness is disputed); among those of Fredegisus, *De nihilo et tenebris*, in which he discusses why *nihil* is *aliquid*. A younger contemporary of the last two is a man who was born and educated in Britain, and whom one might be tempted to call the Charlemagne of scholastic philosophy, Erigena.

Cl. Gehle: *De Bedæ venerabilis vita et scriptis*. Lugd. Bat., 1835. F. Lorenz: *Alcuins Leben*. Halle, 1827. Mannier: *Alcuin*, etc. Paris, 1835. Kunstmann: *Rhabanus Magnentius Maurus*. Mainz, 1841.

## A.—SCHOLASTICISM AS A FUSION OF RELIGION AND REASON.

### § 154.

#### ERIGENA.

F. Hjort: *Johannes Scotus Erigena, oder Vom Ursprunge einer christlichen Philosophie*. Copenhagen, 1823. F. A. Staudenmaier: *Jo. Scot. Erigena und die Wissenschaft seiner Zeit*. I. Th. Frankfurt a. M., 1834. St. René Taillandier: *Scot Erigena et la philosophie scolastique*. Strasburg, 1843. Th. Christlieb: *Leben und Lehre des Joh. Scot. Erigena*. Gotha, 1860. Jo. Huber: *Joh. Scot. Erigena*. München, 1861.

1. THE fact that the earliest manuscripts contain at one time the name JOANNES SCOTUS (or Scotigena), at another time JOANNES JERUGENA (later ERIGENA), has given rise to controversies in regard to Erigena's birthplace. Ergene in England, Ayre in Scotland, finally Ireland (*ἱερὰ νῆσος*, 'Iépvη, Erin), all contend for the honour which probably belongs to the last, since he is always cited as a representative of Irish wisdom. He was born between 800 and 815, and was still living in 877. His knowledge of the Greek language and his fondness for Greek dogma and Alexandrian philosophy lend plausibility to the report that he made many journeys especially in Greece, although such accomplishments and tendencies were not unknown in his fatherland. He was called to Paris by Charles the Bald, and there stood at the head of the royal, or of some other school. He was probably a layman, and the report that he died as Abbot of Athelney or, according to others, of Malmesbury, rests upon a confusion of names. That he was called by Alfred to Oxford and taught there is quite as uncertain. The fact that he introduced an entirely new standpoint caused him to be hated by the clergy, as did moreover the way in which he combated Gottschalk's doctrine of double predestination which was disapproved even by Hincmar of Rheims, who had induced him to write his polemic. The work against Paschasius Radbert upon the Lord's Supper, probably written by Ratramnus, which was burned at the command of the clergy, was formerly and is still by some ascribed to him. The translation in the year 860 of Dionysius the Areopagite,

published without papal permission, led Pope Nicholas I. to demand Erigena's removal from Paris. This did not however take place, for in 873 he was certainly still in France. His principal work, the five books *De divisione naturæ* (*περὶ φύσεων μερισμοῦ*, also cited as *περὶ φύσεως*, *De naturis*, *Perifision merismu*, *periphisis*, etc.), was publicly burned on the 23rd of January, 1225, and, being found in wide circulation among the Albigenses, was proscribed and thus became very rare. It was first published in the year 1681 by Gale, and again in 1830 by Schülter. A much more correct edition is that of A. J. Floss, who issued it in the year 1853, as the 122nd volume of Migne's *Patrologiæ cursus completus*, adding the work upon predestination and the translation of Dionysius the Areopagite, with the prefaces of Gale and Schülter. The commentary upon Marcianus Capella, whose authenticity Gale had called in question, is omitted in the edition of Floss, but has been published by Hauréau.

2. The sentence, enunciated by Erigena in his work upon predestination (i. 1), as well as elsewhere, that the true religion is also the true philosophy and vice versa, is the theme of the entire scholastic philosophy. The consequence, which follows naturally from this, that every doubt in regard to religion can be refuted by means of philosophy, still appeared so preposterous that a meeting of French clergymen declared it to be insanity or blasphemy. Religion is to Erigena in its relation to philosophy what authority is to reason. In respect to rank, reason precedes, so also in respect to time, since that which is taught by the authority of the Fathers was discovered by them with the help of reason. The weak must naturally subject themselves to authority, but those who are less weak should be content with this all the less because the figurative nature of many expressions, and further the undeniable accommodation exercised by the Fathers towards the understanding of the uneducated, demand the use of reason as a corrective (*Div. nat.*, i. 69). By reason is to be understood however not the mere subjective opinion, but the common thought which reveals itself in conversation, when out of two reasons are made one, each of the speakers becoming as it were the other (iv. 9). The organ of this general thinking, or of speculation proper, is the *intellectus*, called also *νοῦς* or *animus*, which stands above the *ratio* or the *λόγος*, and still more above the *sensus internus* or *διάνοια*. The latter again

has below it the five external senses and the life force, which belong to the soul only because the latter is bound to the body. The peculiarity of speculation is found by Erigena at one time to lie in the fact that it does not stop with the individual but always embraces the whole in its view, and hand-in-hand with this in the fact that it raises itself above all contradictions. At another time he finds its peculiarity to consist in the fact that through it the knowing agent becomes to a certain degree the thing known, so that the speculative knowledge of Erigena is unity of subject and object (ii. 20). Its immediateness is often indicated by the designations *intellectualis visio, intuitus gnosticus* or *experimentum*.

3. The totality of all being, called sometimes *πᾶν*, sometimes *φύσις*, commonly *natura*, is divided into four classes: the uncreated creating, the created creating, the created uncreating, the neither created nor creating. On account of the designation *φύσις*, sometimes used for the whole, Erigena calls his entire investigation in the fourth book *Physiologia*. Of these four classes mentioned, the first, the ground of all being, and the fourth, the last goal, which for that very reason nothing transcends, fall in God. And thus, since the second class forms the diametrical opposite of the fourth, and the third of the first, these two embrace in themselves the creation, and in such a way that the second class is composed of the first-created *causæ primordiales* of all things, the third of their effects, the things themselves (ii. 2, v. 39, and elsewhere). It has been rightly remarked that at least the first three classes are to be found in Augustine, who bases his division upon the Moved and Unmoved of Aristotle, between which stands that which is both. If any one should desire to say that in view of this agreement there remains to Erigena only to put the nothing in the fourth class, he would perhaps find little in Erigena's works to refute his view; see further, section 4. Of the five books into which the work of Erigena is divided the first four each discuss one class of being without confining themselves strictly to that limit. In the fifth book the return of every created thing into the source of creation is exhibited. The latter forms the content of Erigena's ethics, while the first four books correspond to the two other divisions of philosophy, to theology and physics. The method of procedure is such that rational grounds and authority are continually mingled. As to the latter, the Scrip-

tures are for the most part allegorically interpreted, Origen being directly followed, Philo indirectly. In addition to the Scriptures he summons to his aid the Fathers, the Greek as well as the Latin. Among the former, Origen, the Cappadocian Gregories, the Areopagite and Maximus the Confessor, are chiefly employed; among the latter, Augustine, and, almost more than he, the allegorical interpreter of the Scriptures, Ambrose. He takes as his starting-point therefore the results of the labours of the greatest men of the Orient and of the Occident.

4. God, as the uncreated Creator, is the chief subject considered in the *first book*. He is commonly called *summa bonitas*. As the One by whom, through whom, and to whom is all, He is beginning, middle, and end, and therefore rightly designated as the unity of three Persons, a thing which can excite offence all the less since every being, above all man, the likeness of God, in its *essentia*, *virtus*, and *operatio*, carries trinity in itself, whether one professes to find it with Augustine in the *esse*, *velle*, and *scire*, or with other Fathers in the *essentia*, *virtus*, *operatio*, or in the *intellectus*, *ratio*, and *sensus*. All three form the uncreated creating, for *Pater vult*, *Filius facit*, *Spiritus perfecit*. God is so completely the ground of all being, that properly there is no being outside of Him. All exists only in so far as God appears in it. All being is theophany (iii. 4). The being of God is in no way limited; therefore He is not really a *quid*, does not properly know what He is, because He is above every *quid* and in so far may be called *nihil* (ii. 28). It thus becomes possible for Erigena, in verbal agreement with Augustine, to deny the applicability of the categories to God and, with the Areopagite, to place the theology of negation above that of affirmation (iii. 20). Thus all plurality, even of properties, must be excluded from God. His knowledge is will, His will being. What God knows, that He wills, that He is; all is actual only in so far as it is in Him, indeed, as it is God (i. 12; iii. 17). The endless nature of God, this proper *nihilum*, out of which things proceed, according to theologians, becomes in His theophanies a particular being (*aliquid*), so that God, without ceasing to be above things, in them comes into being and creates Himself (iii. 19, 20).

5. The first transition (*progressio*) leads to the subject of the *second book*, the created and in turn creating nature. By



this is to be understood the content of the *causæ primordiales*, *ideæ*, *formæ*, *prototypa*, *immutabiles rationes*, etc., in the *Verbum Dei*, which embraces them all in itself, as the beginning in which God created all things, as the wisdom in which He saw all things before Him. Although they are created they are nevertheless eternal; for if there were a time when God did not create, then creation would be accidental to Him, and that is impossible (iii. 6). Among these first principles of all things are enumerated goodness, essence, life, reason, blessedness, etc., in short, the highest thinkable predicates, beneath which stands all that partakes of them, because the *participatum* is always more than the *participans* (iii. 1, 2). They themselves likewise stand toward one another in a relation of participation, and therefore essence is a (sub-) species of goodness, life of essence, reason of life, etc. That praises of Plato are not wanting in Erigena is from this easily understood. In their eternal existence in the word of God, the *causæ primordiales* form a unity, are an inseparable whole (*individuum*). The chaos and vacuum of the Mosaic account of creation are therefore referred to the *abyssus* of the primitive causes and interpreted as the brooding Spirit by whom that unity is divided into genera and species (ii. 18, 27). This gulf of causes or principles is the single material out of which things proceed as from their seed. The assumption of matter, indeed, even of a primitive nothing, outside of God, is always ranked with Manichæism (iii. 14). Whatever is real in things is a participation in the creating truth (iii. 9) by means of the principles which are, after God, the highest (ii. 32).

6. These causes and principles are followed by their principles and effects, the things, whose complex, the created not creating nature, forms the chief topic of the *third book*. This book contains therefore the physics of Erigena, in connection with which it must never be forgotten that he, like Augustine, looks upon creation and preservation as one. The introduction to this book is composed of an allegorical treatment of the six days' work, in which Erigena sees simultaneous acts pictured as successive. God did all that He did at once; Moses however can behold and recount the deeds only in succession. Erigena does not doubt that he is able to penetrate the meaning of the history of creation. The world indeed exists only in order that the rational creature may perceive it, and therefore attains the end for which the unenvious

Deity created it only when it is perceived (v. 33). Seeing is much more than the thing seen, hearing than the thing heard; the becoming cognisable is the highest existence of things. For this reason man does not belong properly to things, but things in their truth are in him when he perceives them (iv. 8). The example of Abraham, who, without the Scriptures, perceived God in the courses of the stars, teaches that not only the Bible but also nature reveals the Lord (iii. 85). Wilderness and emptiness are followed in the first place by the contrast of *obscuritas causarum* and *claritas effectuum*, that is, this contrast proceeds out of the abyss of principles by means of the Holy Spirit, which not only distributes gifts but in general establishes all manifoldness (ii. 32). Within the *claritas effectuum* the contrast between heaven and earth, that is, between *spiritus* and *corpus*, is most prominent, and to them belong life or animation as a mean. The general (*generalia* or *catholica*) elements form the intermediate steps between principles and bodies. They are themselves, properly speaking, not corporeal. In man all is so united that he is designated the *officina creaturarum*. The angels cannot be so named because they do not have a body formed from elements (iii. 26, 27). The twice-told account of the creation of man refers to a double creation; the first without sexual distinction in the likeness of God, to which man would have immediately attained if he had been obedient; the second the creation for the state of sin of an animal nature, male and female (iv. 5, 6). The latter occupies the prominent place, since man, whose state of innocence pictured in the Bible is as little a temporal condition as Paradise is an actual place (iv. 12, 17, 18), immediately after his creation, even before the devil tempts him, passes through the stadia of *mutabilitas voluntatis* and of *sopor*, and, after the temptation, proceeds to sin and loses his original body, which is to be his future glorified body (iv. 13, 14). He is now no longer in Paradise, whence flow from the one fountain of life the four streams—Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Righteousness.

7. This however is not the end. The goal is rather the return of man to God. This is the particular subject of the *fourth book*, but is treated with almost more fulness in the *fifth*. That it can be considered only in connection with the apostasy from God, that is, in connection with evil, lies in the nature of the case. The accusation of Pantheism, which

has been made against Erigena's doctrine of evil, is justified only in so far as the latter really avoids dualism more than the opposite extreme. Since the ground of all true being lies in God, and God wills and knows only true being, evil really possesses no substantial existence, indeed it cannot even be said that God knows of evil (iv. 6, v. 27). Man also, when he assumes the Divine point of view, that is when he considers the All in its entirety, sees nothing evil, but gains the impression of a harmony in which the single discord enhances by contrast the beauty of the whole (v. 35, 36). Since evil has not true being, it has also no positive cause; it is *incausale* (iv. 6). Free-will, to which many have attributed it, is something good; indeed every act of will is this, since it is directed toward good. That which makes it bad is only the delusion and error which picture as a good that which is none. Evil therefore consists only in the perverted tendency of the will, which is in itself good. Since it is in itself delusion and non-entity, it therefore becomes nothing, and that is called punishment, so that that only can be punished which does not exist (v. 35). This punishment issues in pardon or pain, according as the man who receives it turns to God or from Him (v. 32). The pain consists in the inability to do that which the perverted will wishes. Hell, therefore, is an internal state, just as Paradise is. Only on account of the sensuousness of men have the Fathers represented both as spatial and temporal (v. 29). The existence of hell does not disturb the harmony of the whole, since God's righteousness reveals itself in it (v. 35). Since the object of punishment is not the substance of the sinner willed by God, but empty willing accidental to the sinner, Erigena thinks of a restoration of all things as the final goal. Referring expressly to Origen (cf. § 137, 2), he does not entirely exclude from this restoration even the demons, since eternity and evil are incompatible (v. 27, 28). And yet it is only their complete exclusion which he does not admit, for he does not deny the distinction between such as retain a remembrance of their great sins and such as do not, and he connects this with the various steps in which the return of things to God and their *adunatio* with Him advance. This return must naturally, as the antitype of the procession from God, show all the steps of the descending process of creation, but in the reverse order. In creation arose first the distinction between Creator and creature; then, within the latter, the

distinction between the intelligible (the principles) and the material (the effects); in the last again the contrast between heaven and earth, and upon earth between Paradise and the rest of the world; and, finally, the contrast between man and woman; and, in the departure from Paradise, the contrast between this and the coarse material existence in the body composed of elements. Death sets free from this existence, for in death the elements are separated. In the resurrection the distinction between the sexes ceases. Thus the world is transformed into Paradise, the earthly becomes heavenly, and all passes over into the *causæ primordiales*. Finally *theosis* or *deificatio* takes place, which is not however to be thought of as absorption, for the individuality is preserved, the elevation consisting in the attainment of a full knowledge of God, in which the knowing and the known become one (v. 37). If all attain to Paradise, then there must be many dwellings and degrees of rank. Only a few chosen ones will taste of the *deificatio* as the Sabbath of Sabbaths.

### § 155.

1. The fact that in Erigena the principle of Scholasticism makes its appearance as a new or immediate thing, not only gives him the position of an innovator, distrusted by the watchful Church, but also causes the oneness of ecclesiastical doctrine and reason to appear immediate, that is, without distinction. On account of this want of distinction every rational ground is to him at once authority, and the dictum of authority he treats as if it were a ground of reason. The former gives to his philosophizing a heterodox character, the latter a mystical. He philosophizes still too much in the manner of the Church Fathers, who had to frame the dogmas, and from this arises his agreement with the Neo-Platonists. Nevertheless he regards it as certain that there exists already not only a revelation and sacred history, but also ecclesiastical doctrine of irrefragable authority. This is a contradiction. Its solution will be the first step of progress. This will be accomplished by assigning to the distinction between the two sides its proper importance, and by putting reflection in the place of the immediate *intuitus gnosticus*. This reflection proceeds on the one hand from the dogma, as something given to the conception of it; on the other hand, it makes the conception its starting-point, and arrives at the dogma as something in

agreement with it. Where the union of doctrine and of reason is mediate and the result of reflection, both can better secure their rights. The second father of Scholasticism is superior to the first in orthodoxy and in perspicuity. The fact that the union of which we are speaking is not asserted for the first time, takes from it the character of an innovation, and therefore secures it indulgence. The second author of Scholasticism is a highly honoured prince of the Church. The century and a half which lie between him and Erigena, the layman attacked by the Church, show no great philosophical results. The tenth century is at first too uncivilized, afterwards too much occupied with deeds to have time for philosophizing. The shattered State, the tottering Church, must be strengthened, cloisters and schools must be purified and reformed, in order that the luxury of thinking may again become possible and the leisure necessary for philosophy may be won.

2. The first place among the men who could have held up before the age the mirror of self-knowledge if it had only been another age, is occupied by GERBERT of Auvergne, who died in 1003 as Pope Sylvester II. He was borne on by the stream of efforts which sought to restore the ecclesiastical, civil and intellectual life, and he himself did more than any one else to advance them. He was a friend of the Ottos in Germany and of the Capets in France, and had charge of the education of their sons. Although he did not belong to the cloister, every one of whose abbots was made a saint, he yet was mighty in advancing the impulses which proceeded from it. As a teacher he was so celebrated that every school which was under his charge became a normal institute. Where he took part in Church government (in Bobbio, and in the "three R's," the bishoprics of Rheims, Ravenna, and Rome) he opposed abuses with great vigour. He was in fact so occupied with practical affairs that only his inextinguishable thirst for knowledge explains how he could still find time to pursue his studies. Although they embraced some of the free arts, he nevertheless devoted himself with especial fondness to the branches of the *quadrivium*. It is these which at one time procured for him the cognomen *musicus*, and again brought upon him the suspicion that such (astronomical) knowledge was not attained by right means, and finally caused posterity to make his services (in arithmetic) still greater than

they actually were. As regards the *trivium*, we know that he did a great deal for rhetoric, and we still possess a dialectic treatise by him, *De rationale et ratione uti*. The question how the use of reason may properly be predicated of a rational being, a narrower conception in this case, contrary to custom, being predicated of a broader, is answered by Gerbert in a manner which really results in the distinction of assumed and inherent judgments, since emphasis is laid upon the fact that the predicate is here an accident of the subject (*vid.* § 86, 1). This is perhaps less surprising than the fact that such a question should interest an emperor (Otto III.). This serves to prove that even among the most eminent of that age the interest extended at most only to the vestibule of philosophical speculation, as far as that gymnasium of the spirit in which the latter was to prepare itself by means of formal dialectic practice for an activity richer in results.

C. J. Hock: *Gerbert oder Papst Sylvester II. und sein Jahrhundert*. Wien, 1837.

3. BERENGAR of Tours, although he did not come into direct contact with Gerbert, is yet connected with him through the fact that he was educated in the school at Chartres under one of Gerbert's greatest pupils, Fulbert, the "Socrates of the Franks." The writings of Erigena may also have exerted an influence upon him. This is true at least of the work which was so long ascribed to Erigena, that of Ratramnus against Paschasius Radbert and his doctrine of transubstantiation. Berengar appeared as a champion of this doctrine against those who agreed with Paschasius. Even the favour of Hildebrand, who as legate and again as pope endeavoured to protect him, could not prevent his being threatened to the last extreme at two Church councils, so that he felt it possible to rescue himself only by a public recantation. For this double subjection to the fear of men he blamed himself until his death (1088) more than for his unorthodox doctrines. The former as well as the latter may perhaps have been a result of the fact that he always combats the dogmatic definitions of his opponents with the fundamental propositions of dialectics, as he himself willingly admits. While Gerbert, in pursuing his investigations upon subject and predicate, leaves Christianity quite out of view, and is not at all hindered from formulating a confession of faith, as at his election to the

bishopric of Rheims, Berengar, on the contrary, argues that "real body" cannot be united as predicate with bread as subject, etc. Such emphasis of the grammatico-dialectic rules, at a time when no Anselm or Abelard had made logic the queen of the sciences, was an innovation in marked contrast to the ruling opinion. And, again, it is quite natural that the feeling of certainty and confidence of victory which are inspired by a phalanx of thinkers of like views should be wanting in him who was the first to advocate this appeal of theology to the *trivium*. If we compare Berengar with Anselm and Abelard, he appears as a mere beginner; his application of logic to theology as something premature and hence untimely. It is therefore not to be wondered at that he was obliged to yield before the unspeculative but learned Lanfranc, trained by a legal practice and leader of the "positive" theologians, who have been since then contrasted with the "scholastic." Again, Berengar exercises his dialectic talent upon one doctrinal point alone, and that is properly no dogma but a theological speculation, since it not only asserts the bodily presence of Christ but also seeks to explain it (cf. § 145). This fact, if we compare him with Anselm, who tests and sifts dialectically only dogmas, and those in their totality, causes Berengar to appear as a man who has not correctly understood the peculiar problem of his age. Not only the widespread predilection for heresy, which Dr. Strauss has called "romantic," but also the fact that Berengar has been made the subject of that little cabinet-piece of Lessing's, in which a newly-discovered work of his was given to the world, has surrounded him with a certain halo. (The work of Lessing has been published in full by A. F. and F. Th. Vischer, Berlin, 1834.) Finally, the fact is perhaps to be added, that he twice did what Galileo is especially praised as a hero for doing, recanted what he believed to be true.

4. WILLIAM, a contemporary of Berengar, was born in 1026, and became ABBOT OF HIRSCHAU in 1069, a position which he held until his death in 1091. Recently Prantl has again called attention to him, both in the *Sitzungsberichten der Münchener Akademie* and also in his great work. In the former (1861, *Heft I.*) he reviews a very rare quarto volume, printed by Henric Petri in Basel in 1531, which contains William's *Philosophicarum et astronomicarum institutionum libri tres*. More interesting than the attempt to conclude the

existence of almighty wisdom from the fact that the elements of the world are opposed to one another and therefore can be brought into unity only by an external power, is the circumstance that William had become acquainted, through the translations of Constantine of Carthage (Africanus), with some works of the Arabians, and that he quotes Johannitius, that is Honein (*vid.* § 181). Only their works upon the natural sciences, however, appear to have interested him; at least, although the honour of being the first to attain a knowledge of Oriental wisdom may be conceded to him, he cannot be regarded as the channel through which Mohammedan Aristotelianism first flowed into the Christian world. This became nevertheless, as will be shown later, an essential element in the development of scholasticism. Moreover K. Werner (*Entwicklungsgang der mittelalterlichen Psychologie*, Vienna, 1876) has recently asserted that the work in question is only a reprint of the four books *περὶ διδάξεων* of William of Conches (*vid.* § 162).

## § 156.

## ANSELM.

F. R. Hasse: *Anselm von Canterbury*. 2 Theile. Leipzig, 1843, 52.

1. ANSELM, a member of a noble family of Lombardy, was born in Aosta in 1035, and received his theological training in Normandy, first in Avranches, afterward in the monastery of Bec. Here he succeeded Lanfranc as Prior, and finally became Abbot. The school, which was celebrated before his time, became under him the first in Christendom, especially for dialectics. He became Lanfranc's successor likewise as Archbishop of Canterbury, and from the year 1089 until his death (April 21, 1109) victoriously maintained the rights of the Church, not intimidated by a double exile. His works were first printed by Casp. Hochfelder, Nuremberg, 1491, and again by Gerberon in one folio volume, Paris, 2nd ed., 1721. The latter contains Eadmer's biography of Anselm, and, freed from its typographical errors, forms the 155th volume of Migne's *Patr. lat.*

2. Anselm, like the Church Fathers, often quotes the Old Testament saying *nisi credideretis, non intelligetis* [cf. Anselm, *De fide Trin.*, ii.], in order to fix the relation of belief and knowledge, of authority and reason. Belief and purification



of heart must precede the establishment of doctrines; and for those who have not the capacity *intelligere*, belief and submissive *veneratio* suffice. But for the person who is capable of understanding, it would be neglect and indolence not to proceed from the means to the end, that is from belief to knowledge (*De fide Trinit.*, 2; *Proslog.*, 1), and so substitute *dilectatio*, free perception, for *veneratio* (*Cur Deus homo*, 1). However much therefore Anselm emphasizes the fact that all his doctrines agree with Scripture and with the Fathers, especially Augustine (*Monol.*, *præf.*), he nevertheless often reiterates his desire to develop them from reason as if there were no Bible, so that they may be proved even to the unbeliever who admits the validity only of reason, the supreme judge (*Cur Deus homo*, *præf.*). He says that rational grounds which do not contradict Scripture have *eo ipso* the authority of Scripture upon their side (*De conc. præsc. et lib. arb.*, iii. 7). For this very reason, in addition to a knowledge of ecclesiastical doctrine, a thorough dialectic training is most necessary to him who wishes to philosophize successfully. Whoever, for instance, accepts the heretical dialectics, according to which the genera are only *flatus vocis*, mere words, and thus answers the question stated by Porphyry (cf. § 128, 6) otherwise than he had done, is incapable of understanding any of the most important dogmas (*De fide Trinit.*, 2).

3. This method of Anselm is revealed in the investigations in regard to the nature of God to which the *Monologium* is devoted. In agreement with Plato and Proclus, he maintains that every predicate expresses only participation in that which it affirms, so that the predicate great presupposes greatness as its *prius*, etc. Therefore all things by their predicates point to a nature which not only has but is all these predicates. This nature, since the most general predicate of all things is that they exist, coincides with the absolute being, the *essentia*, a word which Anselm, in agreement with Augustine, prefers to *substantia*. This highest of all thoughts, to which all things look, but which points to nothing beyond itself, is the conception of God. God is thus *summum omnium quæ sunt* or *id quo majus cogitari nequit*. He is All in the highest degree, *summe ens*, *summe vivens*, *summe bonum*, etc., and is this All not by participation, but in Himself, *per se*. This nature must be thought of necessarily as one, since the opposite opinion, that it is many, is saved from contradictions

only by the tacit presupposition of unity (*Monol.*, i. 16, 26; 6, 4).

4. The conception of Deity thus gained is then used by Anselm in his ontological proof for the existence of God, which he develops in his *Proslogium*, a work whose second title is *Fides quærens intellectum*. Referring to the opening words of the fourteenth Psalm, he seeks to prove to the *insipiens*, who says in his heart there is no God, that he contradicts himself. He presupposes only that the denier of God knows what he says, and does not utter mere empty words. If such a person understands by God one *quo nihil majus cogitari potest*, and if he is obliged nevertheless to admit that *esse, in intellectu et in re* is greater than *esse in solo intellectu*, he must also acknowledge that *Deus non potest cogitari non esse*, and that he has therefore been talking nonsense. For this very reason Anselm is quite right in his reply to the objection of Guanilo, formerly Lord of Montigny, who when over seventy years of age had entered the monastery of Marmontier and from there wrote against Anselm's new theology. He maintained that the existence of an island Atlantis could be proved in the same way; but Anselm replied that he had not taken his departure from a thing *quod majus omnibus est* but from the *quo majus cogitari nequit*, and had thus brought the *insipiens* into such a position that he must either admit that he thinks of God as actually existing, or must confess that he says what he himself does not think, which would make him an *impudens conspuendus* (*Lib. apol. c. Guanil.*, 5, 9). It is this very subjective turn which Anselm gives to his argument which imparts to it greater value than it possesses in the later form employed by Wolff and others.

5. The remainder of the contents of the *Monologium* finds its continuation in that which is developed by Anselm in his polemics against Roscellin in the work *De fide Trinitatis et de incarnatione Verbi*. It is an attempt to explain the doctrine of the Trinity. The highest being, compared with which things do not properly exist (*vix sunt*), expresses in the Word, consubstantial with Him, Himself and at the same time all that He creates, as the artist knows in one thought his work of art and himself as artist (*Monol.*, 28, 29, 33, 34). In this His Word the world exists as life and truth better and more beautiful than in reality. While our thoughts are copies, the Divine thoughts are models of things. The words pro-

duction, Son, express best the relation to the consubstantial Word, as *spirare* expresses the procession from the Father and from the Son whose *communitas* is the Spirit (*Ibid.*, 36, 39, 57). The Trinity is moreover by no means a doctrine hostile to reason. The fact that the one God is Father, Son, and Spirit, as the one Nile is fountain, river, and sea, ought not to surprise any one who realizes that in man, created in the likeness of God, *memoria*, *intelligentia*, and *amor* exist, all of which are one, indeed in each one of which the other two are contained (*De fid. Trin.*, 8; *Monol.*, 60, 61, 67). Thus the Occidental opinion, according to which Father and Son are quite alike in the *processio*, and the Son does not occupy something like a maternal position, is in accord with reason and is much to be preferred to the Oriental view (*Monol.*, 53; cf. *De proc. Spiriti Sti. c. græc.*).

6. In the same way in which he endeavours, in the works already mentioned, to explain the doctrines of God with the help of reason to such as do not respect authority, Anselm seeks to make soteriology clear. On account of the close relationship, however, in which this stands to the doctrine of the fall, which cannot itself be understood without the creation of free creatures, we must first notice what Anselm teaches in his three dialogues: *De veritate*, *De libero arbitrio*, and *De casu Diaboli*. The principal points are as follows: The being of things is not like that of God; as something borrowed, it is of itself no being, can scarcely be called being. This is the meaning of the statement that the world was created out of nothing, that is, out of a condition which forms a contrast to its own being, but not to that of God. Things were rather in God's thinking and willing before they were created (*Monol.*, 8, 9). The proper end of the world is the honour of God; indeed it may be said that the world is the manifested glory of God, inasmuch as His glory is reflected in its order, and therefore every attempt against this order is an attack upon His honour. The highest station among created things is occupied by rational natures, angels and men, the former counted first. They, like all things, are created to the glory of God, with the difference that in them as conscious beings His glory is known. It is God's glory to be known. To angels and men belong freedom of the will, the *liberum arbitrium*, which Anselm, like Augustine in opposition to Pelagius, conceives, not as the ability to sin or not to sin, but as the

*potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem* (*De lib. arb.*, 1, 12). But he differs from Augustine, inasmuch as he maintains in freedom the distinction between potentiality and actuality which causes him to assert that free will cannot be lost even when the fall has made it impossible to obtain righteousness without higher support. Thus man has the power of sight even when he cannot see because there is no light (*De lib. arb.*, 3). Without the fall, angels and men would have remained at most in their original state, and would not have succeeded in making themselves partakers of the higher good for which God had designed them. The possibility of the fall lies in the fact that the will of the creature has a double end : happiness for its own sake, righteousness for the sake of God's glory. Each of these is natural and necessary ; one of them only involves no idea of merit (*De casu Diaboli*, 18, 13, 14). The angel, inasmuch as both are placed before him, can, by means of his free will, but not by means of that which makes him free, that is he can by means of his arbitrariness, will happiness alone (*De lib. arb.*, 2), can put his well-being in the place of the divine glory, and thus improperly will to be like God, that is autonomous. Or he can subordinate happiness to righteousness, his will to the glory of God. In the former case he loses his righteousness, his will becomes evil, that is lacks what it should have. In the latter case he confirms it and gives to it in a certain degree that which prevents its being lost. The only positive evil is the perverted direction of the will. The will itself comes from God and is good, so also the deed, that is the change produced in the world. Unrighteousness is absence and in so far is equal to nothing. The evil consists in willing this nothing instead of the prescribed something (*De cas. Diab.*, 4, 18, 15, 19, 20). We need not be surprised that God punishes the sinner for this nothing. His punishment consists in the fact that He cannot tolerate the vacancy, that He demands something where nothing is (*De conc. virg.*, 6). As sin lies only in the perverse will, the punishment concerns neither the action nor the work, but the will. If we ask finally what it was that caused the devil to will the negative instead of the positive, to let go instead of holding fast, we must reply that his action was without reason. The evil will is at the same time *causa efficiens* and *effectus*, it lies solely in arbitrariness (*De cas. Diab.*, 19, 20, 27).

7. What has been said so far is true of the fall of man as well as of that of the angels. Anselm, however, regards it as certain that for men there is a redemption, but for fallen angels none (*Cur Deus homo*, ii. 21). He is obliged to enter upon a more exact consideration of the distinction between the sins of angels and of men. This investigation is connected with a discussion of original sin, which cannot exist among angels since they do not constitute a genus growing by propagation, nor an angelhood similar to the family. In this connection the work *De conceptu virginali et originali peccata* is to be especially noticed. It is of the greatest importance that the nature, or the general essence by which each of us is man, be not confounded with the *individuitas*, or especial essence by which we are persons, by which each one is a particular man. In Adam human nature was whole. Outside of him it did not exist, and therefore it is stained by his personal sin, and the guilt passes over, as original or natural guilt, upon those who are in the *potestas propagandi* of Adam. Every one of them is *per creationem homo*, *per individuitatem persona*, *per propagationem Adam*, and this family bond makes them Adam's heirs. Sin has its seat only in the rational will, and consists in the fact that the will, good in itself, is subordinated to the desire for pleasure, also good in itself. Man's original guilt therefore first begins when he awakes to a *rationalis voluntas*, and hence, being inherited, is not so great as the personal sin of Adam. Nevertheless it is justly punished in Adam's posterity, since what he did took place not without the participation of the nature; at the same time, however, the various degrees of punishableness must not be forgotten (*De conc. virg.*, 1, 10, 23, 4, 7, 22, 28).

8. With these propositions in regard to the rise and propagation of sin, the premises are given for the chief question in soteriology—the theory of satisfaction. These Anselm develops in his most celebrated work, *Cur Deus homo*. Again, as he himself says, he proceeds as if there had been no incarnation but the necessity of it were to be exhibited. The loss which natures designed for blessedness had suffered by the fall of the angels is again made good by the creation of men, although they are not created solely on that account. They are to shame the devil, inasmuch as they, although externally tempted, stand more firmly than he who tempted

himself. But man himself fell, and thus served as a triumph for the devil and robbed God of His glory, for which the entire world offered as yet no compensation. Since, however, the indulgence of evil would sanction disorder and disobedience and would justify unrighteousness, it was necessary, if man were not to be lost, that compensation be furnished for that transgression in addition to the punishment which it required. This, however, man himself, whose place it is to supply it, is not able to furnish, since he has made himself incapable of righteousness (*Cur Deus homo*, i. 10, 16, 21; ii. 11, 12, 23, 24). On the other side, God has taken upon Himself the necessity of completing His work, and this necessity is His grace. He alone is in a condition to do as much as must be done, *i.e.* more than all the world. Since God alone can, but man should do it, there remains but the one way open. God must accomplish it as man. Wholly God and wholly man, He must not so much lower Himself to mankind as raise mankind to Himself and complete the restitution which man owes (*Ibid.*, ii. 5, 6, 7). But the difficulty arises, that through the assumption of human nature God appears to take upon Himself also the original sin connected with it. This is not so; for the incarnate One is born, not after the method of natural generation (*De conc. virg.*, 23), but in such a manner that His birth, a creation from woman alone, ranks as a fourth beside the three different ways in which God created Adam, Eve, and their posterity. Thus by this miraculous creative act of God the hereditary activity of the father of the race was interrupted; and so, under these circumstances, even a mere man could have been born free from original sin, especially when, as in this case, the mother who bore him was purified from sin through hopeful belief in the One to come (*Cur Deus homo*, ii. 7, 16; *De conc. virg.*, 16). If the sin of man therefore is to be expiated, God must be born as man, and indeed as a sinless man. The question however arises, Why God the Son? It would be unreasonable to suppose all three Persons united with man to form one Person. It can therefore be but one. The Son (of God) alone in becoming Son (of the Virgin) will not deny His (sonly) nature. The fact, however, that it is the part of the true image of God to win the victory against the evil one, the caricatured likeness of God, is especially decisive (*Cur Deus homo*, ii. 9). There arises the further question: How is that compensation made

which only the incarnated One can offer? Naturally, not by the fulfilment of His own duty. But since every righteous *deed* of man is no more than the fulfilment of his duty, only *suffering*, and indeed undeserved suffering, can make compensation. In this lies the significance of the death of Christ. In His death Anselm does not, like most of the Church Fathers, emphasize the idea that the devil has sold his claim upon men, or that he has been tricked of it (as others, *e.g.* Isidore Hisp., *Sententt.*, i. 14, teach), but rather the fact that the incarnate One offers as a sacrifice to God something which is greater than all that is not God, that is, Himself, an offering upon which God has no claim as He has upon His obedience. This self-sacrifice of the guiltless expiates, through the boundless worth which His life has, the guilt against God acquired in the fall, and shows therefore a contrast to the fall which can be pointed out in all its details. What lust perpetrates suffering atones; the robbery of God is expiated by the gift to God, etc. The fact that this offering of His own life takes place in the form of a painful death, makes the Saviour further a model and pattern, but this is not the principal thing. This sacrifice is necessary, but not in such a sense as to destroy its voluntariness, for only that, only the fact that it is not compulsory, gives the Saviour a claim to reward. Since nothing can be given to Him who possesses all that the Father has, that reward, remission, is imparted to the human race, and works backward upon the ancients and forward upon the brethren who cling to Him. Thus, inasmuch as hereditary righteousness blots out hereditary sin, righteousness and mercy alike gain their rights. Of course this hereditary righteousness belongs only to man, since the Son of God became a man, not an angel, and only man was subject to hereditary guilt (*Cur Deus homo*, ii. 11, 18, 19, 20, 21).

9. After it had been shown that only the death of the incarnate One could furnish that satisfaction without which no man can become blessed, and after the reason for this had been given, there was still needed a proof that the manner in which the redemption accomplished by Christ is appropriated by the individual is not throughout contrary to reason. This is given in the treatise *De concordia præscientiæ prædestinationis et gratiæ cum libero arbitrio*, which Anselm completed shortly before his death, convinced that if any one had refuted his doubts as he does those of his friend, he would have been

satisfied (*De conc. præsc.*, etc., *quæst.* iii. 14). In respect to foreknowledge and decrees, it is maintained that for God there is no before and after, and that one cannot properly say that God has known or decreed something before it comes to pass. The distinction, however, between the *necessitas quæ sequitur* and the *necessitas quæ præcedit* is especially urged. According to the former, when something is known it is, to be sure, to be concluded (reasoning backward) that it must be, but the latter is the cogent ground for an event. If, on account of this distinction, my deed does not follow from the fact that God (fore-)knows my action, but rather His (fore-)knowledge follows from my deed, all difficulty vanishes when we maintain that God knows completely this deed of mine, and therefore also knows that it will be the result of free impulse (*Ibid.*, *quæst.* i. 4; *quæst.* i. 7, 1). Human freedom is also just as little in contradiction with the grace of God as with the divine prescience and predestination, and that for the reason that the freedom of the sinless man itself is a gift of divine grace, while baptism and preaching impart freedom, that is the ability to maintain the obedient direction of the will, to the fallen man. But neither is freedom in conflict with converting and co-operant grace. It is mere misunderstanding which has read in the Scriptures that grace alone, or that free will alone, gives man righteousness. Only in respect to baptized infants can the former be asserted. Elsewhere it is free will through which man exercises belief in constant strife against evil; and this belief has also a meritorious side and brings man nearer the condition, in this world indeed unattainable, in which he will no longer be able to err. In order to call out this militant belief, the effects of sin remain even when baptism or martyrdom have wiped out the guilt, so that only when the appointed number of believers is complete will perfect incorruptibility take the place of corruption (*Ibid.*, *quæst.* iii. 3, 4, 6, 9).

### § 157.

As the original founder of scholastic philosophy was compared above (§ 153) with the gifted creator of the Frankish Empire, the activity of its second ancestor may be likened to the prudent persistency with which the Ottos labour for a Roman empire of German nationality. Not the prophetic



insight of genius, not mystical contemplation, but clear, rational thinking leads him to formulate a Theology which explains what had been established in Nice and in Constantinople, a Christology which proves what had been fixed at Chalcedon, finally an Anthropology which makes accessible to sound human reason the dogmas framed by Augustine, if in no other way, by a moderation of their offensive severity. To the reconciliation of belief with the reason of the natural man Anselm devoted his entire scientific activity. In it may be distinguished, in accordance with the objective (material) and subjective (formal) elements which belief as well as reason contains, four problems, which may be designated the dogmatico-systematic, the psychological, the dialectic and the metaphysical. Anselm keeps all of these in view, and that always at the same time. In the first place, the content of belief, the *fides quæ creditur*, must be rationally arranged and brought into a system. In the second place, there must be shown to be reason in the condition of faith on the part of man, or, what is the same thing, in the *fides qua creditur*. In the third place, the understanding must have formal dexterity in adjusting, if necessary by means of distinction, doctrines originating from the most varied sources. In the fourth place, there must be given the metaphysical conviction that not the world of things, but the supernatural and the ideal alone have truth. With Anselm, thinking is so bound to systematic form that the chronological succession of his works coincides with the order demanded by the system. At the same time he knows from experience the blessedness of belief, and has considered thoroughly the steps which separate it on the one side from sense perception, on the other from spiritual contemplation. He is however a dialectician even in his prayers; and his most subtle argumentations are clothed in the form of addresses to God. Finally, not only his metaphysics but his entire theology rests upon the certainty that the universals have true reality, that is that ideas, as models, go far ahead of things, which are mere copies.

### § 158.

From the strife of Anselm against the tri-theistic ideas of Roscellinus of Compiègne it is plain that the latter, as we know too from other sources, belonged to the dialecticians

who, like Heiric (Eric) of Auxerre (834-881) for instance, and others educated in the school at Fulda (*vid.* § 153), saw in the universals, after the example of Marcius Capella (§ 147), mere words, or at least abstractions of the understanding copied from individual things, which alone actually exist. Anselm, on the contrary, held fast to the Platonism which, more than a century before, Remigius of Auxerre, pupil and successor of Heiric and afterwards teacher in Paris, had made current, in his commentaries upon Marcius Capella. Remigius' pupil, Otto of Cluny, also had followed his master in this respect. It may indeed be carried back still further, since Erigena platonizes in the same way, although, to be sure, in him as epoch-making, and therefore containing latent in himself all that stirs his age, the first germs of the opposite opinions may also be discovered. The Church, in this strife, not only condemned the dogmatic heresy, but at the same time declared against the metaphysical principles, and thereby elevated an old dialectic controversy of the schools to a leading question of the Church. This, however, was not an abjuration of the wisdom which she had elsewhere shown, *e.g.* in connection with the strife of Augustine and Pelagius in regard to Traducianism, but it proceeded from the perfectly correct feeling that whoever ascribes more reality to things than to ideas is more attached to this world than to the ideal kingdom of heaven. Therefore it is not blind devotion to his own opinions which leads Anselm to call such dialectics heretical, but for every careful observer the significance which a person ascribes to the universals is a standard of his relation toward the Church. From this arises the fact that in that age the names of the various tendencies are drawn from the predicates which each of them attaches to the universals. Whoever, like Anselm, proceeds from the fundamental principle that *universalia sunt ante res*, and accordingly asserts that they are themselves *res*, or at least *realia*, is called a *realis*, later a realist. Whoever, on the contrary, like Roscellinus, holds that the universals are abstractions of things, and therefore *post res*, are mere *voces* or *nomina*, is called a *vocalis* or *nominalis*, later a nominalist. As it is no accident that the realists are the more ecclesiastical, it is likewise none that at this time the nominalists are intellectually the less important. At this time; for when the problem becomes the undermining of the mediæval, world-conquering Church, the nominalists

will show that they better understand the age, that is, that they are the greater philosophers (*vid. infra*, § 217).

Cf. Cousin in *Cours de* 1829, Leçon 9, and further the introduction to his *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard*, Paris, 1836, and his *Fragmens de philosophie de moyen âge*, Paris, 1840-50. Also Prantl: *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*. 2nd vol., Leipzig, 1861; 3rd, 1867.—Barach: *Zur Geschichte des Nominalismus vor Roscellin*. Wien, 1866. Joh. Heinr. Loewe: *Der Kampf zwischen dem Realismus und Nominalismus im Mittelalter*. Prag, 1876.

## § 159.

1. The accusation that nominalism, consistently carried out, must lead to the deification of things, was no slander on the part of Anselm; it lies in the nature of the case. What he did not see, was the fact that the last consequences of realism must lead to the opposite extreme, to acosmism or Pantheism. Anselm himself does not go so far, nor, as it appears, does his pupil Odon, bishop of Cambray, who is said to have attacked the nominalist Raimbert of Lille, in his *Liber de complexionibus* and his *Tractatus de re et ente*. A letter of the Bishop Hermann of Tournay, written in the twelfth century, in speaking of this strife, says that Raimbert read dialectics to his scholars "*juxta quosdam modernos in voce*"; Odo (Odoardus) on the contrary, "*more Boethii antiquorumque in re*." The realistically inclined Hildebert of Lavardin, Bishop of Mans and later Archbishop of Tours, approaches nearer to Pantheism, as well in his poetry as in the *Tractatus theologicus* which is ascribed to him. This is still more true of WILLIAM, who was born in the year 1070 at Champeaux, and died in 1121 as Bishop of Châlons. He carried realism further than any one else known to us. He was educated in theology by Manegold of Lauterbach and by Anselm of Laon, and in dialectics by Roscellinus, but took stand against the latter in Paris, where he taught first in the cathedral school and afterward in the monastery of St. Victor, which was founded by himself. While Roscellinus had ascribed substantiality only to the individual, William, on the contrary, asserts that in Socrates manhood alone is something substantial, Socratism only accidental. And not only does he ascribe this priority to actual genera, but he represents every generality reached by abstraction as a *universale ante res*, and asserts accordingly that *rationalitas* and *albedo* would exist even if

there were no *rationale* or *album*. Since the individual variety is not essential, he urges that the *universale* exists *essentialiter, totaliter et simul* in all individuals.

2. In his approach to Pantheism, BERNARD agrees with William. He bears the second name, Sylvester; but this is ordinarily omitted, and he is called Bernard of CHARTRES, or Bernard Carnotensis, from the place where he laboured. He was born soon after William, but outlived him forty years. His principal work, *De mundi universitate, sive megacosmus et microcosmus*, has been recently published complete by Barach and Wrobel, Cousin having already issued extracts from it. It was written while Eugene III. was pope. Prose and verse alternate. Cosmology and psychology almost supplant theology. Nevertheless the enthusiastic Platonist combines with his doctrines of the three principles, spirit, soul, and matter, not only the reference to heathen myths but also the heavenly hierarchy of the Pseudo-Areopagite (*vid.* § 146). His enthusiasm for the ancients, which increased apparently from year to year, had as a result the fact that in his school at Chartres grammar and rhetoric were taught in a manner quite different from that which then prevailed. The account which John of Salisbury (*vid.* § 175) gives of him leads one to look upon him as the originator of a free philological tendency, and prevents one from being surprised at finding among his pupils those who are not considered very orthodox. It is certain that he led no one toward nominalistic tendencies, for he asserts as energetically as William, that the genera (ideas) precede the things.

Cf. J. S. Barach: *Bernardi Silvestris de mundi universitate libri duo, sive Megacosmus et Microcosmus*. Innsbruck, 1876.

### § 160.

The matter does not stop with this contrast between the extreme realism of William and of Bernard on the one side, and the extreme nominalism of Roscellinus and perhaps also of Raimbert on the other. Attempts at a reconciliation appear very soon, which, in accordance with the principle of nomenclature mentioned above, are denominated collectively the views of the *conceptuales*, later *conceptualists*, because one of them calls the universals *conceptus*. It lies in the nature of the case that these mediating doctrines approach one

extreme or the other. Those appear to have approached realism, who are mentioned as defenders of the *non-differentia* or *indifferentia*, because they assert that that which is common in genera and species embraces that in which the individuals do *not* differ, while the individuality consists in that by which they are distinguished. Since what others designated *universalia* or *communia* was thus called by them *indifferentia*, they received the special name "Indifferentists" (*vid. supra*, § 158). They appear to have held in common that the actual being is entirely unaffected by the differences of genus, species, and individual, since one and the same individual Plato is as species man, as genus living creature. There is controversy as to who was the author of this opinion. The same passages in contemporaneous writers are referred by some (*e.g.* Hauréau) to Adelard of Bath (*Philosophus Anglorum*), the translator of Euclid from the Arabic, by others (*e.g.* H. Ritter) to Walter of Mortagne, who died in 1174 as Bishop of Lyons. The work of the former, *De eodem et diverso*, must have been written between 1105 and 1117, before his *Quæstiones naturales*. Still others (as Cousin) refer them to a later doctrine of William of Champeaux, and appeal in support of this opinion to the testimony of Abelard in the *Hist. calamit.*, which lends a certain weight to their assertion, that is, to be sure, only if, in agreement with certain manuscripts, *indifferenter* be read where the reading of other manuscripts, *individualiter*, is more probable (*vid.* § 161, 3). On the other hand the author of the work *De generibus et speciebus* plainly approaches nearer to nominalism. This work is regarded by its first editor, Cousin, to whom is due its title (perhaps not well chosen), as a youthful production of Abelard, by H. Ritter as a work of Joscelyn of Soissons, whom John of Salisbury mentions as a celebrated conceptualist. The universals are here taken as concepts (*conceptus, collectiones*), and accordingly it is asserted, in direct contradiction to the "*totaliter*" of William, that only a part of the species *homo* (as matter) is united with the *Socratitas* (as form) to make an actual substance, Socrates. More important than all the remaining conceptualists, and furthest removed from both extremes, is Abelard, the greatest of French Schoolmen. He really brings the strife between realism and nominalism to an end, so that this question ceases to be the chief philosophical problem.

## § 161.

## ABELARD.

Charles Rémusat : *Abélard*. 2 vols. Paris, 1845.

1. PIERRE DE PALLET (or Palais, and hence Petrus Palatinus), better known under the cognomen ABÆLARDUS, was born in 1079. He first studied dialectics under Roscellinus, who, when driven out of England, taught in the little city of Loches in Touraine (or Lochmenach in Brittany?) before he became canon of Besançon, and afterwards under William of Champeaux in Paris. The result was, that the formulæ of both appeared to him to be repugnant to reason, and when, after having himself taught for a time in Melun and Corbeil, he returned to William to hear rhetoric from him, in a public disputation with him he brought him to moderate his extreme realism. From that time on Abelard alone was spoken of as the greatest dialectician, and he called himself *Philosophus Peripateticus*, which passed as a synonym for *Dialecticus*. (To these two Ps were added two others; and where PPPP are found, Abelard is meant.) Through his lectures on the hill of St. Geneviève his fame increased still more, and at the same time the hatred of William, who first aroused St. Bernard against him. Abelard's reputation continued to advance when he became a teacher of theology, after having been inducted into this science by Anselm of Laon. His love affair with Heloise, his marriage to her, the well-known catastrophe which resulted, exiled him from Paris and caused him to work, attacked everywhere by the same enemies, first in the monastery of St. Denis as monk, then as teacher in Maisonville, and later near Nogent upon the Seine, in the monastery which he himself built to the Paraclete. He was for a time abbot of the monastery of St. Gildas de Ruys in Brittany, then taught again in Paris, was condemned at the council of Sens in 1140, and ended his troubled life on the 21st of April, 1142, in the monastery of St. Marcel, near Châlons, after being reconciled with his enemies by Bishop Peter of Cluny. The edition of his works (Paris, 1616) by Duchesne (Quercetanus) based upon manuscripts collected by Fr. Amboise is not complete. Martène and Durand (*Thesaurus novus anecdott.*), Bernard Pezirus (*Thesaurus anecd. novissimus*), Rheinwald (*Anecd. ad hist.*

*eccl. pertin.*, 1831, 35), and Cousin (*Ouvrages inédits d'Abelard*, Paris, 1836) have made important contributions. The last named has also published a new and complete edition of his works (vol. i., 1849; vol. ii., 1859). With the exception of the *Dialectics* they are all to be found in vol. 178 of Migne's *Patr. lat.* Many other writings of Abelard, e.g. a grammar, an elementary book on logic, etc., have not yet been found.

2. Logic, of which Abelard himself says that it was the cause of his ill-fortune, was and remained nevertheless his goddess. He confesses frankly his ignorance of mathematics, so that his sphere remained the *trivium* (cf. § 147), and he left to others the *quadrivium*. Logic takes its name from the Logos, that is from the Son of God (*Ep.* iv.), and the logician, especially he who pursues dialectics, much more than the grammarian and rhetorician, is the true philosopher (*Ouvr. inéd.* p. 453). His *Dialectics* (*Ibid.*, pp. 173-497) must therefore be first considered. As we have it in the form edited by Cousin, unfortunately not entirely complete, in its first part (not extant), which treats of the parts of speech (*partes*), it follows the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, which it comments upon, in the second part the *Categories* and the *Hermeneutics* of Aristotle. It thus handles first, as *sex antepredicamenta*, the familiar "*voces*," *genus*, *species*, etc., together with the "*individuum*" belonging to them, then in the extant section the *predicamenta*, and finally the *postpredicamenta*. The gaps can be filled only with great difficulty from Rémusat's reports of Abelard's *glossulis ad Porphyry*. This labour has been undertaken by Prantl. The second part gives the doctrine of the categorical conclusion, the third comments upon the *Topics*, the fourth treats of the hypothetical conclusion, and the fifth, which Prantl regards as an independent work, contains the theory of divisions and definitions. The last four contain comments upon the versions of Boëthius, for Abelard knows neither the *Analytics* nor the *Topics* of Aristotle, with the exception of a few principal passages. The respect with which Abelard in this work always mentions his teacher (whether it be William or any one else) leads us to conclude that it was composed early in life, in spite of the contrary opinion of Cousin. Abelard is more independent in his investigations upon unity and difference. They are contained in a theological work (the *Theologia*

*christiana*), but are purely dialectic. In at least five different senses a thing can be called the same (*idem*) as another, or different (*diversum*) from it. It is essentially (*essentialiter*) identical with it when both form only one nature, as living and man in Socrates. In this case they are also numerically the same. On the other side the essential difference may coincide with the numerical, but it is not necessary that it should. An example of the first case is two houses, of the second a house and its wall. The third unity and difference are those of definition. When from the fact that something is one thing it follows that it is also the other, then the two are the same according to definition, *e.g.* *micron* and *ensis*. On the other hand, such things as can be thought of, each without the other, are, according to definition, different. Whatever is the same according to definition, is also essentially the same, but not vice versa. Numerically it may be, but need not be the same, as for instance the sentence *mulier damnavit mundum et eadem salvavit* is correct if *eadem* be understood according to definition, but false if it be taken numerically. Things are the same in respect to quality when each shares the quality of the other, as when white becomes hard. Difference of property may be united with numerical unity, as for instance a picture of a plant does not possess all the qualities of the plant, nor the plant all those of the picture. Further, we speak of identity and difference in respect to resemblance, that is, in connection with existence in the same genetical conception. Finally, variety of contents is to be mentioned, of which we think when we contrast the wine in the cask with that in the cellar, although the wine and the space which the wine occupies are only one. These investigations, although proposed especially for the sake of the doctrine of the Trinity, acquire importance for Abelard in connection with the question of the age, namely the question in regard to the universals. Since he stands in opposition to both contending parties, this question no longer means to him that one must decide in favour of one or the other extreme. The fact that Roscellinus is wrong does not prove that William is right. In opposition to the formula of the latter, *ante res*, as well as to that of Roscellinus, *post res*, he places his own *Universalia sunt in rebus*, and emphasizes therefore the fact that the species "*non nisi per individua subsistere habent*" (*Dial.*, 204). He stands thus in relation to both exactly as



the genuine Peripatetic teaching stood toward Platonism which preceded, and toward Epicureanism and Stoicism which followed it (*vid.* § 97, 2). That which he especially finds fault with in William's theory, is the fact that he holds that the *humanitas tota* is in Socrates, an opinion which leads to absurdities, and that he does not recognise that it exists *individualiter* in the individual man; from which it follows that the difference of individuality is not an accidental but an essential one. Roscellinus' view, to be sure, that only the individual essentially exists, is absurd. The latter utterance is a decisive refutation of all those who make Abelard a nominalist. He was only more of one than William, and therefore, it is true, distrusted by the strict ecclesiastics. Nor can his nominalism be deduced from the oft-quoted statement of John of Salisbury, that according to Abelard the universals are *sermones*. That he sees in them not only a simple *dictio* (λέξις) or a mere *vox*, but *sermo* (λόγος), has its ground in the fact that he looks upon them as natural predicates. He says, "*id quod natum est prædicari*," which is an exact translation of a sentence of Aristotle's. Since the *natum* is thereby emphasized as much as the *prædicari*, the conflict between Platonists and Aristotelians seems to him a mere verbal strife. Of course he cannot call that which is *in rebus* a *res*, and therefore his utterance, *res de re non prædicatur*, does not make him a nominalist, although it does separate him from realists like William. The difference between *in re* and *res* or *aliquid* is very clear to him (*Dial.*, p. 241).

3. In these investigations the theological element is quite in the background; but in another work Abelard proposed to himself an entirely different object, to exhibit as a rationally ordered whole that which the chief teachers of the Church had asserted. This is the peculiar significance of his *Sic et non*, a work which we shall judge much more correctly if we regard it as the predecessor and pattern of all later collections of propositions and summaries, than if, misled by the mere title, we compare it with the works of the Skeptics. It was first published by Cousin, then much more correctly by Henke and Lindenkohl in 1851, and the text of the latter is reprinted in Migne's *Patr. lat.* The leading ideas which Abelard followed in the composition of this work were, first, to give an inventory, as exact as possible and at the same time systematically arranged, of what had been hitherto

taught within the Church, and then, where contradictories had been asserted, to state them, in order to arrive at the discovery of a point of reconciliation, but at the same time to stand firmly against too hasty decision and against indolent repose upon any ecclesiastical authority. The work, freely used but seldom named, gave rise to a multitude of imitations which lived and won fame while it soon sank into forgetfulness. Abelard, however, did not rest satisfied with this separation of formal dialectic investigations and dogmatic material. Both were for him only a preparation for his chief object, which he attempted to carry out in his *Introductio in theologiam*, with which the *Epitome theologiæ christianæ* is connected as a supplement, and also in his *Theologia christiana*. Only the first of these is to be found in his complete works, the second was published by Rheinwald in 1823, and the third is given in the *Thesaurus* of Martène and Durand. Migne's *Patr. lat.* contains them all. The object referred to is to point out the agreement of dogma with reason, and hence not so much to state the doctrines as to defend them against doubts, since heretics are to be refuted not by force but by reason alone. He was so convinced of the power of the latter to achieve this end, that his opponents accused him of ascribing to himself an exhaustive knowledge of God. He deviates from the customary formulæ also in representing knowledge less as a fruit of belief than as a critical means of defence against blind faith as well as against doubt; at the same time he does not deny the older position. His certainty is based upon his great respect for the power of reason. The superiority of the Jews in possessing the law and the prophets is counterbalanced among the heathen, according to Abelard, by their use of reason, by philosophy. He treats the latter with decided preference, finds fault with the carnal sense and the material hopes of the Jews, ranks Socrates upon an equality with the martyrs, claims that Plato taught the Trinity, and that the Sybils and Virgil proclaimed the incarnation, and gives expression repeatedly to the opinion that their possession of the truth and their strict apostolic life, of which he is never tired of furnishing examples, assure the heathen philosophers of salvation, while the safety of catechumens and of unbaptized children of Christian parentage appears very doubtful to him. Since the Son of God is wisdom, he hears everywhere in the voice of wisdom the Son

of God ; and wisdom in the mouth of Plato opens to the latter the understanding of the Christian faith. This concerns in part the nature of God, in part His offices of grace, and therefore these two are to be considered in order.

4. The sum of the Christian faith is the doctrine of the Trinity. The doctrine of the Church is first given, then its difficulties, and finally their solution. Abelard lays strong emphasis upon the simplicity of the Divine substance, asserted by the earlier ecclesiastical teachers, on account of which nothing is in God which is not God, and therefore might, wisdom, and goodness are not forms or definitions of His nature but are this nature itself. For this reason it cannot properly be said of God that He is substance, since then properties would belong to Him. This denial of the difference between nature and property in God, in consequence of which it must be asserted that the world, as a work of divine goodness, is a result of His nature, is the reason why Abelard in recent times has been accused of Pantheism (Fessler has very skilfully collected parallels between his *Christian Theology* and Spinoza's *Ethics*). From this absolute unity of the Divine nature the opponents of the Christian faith seek to deduce the impossibility of a Trinity of Persons, and Abelard cites twenty-three objections against the doctrine which he attempts to refute. He always identifies the difference of the three Persons with that of might, wisdom, and goodness, between which exists a difference of definition, and opposes the assertion that a Trinity of Persons is incompatible with the unity and indivisibility of the Divine nature, partly by the statement that Socrates' unity suffers no detriment when he is at the same time first, second, and third person in a grammatical sense, partly however, and especially, by the assertion that a difference of definition is not necessarily an essential and numerical difference. All the objections which are adduced in the third book he attempts to refute in the fourth book of the *Christian Theology*, not in the same order, but with comparative completeness. Those too are answered who urge against his identification of the Father with might, etc., that the Father is also wise and good. This Abelard willingly admits, without ceasing to maintain that only upon his theory is it conceivable why creation belongs to the Father, that is to the might ; incarnation, that act of illumination, to the Son who, as wisdom, is called Logos, or reason

and finally why the Virgin receives the Saviour, and man the forgiveness of sins from the Spirit, that is from the goodness of God. By this the co-operation of the other Persons is not at all excluded. The objections against the doctrine of the Trinity appear to him collectively and separately so weak, the doctrine itself so in accord with reason, that he replies to the query, Why heathen and Jews, who cannot be denied the possession of reason, did not teach the Trinity? that they do actually teach it. Especially among the Platonists he finds this doctrine highly developed. Plato is in his opinion the greatest of all philosophers, Cicero the greatest of Roman philosophers. The fifth book is not confined to the negative object, expressed frequently in the earlier books, of proving the unity and trinity of God by refuting objections, but undertakes to prove it positively. That God exists is deduced from the order of the world, that He is one, from this and from the conception of the *summum bonum*. Abelard then proceeds to discuss the trinity of Persons, but considers here only the Father, the might, for the discussion, as we have it, breaks off rather abruptly. It is asserted with emphasis, that God's omnipotence does not suffer by the fact that there are many things which He cannot do, *e.g.*, go, sin, etc., indeed that He cannot do more and cannot do other than He actually does. These sentences remind us again of what has been called Abelard's Spinozism.

5. The doctrine of the omnipotence of God, which is treated in the *Introductio ad theologiam* still more thoroughly than in the *Theologia christiana*, forms the stepping-stone to his doctrine of creation, in which he seeks to combine the two facts that God as unchangeable eternally creates, and yet that the world is created in time. In his historical, moral, and mystical commentary upon the six days' work, which he wrote for Heloise, it is repeatedly said, that by nature are to be understood only the laws which rule and preserve the completed creation, instead of which the creative will of the Almighty worked in the act of creation. This commentary is given in the *Thesaurus* of Martène and Durand, col. 1361-1416, and in Migne's *Patr. lat.*, col. 731-783. It has been remarked not incorrectly, that when Abelard considers the relation between God and the world, as well as when he considers the relation between the Divine and human in

Christ, his fear of all mystical immanence gives his doctrine great clearness, it is true, but at the same time that rationalistic character which caused so many, above all the mystically inclined Bernard of Clairvaux, to take offence at him.

6. Though in his *Dialectics* Abelard's interest was centred only in the logical, in his *Sic et non* only in the systematic, in his *Introduction* and his *Christian Theology* only in the speculative-theological element, he nevertheless showed by his life, which excited the admiration of Petrus Venerabilis of Cluny, that subjective piety was not a matter of indifference to him, and moreover a great part of his literary activity was devoted to its defence over against reason. To praise the blessedness of faith, in contrast with holiness by works, was one of his chief employments, not only in his sermons but also in his scientific investigations. That he has such a tendency to ascribe to the Greeks a superiority over the Jews is due in great part to the fact that the legal sense of the latter places greater difficulties in the way of their conversion. This element is above all prominent in his ethics. It is no accident that the title under which Abelard develops his ethical teachings, *Scito te ipsum*, appears oftenest in the history of morals in connection with a very subjective doctrine (cf. *int. al. loc.*, § 267, 8). (This work of Abelard's was first published in the *Thesaurus noviss.* of Pezsius, iii., p. 617, and is found in Migne's *Patr. lat.*, col. 633-676.) Abelard was really the first to propose an ethics in the modern sense of the term, regarding the ethical subject not as a member of a (human or divine) state but as an individual, and seeking the norm of conduct not so much in the whole to which he belongs as in the individual himself. From this comes the weight which he lays upon one's own voluntariness, for the sake of fixing the conception of *peccatum*. To this is due also, on the other side, the assertion that the actual commission of the sin contributes nothing toward condemnation, but that this rests only upon the *consensus* and the intention. From this results, finally, the emphasis with which, as far as duty is concerned, the agreement with one's own conviction and conscience is declared to be the principal thing. For this reason original sin, while to be sure a *vitium*, is no proper *peccatum*, and Abelard so strongly emphasizes freedom in the choice of evil, that he asserts the

possibility of a person's going through life quite without *peccata*. Forgiveness of sin is therefore the infusion of a repentant disposition. The sin against the Holy Spirit is the complete incapacity for repentance, which coincides with conduct in opposition to conscience and with doubt of God's grace, and which has no pardon. Exactly as in this larger work Abelard has also represented, in the poem addressed to his son Astralabius (Migne, col. 1759), truth to one's convictions as the only principle of morality. When therefore he is often designated as the rationalist among the Schoolmen, he deserves the title not only on account of his doctrine of the Trinity, which approaches Sabellianism in spite of all his polemics against it, and not only on account of his critical attempts, but also on account of his ethics, in which he actually completely agrees in the principal point with many modern rationalists. The fact that all those in whom the ecclesiastical sense was very powerful held aloof from Abelard, is due not only to his above-mentioned tendency toward nominalism, or rather away from extreme realism, but also to this rationalistic vein in his character.

### § 162.

The conflict of Abelard, the incarnation of French scholasticism in its keenness and elegance, with the clergy of his fatherland aroused there a widespread distrust in philosophy. The consequences of this had to be borne also by such as stood in no connection with Abelard, for instance by William of Conches (1080-1154), a pupil of Bernard of Chartres. By his youthful writings, *De philosophia*, as well as by his notes to Plato's *Timæus*, in which he brings forward a Platonizing atomism, he aroused accusations against himself which he was able to still only by a retraction which he later repeated in his *Pragmaticon philosophiæ*. (The latter work was printed in Strasburg in 1583, under the title *Dialogus de substantiis physicis confectus a Wilhelmo Aneponymo philosopho. . . . industria Guilielmi Grataroli*. Haureau, in his *Singularités*, gives accurate information in regard to William's works.) Later he confined his instruction chiefly to grammar and the interpretation of the ancients. (I am not able to decide whether it is true that the work *περὶ διδάξεων*, published in *Bedæ venerab. opera*, is an extract from William's early

work, since I have not seen the latter, although it is said to have been published in 1474.) This distrust of the Church toward scholasticism is further the reason why the latter, its ground of support, ecclesiastical recognition, being taken away, begins to approach its dissolution. Its death is in a proper sense dissolution, since the elements which scholasticism contains (*vid.* § 157), and which in Anselm had been completely one, began to separate themselves in Abelard, and after him were wholly sundered. While Abelard was at one time a mere logician, as in his commentaries upon Boëthius, at another time a pure metaphysician, as in his ontological controversies with William, again only a systematic compiler of ecclesiastical tradition, as in his *Sic et non*, and finally only an extoller of subjective piety, as in his sermons and his ethics, his speculative talent nevertheless enabled him to unite these different elements, as formerly the most various tendencies were combined in Socrates. Whoever is unable to comprehend such a personality, must err respecting it. Socrates appears eccentric; Abelard is regarded by the friends of Bernard as dishonest. In spite of this, his personality is so powerful that all his contemporaries, attracted or repelled, take notice of him, and therefore divide themselves into his scholars, or at least friends, and his enemies. Even the former, however, are not able to reproduce Abelard as a whole, but only one or another side of the master, as formerly the lesser Socratic schools had done in connection with Socrates (§ 66, 67). His enemies, on the other hand, since they attack only one or the other side of Abelard's teaching, cannot avoid agreeing with him and learning from him in many things. Gilbert, a man of like spirit with Abelard, takes up the logical and metaphysical work with such effect that his theological accomplishments are soon forgotten. Hugo, on the contrary, one of Abelard's bitterest opponents, makes the material and formal side of faith so prominent that he very nearly despises dialectics. That which had been united is separated, and the attempts to transform scholasticism into mere rational teaching or into mere religious teaching appear side by side. Both tendencies bear an equally negative relation to the standpoint of Erigena, who had fused both into an undistinguishable unity.

## B.—SCHOLASTICISM AS MERE RATIONAL SCIENCE.

## § 163.

I. GILBERT DE LA PORRÉE (Porretanus), born in Poitiers and educated under Bernard of Chartres, taught first in Chartres, then in Paris, finally in Poitiers, and in the last place was made bishop in 1142. He was celebrated as a dialectician and therefore called *Peripateticus*. For that very reason he fell under the suspicion of Bernard of Clairvaux and of the pope and was obliged to defend himself at two councils. He was however more yielding and therefore more fortunate than his contemporary Abelard, and died in the year 1154 without being attacked again. Of his writings the most celebrated is the *De sex principiis*, a work of but a few pages, which is contained in many old translations of Aristotle's *Organon*, among others in that which was published in Venice, *apud Juntas*, in 1562 (pp. 62-67). (An older edition without date, which has at the close the shield of the city of Halle, —which is also, however, the crest of Martin Landsberg of Würzburg,—contains ten leaves in folio.) It belongs to the *Organon* also, because it was composed with the intention of adding to the comments upon the first four categories, which Aristotle himself had written (*vid.* § 86, 6), equally exhaustive comments upon the remaining six, which explains the title of the work. The name, however, is not quite exact, since, in addition to the six Aristotelian categories, the form is discussed at length in the first chapter, and the assumption of differences of grade in the last. Moreover the eight chapters (or, according to another division, eleven chapters in three tracts) of this little work contain many references to other commentaries of the author upon Aristotle; and it may have gained especial prominence only because the others were early lost. Gilbert is the first who can be proved to have known, in addition to the portions of the *Organon* which were previously known, the *Analytics* of Aristotle. In so far there was a propriety in calling him more than others a Peripatetic. It is true that he makes little use of this additional source, and operates with the traditional logic of the schools, which was all that Abelard and his other contemporaries were acquainted with (*vid.* § 151). His investigations in regard to the various meanings of



*ubi, habere*, etc., often purely lexical, were regarded in the Middle Ages as very weighty additions to Aristotle. To us they seem rather unimportant.

2. In addition to this work there is extant a *Commentary* of Gilbert's upon the Pseudo-Boëthian works *De Trinitate* and *De duabus naturis in Christo*. Both are contained in the Basel edition of Boëthius' works of the year 1570. For the metaphysics of Gilbert the former is most important, for his theology the latter. In the former, from the proposition that being has the priority over that which is, is deduced the conclusion that the presupposition of all is that being which, since it is not a mere participation in being, is quite simple, or, as he calls it, abstract. This entirely pure being is God, from whom for that very reason Deity cannot be distinguished, as mankind, of which man partakes, can be distinguished from man. If the word substance designates that which possesses properties then God is not substance, He is *essentia non aliquid*. As there is no distinction between *Deus* and *Divinitas*, there is also none between Him and any of His properties; He is in no sense to be thought of as a union of manifoldness, as something concrete. Therefore our thinking also can comprehend nothing in Him; He is not *comprehensibilis*, but only *intelligibilis*. Essentially different from this perfectly simple being are the substances or things which, as possessors of attributes, have in themselves a doubleness which belongs to them on account of matter. By the latter is not to be understood corporeality, although it is the principle of corporeality, that is apparent existence. Matter is to be regarded as a negative principle, as the opposite extreme to mere or pure being, and, like the latter, is incomprehensible, but for a contrary reason.

3. Between the absolute being and substances stand the ideas (*εἶδη*), or forms, the original types after which all is created, and which themselves have their ground in being as pure form. Since they have no properties it cannot be said that they are *substant* or substances; but since they nevertheless *subsistunt* they are called *subsistentiæ*. They are accessible neither to the senses nor to the imagination, but to the understanding alone, and are *perpetuæ*, while God is *æternus* and things are *temporales*. Among them are reckoned not only genera and species but also all *abstracta*, e.g., *albedo*. In materializing themselves the forms become *formæ nativæ* or, since the materially existing was substance, *formæ substantiales*.

As these they are for the first time properly *universalia*, which then exist as such *in re*. This is in exact accord with Abelard. It is not in conflict with this however when Gilbert, in agreement with his teacher Bernard and with William, ascribes reality to the forms independent of their materialization and previous to it in the supersensuous world. In this double reality they are distinguished also by the expressions *exempla* and *exemplaria*. Gilbert rejects William's pantheistic formula, that the distinction of individuality is merely accidental. Properties, according to him, do not make this distinction, but simply show it (*non faciunt sed produnt*). The subsistencies, namely, or forms, constitute the proper nature of things, which originally has no relation to properties. When a form however exists in a substance it comes into an indirect relation to the latter's properties, which *insunt* in the substance, but *adsunt* to the form. In virtue of this indirect relation, the form excludes all properties which are contradictory to it and admits only such as are in conformity with it, and thus from them conclusions can be drawn in regard to it.

4. The distinction which Gilbert, in agreement with the Platonists, draws between eternal, temporal, and perpetual, causes him, like Aristotle, to distinguish three principal sciences, theology, physics, and mathematics. With these correspond the three modes of knowing, *intellectus*, *ratio*, *disciplinalis speculatio*, and each of them has its own underlying propositions. Theology thereby is widely sundered from the others, since the categories do not apply to God, nor is language sufficient to express a knowledge of Him. The way is thus really prepared for the proposition, which subsequently became so famous, that a thing may be true in theology which is false in philosophy, that is, the complete separation of the two is approached. Among the dogmas, Gilbert seems, like Abelard, to have busied himself especially with the Trinity, and to have treated it much as the latter did. The repeated assertion that language is inadequate, that none of the expressions used, such as nature, person, etc., are to be taken in the ordinary sense, is, accurately considered, an isolation of theology by which it ceases to be science. For Gilbert, as he proves by his action, science was especially dialectics, and from this is to be explained his readiness to recant his theological propositions that were regarded as

heretical. He would perhaps have held more firmly to the distinction between substances and subsistencies. In addition to dialectics, he busied himself much with exegesis. At least his commentary upon Canticles is often cited by Bonaventura.

### § 164

1. A tendency in philosophy, which John of Salisbury (*vid.* § 175) criticizes in his *Metalogicus*, developed itself, probably not without feeling the influence of Gilbert's dialectical studies, and certainly under the impetus which was given by the discovery of the weightiest analytical works, especially the Topics of Aristotle. This tendency had appreciation only for logical subtleties and the arts of disputation, and in connection with the union of the three *sermocinales scientiæ* which was recognised at that time, finally contented itself with mere logomachies which would have done honour to an Euthydemus and a Dionysodorus. In consequence a contempt for logic, as empty altercation of the schools, began to spread among those who desired substantial knowledge, a contempt which these "*puri philosophi*," as the logicians called themselves, seem to have answered with an equal contempt for all real knowledge. Without scientific value in themselves these phenomena are nevertheless significant as showing how one of those elements which are essential to scholasticism seeks to free itself at this time from the others and to occupy the field alone.

2. Those who first interpreted the Analytics and Topics of Aristotle, instead of the Boëthian school books which had hitherto been in use, received the name of *moderni*, a name by which the followers of Roscellinus had been designated. From *logica modernorum* was formed the term *logica nova*, and this was now taught in addition to the school logic, which had been previously in use, and which was called therefore *logica vetus*. Finally, when the superiority of Aristotle's doctrine of the syllogism became so apparent to all as to suppress the *logica vetus* and this term thus lost its meaning, it was employed, for the sake of preserving it, to designate something quite different. The division of dialectics which treats of the predicables, the categories, and the judgment, is called *logica* (or *ars*) *vetus* because it forms the presupposition for and is therefore older than that part which has to do with conclusions, proofs, and methods,

3. While thus, by Gilbert and the *puri philosophi*, the *Organon* was transformed from an authority ranking with the Scriptures and the Fathers into an authority which, as the only one, suppressed and drove the others into oblivion, on the other hand the rise of the opposite extreme may be quite easily explained. The doctrine of faith must be made the principal thing, and dialectics and metaphysics must take a subordinate position. Whoever emphasizes the former only at the cost of the latter occupies a twofold relation to Abelard, who was at the same time so decidedly both dialectician and theologian. It is therefore no wonder if such a one treats many dogmas exactly as Abelard had done, and yet speaks of him scarcely otherwise than with bitterness. The agreement is with the author of *Christian Theology*, the disagreement is with him who called logic his goddess. The man who does not strive after the name of *Peripateticus*, but who is called by his followers a theologian equal to Augustine, is Hugo. He placed in opposition to Abelard's French keenness, which falls only too easily into mere formal investigation, the rich profundity of the German spirit.

### C.—SCHOLASTICISM AS MERE RELIGIOUS SCIENCE.

#### § 165.

#### HUGO.

Alb. Liebner: *Hugo von St. Victor und die theologischen Richtungen seiner Zeit*. Leipzig, 1832. B. Hauréau: *Hugues de Saint-Victor. Nouvel examen de l'édition de ses œuvres*. Paris, 1850.

1. Hugo, Count of Blankenburg, was born in the paternal castle in the Hartz in the year 1096. He was thoroughly educated in German schools before he went, in his eighteenth year, to the Augustine monastery of St. Victor, which had been founded by William of Champeaux. To this monastery is due the cognomen by which he is ordinarily known. He remained there until his death, in 1141. His writings were collected after his death and have been often published, with the insertion of many works that are not genuine. The Paris edition of the year 1526 is the earliest. The Venice edition of 1588, in three folio volumes, is more common. In Migne's *Patr. lat.*, Hugo's works are printed

from the Rouen folio edition of 1648 and fill vols. 175-177. Hauréau has shown how carelessly they are edited. Only the first volume and the second, as far as col. 1017, contain the genuine works, the remainder of the second and the whole of the third are made up of other writings, a part of them under the names of their real authors.

2. That which distinguishes Hugo above most of his contemporaries is the fact that widely various theological tendencies have exerted an influence upon him, and he thus, with remarkable versatility, reveals an enthusiasm for the Scriptures as great as that of the men who were called in his day Biblical theologians, and at the same time is filled with respect for learned exegesis and for the traditional threefold method of interpretation, historical, allegorical, and anagogical or tropological. He is better acquainted with the ancients than most of his contemporaries, and he loves them, but at the same time he knows how to maintain the specific difference between heathen and Christian science better than Abelard, and urges that all worldly science is only a preparation for theology. As such it is treated by him in the first three books of his *Eruditio didascalica* (Migne, ii. 739-838), called also *Didascalon* and *Didascalion*, where it precedes in encyclopædic form the introduction to Biblical and ecclesiastical history, which fills the last four books. Following Boëthius and the Peripatetics, Hugo divides philosophy and the entire sphere of knowledge into theoretical, practical, and mechanical (technical). From this are excepted the logical inquiries which are to precede all others in the *trivium*, and which Hugo tolerates only as means to a correct and precise terminology. Otherwise he treats them rather contemptuously, and where they are made the end regards them as dangerous. The theoretical part mentioned is divided into theology, which deals with the Divine, eternal, intellectual; into mathematics, whose province is the sempiternal and intelligible, and whose four divisions form the *quadrivium*; and into physics, which has to do with the temporal and material. Practical philosophy is divided into ethics, economics, and politics. Finally, the mechanical division of science contains instructions in the seven arts, weaving, smithcraft, navigation, agriculture, hunting, medicine, the histrionic art. This encyclopædic outline is followed by methodological rules, and by an historical introduction to the

Bible. His guides for the former are Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville, for the latter especially Jerome.

3. Hugo is much more independent in his chief theological works, by which are to be understood his *Dialogus de sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptæ* (Migne, ii. 18-42), his *Summa sententiarum* (*Ibid.*, 42-174) and his *De sacramentis christianæ fidei libri duo* (*Ibid.*, 174-618). The influence is apparent which was exerted upon him by Augustine, Gregory the Great, and Erigena, the last of whom he necessarily became acquainted with and prized as the translator of the works of the Pseudo-Areopagite, upon which he himself wrote a commentary. He felt also, though more indirectly, the influence of Abelard, against whom he was greatly prejudiced, not only on account of his love for Bernard but also on account of the great difference between their modes of feeling. They both agree that the problem of theology is to make belief comprehensible. But while Abelard emphasizes the fact that doubt makes this comprehension necessary, Hugo insists especially that comprehension is possible only as a result of previous experience. Both agree that nothing may be believed which is contrary to reason. But to Hugo the service of belief appears to be diminished if its content be composed only of that which arises from or is according to reason. The weightiest propositions of belief stand rather above reason (*De sacr.*, i. 3), and with this position the fact coincides that he, in agreement with Erigena, prefers negative to positive utterances in regard to God. That God is spirit is quite true only in so far as He is not body. Belief consists of two parts, the *cognitio*, or the *materia fidei*, that *quod fide creditur*, and the *affectu*, that is the *credere*. This subjective side as the proper *fides* he always places above the former, which a person may have without believing (*De sacr.*, ii. 10). This however has not hindered him from giving in his *Summa sententiarum* a logically arranged presentation of the content of belief, in connection with which one can scarcely help concluding that Abelard's *Sic et non* was the original occasion of the work. Moreover in this work too as elsewhere the practical point of view is prominent, inasmuch as the virtues of faith, of hope, and of love are first discoursed upon and afterward the content of belief is considered. After treating in the first tract of the being and attributes of God, the Trinity (in a manner very like Abelard) and the incarnation, he considers in the second

the creation of the angels and their fall. The third tract discusses the six days' work, the creation and the fall of man; the fourth the sacraments, that is the means of grace, and indeed those of the old economy, especially the law, which furnishes an opportunity for the consideration of the whole doctrine of ethics. The three following tracts have to do with the sacraments of the new economy: the fifth, baptism; the sixth, penance, the power of the keys, and the eucharist; the seventh, marriage. Up to this point there is no discussion of eschatology.

4. The subjective complement of this objective, almost dry, presentation of the contents of belief is formed by those works which have chiefly gained for him the name of Mystic. Here belong especially his dialogue with the soul, *Soliloquium de arrha animæ* (*Ibid.*, p. 951-970), the three closely connected works *De arca Noe morali* (*Ibid.*, p. 618 ff.), *De arca Noe mystica* (p. 681 ff.), *De vanitate mundi* (p. 701-741) and some other less important essays. With fondness and with almost trifling accuracy the comparison is carried out between the ark of Noah and the Church as a whole, or between the ark and the soul as it sails upon the waves of the world toward God, or again as it rests in God, and the succession of conditions through which the soul passes in nearing its last goal is fixed with exactness. This goal is the immediate contemplation of God, the *contemplatio*. The separate presentations differ from one another only in the fact that at one time are given as preparatory steps to that contemplation only *cogitatio* and *meditatio*, at another time the whole series beginning with the *lectio*, which is to be followed by *meditatio*, *oratio*, and *operatio*. *Cogitatio*, *meditatio*, and *contemplatio* appear then as the functions of the three eyes by which we perceive. Of these the outer, designed for material things, has been least affected by the fall, the inner, by which we contemplate ourselves, has become very weak, and finally our eye for God almost blind. It is clear that these three eyes are parallel with the three principles, matter, soul, and God. In spite of the great value which is laid upon moral purity, the practical appears to be subordinated to the theoretical enjoyment, which is often called a tasting of Deity. This condition is an absorption in oneself as well as in God, and is always brought into connection with renunciation of the world, still more with complete forgetfulness of the world. In this condition there

remains to man nothing, not even his own self. Whoever considers such expressions an indication of pantheism is not acquainted with the language of mysticism.

5. Hugo's *De sacramentis christianæ fidei*, which is one of his last, must be regarded as his ripest work. It treats of all the means of grace and therefore embraces his entire dogmatics. In this work the objective and subjective elements of his faith, rational reflection and mystical profundity, appear more than in any other of his writings, and he shows not only familiarity with the manner in which others dogmatize but also dogmatic keenness of his own. Since all that exists consists of those works of God by which the non-existent becomes existent (*opera conditionis*), and again of those by which the ruined is made better (*opera restorationis*), the first book (*Ibid.*, pp. 187-363) treats of the former, and thus in general of the creation, and questions connected with it. In twelve sections, each of which is again divided into many chapters, are first considered the being and constitution of the world, then from this conclusions are drawn as to the original causes which lie at its foundation, and thus God is reached, and His Trinity is conceived, and parallels pointed out in creatures, just as by Abelard. Investigations follow in regard to our knowledge of God, and here the above-mentioned distinction between supra-rational and irrational is brought out. Hugo proceeds next to the consideration of the will of God, and the difficulties which arise from the existence of evil are met by very fine distinctions between will and signs of the will, as well as between the willing of evil and the willing that that which is evil may exist. The creation of angels and their fall, and the creation and fall of man follow. To this is joined the consideration of the restoration and of the means to it, first belief and then the remaining means of grace or *sacramenta* as well of the pre-Mosaic time, the *sacramenta naturalis legis*, as of the written law. All that is treated in this book forms at the same time the introduction to the subject of the second book (pp. 363-618), the means of grace under the new economy. This book is divided into eighteen sections and discusses the incarnation, the unity of the Church as the body of Christ, Church ordinances, holy garments, consecration of churches, baptism, confirmation, the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ, the minor sacraments, that is Church usages of all sorts (in which



connection an excursus upon simony is introduced), finally marriage and the vow. The incarnation is represented, as it had been by Anselm, as suitable, even if not absolutely necessary (*vid.* § 156, 8). The consideration of virtues and vices forms the step to the treatment of the confessional, forgiveness of sins, and supreme unction. Death, the last things, and the future world are treated in the last three sections, to which the *Summa sententiarum* is related as a more historical introduction.

### § 166.

That which in Anselm was completely one, and in Abelard at least closely united, appears separated in Gilbert and the *puri philosophi* on the one side, and in Hugo on the other. The separation of scholasticism into its elements proceeds however still further, since Hugo is followed by others who either look upon the content of belief, that which he calls *cognitio* or *quod fide creditur*, as the principal thing in all science, or place faith itself, Hugo's *affectio* and *ipsa fides*, so far above all else that even the doctrine of God recedes before the doctrine of piety, and they forget everything above their religious anthropology. Those of both tendencies, which are related to one another later in the eighteenth century as the orthodox and the pietistic, are able to make use of Hugo. The former, however, revere in him especially the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, and are therefore in a position to make use of the preparatory labours of Abelard, while the latter accept him because he wrote the *Arrha animæ* and the *Arca moralis* and *mystica*. Both, like their common father Hugo, occupy a negative relation toward those who look upon dialectics as the principal part of philosophy. The more one-sidedly they develop the more hostile will they become toward each other. The representatives of the former tendency, the writers of summaries, keep themselves freer from such one-sidedness, and are aided in this by the fact that they are not all scholars of a single master. Among the monks of the monastery of St. Victor, on the contrary, who allow only their great theologian to be regarded as an authority, this one-sidedness increases until it results in decided hatred for every other tendency.

## § 167.

## THE SUMMISTS.

By the name SUMMISTS, which is derived by Buläus from Hugo's *Summa sententiarum*, are quite fittingly designated the authors of the so-called theological *Summa*. These works, like those of Hugo and the earlier *Sic et non* of Abelard, aim to show, not so much what their author believes, as what the greatest teachers of the Church have regarded as true. At most they go on to show how casual contradictions among the authorities are to be solved, a task which Abelard had not undertaken. Soon after the above-mentioned works of Abelard and Hugo, perhaps contemporaneously with the latter, appeared the work of Robertus Pullus, who is the first of the mere Summists. The work of Peter of Novara attained a much greater reputation than that of Robert, in spite of the fact that it was drawn largely from the latter. His collection of sentences supplants gradually the works of Abelard and of Hugo. As at the beginning of scholasticism so here too the more gifted originator is eclipsed by the more logical arranger, the Briton by the Italian, and the glitter of the latter's name becomes so great that the most talented of the Summists, the German Alanus, has not been able to secure the reputation which he deserves. Chronologically the earliest is followed by the most celebrated, the most celebrated by the most talented.

## § 168.

I. ROBERTUS PULLUS (called also Poulain, Pulleinus, Pullanus, Pollenus, Pollen, Pully, Pulcy, Pudsy, de Puteaco, Bullenus, Bollenus) was born in England, and, after teaching in Paris and also, as it seems, for a time in Oxford (from 1129), was called to Rome, where he died in 1150, having been made a cardinal in 1141 and afterwards papal chancellor. His works have been published by Mathaud in folio, Paris, 1655. His *Sententiarum libri octo*, which alone come into consideration here, are contained in Migne's *Patr. lat.*, vol. 186 (pp. 626-1152). They are cited also as his *Theology*, and as *Sententiæ de sancta Trinitate*. Of his works are mentioned, in addition, *In Psalmos*, *In Sancti Johannis Apocalypsin*, *Super doctorum dictis libb. IV.*, *De contemptu mundi*, *Prælectionum lib. I.*, *Sermonum lib. I.*, *et alia nonnulla*.

2. It is characteristic of the standpoint of the *Sententiæ* that the doctrine of philosophers is very often contrasted with the teaching of the *Christiani*. The division of the work into eight books is rather artificial, since sometimes a new book begins in the very midst of a subject. The arrangement of the work is nevertheless quite logical. The *first* book, in sixteen chapters, shows that God exists; that He is only one, but one in three Persons; that He possesses no properties nor actual manifoldness; again, how the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit are related; how each of them is *alius non aliud quam Pater*; that God is everywhere present as the soul in the body; what is meant by the love, hate, anger, will of God; how God rewards and punishes; that even to His omnipotence many things are impossible, but that it extends farther than His actual willing; finally, that God foresees all things. Objections are continually adduced and answered. In the *second* book, which contains thirty-two chapters, the author teaches that God has created the world in order that His goodness and blessedness may be shared by others, and has destined heaven for the angels, the earth for man. To both freedom is given. The angels by means of it confirm themselves so thoroughly in the good that they are able only to be good; the devil estranges himself so completely from the good that he is able only to be bad. He is devil, therefore, only by his own agency. As regards man, the soul is created in the previously-formed body and receives its sinfulness from this impure environment. The body is joined with the soul, and man is not a third something beside the two. The soul possesses reason, temper (*ira*), and passion, and on account of the first is immortal. Man was created in order to compensate, not numerically but in merit, for that which God had lost through the fallen angels. In his original condition he was more perfect than we, but less perfect than that for which he was destined. Then he merely could sin and die, now he must. Adam, as the seed of all other men, propagates sin by means of the passion which accompanies generation. The means of transmission itself transmits.

3. In the *third* book, which contains thirty chapters, the means are considered by which God offers salvation, first to some, then to all. After a comparison of the particular Jewish economy of salvation with the universal Christian economy

the author proceeds to consider the incarnation, the immaculate conception and birth of Christ, and the relation of the two natures in Him. Since Deity is joined with the entire man, body and soul, Christ is *persona trium substantiarum*, and His union with God is essentially different from that of every believer. The book is closed by investigations as to how the Divine and human are related in Christ, for instance in miracles. The *fourth* book, in twenty-six chapters, opens with the subordination of the incarnate One to God, and touches the question whether He was able to sin, without coming to a decision upon it. It inquires further how far omnipotence is to be ascribed to Him, and remarks in that connection that Scripture is accustomed often to say less than it means, and *vice versa*. The question why Christ prayed, and how this is consistent with omnipotence and omniscience, is subtly answered; and the author then proceeds to ascertain whether He possessed faith, love, and hope. Sight took the place of faith in Him. The necessity of the death upon the cross, the question as to how far in spite of this the murderers of Christ sinned, the fact that Christ offered Himself not to the devil but to God, and an investigation as to what the lower world contains and what Christ accomplished by His descent into Hades—these and related subjects make up the contents of the remainder of the book. The *fifth*, containing fifty-two chapters, opens with the subject of the resurrection, in which connection the going forth of the dead out of their graves for a short time, and appearances of Christ after His ascension, are considered. The latter are regarded either as appearances of angels, or as due to an ecstatic condition on the part of the beholder. An accurate presentation of justification by faith, and of the meritoriousness of works, of the necessity of baptism and the possibility of making up for it by martyrdom and faith, is not free from Semi-Pelagianism, which indeed at that time was regarded as orthodox. Baptism and the ceremonies belonging to it, the opening of heaven in connection with it and by means of it, the confessional, forgiveness of sins, works dead and meritorious, are considered at length one after the other, as well as the various degrees of spiritual death from which it is still possible to be rescued, and the last degree for which there is no salvation.

4. The *sixth* book, in sixty-one chapters, takes up first an

entirely different subject, discussing the nine orders of good angels and the corresponding orders of the bad. The investigation then returns to man, and devotes itself to the share which divine grace has in man's good works, and to the share which belongs to man's own activity. The latter is made to consist chiefly in the giving up of opposition. The various elements of repentance are given, and the confessional and absolution are considered from the side of the confessor, as well as from the side of the penitent, in such a way as to oppose levity on the part of the latter and hierarchical cupidity on the part of the former. The thirty-seven chapters of the *seventh* book treat of the forgiveness of sin, the life of the saved within the Church, and their various ranks; finally state and family life, and, with especial fulness, marriage. In the *eighth* book, which contains thirty-two chapters, the discussion concerns the Eucharist, its relation to the celebration of the passover, transubstantiation, laws in regard to meats, finally, with great fulness, death, resurrection, judgment, eternal perdition and blessedness. The discussion bears throughout an exegetical character. Difficulties are set aside by rather arbitrary conclusions.

### § 169.

1. PETRUS, born in Novara and therefore ordinarily called LOMBARDUS, died in the year 1164 as Bishop of Paris. He appears to have been originally a pupil of Abelard, but later he heard Robertus Pullus, and finally was directed by Bernard to Hugo, who captivated him above all others. His fame is due chiefly to his work *Sententiarum libri quattuor*, from which arises his common designation *Magister sententiarum*. The fact that this work became the basis for all dogmatic investigation, just as the *Decretum Gratiani* for studies in ecclesiastical law, and further the fact that the aim which Gratian had placed before himself in his *Concordantia discordantium*, as well as the division into distinctions and questions, are common to both works, made it possible for the tradition to arise that the two contemporaries were brothers. Indeed a third brother has been given them in the person of Petrus Comestor, the author of the *Historia scholastica*. The honour of being for some centuries the only recognised com-

pendium of dogmatics, so that teacher and students of that subject were called Sententiaries, is due to what might be called a defect in the work, if it be compared with the *Sententia* of Pullus. It shows, namely, less originality, in many points less decision, than the work of Pullus. There was thus left, however, more room for independence on the part of those who made it the basis of their lectures. Opinions for and against a thing are presented in the manner introduced by Abelard, then it is shown how the contradiction may be solved; but the conclusion is not so strongly supported that the teacher himself cannot modify it or at least its grounds. It thus became possible for the Jesuit Possevin to cite 243 commentaries on the *Sentences* as already known to him. The work was first printed in Venice, in 1477; since then times without number. Migne's *Patr. lat.* contains, in vol. 191, Lombard's commentaries on the Psalms and his Collects on the Pauline epistles, and in vol. 192 (pp. 519-963) the *Sentences*, according to the edition of Aleaume (Antwerp, 1757).

2. The work begins by referring to the difference between the *res* and the *signa* which had been noticed by Augustine and considered also by Hugo. This Lombard held to be important for the subjects of belief, since there are not only things but also signs which conduce to man's salvation, namely the sacraments. The latter are at first left out of consideration and taken up again in the fourth book. The first three books are devoted solely to the realities which contribute to salvation. They are however further subdivided. Augustine had already drawn the distinction between that which man enjoys (*frui*), that is, desires for its own sake, and that which he uses (*uti*), that is, wishes for the sake of something else. This distinction between *quo fruendum* and *quo utendum est* is adopted here, and the former predicate applied to God alone, of whom the *first* book treats. The divisions of this book as well as of all the others are called *distinctiones*. Each contains a number of questions which are considered from various sides and finally answered. In the forty-eight *distinctiones* of the first book the doctrine of the triune God is discussed, the author showing how the difficulties raised against it have been already answered by Augustine and others, since they have pointed out an image of the Trinity in creatures, especially in man. The author shows

further that the contradictions between the various authorities are only apparent, arising chiefly from the ambiguity of the words employed, and are therefore to be solved by distinctions. He opposes Abelard frequently in this part. The essential predicates of God, His omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence, as well as His will, are considered at length, and difficulties in part solved, in part simply mentioned. In the *second* book, in twenty-four *distinctiones*, the subject treated is *quo utimur*, created things. First the act of creation is considered, and its ground made the goodness of God, its end the true profit of the creature, which consists in serving and enjoying God. Protest is entered against the highest authorities of the dialecticians, Aristotle and Plato, because the former taught the eternity of the world, the latter the eternity at least of matter. The consideration of the six days' work, of angels and men, is followed by a discussion of evil, in which Peter comes to the conclusion that the dialectic rule of the incompatibility of opposites suffers an exception in the case of evil. Since this rule, however, was the basis of all dialectics, it is easy to understand how, as occasion offers, he speaks of dialectics itself somewhat scornfully, or contrasts the dialecticians, just as Pullus had the philosophers, with the Christians. The *third* book, containing forty *distinctiones*, considers first the incarnation. If it were not necessary it was nevertheless fitting that it should take place, and that the redemption should be accomplished by means of it exactly as it was accomplished. The question whether faith, hope, and love existed in Christ, forms the transition to the consideration of these virtues; and in this connection love is treated with the greatest minuteness. A hasty consideration of the four cardinal virtues and a fuller one of the Holy Spirit's seven gifts of grace (according to Isa. i. 2) follow. It is then shown that the ten commandments are only deductions from the command to love God and our neighbour. After a discussion of lying and of perjury, the relation between the old and new covenants is considered at the close. In the *fourth* book, which contains fifteen *distinctiones*, the sacred signs are treated, the conception of the sacrament is fixed, and then the seven sacraments are discussed, confirmation most briefly, the confessional most fully. Finally eschatology is taken up, and at the end the question is proposed, whether the unhappiness of the condemned can disturb the blessedness of

the saved. This question, which is discussed in the fifteenth *distinctio*, is answered in the negative.

3. One of the most zealous followers of Lombard was Peter of Poitiers. He was chancellor of Paris toward the end of the twelfth century, and himself wrote five books of *Sentences* or *Distinctions*, which he dedicated to William, Archbishop of Sens. They were published simultaneously with the works of Robert Pullus by Mathaud. The first book treats of the Trinity, the second of the rational creature, the third of the fall and of the necessary restoration, the fourth of the redemption accomplished by the incarnation, the fifth of the redemption which is repeated in the sacraments. The work agrees completely in its arrangement and essential contents with that of Lombard.

### § 170.

1. Intellectually the most gifted of the Summists was the German ALANUS (DE INSULIS because he was born in Ryssel), whose long life and extended literary activity has given rise to the assumption that there were two persons of the same name. He was first a professor in Paris, then a Cistercian monk, and later for a time Bishop of Auxerre. He died in the Cistercian monastery of Clairvaux in the year 1203, after he had won the cognomen of *Doctor Universalis* by his writings and disputations against the Waldenses and Patarenes. His works were first published by Visch in Amsterdam (1654), but appendices were added in the *Bibliotheca scriptorum ordinis Cisterciensis*, Colon., 1656. This edition was made the basis of Migne's edition (*Patr. lat.*, vol. 120), for which however manuscripts were especially collated, and which contains in addition the lexicographical work of Alanus, *Distinctiones dictionum theologicarum* (also called *Oculus SSæ.*), which was printed in 1477.

2. The shortest but most important of Alanus' works is his *De arte, seu de articulis catholicæ fidei, libri quinque*, which was first published by Pez in the *Thes. anecd. noviss.*, and is contained in Migne, col. 573-617. It is a *Summa*, much shorter than usual, written with the purpose of opposing heretics and Mohammedans. For this reason there are given in the prologue a number of definitions (*descriptiones*), postulates (*petitiones*), and axioms (*communes animi conceptiones*),



in order to gain firm ground for the disputation, which is then carried on in a strictly syllogistic form. The *first* book, in thirty Sentences, treats of the *una omnium causa*, God. From the impossibility that anything should be *causa sui* is deduced the existence of a *causa prima* which has no properties and therefore is unchangeable and eternal, unending and inconceivable, an object not so much of knowledge as of faith, that is of an acceptance whose meritoriousness consists in the fact that it does not rest upon irresistible grounds. Faith stands therefore above opinion and below knowledge. All qualities which are ascribed to the perfectly simple, highest cause, belong only improperly to it, since they have been transferred from the effect to the cause. The Trinity of Persons in God, which does not conflict with His unity, must be concluded by a like transference from the fact that in everything are found matter, form, and their unity (*compago*). The thirty Sentences of the *second* book treat of the world and its creation, especially angels and men. Communicative love, joined with might in God, impels Him to the creation of rational spirits, which recognise in the world His goodness and might, and which are free because only to such can He show His righteousness. The rational angel-like spirit is united in man with that which is lowest, the earth. From this arises his frailty, as a result of which he falls, sins against God, and thus brings upon himself endless punishment. The *third* book considers, in sixteen doctrinal Sentences, the incarnation and redemption. In its arrangement it closely follows Anselm's *Cur Deus homo*, showing that that which man ought to accomplish but which God alone could accomplish, was performed by the incarnate God, and most fittingly by the Son, because He is the basis of all form and therefore opposed to all deformity. He takes upon Himself the hardest of punishments, the punishment of death. It is however in this connection expressly said that God might have adopted other methods of redemption. The *fourth* and the *fifth* books contain nothing peculiar. The former treats of the sacraments in nine Sentences, and the latter of the resurrection in six.

3. With this work agree in their contents two others, of which it is difficult to decide whether they are preparatory to or are further developments of what the first contains. They divide between them the ends which the work *De arte* had pursued, the one, *De fide catholica contra hæreticos libri*

IV., emphasizing the polemical element, the other, *Regulæ theologicae*, rather the systematic. The introduction to the latter work (Migne, pp. 617–687) reminds us of Gilbert (§ 163, 4), in so far as it is asserted that every science has its own fundamental principles, distinguished by special names. Dialectics has its *maximæ*, rhetoric its *loci communes*, mathematics its *axiomata* and *porismata*, etc. They all hold only so long as the accustomed course of nature lasts. The *regulæ* or *maximæ theologicae* alone have irrefragable necessity, since they treat of the eternal and unchangeable. These fundamental propositions are in part generally recognised, in part such as are convincing only to the one who looks deeply. Only the latter are to be considered here. They are especially such as follow from the fact that God is not only one but also unity itself (*monas*). Many of them are expressed in formulæ which sound paradoxical. For instance, *monas est alpha et omega sine alpha et omega*, *monas est sphaera cujus centrum ubique circumferentia nusquam*, etc. Especial weight is laid upon the fact that there is no difference in God between His being and that which He is, and that He is therefore not the subject of properties, and hence no theological proposition can speak of the accidental (*contingens*). God, as form itself, is naturally without form, just as He does not have being, because He is being itself. Since all predicates are taken from the forms which an object has, positive predicates do not apply to God. It is very carefully considered whether substantives or adjectives, abstracts or concretes, verbs, pronouns, or prepositions, may be used in speaking of God, and how their meaning is modified. The especial predicates are then considered which, although they belong to all three Persons of the Divine nature, are yet ordinarily applied in an especial sense to one or the other of them, as might to the Father, etc. The objections are then weighed which are brought against omnipotence, as well as those brought against wisdom and foreknowledge. A consideration of goodness forms the transition to a discussion of whether and in how far all is good. This is followed by ethical investigations, of which the work *De arte* contained none. The principal proposition is, that all that is worthy of punishment as well as of reward lies in the will alone. With this it is quite compatible that punishment is earned, while reward is unearned, since man accomplishes evil as *auctor* but good as *minister*. Alanus seeks to

avoid Pelagianism and extreme Augustinianism by distinguishing between *gratia ad meritum* and *gratia in merito*. *Vitium* is considered, both as the absence of *virtus* and as its opposite. *Caritas* is defined as the source of all virtues, and it is shown how it is unity with God, which was begun by the incarnation of the Son, who as a man earned nothing for Himself but all for us, and is continued by the sacraments. Some propositions which are said to hold not only for theology but also for the *naturalis facultas*, complete the book. It is divided into 125 chapters, and as an *inventarium* of that which is taught by the theological *sensus communis* stood for a long time in high esteem.

4. It was probably the four books *De fide catholica contra hæreticos* (Migne, pp. 305-428) which led Trithemius and others after him to ascribe to Alanus a commentary upon the *Sentences* of Lombard. The book has an entirely different, purely polemical tendency. In the *first* book, which contains sixty-seven chapters, dualistic, baptist, anti-sacramental, and other heresies are refuted by the authority of apostolic and patristic utterances. It appears often as if all these assertions proceeded from a single sect, but elsewhere it is seen that the author has various sects in mind. The *second* book, directed particularly against the Waldenses, embraces twenty-five chapters, and defends especially the dignity of the priesthood while it opposes also the rigorous morals of the heretics mentioned. The *third* book, in twenty-one chapters, combats the Jews, refuting their objections against the Trinity, against the abrogation of the ceremonial law, against the appearance of the Messiah as well as against His divinity and resurrection, with arguments drawn partly from the Old Testament and partly from reason. The *fourth* book is directed *contra paganos seu Mohametalanos*. It is the shortest, containing only fourteen chapters. In connection with the doctrine of the Trinity, reference is made to that already said against the Jews, the conception by the Holy Spirit is justified, and finally the worship of images is defended, which are for the laity what the written word is for the clergy.

5. Alanus has gained still greater or at least wider fame from a poem in nine books entitled *Anticlaudianus* (Migne, pp. 483-575), sometimes called also *Antirufinus*, because it pictures, in opposition to Claudian's *Rufinus*, how nature forms a perfect man according to God's will. The

virtues and vices, which fight over the soul created by God and furnished by nature with an excellent body, are personified. The poem, in describing the journey of Wisdom to God, contains at once an encyclopædia of sciences and a representation of the universe with its circles of planets and its heavens. Arrived in the heavenly sphere, Wisdom is obliged to separate itself from the seven arts and sciences; Theology becomes its guide; and Faith and a mirror, in which all is seen only by reflection, become the means by which it approaches God. It is emphasized with a certain joy, how theological doctrines are in conflict with those of the *trivium* and the *quadrivium*. Logic is not accorded a very high position, and the novelties introduced by the discovery of Aristotle's *Analytics* are especially complained of. This is a confirmation of the opinion expressed in § 164, 1, that the *logica nova* led away from theology.

### § 171.

#### THE VICTORINES.

Over against the Summists, who, constituted the orthodox party, stand the religious ANTHROPOLOGISTS or teachers of piety, the pietists of the twelfth century. Their principal centre was the monastery of St. Victor, and hence they are called by some Victorines. For them, as for the Summists, belief without proof stands highest. But they emphasize in belief the act of faith itself much more than the content of faith. They do not wholly forget, it is true, the *fides qua creditur* (to use the modifications of Hugo's expressions which later became common) in holding the *fides qua creditur*, but nevertheless the latter is treated with greater fondness by him who still follows closest in the footsteps of Hugo. His successors speedily become more one-sided, and thereby make enemies not less of the writers of Sentences and Summaries than of the untheological dialecticians. The solitary life, withdrawn from all scientific labour and devoted to contemplation, finds among them full approval.

## § 172.

J. G. V. Engelhardt: *Richard von St. Victor und Johannes Ruysbroek*.  
Erlangen, 1838.

1. RICHARD, a Scotchman by birth, was from 1162 until his death, in 1173, Prior of the monastery of ST. VICTOR, whose name is always added to his own. He was educated by Hugo, and did not neglect entirely the doctrinal side of theology, as his works upon the Trinity prove. Nevertheless he laid especial weight upon mystic contemplation, to whose description and glorification his most important works are devoted. He is also stirred with enmity against philosophers, whose arrogance makes him distrustful toward philosophy itself, so that he is disposed to admit its services only in connection with natural science. His works have been often published, first in octavo, in Venice, in 1506, then more complete in folio, in Paris, 1518, and elsewhere. In Migne's *Patr. lat.*, they constitute the 194th volume.

2. Although Richard's *De Trinitate libri sex* (Migne, pp. 887-992) was often cited after his age as an important work, it may be passed over here, since it contains scarcely anything which had not already been said, and in part better, by Hugo and the other Summists considered in the preceding paragraphs. He appears much more original, on the other hand, in the works which are commonly called mystical; thus, in the work *De exterminatione mali et promotione boni* (pp. 1073-1116), in which he interprets tropically the words of Psalm cxiv. 5, *quid est tibi mare*, etc., and shows how believers must fall into the Dead Sea of remorse, how their spirit (the Jordan) must flow upwards towards the source, etc. In the work *De statu interioris hominis* (pp. 1116-1158) the words of Isa. i. 5, 6, *omne caput languidum*, etc., are interpreted in an equally figurative way, and the might of free-will in contrast with arbitrariness, as well as the power of humility and of the prayer of devotion, is described and praised. The three books *De eruditione hominis interioris* (pp. 1229-1366) treat in the same manner the dream of Nebuchadnezzar. Finally, his two principal works, *De præparatione animi ad contemplationem* (pp. 1-64) and *Libri quinque de gratia contemplationis* (pp. 63-202), are designated as *Benjamin minor* and *Benjamin major* because they use the history of the sons of Jacob, especially Benjamin, allegorically. They are called also *De*

*arca mystica* by later writers. With these are connected the *De gradibus charitatis* (pp. 1195-1208) and *De quatuor gradibus violentæ charitatis* (pp. 1207-1224), which describe the aspiration that conditions the state of contemplation.

3. Contemplation, Benjamin, who is born only by the death of Rachel (reason), has as its content not only that which is above reason, as Hugo had said, but also that which is entirely outside of, and indeed opposed to reason. Only at occasional moments do Joseph and Benjamin kiss each other, that is, *meditatio* and *contemplatio*, reason and revelation, go together. In general there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between *cogitatio*, whose organ is the imagination and which knows neither work nor fruit; *meditatio*, which belongs to the *ratio*, and toils but does not reap; and finally *contemplatio*, whose organ is the *intelligentia* and whose reward is fruit without labour. If the word *contemplatio*, however, be taken in the broader sense, six grades of it may be distinguished, which are mystically indicated by the principal parts of which the ark of the covenant was composed. Two belong to the imagination, and of these the lower is conformed to the imagination, the other to the reason. Two belong to the reason, and of these the lower leans upon the imagination and needs images, while the higher is pure rational perception. Finally, there is one that stands above reason but not outside of it; and, highest of all, one that is outside of reason and appears to be contrary to it, as for instance the contemplation of the Trinity. The object of the two highest grades is called the intellectual. All six species of contemplation are considered at length, and divided into various steps, in the *Benjamin major*; and it is repeatedly pointed out that Aristotle and the other philosophers remained upon the lower steps. Self-knowledge and self-forgetfulness which follows it, are praised above all else. The highest grade of contemplation is characterized as the state of being actually lifted out of oneself, and its various methods are described. It is a work of God's good pleasure; and the prayer of complete self-devotion is the means of securing it again when we have once experienced it. Richard repeatedly finds fault with the dialecticians, among other things, because they entirely forget the formal character of their science. Since even correct conclusions may lead to false results, the chief thing is the truth of the premises and fundamental propositions. But he blames not only the

dialecticians. It was early noticed that he often seizes the opportunity of making some accusation or other against Lombard, so that a theology which produces only a *Summa* does not seem to him the right one.

### § 173.

1. Richard was succeeded by WALTER OF ST. VICTOR. His work against the heresies of Abelard, Peter Lombard, Peter of Poitiers, and Gilbert is ordinarily cited, on account of an expression in its preface, under the title *In quatuor labyrinthos Franciæ*. It has become known through extracts made by Bulæus (*Hist. univ.*, Par. II. pp. 629 ff.). Walter condemns with equal scorn the logicians and the metaphysicians, who think so much of Aristotle that they forget the Gospel, and also, in their subtle investigations in regard to *aliquid*, become finally veritable *nihilistæ*. He condemns likewise the writers of Summaries, who say just as much against the existence of God as for it. When they say of anything that it is in violation of the rules of Aristotle, he inquires what difference that makes, and quotes the warning of the Apostle against all philosophy. He is disturbed by the fact that they give the various opinions side by side without deciding between them, and demands that they condemn heresy that they may not themselves become heretics. Quotations from the Church Fathers, especially from Augustine, and railing invectives are the weapons with which he attacks the "Dialecticians" as much as the "Theologians," and not less the "Pseudo-Scholastics." The teachers of the "Dialecticians" are the heathen Socrates, Aristotle, and Seneca, and they do not realize that the correctness of the conclusion is not a warrant for the truth of the thing concluded. By "Theologians" he plainly means the compilers of the various Summaries, since he places John of Damascus at the head. As for the "Pseudo-Scholastics," they propose a great number of useless questions, which are to be answered only by circumlocutions and subtle distinctions. Over against them all he places constantly living, world-conquering faith in the Son of God, who has become man with skin and flesh, with bones and nerves—that faith which is to the world indeed foolishness, but which drives out devils and raises the dead.

2. The influence of the monastery of St. Victor,—especially

since the subjective side of piety (*affectus*) had been emphasized there at the expense of the objective element of religion (*cognitio*),—is not to be mistaken in the tendency of that age to awaken the people by sermons, rather than to study learned theology. The miracle-working, travelling preacher, Fulco of Neuilly, and Dominic, the founder of the predicant order, were at least indirectly influenced by the Victorines. Four Paris professors, the founders of the order of the *Vallis scholarium*, which took its rise in the neighbourhood of Langres, were directly stirred by them. Also the two monks, Isaac in Stella and Alcher in Clairvaux, a part of whose correspondence is extant, appear to have felt the influence emanating from St. Victor. The latter's work, *De spiritu et anima*, is often cited in later times as a production of Augustine. The unscientific mysticism of this age and the scientific mysticism of a shortly subsequent period found scarcely anywhere more nourishment than in the works which proceeded from this monastery, and that almost more in later writings than in those of Hugo and even of Richard. They may be regarded as diametrical opposites, and therefore as the corresponding correlates, of the *puri philosophi* mentioned above (§ 164).

### § 174.

When the Schoolmen have thus become mere metaphysicians, who concern themselves more about substances and subsistencies, about *nihil* and *aliquid*, than about belief, or logical pugilists who do not inquire as to the Trinity but as to whether the man or the knife accomplishes the slaughter; and when they have become, on the other side, theological compilers, for whom an authority stands higher than all logical laws of thought, or again glorifiers of piety, in whose opinion the pious heart is to take the place of all science—when these results have taken place, scholasticism has really been separated into its component parts, that is, has fallen. When within it are found men who are not satisfied with any of these extremes, but who do not possess sufficient intellectual power to give scholasticism a new impulse, they will either proceed to acquire knowledge of all that is taught in the name of philosophy,—to do justice to all in so far as possible,—or they will make the attempt to return to the primitive state of scholasticism, in which all its elements were still one, even if



they did form a chaotic mixture. The former learned historical interest is more or less sceptically inclined, the latter attempt, on the other hand, to animate the past is in itself mystical. As very frequently the disappearance of the speculative spirit has been heralded by the rise of scepticism and mysticism, thus the temporary exhaustion of the scholastic spirit became manifest in the appearance of the mediæval academician, John of Salisbury, and in the mystical reactionary attempt of Amalrich of Bene.

### § 175.

G. Schaarschmidt: *Johannis Sarisberiensis, nach Leben, Studien, Schriften und Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1862 (viii. 360).

1. JOANNES PARVUS (perhaps his family name was Short or Small) is ordinarily called, from his birthplace, JOHN OF SALISBURY, sometimes, from his bishopric, JOHN OF CHARTRES. By his education, which he himself describes in his *Metalogicus* ii. 10, he was better fitted than any one else to pass a final judgment upon previous Scholasticism. While still young, but with a thorough school education, he went to Paris in the year 1136, and became a zealous pupil of Abelard, who imparted to him a high respect for logic, which he never lost. This is proved by his *Metalogicus*, written in mature years, in the four books of which he combats, in the person of Cornificius, those who looked with contempt upon the investigations connected with the *trivium*. He declares them to be the necessary foundation of all scientific study. Being familiar, however, with the Aristotelian *Analytics* and *Topics*, he does not wish one to be satisfied, as Abelard still was, with the old logic, that is, that which follows Boëthius more closely than Aristotle. The genuine Aristotelian logic, above all the *Topics*, he cannot praise enough, in part because it performs such great services for rhetoric, in part because it does the same for scientific disputation. This does not hinder him, however, from characterizing logic as a study especially for youth, and from opposing those who, in making this study the only one, become *Eristics* and *Sophists* instead of philosophers. The method proposed by him he himself followed. Having studied the old logic under Abelard with great industry, he became, after the latter had given up his lectures, a pupil of Alberich, one of the most violent opponents of nominalism, and was thus initiated

into all the subtleties of the famous nominalistic controversy, and was in a position to give later an account of all the various attempts at compromise. By William of Conches, who was then his teacher for three years, and by two other pupils of Bernard of Chartres, perhaps also by the aged master himself, he was led to turn his attention to another sphere, namely, the Ancients, whom he now began to study with great zeal. Cicero especially captivated him, and rhetoric became from that time a principal object of his studies. At the same time he was inducted into the *quadrivium* by a German, Hartwin, and by a man whom he calls Richardus Episcopus. Both studies shattered his admiration for Aristotle, whose physics and ethics seemed to him to be in conflict with the doctrines of faith. His respect for Aristotle as a logician, however, increased all the more when his countryman Adam, by a new translation, made the hitherto almost unknown *Analytics* and *Topics* more accessible to the learned public. Under the tuition of Adam and of William of Soissons he now learned to prize this "new logic," and its fruitfulness for rhetoric. His studies were interrupted by three years of teaching, and then he went again to Paris and studied philosophy under Gilbert, but at the same time heard Robertus Pullus and a certain Simon on theology; and from the way in which he cites Hugo of St. Victor it must be concluded that he had made himself familiar with his views also; so that none of the tendencies which arose in that period remained unknown to him. He was thereby placed in a position to report as accurately as he does upon the different modifications which had been developed within the various contending parties. In the question as to the universals he proposes a compromising formula, which, when compared with that of Abelard, appears nominalistic.

2. He imitates Cicero, whom he greatly admires, in appropriating various opinions; and he zealously emulates him also in purity of language. Like Cicero, he is fond of calling himself an Academician, and desires no extreme scepticism, but as little does he wish a knowledge that mistakes its limits. Like Cicero also, he combats superstition, but at the same time, just as zealously, irreligiousness. With John, however, ecclesiastical considerations naturally take the place of political. His interest is above all practical. Church life and the freedom of the Church are for him more important

than dogma. He was confirmed more and more in this tendency by his position as Secretary of the Archbishop Theobald, of Canterbury, who, as well as King Henry II., sent him often as an Ambassador to Rome—a mission for which he was eminently fitted by his intimate friendship with Pope Hadrian IV. Thus Thomas à Becket, with whom he became acquainted soon after his return to England, found in him his truest servant and assistant when he undertook to defend the rights of the archbishopric against the encroachments of the State; and John himself was in danger of sharing the martyr's death. From the year 1176 he was Bishop of Chartres, and died there in 1180. Of his works, the *Policraticus*, in eight books, was completed in 1159. It considers in the first six books the *nugæ curialium*, in the last two the *vestigia philosophorum*. It appeared first in the year 1476 in folio, of which the Paris quarto edition of 1513 is a mere reprint. The Lyons octavo edition of 1513 made use of another manuscript. Both editions were used by the editor of a third, Raphelengius, Leyden, 1595, 8vo. This was reprinted by Jo. Maire, Leyden, 1639, 8vo, who united with it the *Metalogicus*, which had been written at the same time, and first published in Paris in 1610. The epistles of John were first published by Masson, Paris, 1611; his poem, *Entheticus de dogmate philosophorum*, by Petersen, Hamburg, 1843. In the year 1848, J. A. Giles, of Oxford, issued a very incorrect edition of John's complete works, in five octavo volumes. A reprint of this forms the 199th volume of Migne's *Patr. lat.* In all his works more learning is shown than was common at that time, united with a tasteful presentation quite unusual in his age. Throughout, the practical element is predominant. Love is for him the sum of all ethics; and in every theoretical investigation the question constantly forces itself upon him, whether it has also a practical value. This sometimes borders upon a very prosaic utilitarianism.

### § 176.

AMALRICH (the form Almarich is also found) is in every particular the opposite of John. He was born in Bena near Chartres, and is therefore called after both places. In the year 1204 he was condemned on account of his heretical doctrines by the University of Paris, where he had first been a

teacher of arts, that is a professor in the philosophical faculty, but had afterwards devoted himself to theology. With a sense of his innocence he appealed to Rome; but his condemnation was confirmed, and he died in the year 1207, soon after making a recantation under compulsion. The proposition, that every Christian must view himself as a member of the body of Christ, which has alone come down to us as his error, can hardly have been the ground of his condemnation. It is probable that the latter was due rather to the way in which he proved it. The judgment, further, which was held over his bones in the year 1209, was caused by the fact that the Albigenes and other heretics, who had adopted the apocalyptic representation of Joachim of Floria and other fanatics, appealed often to Amalrich. Among the propositions which they are said by Bulæus to have asserted, are some which occur word for word in Erigena, and, as far as it is possible to draw a conclusion from the later notices of Amalrich himself, as well as the somewhat fuller notices of the so-called Almericians, the works of that father of scholasticism seem to have had more influence upon Amalrich than the Schoolmen of his own day. From this arises the oft-repeated accusation of his opponents, that in everything he had to make his own peculiar opinion current, and further the report that he had written a book under the name *Pision*, by which it is difficult to understand any other work than that of Erigena, whose title had long before undergone similar corruptions (§ 154, 1). Amalrich appears, to judge from the way in which Cardinal Henry of Ostia cites sentences from the work of Erigena, to have seized especially upon all that could be interpreted in a pantheistic sense, a phenomenon which can cause no surprise in connection with a mystical reactionary attempt. It is impossible to determine in how far the report is true which is found in later writers, that Amalrich had declared for the opinion that the sovereignty of the Son had now come to an end, just as the sovereignty of the Father had ceased with the old covenant, and that the reign of the Spirit was approaching.

## § 177.

## CONCLUDING REMARK.

When John of Salisbury knows how to give only an inventory of what the various Schoolmen have attempted to accom-

plish ; when Amalrich, on the contrary, is able to counsel only a return to the original scholasticism of Erigena ; when Walter of St. Victor, finally, has only a cry of woe for that to which scholasticism has been brought by its leaders—all this is not much less than a declaration of bankruptcy on the part of the scholastic spirit. In fact, it has exhausted itself in the solution of the problem, how to make ecclesiastical dogma accessible to the natural understanding, a problem which it undertook to solve partly by pointing out rationality in the separate doctrines and logical arrangement in their totality, partly by exercising the natural understanding in the appropriation of the super-sensuous material, and by showing it the steps by which it can rise to a comprehension of the dogma. Scholasticism can make further progress only when it receives a new impulse. This is given to it simultaneously with a new problem, whose solution it attempts in the period of its glory.

## SECOND DIVISION.

### Scholasticism at its Height.

#### § 178.

THE more true it is that the spirit of Christianity is entirely new, the more must the Church, permeated with that spirit, look upon the pre-Christian and the un-Christian spirit as an unspiritual nature—as materialism. From this arises the struggle of the Christian community, later of the Church, against the world. It is a continual strife at the same time against Hellenism, the culminating point of classic heathendom ; and against Judaism, the summit of Orientalism ; finally against the world-empire of the Romans, which incorporated both in itself. To the first was opposed, even in the Apostolic age, the Judaizing tendency, which received its first impulse from Peter and James ; then, in the youthful days of the community, monkish asceticism, the desire for martyrdom ; finally, in the Church, the dogma of the one holy God, and of the creation of the world from nothing. Judaism is combated from the very beginning by Pauline heathen Christianity ; then the fresh and

animated spirit of a congregation composed solely of priests is contrasted with it ; and later the doctrines of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, of the worthlessness of all legal righteousness, are put in opposition to it. Christianity contends finally with Roman imperialism in undermining the pillars of the law, property and punishment, and in repudiating the deification of the world-power, the Roman State, symbolized in the worship of the emperors. Those who were foolishness to the Greeks, an offence to the Jews, and,—on account of their *odii generis humani*,—a *sceleratissima gens* to the Romans, richly returned such hatred, and considered it their duty, whenever they met even with that which was pre-Christian, or hitherto unaffected by the Christian spirit, not to rest until it should be made subject to the dominion of the Spirit. This work was comparatively finished towards the end of the eleventh century, when the greatest of the Popes, an anti-type of Charlemagne, united the world-hierarchy with the world-monarchy, having conquered the world which lay humbly at his feet.

### § 179.

The Kingdom of God, in order even to begin the struggle, had to become the kingdom of this world (*vid.* § 131) ; and still more, as a result of the strife itself, and of its continuation and long duration, it became infected, as is always the case, with its opponent's nature. The Church came out of its victory over the world conformed to the world. It became Jewish through its priesthood, patterned after the Old Testament, and through its Pelagianism, which, modified though it was, caused it to lay such great weight upon the ritual service and upon meritorious works, for which latter equivalents may in the end be substituted. The Church became heathen, since, instead of consisting solely of children of God or of priests, it accepted also children of the world, with whom the minority, as the (true) Church, were contrasted. It became heathen in putting in the place of the earlier conception of Salvation as belonging only to the next world, the material conception of it as a possession in this world, in accordance with which a sacred picture, a relic, a host, in short, a material thing, makes salvation present and performs miracles. It became, finally, in its greed for conquest and its pettifogging interpretation of the laws, a pupil of Rome, and boasted of being its successor, and following in its

footsteps. The degree to which the world has gained power over Christianity is shown more than in all this, in the fact that, having been accustomed to the conflict with the un-Christian world, Christianity can no longer dispense with its society. It is no more enough to have to do with Christians alone ; but, as acid tends to unite with a base, the Christian spirit of this age seeks to combine with its opposite. All that Christianity had ever opposed reappears now, united in Islam in a rejuvenated form. Heathenism, Judaism, and Christian heresy were the teachers of Mohammed. What they gave their pupil was fused by him, in the spirit of a Roman world-conqueror, into one doctrine, which is entirely of this world, so that all the various traits which the Apostolic age had ascribed to Anti-christ are united in Islam, the true Anti-Christianity. An encounter with it, the Antichrist, becomes a general desire, all the more because by that means the most priceless of all relics, the tomb of Christ, which has hitherto been lacking, may be obtained, and the most beautiful province, the Holy Land, be made subject to the sceptre of the Holy Father, and thus meritorious works of every sort be performed. It was therefore the universal wish of Christendom that the head of the Church declared to be the will of God, when he uttered the call to seek salvation by plundering the treasure which Antichrist possessed.

### § 180.

Philosophy, as self-consciousness of the mind, must likewise have its crusades. They show us scholasticism as it learns wisdom from anti-Christian philosophers. It is no longer satisfied with drawing upon Alexandrianism and Neo-Platonism, permeated with Christian ideas, nor with learning from Aristotle only that which passed as quite immaterial in antiquity and in the Christian age, namely, the rules of rational thinking. There arises the desire to incorporate in scholastic philosophy the entire content of pure Greek wisdom, which Aristotle,—who may therefore be called the arch-heathen,—had concentrated in himself (*vid.* § 92) ; so that now he obtains the honourable name of *magister* or *philosophus* in an eminent sense, since the men whom the Church looks upon as her *magistri* accept him as their teacher. At the same time, they do not fail, as Philo and the Church fathers did, to realize that

they have to do with a wisdom whose source is entirely different from that of the doctrine of the Church. This is, on the contrary, especially emphasized ; for, as if Aristotle were not un-Christian enough, Mohammedan and Jewish commentators are obliged to unlock the true sense of his teachings. As the heathen is called the "*philosophus*," the most irreligious of Mohammedans is called the "*commentator*" *par excellence*. It is as surprising that the Church permitted, and later demanded, that its teachers should sit at the feet of Anti-Christians in order to learn wisdom, as it is that it spurred on believers to dangerous contact with the enemies of the faith. First in its period of glory can the representatives of scholasticism be called Aristotelians. Inasmuch as this took place through the influence of the Oriental Peripatetics, we must first consider these teachers. Since, however, they concern us here only as the teachers of the Christian Schoolmen, the sense which the first translators of their works made out of them is of more importance to us, even when it is incorrect, than that which has been shown by modern study of the sources to be the truer meaning of the original. And thus works of which the Christian Schoolmen knew nothing, even though they may have been the most important, must, since they remained without influence, be assigned a minor position in comparison with those works whose influence was felt.

#### A.—MOHAMMEDANS AND JEWS AS FORERUNNERS OF THE CHRISTIAN ARISTOTELIANS.

##### THE ARISTOTELIANS IN THE ORIENT.

Aug. Schmölders: *Documenta philosophorum Arabum*. Bonn, 1836. The same: *Essai sur les écoles philosophiques chez les Arabes*. Paris, 1842. Abu'l-Fath' Muhammad asch-Scharastani: *Religionsparteien und Philosophenschulen*, übersetzt von Th. Haarbrücker. Halle, 1850-51, 2 vols. Munck: *Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques*. Paris, 1844-52, 6 vols. The same: *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*. Paris, 1859, Moritz Eisler: *Vorlesungen über die jüdische Philosophie des Mittelalters*. Wien, i. Abth. 1876, ii. Abth. 1870. M. Joël: *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie*, 2 vols. Breslau, 1876.

#### § 181.

A syncretism like that of Islam, moreover a reactionary attempt such as its view of the world is over against the



Christian view, contains no seed of development; nor does the philosophy of those who belong to it. The mission of both is to keep pre-Christian ideas living in order that they may prove a spur and an animating force in the conflict with the Christian spirit. After this has been accomplished they perish. The persecution of the philosophers by Justinian mentioned above (§ 130, 5) drove them first to Persia, then to Syria. Here, in the sixth century, translations of at least some of the analytical works of Aristotle begin to appear, as well as of his commentators, especially the Neo-Platonic. In connection with the prosperity which the Caliphate of Bagdad enjoyed under the Abbasides, this place became speedily the centre of scientific studies. Galen, translated some time before, drew attention to Plato and Aristotle. The Nestorian physician, Honain ben Ishak, often cited later as Johannitius (809–873), compiler of the celebrated *Apophthegmata philosophorum*, and his son Isaac, both of them equally versed in Syriac and Arabic, translated into both languages the works of Plato, Aristotle, Porphyry, Themistius, and others; as did also another Nestorian, Costa ben Luca, to whom Albertus Magnus ascribes an original work, *De differentia spiritus et animæ*, which, according to Jourdain, still exists in manuscript. They are soon followed by others who translate the Greek authors into Arabic, usually through the medium of the Syriac, but often directly from the original. Through them is formed gradually the school of the so-called “philosophers,” that is, of the more or less dependent paraphrasts of an Aristotelianism combined with Alexandrian ideas. Although the purely Arabic speculations which arose only from religious necessity may have had more originality, these Aristotelians mentioned have alone had a lasting influence upon the course of philosophy. Looked upon by their countrymen with distrust, they found early recognition among the Jews, whose school at Sora, in the neighbourhood of Bagdad, gained celebrity under Saadju and others. (Compare the work of Moritz Eisler, mentioned above.) In accordance with the worldly tendency of Islam, Aristotelianism retains, here much more the character of worldly wisdom, and remains, therefore, in spite of the introduction of emanative Alexandrianism, nearer its original form than in many of its Christian followers.

## § 182.

The line of philosophers is opened by Abu Jussuf Jakub Ibn Isaak al Kindi (ALKENDIUS), who was born in Basra probably at the very close of the eighth century, and died towards the end of the ninth. He was thus a contemporary of Erigena (*vid. supra*, § 154). He is called the "Excellent one of his century," the "Only one of his age," the "Philosopher of the Arabians," etc. Flügel has supplemented the notices given by Casiri (*Bibl. arab. escurial. i.*, 353 ff.) by the translation of the register, given in the Fihrist, of all of Alkindius' works. Almost all his works mentioned there,—two hundred and sixty-three in number, of which thirty-two are upon philosophy,—have disappeared. From their titles, however, it is clear that there was scarcely a province in which he was not active. Logic appears to have absorbed him especially; and he seems to have been no slavish translator, but an independent paraphrast. Mathematics he regarded as the foundation of all learning, natural science as an essential part of philosophy. Roger Bacon and Cardanus (*vid. infra*, §§ 212 and 242) esteemed him greatly, the latter indeed on account of his assertion of the unity and universality of the world, by reason of which the knowledge of a part contains that of the whole. To him is ascribed also the revision of an earlier Arabic translation of a very enigmatical work. This is later commonly called *Theologia Aristotelis* because Aristotle is introduced as speaking, and as citing some of his own works. Thomas Aquinas mentions its fourteen books as not in his time translated into Latin. He does not say in what language the copy which he used was written. That which later writers have read out of Thomas upon this subject, they have first read into him. Franciscus Patritius, who appends a Latin translation of this work to his *Nova de universis philosophia* (Venet. 1593), says that the translation was made from the Italian. He explains the work, however, as the mystic theology of the Egyptians and Chaldeans, as it was propounded by Plato and taken down by Aristotle after he had given up his hatred for Plato. The agreement with Plotinus is often verbal. Between the first originator and the *intellectus agens*, however, is always inserted the *verbum*, which, as *conceptum*, threatens to coincide with the former, as *expressum*, with the latter. The treatise of Haneberg (*Sitzungsberichte der*

*Münchener Akademie*, 1862, pp. 1–12) promises so much that its suspension is greatly to be regretted.

Cf. Flügel: *Al-Kindi genannt der Philosoph der Araber*. Leipzig, 1857.

### § 183.

Abu Nasr Muhammed Ibn Muhammed Ibn Torkhan, called al Farabi (ALPHARABIUS) from the province where he was born (the names ABUNAZAR and AVENNASAR also occur), died in the year 950. Casiri (ib. i. 190) gives a detailed register of his works. He is said in his thorough, logical works often to have followed Alkindius. His encyclopædia is most celebrated; but in addition to that, he undertook investigations upon all sorts of subjects, partly in commentaries upon Aristotle, partly in independent works. The report that he strongly emphasized the agreement of Plato and Aristotle points to Neo-Platonic influence. Even his opponents ranked him very high. The Christian Aristotelians quote him very often; and his commentary upon Aristotle's *Analyt. post.*, which is cited as *De demonstratione*, has exercised a great influence upon their logical development. A Latin translation of his works, or more correctly of two of them, *Alpharabii, vetustissimi Aristotelis interpretis opera omnia*, Paris, 1638, 8vo, is now very rare. Schmölders has lately translated a part of his works from the Arabic. A proof of the distrust with which these philosophical efforts were looked upon, is the fact that they concealed themselves in the obscurity of a secret society. The fifty-one treatises of the "Sincere Brethren," which were written in the second half of the tenth century, and of which Dieterici has translated a few, are the product of Aristotelianism coloured with Neo-Platonism, and soon after their composition found their way to Spain. It is interesting that in them branches of science are treated which we at least learn nothing of from Aristotle, for instance mathematics and botany.

Cf. F. Dieterici: *Streit zwischen Mensch und Thier*. Berlin, 1858; *Naturwissenschaft und Naturanschauung der Araber im zehnten Jahrhundert*. Berlin, 1861; *Die Propädeutik der Araber im zehnten Jahrhundert*. Berlin, 1865; *Die Logik und Psychologie der Araber im zehnten Jahrhundert*. Berlin, 1868; and *Aristotelismus und Platonismus im zehnten Jahrhundert nach Chr. bei den Arabern (Vortrag bei der Philogenvers. in Innsbruck)*.

## § 184.

1. Abu Ali al-Hussein Ibn Abdallah IBN SINA (AVICENNA) is universally regarded as the greatest of the Oriental philosophers. He was born in Bokhara in 978, lived in various places, and died in Ispahan in 1036, after winning a reputation as a physician and philosopher which has lasted for many centuries. Most of his works were translated before the end of the twelfth century. The Venetian edition, published in 1495, characterizes them as *opera philosophi facile primi*. Casiri (ib. i., 268 ff.) mentions a multitude of writings of which many are lost. Among these is the *Oriental Philosophy*, with which Roger Bacon was acquainted, and which, according to Averroës, was somewhat pantheistic. The work of Scharastani contains an accurate presentation of Avicenna's logic, metaphysics, and physics. The influence of Alfarabi is very apparent, especially in his logic. Only a part of this, treating of the five universals of Porphyry, is extant in a Latin translation, said to be from the hand of the Jew, Avendeath. The most interesting point is, that the question which was touched upon by Porphyry only in passing (*vid. supra*, § 128, 6) in this work receives its answer; not only the *genera* but all *universalia* are *ante multitudinem*, in the Divine understanding namely, and also *in multitudine*, as the actual common predicates of things, and finally *post multitudinem*, as our conceptions abstracted from things. And thus, if we examine the various modifications more carefully (cf. Prantl. ib. ii. 350 ff.), we see that the strife between realism and nominalism was settled in the Orient before it had burned out in the Occident. Really settled, for when all the contestants are held to be not only (as by Abelard) wrong, but also right, it is foolish to strive further. In addition to this fragment from one of Avicenna's larger works, there are extant two outlines of logic, one in prose, of which P. Vattier published a French translation in Paris in 1658, and one in metre, of which Schmölders gives a Latin translation in his *Documentis*. An old edition of his work *De anima* (*Papæ impressum per magistrum Antonium de Carchano s.a.*) designates it as *Liber sextus naturalium*. It forms a part of a course of instruction in philosophy addressed to a pupil, and was preceded by elements of physics in five books, and was to be followed in the seventh and eighth books by a treatment of plant and animal life.

After these eight books, which complete the discussion of natural science, the author promises to treat in the next four the *scientiæ disciplinales* and then the *scientia divina*. Finally, something from the *scientia de moribus* is to conclude the work. In how far this plan was carried out I cannot tell. The book which lies before me treats of the soul in general.

2. Passing from logic, which among the Arabs is only the tool of science, to science itself, we find placed at the head the absolutely Simple, which shuts out all mere possibility, and therefore does not admit of definition—the absolutely necessary and perfect, whose nature pre-supposes existence. This is the good after which everything strives and by which it becomes perfect. It is at the same time the true, since its existence is the most absolute certainty. Without impairing its unity, it is at the same time the process of thinking, the one thinking, and the thing thought; and in thinking itself it thinks all things, whose ground it is by its nature, not by design. This is to be limited in so far as only that which is general, *i.e.*, changeless laws, can form the subject of Divine thought, and not the accidental, for then a change would be introduced. Opposed to this, which is completely abstract (*χωριστόν*, according to Aristotle), is *materia* or *hyle*, to which belongs mere possibility as a predicate. Related in like manner to existence and non-existence, it needs, in order to exist, another which shall give the preponderance to existence. Matter, which is not corporeal stuff, but non-existence, limit, is the principle of all defect, therefore of lack of order, of beauty, of perfection. That which lies between the two consists of the intelligible, the form, and of the sensible, the matter, or, what is the same thing, there is to be distinguished in it possibility and existence. There is a single exception which is formed by the active understanding, this first efflux from the necessarily existent. In this, since it thinks the original one and itself, exists the first manifoldness, without which there would be an endless line of unities, but not a corporeal world, since unity can produce only unity. Since the active understanding has its possibility in itself, but derives its existence from the Original and the One, it ranks, in spite of its complete immateriality and perfection, below the latter, which is therefore often called the "More than perfect."

3. As the active understanding, which proceeds from the Original, receives from it unity, in the same manner eman-

tions from the understanding itself receive from it twofoldness. Therefore the heavenly circles consist of matter and of form, that is, every sphere is animated by a soul. In each one, however, since it is an emanation from a thinking principle, an intelligence also appears which Avicenna often designates as an angel. To these is attributed a perception of the particular, and thus through them the particular comes to the knowledge of the Deity, which, as such, knows nothing of it. All the heavenly circles have as their common ground that which was first caused, the active understanding, and therefore do not proceed from each other. The heavenly circle, however, which embraces all the others (whether the heaven of the fixed stars or the crystal sphere above it, remains undetermined), is the mover of those beneath. As regards its own motion, it is not natural in the sense in which the mounting upward of fire, etc., is, for this consists only in a struggle to pass from a foreign abode into its own element; but the heavenly sphere, on the contrary, is stirred by the immanent soul, which craves for the original ground which encompasses it, and therefore endeavours to approach every point of it. This craving is shared also by the souls of the lower circles. The aim is here as everywhere self-unmoved *movens*. The heavenly circles do not show the perfect and eternal, but nevertheless that which is satisfying and sempiternal. The realm of the unsatisfying and temporary begins below the latter. This explains the title *sufficiencia* of one of Avicenna's works. In the realm of the temporary, motion in a straight line shows itself, the spatial manifestation of the struggle to reach its own place by the shortest way. The distance from the natural state is the measure of this movement.

4. From the two active qualities, cold and warm, and the two passive, dry and moist, are deduced, as the possible combinations, the four elements, which can pass over into one another on account of the matter lying at their base. In the earth they lie in strata one above the other; only elevations and depressions modify the natural order. Fire, transparent as air and coloured only by smoke, forms above the four atmospheric strata a higher one in which the fiery meteors take their rise. The form of the rainbow is mathematically explicable but its colour not. From the vapours shut up within the earth not only earthquakes receive their explanation, but likewise the origin of metals, a co-operation of the stars being

assumed in the latter case. The metals, again, play a very important part in the formation of those bodies which attain life by the addition of a soul. The author's conception of the soul, with its three grades with their peculiar functions, agrees almost verbally with that of Aristotle; but the distinctions are carried further by means of more extended, mostly dichotomous, divisions. The senses are considered at length; and since in the fifth four separate sensations are distinguished (warmth, softness, dryness, smoothness), eight senses are often spoken of. To them is to be added the inner or common sense, which Avicenna often designates in conjunction with them by the Greek word *φαντασία*. In addition to this, the estimating or judging powers, as well as the recollecting power, belong to the *anima sensitiva*. By means of certain fine substances, the *spiritus animales*, the various functions are connected with separate parts of the brain. In the rational soul of man, originating with the body but outliving it, because produced by other, immaterial causes, are distinguished the acting, and the knowing or speculative powers. The latter is able to occupy itself with the universal forms deduced from matter. In that connection are to be distinguished the stages of planning, of preparing, and of performing (*intellectus materialis s. possibilis, præparatus s. dispositus*, finally *in actu*). In order to obtain an actual knowledge of the former, there is needed an infusion of that which was first caused, the active understanding, which is also called general because it works in all rational souls. This illumination, which comes often in dreams, often in waking hours (if suddenly, as *raptus*), is a necessary condition of all knowledge. Its highest grade is prophecy, which is often united with visions of the imagination. A contradiction between rational knowledge and the teaching of the (highest) prophet is therefore impossible. Purifications of the soul, ascetic practices, prayer and fasting, by which man frees himself from evil, that is from limitation, are the preparations for that infusion in which the understanding, to the degree in which it perceives all, becomes an intelligible world. This apprehension of the world and of its grounds is the blessedness which constantly increases.

### § 185.

Two generations after Avicenna, Abu Hamid Muhammed

Ibn Muhammed AL-GHAZZALI (ALGAZEL) occupies the same position which was pointed out in § 174 ff. as that of John of Salisbury and Amalrich of Chartres. This shows that the speculative spirit among the Arabs had exhausted itself with Alfarabi and Avicenna. Philosophy declares bankruptcy in passing over into scepticism and mysticism. Casiri, Schmölders, and especially Gosche, give accurate accounts of Algazel. He was born in the year 1059 in a small town, Ghazzalah, which belonged to the Persian city Jûs. He was first thoroughly instructed in the Shafitic theology, then, after busying himself many years with Aristotelian philosophy, became a teacher in Bagdad in 1091, but finally devoted himself wholly to Sufism, and died in monkish seclusion in Jûs in the year 1111. He was thus a contemporary of William of Champeaux. His strong desire, from his youth up, to secure a knowledge of the most various opinions, betrays the spirit of a compiler rather than of an original creator, and thus encyclopædia and logic were always his strongest points. The war of philosophical opinions disgusted him with philosophy, and from this resulted his celebrated work *A Refutation of the Philosophers* (*Destructio philosophorum*), which for a long time was known only through the reply of Averroës (*vid. infra*, § 187), until Munck obtained direct information in regard to it from Hebrew manuscripts. Algazel regards philosophy only as a preparation for theology; as appears from his work *The Reanimation of the Religious Sciences*, which was especially prized by his countrymen. Hitzig supplied the first reliable information in regard to this in the year 1852. A work written shortly before his death reveals Algazel's entire intellectual development, and shows how he came at last to divide all knowledge into such as is beneficial or harmful to religion. The work is translated by Schmölders in his *Essai*, pp. 16 ff. His earlier, particularly his logical, writings, like his ethical "Scales," were highly prized, especially by the Jews, and were therefore speedily translated into Hebrew. In Latin appeared in Venice, in 1506, *Logica et philosophia Algazelis Arabis*, translated by Dominicus, Archdeacon of Segovia, and printed by Peter Liechtenstein. The first two sheets of this unpagged work contain an outline of logic. The reputation of the work is shown by the fact that Lully, as late as his day (*vid. § 206*), composed a *Compendium logicæ Algazelis*. After the outline of logic follows the



*Philosophia* in two books, so that metaphysics, the *scientia divina*, is first treated, and then the *scientia naturalis*, a method which Algazel himself declares to be an innovation. In the introductory division of philosophy into *activa* and *theorica*, each of which is subdivided into three parts, the three theoretical sciences are designated as *scientia divina*, *disciplinabilis*, and *naturalis*, or as *philosophia prima*, *media*, and *infima*. Since all doctrines are represented only as opinions of the "philosophers," Munck is perhaps right when he asserts that this work does not contain Algazel's own opinions at all, but is a presentation of those which he intends to refute, and is therefore properly the first part of the *Destructio*. Makâzid (aims) and Tehâfot (fighting) are closely connected in the Hebrew version. The impulse which was given to many of his countrymen by his *Reanimation* remained without significance for the development of philosophy. Moreover, the earnestness of his scepticism was early doubted.

Cf. R. Gosche: *Ueber Ghazzâlî's Leben und Werke*. Berlin, 1858.

### THE ARISTOTELIANS IN SPAIN.

Ernest Renan: *Averroës et l'Averroïsme*. Paris, 1852.

#### § 186.

The tenth century was the golden age of Spain, especially of Andalusia. Unparalleled religious toleration gave rise to a great number of high schools, in which Christians, Jews, and Mohammedans taught at the same time. Libraries increased rapidly, and even a reaction of blind fanaticism was unable to suppress the impulse toward science when it had been once aroused. As philosophy withers in the Orient it blossoms up in Spain. Abu Bekr Mohammed IBN BADJA (AEMPAGE), a contemporary of Abelard (*vid. supra*, § 161), teaches under the impulse received from Algazel, but in opposition to his later scepticism and mysticism. He was born in Saragossa and died in the year 1138. Among his works, of which Wüstenfeld gives a list (*Geschichte der Arabischen Aerzte und Naturforscher*, Göttingen, 1840), his "Conduct of the Hermit" has become famous. In this, as in other works, it is maintained that by the natural advance from presentation to thought, etc., man is in a position to attain a knowledge of ever purer forms. It is easy to under-

stand that this assertion was condemned as irreligious. The "Goldsmith's Son" (Ibn-al-Cayeg) was repeatedly called an enemy of religion. In some points he anticipates the teaching of Averroës, who on his side esteems scarcely any one more than him. Also in his polemics against Algazel he is the predecessor of Averroës. The same character, *i.e.* rationalistic in contrast with Algazel, is shown by a follower of Avempace, Abu Bekr Ibn Tofail (sometimes called ABUBACER, sometimes TOPHAIL), who was born in a small city of Andalusia and died in Morocco in 1185. He was thus a contemporary of John of Salisbury (*vid. supra*, § 175). His philosophical romance, "The Natural-Man," is in the opinion of Schmölders a translation from the Persian, while others regard it as original. It has been published in Latin by Pocock (*Philosophus autodidactus*), and in German by Eichhorn, from Pocock's Latin edition. The author seeks to show that, without any revelation, man is in a position to attain to a knowledge of nature, and through it to a knowledge of God. Whatever is found in the positive religions above and beyond his natural religion, is in part a sensuous veiling of truth, in part accommodation. Since both are necessary for the uneducated and the weak, Abubacer, in spite of his rationalism, is an enemy of all religious innovations.

### § 187.

1. Abu Walid Muhammed Ibn Achmed Ibn Muhammed IBN ROSCHD (AVERROËS) was a friend of Abubacer, and was so familiar with the writings of Avempace and of his Oriental companions that many things which they had discovered have been ascribed to him by admiring posterity. Of the numerous corruptions of his name which Renan records, many, as the common one just given, have arisen from his patronymic, as for instance Aven Rois, Abenruth, Liveroys, Benroyst, etc.; others from his given name, as Membucius, Mauvitus, etc. He was born in Cordova in the year 1120, and died, as a physician, in Morocco in the year 1198. During his life he was a part of the time a physician, a part of the time a supreme judge, now on most intimate terms with the reigning monarch, and again almost an exile on account of a breach of etiquette. In every position, however, he busied himself with philosophy, and thereby brought upon himself the hatred

and persecution of his countrymen. A list of his writings is given by Casiri, and a more complete one by Renan in the work mentioned in § 186. His (shorter) paraphrases, as well as his (medium and larger) commentaries upon Aristotle's works, have procured for him the cognomen "Commentator." These writings were early translated into Latin, and are found more or less complete in the old Latin editions of Aristotle, first in the edition of 1472. They are given most fully in the Venetian editions apud Juntas, of which that published in 1552, xi. vols. fol., is regarded as the best. This contains, in the *first* volume, the commentaries (in part medium, in part larger) upon the *Organon*, an epitome *In libros logicæ Aristotelis*, and eighteen *Quæsitæ varia in logica*; in the *second* volume, the paraphrases on rhetoric and poetics; in the *third*, his exposition of the *Nichomachian Ethics* and his paraphrases on Plato's *Republic*. The *fourth* volume contains a *Proœmium* as well as the larger commentaries and the exposition of the *Physics*. The *fifth* contains running commentaries upon *De Cælo*, *De gen. et corr.*, and *Meteor.*, as well as a paraphrase of the first of the three. The *sixth* contains paraphrases of *De part. anim.*, commentaries upon *De anima*, paraphrases of *Parv. natur.*, and of *De generat. anim.* The *seventh* contains nothing by Averroës, but the *eighth* his running commentary upon the whole of the *Metaphysics*, with the exception of Book K, which was unknown to him, and also an epitome *In librum metaphysicæ Aristotelis*. The *ninth* and *tenth* volumes are composed of independent works of Averroës, and contain nothing by Aristotle himself. In the former are contained *Sermo de substantiâ orbis*, *Destructio destructionum philosophiæ Algazelis*, *Tractatus de animæ beatitudine*, *Epistola de intellectu*; in the latter, the medical work *Colliget*, *Collectanea de re medica*, commentaries upon Avicenna's *Cantica*, and the treatise *De theriaca*. The *eleventh* volume contains no writings either of Aristotle or of Averroës, but treatises of Zimara (*vid.* § 238, 1), which aim at solving apparent contradictions in the works of the two. In addition to the writings mentioned, this edition contains also the work of Gilbert, *De sex principiis* (*vid.* § 163), the work *De causis* (*vid.* § 189), and remarks of Levi ben Gerson (Gersonides) against Averroës. Many of the works named here have also been published separately. Of some there exist more than a hundred editions, while others have never been printed. Some are very likely lost, and some

hidden among the manuscripts of great libraries. Munck and Renan mention some of these, which comprise Arabic originals as well as Hebrew translations of such works as have probably perished. Among the latter was reckoned for a long time the treatise on Philosophy and Theology, which however was translated from the Arabic into German by Marc. Jos. Müller in Munich, shortly before his death, and was published in 1875 from manuscript left by him. The work is extant also in Paris in Hebrew. Unfortunately, the preface is omitted in the translation. Possibly the translator did not get to it, although he refers to it in the course of his work. If the work was actually written by Averroës, it is plain that he accommodated himself to a serious extent to the religious ideas of his countrymen.

2. Averroës' veneration for Aristotle is so great as to be almost worship. He doubts whether that which this "Ideal" could not find can ever be found. He blames Avicenna also because he so often, instead of following the positions of the master, began anew *quasi a se*, and was followed in this by others to their own injury (*De anim.* III., *comm.*, 1430). In accordance with this, Averroës' polemics against those mentioned is due almost wholly to the fact that he comes to other results simply by a different exegesis of Aristotle's works. He asserts, that since many of these works are lost, it is often necessary to take as authority conclusions drawn from his assertions instead of his own words. But wherever Aristotle speaks, his words are not paraphrased (as was done by Avicenna and others), but are verbally quoted, and then followed by a commentary which explains and proves sentence by sentence. One of the points, according to Averroës, in which Avicenna departs from Aristotle to the damage of the truth, is in regard to the origin of things. Here the doctrine that the forms are applied to matter is plainly an approach to the creation from nothing, as that is taught by the three religions, and among the Aristotelians by Joh. Philoponus (*vid.* § 146). In Averroës' opinion all these really do away with nature, and put in the place of its continuity new and merely sporadic creations. Aristotle long ago discovered the truth in this matter; and since him philosophy sees, in that which is called creation by those referred to, merely a transition from possibility to actuality. In eternal matter all forms exist potentially. They do not need to be first brought to it; but the forms are rather

drawn from it, according to the teaching of truth and of Aristotle, who by motion understands nothing else (*Met.* 12, *comm.*, 18). This actualization, therefore, which proceeds naturally from one, and which is not at all power, but only *actus*, brings to matter nothing new, so that strictly speaking no change and no increase takes place in being. All that exists potentially (*potentia*, which is to be sure something else than the merely being conceivable, *possibile*) must at some time become actual (*De anim. beat.* fol. 64), and therefore it is already actual, that is necessary, for him who stands in the midst of eternity where there is no past and no future, that is for the philosopher, just as for the eternal mover (*Extractor*), who takes in with a single glance (*subito*) whatever he regards. For this reason, among other questions the frequently agitated one, whether disorder has preceded order or *vice versâ*, has no sense. The same is the case with the question as to whether the world has progressed or retrograded. That the extraction of the actual from the potential cannot be an arbitrary act, lies in the very nature of the case. This is nevertheless expressly asserted in opposition to Avicenna.

3. In the Metaphysics of Averroës the *extractio* of the forms, in his Physics the passage which discusses the doctrine of heaven, distinguish him from his predecessors. Here also he prides himself upon his return to original Aristotelianism when he eliminates the active understanding which Avicenna had placed between heaven and the original mover. He eliminates it in this connection only; in another place it will be seen to occupy a prominent position. According to Averroës as well as Aristotle, the all-embracing heavenly sphere (*orbis, corpus caeleste*) strives after the extra-spatial unmoved by which it is surrounded. This sphere cannot be matter consisting of elements, for it has no opposite; but since it shows that *desiderium*, it must be thought of as intelligence, as of like nature with the soul, and as sharing with other souls the *virtus appetitiva*. Heaven, being in no way compounded, is without origin and permanent. Its daily revolution is the only motion of the fixed stars which are inserted in it, and which consist of the *quinta essentia*. With the planets it is different. The heaven of the planets (*corpora caelestia*), within the one heaven and concentric with it, have, in addition to the diurnal revolution, a motion of their own, and to this must be added that of the various epicycles. For the same reason that heaven must be an in-

telligence, there must be also *orbes* or *corpora cœlestia* included within it which strive after it, and therefore know of it. Since all knowledge is determined by the thing known, there follows the oft-repeated principle, that the lower always thinks of the higher, the *causatum* of the *causa*, and concerns itself about it, while the reverse never takes place. Therefore the first mover thinks himself alone; the heaven, on the other hand, thinks both itself and the first mover, but does not concern itself with the *orbis Saturni* which it sets in motion, and whose object and goal of desire it is. Passing from this still further down to the sixth (Jupiter) sphere, etc., we finally reach the *intelligentia (motor) lunæ*, which of course sets in motion no lower sphere, since the earth is the fixed centre of the world. Here then the system of cosmical motion closes, a system so complete, according to Averroës, that the least increase or diminution would result in the stoppage, that is the destruction of the whole. Since this is impossible, the sum of the motions is unchangeable. The commentary upon *Ar. de Cœlo* and the *Sermo de subst. orbis* contain these doctrines.

4. As regards the earth, Averroës holds that the sun and all the stars contribute to its life and growth, especially by their warmth, which works more energetically in these ethereal beings than the warmth of earthly fire. In the series of living beings, man occupies the highest position, since he alone is capable of perceiving pure (*abstractæ*) forms. That which gives him this capacity, the intellect, occupies in the teaching of Averroës so peculiar a position between cosmology and psychology that it constitutes, beside the *extractio formarum* and the doctrine of the *corpus cœleste*, the third point which one is accustomed to think of in speaking of Averroism. Aristotle's distinction between *νοῦς παθητικός* and *ποιητικός* had given rise to strifes among subsequent thinkers, as to whether both or only one or neither of them were organic powers (that is, joined to an organ), and therefore perishable; whether they were individual, etc. Averroës believes that he finds contradictions in the master himself in regard to the *νοῦς παθητικός*, and in order to remove them considers it necessary to draw sharper distinctions than Aristotle did. The latter, according to Averroës, takes the word *intellectus* often in so broad a sense that it includes also the *imaginatio*, and then of course it is natural that it should appear as an organic power, and that it should be called *patiens*, *passivus*, etc. Among the

propositions of Aristotle, however, which concern this *intellectus patiens*, are some which are quite correctly used of the *intellectus* in the stricter sense of the term; that is, of the *intellectus materialis*. This, as the one side, joined with the *intellectus agens*, as the other, gives that which has been the object of attack on the part of Averroës' later opponents, and which, according to Averroës, should alone be called *intellectus*. Against this, as against the *intellectus universalis* and the *unitas intellectus*, these opponents have always directed their polemics. This lowest of all intelligences is related to the *motor Luna* (the *intellectus agens*), as the form of the heaven of the fixed stars is related to the prime mover, as the soul of the Saturn heavens is related to the mover of the heaven of the fixed stars, etc. It can hardly be designated otherwise than by the modern expression, *Erdsgeist* (earth-spirit); but here, since man is the only being on earth possessed of intelligence, the spirit of man is to be thought of almost exclusively. This, as eternal as mankind, with whose destruction (impossible, to be sure) he too would come to an end, unites, in the individual man, its two sides, to form the *intellectus adeptus*, which acts both as *intellectus speculativus* and as *intellectus operativus*. The individual is then its subject during his life. His death does not destroy the speculative spirit, for, although Socrates and Plato are not eternal, philosophy is. The temporary union (*copulatio*) of this general human understanding with the individual man takes place by means of its lower part, the *intellectus materialis*. This, as intellect, has to do with forms lying in itself, and therefore does not suffer, but nevertheless only with material forms, while the above, *i.e.* the *intellectus agens*, has to do with the perfectly pure, abstract forms, and hence is often called *intellectus abstractus*. Averroës compares the *intellectus materialis* with sight, the *intellectus agens* with light. If the former were conditioned by the coloured substance (*coloratum*), it would be passive. But since the colour (*color*) is its object, and this is not substance but form, it is active in relation to it. From the canon given above, it is manifest that human intelligence, as the lowest, will be the widest in scope. At the same time, as sublunar intelligence, it is the most limited, in so far as it has intuitive knowledge of sublunar things alone, of all that lies above only an indirect knowledge. (These statements are taken in part from the commentary upon Bk. III. of *De anima*, in part from the *Epitome*

in *libr. met.*, and in part from the *Libell. de connex. int. abstr. et hom.*)

5. The view that the human race is immortal, while the individual partakes of immortality, as Plato and Aristotle say of animals, through propagation alone—(the philosopher continuing to live in his doctrine)—does not appear to Averroës to be dangerous to morality. On the contrary, it is the best protection against that servility of conduct which has in view only rewards and punishments. The wise man acts without regard to such things, impelled by the love of virtue alone. Averroës acknowledges that there are weak persons who need the common religious ideas. An attack upon these is all the more out of place because it is often found, when the matter is considered more carefully, that that which the philosopher recognises as true is concealed under figurative expressions. The work translated by M. J. Müller, which was mentioned above, considers at length those who, being incapable of grasping the apodictical proofs, are referred to the dialectical (probable) and rhetorical (parenetic) grounds. It is shown also how a philosophical sense can be drawn from many expressions of the Koran by means of allegorical interpretation. Accommodation is carried still further here than in the *Destruct. destructt.*, where the apologetic tendency better explains it if it does not justify it. These writings are least calculated to give a knowledge of true Averroism.

### § 188.

In Spain also the Mohammedan philosophers found less acceptance with their brethren in the faith than with the Jews. Among the former, the princes who persecuted philosophy were always the most popular. The latter had already reached, in Southern France, a high grade of culture by the help of schools of all kinds. Under the Moorish rule in Spain they enjoyed a hitherto unheard-of toleration. A common language and intermarriages contributed to their advancement, so that soon not even chairs of instruction were closed to them; and thus, contemporaneously with the Moors, perhaps even before them, scientifically trained Jews pursued further the lines which were followed in Bagdad. Munck in Paris proved, in 1646, that the work *Fons vitæ*, so often quoted in



the Middle Ages, was written by the Jew SALOMON BEN GABIROL (AVICEBRON), who was born in Malaga. His Songs for the Synagogue are very celebrated. He was born in 1020, and died certainly before 1070. That which Munck at first held to be a Hebrew translation of this work, hitherto regarded as lost, he has since shown to be an extract from it made by Joseph Ibn-Falaquera. His translation of the work is accompanied with a careful reproduction of its line of thought. The Mazarine manuscript *De materia universalis*, of which Seyerlen has given an account (Zeller's *Jahrb.*, vol. 15), appears to be a more complete Latin revision. In five books in the form of a dialogue, it is shown that the contrast between matter and form, which is the same as that between *genus* and *differentia*, rules the material as well as the moral world, but that above this contrast, as well as above the world, stands the being of beings. Above the Neo-Platonic series of hypostases, nature, soul, and intellect (*vid.* § 129, 2), and below the Deity, Avicbron places the will or the creative word, which is endless in its nature, temporary only in its activity (because it has a beginning); while with the intellect the reverse is the case. This is quite peculiar to Avicbron, and is in agreement with that taught by the *Theologia Aristotelis* (*vid.* § 182). The will, to which Avicbron devoted a special work, stands, as God does, above the contrast between matter and form, and is therefore not to be defined, nor to be grasped in ecstatic intuition. In the intellect, on the other hand, not a particular portion but common matter, matter in general, is united with form in general, or the content of all forms, in a simple substance. Avicbron, in deducing general matter and form from God, connected the former with His nature, the latter with His attributes. In consequence, the view that God is to be taken as the material principle of the universe has been attributed to him. The proposition, as well as the view, expressed also by the Arabs, that supersensuous substances are not without matter, was subsequently combated with great energy. Indeed, it can be interpreted scarcely otherwise than as pantheistic. To this is due the fondness of the heterodox for this book, as well as the aversion shown towards it by those who are ecclesiastically inclined. Ben Gabirol is also the author of a collection of sayings ("String of pearls"), and of an ethical work ("Ennoblement of the Character"). The exegete Ibn Ezra, who flourished in the middle of

the twelfth century, is regarded by the Jews as a follower of Ben Gabirol. In regard to him the works of Eisler and Joël, cited in § 181, may also be consulted.

Abr. Geiger: *Salomo Gabirol und seine Dichtungen*, Leipzig, 1867.

### § 189.

It has not yet been determined whether the work *De causis* was written by a Jew or not. This work is also cited as *De intelligentiis*, *De esse*, *De essentia puræ bonitatis*. It was translated into Latin by the Jew David, later expounded by the Christian Aristotelians in their lectures, and discussed in commentaries. It was continually cited, and is attached to many translations of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle (e.g. Ingolst., excud. David Sartorius, 1577). There are many arguments for Jewish authorship. Some of its commentators regarded it as a genuine work of Aristotle; others, a compilation made by the Jew David from writings of Aristotle and of certain Arabs; others, as an independent work of a certain Abucaten Avenam (?); still others, as a later restored work of Proclus. It is clearly of Oriental origin, for it speaks of *alachili*, i.e. *intelligentia ultima* (Prop. 5), asserts that even in the highest intelligence *ylchachim* exists, because it is the contrast between *esse* and *forma*, etc. At the same time, the standpoint of the work is not exactly the same as that of the *Fons vitæ*, for it maintains much more energetically than the latter, the agreement between religion and philosophy, and characterizes with the greatest emphasis the highest principle as *Deus benedictus et excelsus* and as *Creator*. It contains the gradation of the first cause, which is before all eternity because eternity participates in it (the being), of intelligence, which is with eternity, finally of the soul, which is after eternity but before time, because time demands a counting soul (*vid. supra*, § 88, 1). Again, the work teaches that the nature of the first cause is pure good, that the following principles emanate from it as from absolute rest, etc. All this reveals a fusion of Aristotelian and Alexandrian ideas, which would of necessity show points of contact with the Neo-Platonists (*vid. supra*, § 126 ff.) even if the latter were not directly drawn upon. In fact, the propositions just given are of Platonic origin, while others are drawn from Proclus. The author does not seem to care when, in the course of the investigation (Prop. 18), the order of Proclus,

*unum, vita, intelligentia* (*vid.* § 130, 2), replaces the original Platonic order.

Haneberg, in the *Sitzungsberichte der Münchner Akademie*. 1863, p. 361 ff.

### § 190.

1. The works mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs combine Jewish doctrines of religion with Neo-Platonic, and therefore only indirectly (*cf.* § 126) with Aristotelian philosophy, as this had long been done among the Mussulmans by Alkendi, Alfarabi, and the "Sincere Brethren." In the twelfth century, on the other hand, men appear who appeal directly to Aristotle, that they may gain the support and warrant of his philosophy for their doctrines of religion. In this they are not only counterparts, but conscious imitators of the believers in the Koran who had preceded them. The first to do this, and at the same time the most successful, was Moses ben Maimon (MAIMONIDES). No one can deny that he was influenced by Avicenna, and hence there is all the more reason to class him with the latter. He was born in Cordova on the 30th of March, 1135, and died in Cairo, Dec. 13th, 1204. He is still honoured by his people as almost the greatest of philosophers. A list of his writings is given by Casiri (I. p. 295). Among these should be mentioned the *Tractat. Aboth*, which contains a collection of rabbinical sayings. Moses himself wrote an introduction to it, in which his ethical (Aristotelian-Talmudic) doctrines are developed. Maimonides' *More Nevochim* (*Doctor perplexorum*) however is justly the most celebrated of his works. It was written originally in Arabic, but soon translated into Hebrew, and later by Buxtorf into Latin. The original text was first published by Munck in 1856, with a French translation and an introduction. This *Guide des égarés* shows an able man opposed to all mysticism, who maintains, in addition to the results of Aristotelian philosophy, all that he finds in the Scriptures, because a contradiction between religion and philosophy is impossible. Wherever there appears to be contradiction, it is the result of false exegesis. When the grammatico-historical method does not suffice, the allegorical must be employed, as it had been by the Arabian Aristotelians. The work is divided into three parts. After a critical sifting of the names of God, the doctrine of the Divine attributes is discussed, in connection with which the

reader is warned against applying positive predicates to the Deity, and the anthropomorphism thus approached is combated strongly. This is followed by the division of all existing substance into macrocosm and microcosm. The world and man, however, are not to be thought of as if the former had only the latter as its object. With this is connected a critical comparison of the orthodox doctrines of Jews and Mussulmans. In the second part Maimonides develops the doctrines of the Peripatetics. He agrees with them for the most part, but will not admit the eternity of the world *a parte ante*. He complains in this connection as well as elsewhere that the laws of nature, that is, of that which already exists, are applied to that which precedes, and that thus what is true of production in the world is asserted of the primordial genesis. The third part considers the ultimate object of the world, Divine Providence, evil, and law, which contributes to evil. In the doctrine of providence, the author differs from Averroës in teaching that the Divine foresight, so far as man who perceives God is concerned, has reference to the individual. Otherwise only the general and unchangeable, the genera, come within Divine knowledge. The work closes with observations upon knowledge of God and communion with Him. These bring the author into a position to represent prophecy as, to a certain degree, a natural phenomenon, which can scarcely be wanting when very vivid phantasy and moral purity are joined with great intellectual talent. This is in complete consonance with the way in which Maimonides likes to refer miracles to higher natural laws.

Cf. Geiger: *Moses ben Maimon*, Breslau, 1850. Beer: *Philosophie und philosophische Schriftsteller der Juden*. Leipzig, 1852 (a treatise of Munck, which is again given with the additions of the German translator in the *Mélanges*, mentioned in § 181.) Eisler and Joël, in the works mentioned in the same paragraph.

2. The writings of Maimonides were received with favour, and soon had their commentators. Among these, Schem Job ben Joseph ibn Falaguera, in the thirteenth, and Is. Abrahanel, in the fifteenth century, were distinguished for their zeal. It is a still greater honour to Maimonides that he influenced others to follow the path opened by him. The chief place among these followers is occupied by Levi ben Gerson (GERSONIDES), who was born about 1288 in Bagnol, in Provence. He was more thoroughly acquainted with the doctrines of

Aristotle than Maimonides, which was due in part to the fact that, instead of following Avicenna, he followed Averroës, and expounded his works. He was just as familiar also with the Biblical and Talmudic doctrines, as his Bible commentaries show. He continued that which Maimonides had begun, and antagonized the opponents of the latter by continuing his teaching, and his friends by adding to it. To point out the agreement, even to the smallest details, of Averroistic Aristotelianism with the doctrines of Scripture, is an affair of the heart to a man who asserts that there is no sphere of knowledge which the Bible has not intended to touch. His *Milchamot* is devoted to this object. Among the few almost timid attempts to improve upon the doctrines of Averroës is the endeavour to rescue personal immortality. Man, who is distinguished from the brute by the natural, bodily disposition to think, possesses a suffering, mortal understanding, since with this disposition to think is joined that which Alexander of Aphrodisias calls "hylic" understanding, and for which the name "Earth-Spirit" was proposed in connection with Averroës (*vid.* § 187, 4). As soon, however, as this understanding becomes "acquired" understanding, by the adoption not only of sensuous, but also of intellectual forms, which are imparted to it by the higher, active understanding, these cognitions make blessed and immortal, and the greater their number the more is this the case. It is natural that Gersonides, a contemporary of William of Occam (*vid.* § 216), should exert no influence upon scholasticism, which was already expiring. His influence upon Spinoza was all the greater. Joël has rendered the service of pointing out this influence on the part both of him and of Maimonides.

Cf. Joël: *Lewi ben Gerson*, Breslau, 1862 (contained also in the work mentioned above).

3. It is natural to compare the advance from Maimonides to Gersonides with the difference between their teachers Avicenna and Averroës. Less apparent but always justifiable is the comparison with the progress of Christian Scholasticism, which begins with maintaining that reason (that is the general ideas of all the educated) is the vindicator of dogma, and afterward proceeds to assign this function to Aristotelianism (*vid.* § 194 ff.). That to which both attain justifies a parallel. The error of Scholasticism in its immature and more natural state, shown in its becoming mystical and sceptical (*vid.* § 174 ff.),

is paralleled (§ 185) by the gauntlet which Algazel threw to philosophy. A similar gauntlet on the part of the Jews was thrown down to the followers of Maimonides by the work called *Chosari*, written by Rabbi Jehuda Halevi. In this work he represents before a Chosaric prince (hence the name) all philosophical doctrines as worthless trifles, and makes the acceptance of Judaism, as it rests upon revelation and tradition, appear the only wise course. The *Or Adonai* (eye of God),—itself a product of the still further advancing Aristotelianism of Gersonides and directed against him, just as eighty years earlier the Christian scholastic who had best understood Aristotle reached his *Centilogium theologicum* which separated theology from philosophy (*vid.* § 216),—was written in the year 1410 by CHASDAI CRESKAS, a native of Barcelona. It is divided into four tracts, the first of which considers belief in God in general; the second, those attributes of God without which there would be no law; the third, the less fundamental doctrines; and the fourth, that which has only a traditional worth. The author's demonstration, that although this is all true, nevertheless the philosophical proofs of it are delusions, greatly pleased Spinoza, because it leads to a separation of philosophy and religion.

Cf. Joël: *Don Chasdai Creskas*. Breslau, 1866. (Contained also in the work cited in § 181.)

## B.—ARISTOTELIANISM IN CHRISTIAN SCHOLASTICISM.

Jourdain: *Geschichte der Aristotelischen Schriften im Mittelalter, übersetzt von* Ad. Stahr. Halle, 1831.

### § 191.

Jews were almost the only people in that age who made journeys and learned foreign languages, and that chiefly for commercial purposes. By them the first news of Mohammedan wisdom was brought to Christian Europe. Latin translations, likewise made by Jews, often through the medium of the Hebrew, accomplished the rest. Medical and astronomical works opened the way. The former were industriously translated as early as the middle of the eleventh century by

Constantinus Africanus, the latter a half century later by Adelard of Bath. Philosophical writings came next in order, especially after Raymond, Archbishop of Toledo and Chancellor of Castile, took up the work. Alfarabi, Algazel, Avicenna, were the first authors to be translated. The Archdeacon Dominicus Gonzalvi, the Jew Johannes ben Daud (commonly called Avendeath, by Albertus Magnus Avendar, also Johannes Hispalensis), further the Jew David and Jehuda ben Tibbon were the first to devote themselves to this work. The last named was called the "Father of translators," because he was followed in the same occupation by his son and his grandson. In addition to the writings of the authors mentioned, the work *De causis* was also translated. Alfred of Morlay (Anglicus) and Gerard of Cremona are also to be mentioned. Somewhat later, at the court of Frederic II., famous for his scientific zeal as well as for his heterodoxy, and still later at the court of Manfred, the works of Averroës were translated by Michael Scotus (born 1190) and Hermannus Alemannus, or rather under their direction. A Hebrew version had already been produced by the son of R. Simson Antoli. Michael Scotus was also the translator of the work *De sphaera*, which was much quoted in the Middle Ages. Its author was Alpetrongi or Alpetrangius, a Christian who had gone over to Mohammedanism. At the same time translations were made of the *Metaphysics* and of the physical writings of Aristotle, which up to that time had been quite unknown. All of these were translated from Arabic versions, for before 1220 there were no others. Robert Greathead, (Grosse-tête) (1175-1255) is named as one of the first who took pains to have translations made from the Greek. He was first a teacher in Paris and Oxford and then Bishop of Lincoln. It is said that he himself translated the *Ethics* of Aristotle, and that he arranged for the translation of apocryphal works, such as the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*. In addition, he expounded logical and physical writings of Aristotle. John Basingstock aided him in this work. After him are to be mentioned the Dominicans Thomas of Cantimpré and William of Moerbeka, who were afterwards followed by others. Roger Bacon denies that any of these translators had a thorough knowledge either of Arabic or of Greek. For quite a length of time before the Arabic-Latin translations ceased many books were read in two versions. The earlier

known was then called *translatio vetus*, the later, *translatio nova*.

§ 192.

DAVID OF DINANT wrote a work *De divisionibus*, and in the year 1209, when his doctrines were condemned, Amalrich (*vid. supra*, § 176) was also anathematized. This fact has led to the opinion that David was a pupil of Amalrich, and that he went back like the latter to Erigena. But his condemnation was accompanied by that of the physical writings of Aristotle and of the commentaries upon them; and in the year 1215, when the judgment was repeated, a Mauritius Hispanus is named in addition to David. If greater weight had been laid upon these facts (as is rightly done by Kränlein in the *Studien und Kritiken*), the more correct opinion would have been reached, that David received his inspiration and his pantheism from Moorish commentators of Aristotle, it being assumed that Mauritius was not Mauvitus, that is Averroës (*vid. supra*, § 187, 1). This is confirmed by the fact that he often cites Anaximenes, Democritus, Plutarch, Orpheus, and others, whose names are frequently quoted by the Arabs, and also by the fact that Albertus Magnus considers his pantheism derived from that of Xenophanes. His classification likewise of things into *materialia*, *spiritualia*, and *separata*, which run parallel with the three conceptions *suscipiens*, *mens*, and *Deus*, is not in conflict with the assumption that David was the first who professed himself to be a pupil of the Mohammedans, and therefore experienced the fate of the innovator, as before him the Gnostics (*vid. supra* § 122 ff.) and Erigena (§ 154). The three principles of the Platonists from which he starts are reduced by him to a single one, and thereby God is finally made the material principle of all things. This has been looked upon, not incorrectly, as drawn from the *Fons vite*. In the year 1209 the physical writings of Aristotle were condemned by the Church, and in the year 1215 both they and the *Metaphysics*. In 1231 only lecturing upon them is forbidden until further notice. In 1254 the Paris University fixes the number of hours which shall be devoted to the exposition of the *Metaphysics* and of the principal physical writings of Aristotle, and that without protest from the Church. Less than a century later, the Church itself declares that no one shall become *Magister* who has not lectured



upon Aristotle, this *Præcursor Christi in naturalibus, sicut Joannes Baptista in gratuitis*. All this shows again how consistently the Church distinguishes between different ages.

### § 193.

A tendency to make assertions which the Church cannot tolerate was combined with the heterodoxy which lies in innovation as such, in the case of those who permitted themselves to learn from anti-Christians, just as in the case of the Gnostics, of Origen, and of Erigena. Soon after the Aristotelian writings and their commentators became known in the University of Paris, naturalistic tendencies, in the sense of Averroës and of the Mohammedans of like mind with him, revealed themselves, especially in the faculty of Arts. How soon this took place is shown by the circumstance that not only Bishop William of Auvergne, a man not unfamiliar with these studies, zealously combated these tendencies, but also by the fact that the University itself often forbade the meddling of philosophy in theology. The Dominicans and Franciscans sought to avert the danger which threatened the Church from these innovators, not by anathemas and prohibitions, but in a more effective way. Their struggle for chairs in the University and, when they had gained these, for formal admission into the academic corporation, is to be explained, not so much by their ambition as by their desire to oppose the course of the innovators, which was hostile to the Church, and to conquer them with their own weapons, with the authority of Aristotle and of Avicenna. The fact that the members of the two mendicant orders appear at this period as the leaders in philosophy need not cause surprise. It behoved them, the most ecclesiastical among ecclesiastics, above all to stamp upon philosophy the ecclesiastical character which the Middle Ages bore (*vid. supra*, §§ 119, 120). They who formed the standing army of the Church were more anxious than any one else to transform philosophy into a wholly ecclesiastical science, a transformation which was pointed out above (§ 151) as the characteristic disposition of scholasticism. When the greatest of the world's sages, with that which he had discovered in regard to the physical and moral world, and likewise those who had exhumed his weapons in order to defend with them the teaching of Antichrist, were brought to testify to the

dogmas and decrees of the Church, certainly both ends were most fully attained.

§ 194.

The adoption of Aristotelianism by Scholasticism can be called a progress only if nothing is lost which the early Schoolmen had gained, while at the same time that which they had lacked is added. This is in fact the case, for the agreement of ecclesiastical doctrine with Peripatetic philosophy is pointed out, a philosophy which knows not only what the ~~natural~~ understanding says, but also much else ; so that that which for Anselm was the whole, for those of this period constituted but a part of their mission. At the close of the previous period, dialectic skill had reached a position, by means of the division of the scholastic problem, far above that which it had attained under Erigena. The question in regard to the universals had acquired a much more settled form and had received far more practicable solutions than it had in the hands of Anselm. At the same time, the dogmatic material had increased to repertories of an ever greater fulness of detail ; and not only had the knowledge of God been fixed as the goal of the believer, but even the steps leading to it had been given with exactitude. In addition to all this, the Franciscans and the Dominicans of the thirteenth century, in taking up again the problem in its entirety, show themselves, in every element of it, superior to their one-sided predecessors. Alexander, Albert, and Thomas are far ahead of the *puri philosophi* in the art of drawing distinctions. They practise the art, however, in such a way as to resolve at the same time the contradictions among the authorities of the Church. The relations of substances, subsistencies, and universals have the same interest for them which they had for Gilbert ; but they consider at the same time other metaphysical problems, and they are not led thereby away from the dogma, but to an orthodox establishment of it. Further, the summaries of Hugo, of the three Peters, of Pullus, and of Alanus do not by any means show such extensive reading as those of the three named above, and, at the same time, the decisions of the latter are much more positive than those of the former. Finally, no one of them is inferior to Richard of St. Victor in piety ; and how accurately this period was able to describe the journey of the soul to God, is shown by Bonaventura. In

advancing beyond their predecessors without letting anything fall which they had acquired, they most naturally based their investigations upon those of the latter, making them their point of departure. It was therefore more than a mere conventional habit which led them to expound collections of Sentences belonging to the previous period, or Gilbert's book, *De sex principiis*, for the sake of developing their own doctrines. The Summaries of the thirteenth century are thus related to those of the twelfth, somewhat as the commentaries of the later Roman jurists to the *Libris juris civilis* of Sabinus. The compilers of Sentences are succeeded by the defenders of Summaries, who stand upon the shoulders of the former. These Sententiaries are related to the Summists somewhat as an Anselm to an Athanasius. They are also conscious of this difference when they designate their independent works, not *Summæ sententiarum* but *Summæ theologicæ*. In the formula for the task set for Church Fathers and Schoolmen (*vid. supra*, § 151) the word belief had two widely different meanings. Here the formula is again modified, for reason, as thought of by Anselm and Abelard, is something quite different from that thought of by Thomas and Duns Scotus. To the former it meant the general ideas with all the Alexandrian elements with which the mental atmosphere had been pregnant since the time of the Church Fathers; to the latter, on the contrary, the *ratio scripta*, that is, Aristotle ("with annotations," as Luther later expressed it). A great deal, as for instance the greater clearness of the former, and the awful terminology of the latter, has its ground in this. The first who succeeded in defending the theology of the twelfth century against the doubts of unbelievers, not only by natural reasoning, but also with the principles of peripatetic philosophy, obtained the cognomen *Theologorum Monarcha*, which was justified by the greatness of the task. This was the Franciscan Alexander of Hales.

## § 195.

### ALEXANDER.

1. ALEXANDER DE ALES OR HALES (hence sometimes called Alensis, sometimes Halensis) was born in England, in the county of Gloucester, and when he had become the most

celebrated teacher in Paris, entered the Franciscan order, and died in 1245. He is the first who can be proved to have made frequent citations from Avicenna and Algazel (as Argazel, Arghasel, etc.). It is difficult to decide whether he had Averroës in mind when combating the philosophers who taught the eternity of the world, and especially when he defended the immortality of the soul against the Arabs. He is said to have written a commentary upon Aristotle's work on the soul. It is certain that he was acquainted with his *Metaphysics*, for he cites it often. The report of Bulæus, that he expounded first the *Sentences* of Lombard, with which the notice of P. Possevin agrees (who cites Alexander Halensis in *Mag. sent.*), has led many to regard Alexander's *Summa theologica* as identical with this commentary. But the two are not the same. In the *Bibliotheca ecclesiastica ed. Fabricius* (Hamb. 1718) it is said in a scholium of Miræus upon *Henr. Gaudav. de script. eccles.*, that Alexander, in addition to the *Summa*, wrote commentaries upon the four books of *Sentences*, and that they were published in Lyons in 1515. I have not seen them, neither had Hain, or else he would certainly have described them in his *Repert. Bibl.* of pretended works: *Super Magistrum sententiarum Papiæ*, 1498, 4to, and *Super tertium sententiarum*, Venet. 1474, fol. (I frankly confess that, like many before me, I consider the existence of such a work as improbable as that of a *Summa virtutum*, which has also been ascribed to Alexander.) I am also unacquainted with the edition of the *Summa theologica*, Venet. 1577, in three folio volumes, mentioned in the same connection. I know only the edition in four volumes, published by Koburger, in Nuremberg, in 1482. The *Summa theologica* quotes Lombard often, but is far more closely related to the work of Hugo, *De sacramentis christianæ fidei* (*vid. supra*, § 165, 5). It adopts, for instance, the divisions of the latter. The *Summa sententiarum*, by the same author, is also cited at least as often as the *Sentences* of Lombard, and there is no thought of an exposition of the latter in the sense of the later Schoolmen.

2. The *first part* contains seventy-four *Quæstiones*, which are all divided into several *membra* and these again sometimes into *articuli*. In it attention is called to the fact that *in logicis* the reason and the proof produce belief, while *in theologicis* belief furnishes the proof. Then, following the ontological

argument of Anselm, the author discusses the reality of God, His nature, His unchangeableness, His simplicity, His immeasurability, unity, truth, goodness, might, knowledge, and will. The method used throughout is, to state first the question, and then to give the affirmative and negative answers. These are partly *auctoritates*, that is, Bible sayings, and expressions of celebrated ecclesiastical teachers, of Augustine, Ambrose, Cyprian, Jerome, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Dionysius, Gregory the Great, John of Damascus, Bede, Alcuin, Anselm, Hugo and Richard of St. Victor, St. Bernard, Lombard, and others ; partly *rationes*, namely doctrines of the philosophers, Plato, *Philosophus*, that is Aristotle, Hermes Trismegistus, Cicero, Macrobius, Galen, Boëthius, Cassiodore, Avicenna, Algazel, *Fons Vitæ*, Isaac, *Philosophus de causis*, etc. The conclusions then follow, often very positive, but sometimes *sine præjudicio*, with a warning against deciding anything ; for where the saints have not reached a decision every view is simple opinion. The various meanings of the words play a very important rôle in reaching conclusions, as well as the distinctions *secundum quid*, which up to his time no one had carried so far as Alexander. The creation, as a progress from non-being to being, is thus to be sure a *mutatio*, but only *ex parte creaturæ*, not *ex parte Dei*. These investigations are followed by others upon the various names which are applied to the Divine nature, as well as to the three Persons in it. Especially careful consideration is devoted to the question whether the statement that God sends the Holy Spirit implies a process in the Trinity as a whole, or a process which concerns only one Person. The *missio passive dicta* is distinguished from the *missio active dicta*, the visible from the invisible mission, and within the former the Incarnation and the appearance in the form of a dove. It is shown also why the former only, and not the latter, is perpetuated in a sacrament. In scarcely any other part does Alexander show such great keenness in drawing distinctions.

3. The *second part* is divided into one hundred and eighty-nine questions, each of which, with the exception of two, contains from two to thirteen *membra*. The subject considered is the doctrine of the creature ; in the first eighteen, questions of the creature in general ; in the nineteenth and following, of the angels. In connection with the question as to the personality of angels, Aristotle is quoted as a witness that

*individuitas est a materia vel ab accidente*, which however is said to have no reference to angels. In the forty-fourth question Alexander takes up the consideration of corporeal things. Matter is not formless, but on the contrary contains all forms potentially. The ideas, whose content is God, are planted in it, and thus become actual forms. The work of creation is taken up in the order in which it is described ; and in that connection the most subtle questions and doubts are discussed. The consideration of the soul begins with the fifty-ninth question, but it is treated only from the theological standpoint, as it is called ; and thus it happens that among the many definitions of the soul, that of Aristotle is not given, and only afterward is touched upon simply in passing. In opposition to the heretics, who deduce the soul from the Divine substance, and to the philosophers, who draw it from corporeal matter, Alexander declares for its creation from nothing and its later union with the body. This union is accomplished by certain media, of which *humor* and *spiritus* are attributed to the body, *vegetabilitas* and *sensibilitas* to the soul. The union of the two, therefore, is to be compared only conditionally with that of matter and form. The separate faculties of the soul are considered at length, and a threefold *intellectus* is assumed : the *materialis*, which is *inseparabilis* ; the *possibilis*, which is *separabilis* ; and the *agens*, which is *separatus a corpore*. The doctrine of free-will is treated with great fulness. Heathen philosophers are said to comprehend it as little as they do grace, the second factor in the work of redemption. The discordant opinions of Augustine, of Hugo, and of Bernard are represented as justified by the various meanings of the word. The doctrine of the conscience is then taken up, first the *sinderesis*, this *scintilla conscientiae* according to Basil, Gregory, and Jerome, which can be designated as the natural tendency toward good, in contrast with sensuousness, which leads to evil. This is followed by the *conscientia*, which, because of its relationship to reason, has in addition to its practical also a theoretical character, but at the same time is subject to error. The seventy-eighth question begins the consideration of the human body, first that of Adam, then that of Eve. In the eighty-ninth and following questions the entire (*conjunctus*) man is considered, from the side of his passions, his mortality, etc. In this connection a number of questions are proposed as to what would have happened if man had not lost

his innocence. The question as to how far the *gratia gratis data* and the *gratia gratum faciens* were imparted to man at the first creation is considered at length, as well as the question in regard to the *gratia superaddita*, and in regard to man's illuminated knowledge. In general the view is maintained, that the condition in Paradise constituted the mean between misery and final glory. Man's dominion over the world is then taken up ; and from the one hundredth and following questions the subject of evil. The fact that evil has only a *causa deficiens* and yet is grounded in the *libero arbitrio*, is shown not to be contradictory. After its nature and the permission of it have been considered, the fall of Lucifer is discussed in the hundred-and-ninth question. In what the fall consists, wherein it has its ground, when it took place, how it is punished, how other angels participate in it, how the devil and demons work as tempters, etc., all these questions are handled in the regular way. Then the temptation of man is taken up, and afterwards his sin (*Quæst.* 120-189). The threefold distinction of *peccatum primorum parentum*, *originale*, and *actuale* is drawn, corresponding respectively to the corruption of the nature by the person, of the person by the nature, and of the person by the person. The last is considered at greatest length, and the distinction between mortal and venial sins, between sins of omission and of commission, is fixed. The sins of thought, of word, and of deed are then considered one after the other ; and from the trinity in man, *spiritus*, *anima*, *corpus*, are deduced the seven principal sins (*superbia*, *avaritia*, *luxuria*, *invidia*, *gula*, *ira*, *acedia*, the initials forming the word *Saligia*) and those which spring from them. After sins of weakness and of ignorance the sin against the Holy Ghost is treated of, then idolatry (where tolerance toward Jews and heathen is spoken of), heresy, apostasy, hypocrisy, simony, and sacrilege. With this the investigation in regard to sin and the first division of the work are brought to an end.

4. The second division begins with the *third volume*. Following Hugo, it treats of the *opus reparationis*. Just as, above, the Creator was first considered, and then His work, so here, the Redeemer first, then the work of redemption. The first twenty-five questions discuss the possibility and the adaptability of the Incarnation, the participation which each Person of the Trinity takes in it, the union of the Divine and human in Christ, the sanctification of Mary in the very womb

of her mother, Christ's assumption of human limitations, His love, His death, the question whether He was still man when body and soul were separated, His transfiguration, resurrection, ascension, and second coming. The twenty-sixth question begins with the remark,—which does not exactly accord with the arrangement of the work,—that theology has to do in part with *fidem*, in part with *mores*, and that now, the former having been considered, the latter is to be discussed, hence first the condition of all morality, that is law (*Quæst.* 26–28). The *lex æterna*, which coincides with the Divine will, is first taken up. Upon it the *lex indita*, or *naturalis*, as well as the *lex addita*, or *scripta*, are dependent. Under the latter head the law of Moses is first considered, not only the part which contains the *lex moralis*, that is the Decalogue, but also the *lex judicialis* (*Quæst.* 40–53) and *ceremonialis* (*Quæst.* 54–59). This is followed by the *lex et præcepta evangelii*. Their relation to the natural and to the Mosaic laws is given, and also their division into *præcepta* and *consilia*, according as they concern *opera necessitatis* or *supererogationis*. The former are divided into the same categories as the Old Testament laws, except that here the ceremonies are replaced by the sacraments, which not only teach what is to be done, as the laws do, but also confer power for the doing of it. They thus form the stepping-stone to the subject, grace, which is considered in the sixty-ninth and following questions. Its necessity, its recipients, its division into *gratia gratis data* and *gratum faciens* are stated, and then its first effects, the *fides informis*, *spes informis*, and *timor servilis*, are considered, and afterward the real virtues, the *fides formata*, *spes formata*, and *caritas*. Belief alone,—both its subject and its object,—is discussed in this volume. The content of the three œcumenical symbols is given as the object of belief.

5. The *fourth volume* of the work makes the impression that something is wanting between it and the end of the previous volume. It treats in one hundred and fourteen questions the means of grace, in the same way that Hugo had done, first the *sacramenta naturalis legis* (sacrifices, etc.), then the sacraments of the *lex Moysis* (circumcision, celebration of the Sabbath, etc.), finally those of the *lex evangelica*. The sacrament is defined as *signum gratiæ gratis datæ*, and there being seven of them, they are said to correspond to the seven virtues which they are designed to promote. In *Quæst.* 9–23 baptism



is discussed; in 24-28 confirmation, in 29-53 the Lord's Supper—in connection with which the entire ordinance of the mass is very thoroughly considered and explained in all its characteristics. The sacrament of penance next follows (*Quæst.* 54-114), and its separate elements, *contritio*, *confessio*, and *satisfactio*, are taken up. *Attritio* is distinguished from *contritio*, as it had been by Alanus. *Oratio*, *jejunium*, and *eleemosyne* are distinguished as the different elements of *satisfactio*. The volume closes with the consideration of *eleemosyne*. At least one, perhaps several, volumes would have had to follow, if all that is announced as the subject in the beginning of the third volume,—the *sacramenta salutis per præsentem gratiam et præmia salutis per futuram gloriam*,—had been handled with the same fulness as that which precedes. When we remember that Alexander was the first to introduce this dialectic analysis and demonstration of that which the compilers of the Sentences had asserted, and at the same time observe how far he carried it out, we realize that he has had no superior in this respect.

6. A favourite pupil of Alexander's, John of Rochelle (de Rupella), who was entrusted by him in the year 1238 with the continuation of his lectures, and who is said to have written a commentary upon Lombard's works, seems only to have repeated what the master had taught. At least, all that is contained in the portions of his psychological works, published by Hauréau from Paris manuscripts, is found, though scattered, in the *Summa* of his master. The distinction between the *virtus sensitiva* and *intellectiva* had already been drawn by Alexander, as well as the further distinction of *sensus* and *imaginatio* in the former, and of *ratio*, *intellectus*, and *intelligentia* in the latter. The same is true of the distinction between the soul as *perfectio corporis*, and as *perfecta* and *tota in toto corpore*. In fact, the more one studies Alexander, the more astonished does one become at the industry and the conscientiousness with which he deals even with the smallest questions.

Hugo had considered not only the *cognitio*, the content of doctrine, but also,—in his writings which are commonly called mystical, and which have gained him no less fame than his  
and his work *De sacramentis*,—the subjective side

of belief, the *affectus*, which he himself designates as belief proper. Alexander, in his further development of theology, follows only the former, and is therefore a pure Sententiary, a mere defendant of Summaries. If nothing is to be lost of that which has been accomplished by the great theologian who is so often compared with Augustine, the second element also, as shown in his *Arca mystica*, etc., and carried still further by his pupil Richard, must be made the subject of exposition and continuation. Not only dogma, but also the doctrine of mystical contemplation must be brought into agreement with the teachings of the Peripatetics, just as Avicenna had brought the *raptus* of the prophets into harmony with Aristotelianism. This supplement to that which had been accomplished by Alexander of Hales and John of Rochelle is supplied by a pupil of both of them, Bonaventura. The very fact that it is a supplement goes well with the circumstance that he, who furnishes it, comments upon Summaries just as they had done. Bonaventura was a man whose nature and development fitted him for the solution of this very problem; and his services can be correctly estimated only when his mission is borne in mind.

## § 197.

## BONAVENTURA.

I. JOHN FIDANZA (according to Trithem. : *De scr. eccl.*, and others, Eustachius Fidenza) was born in the year 1221, in the Florentine Bagnarea (Balneo regio). He is better known by the name BONAVENTURA, which some think was given him by accident. As a child he was intended by his mother for the Franciscan Order, and entered it in his twenty-second year. By his pure innocence he won the admiration not only of the aged Alexander of Hales, but also of all his other companions, so that seven years after his admission, the lectures upon the Sentences were put into his hands, and six years later he was honoured with the position of General of the Order. Finally, his purity led to his being called in a peculiar sense *Doctor Seraphicus*, *seraphicus* being a predicate which the Order was fond of applying to itself. He died as Cardinal and Bishop of Albano, during the Council of Lyons, on the 18th of July, 1274. In the year 1482 he was canonized by Pope Sixtus IV. His works have often been published, first in 1482, and

then, by command of Pope Sixtus V., in seven folio volumes in Rome, 1588. Later, in the year 1680, an edition, based upon the former and upon a German edition, was published in Lyons in seven folio volumes. Unfortunately it is marred by many typographical errors. It contains in the *first volume*: *Principium SSæ., Illuminationes Ecclesiæ s. Expositio in Hexameron* (which, according to a postscript, are lectures delivered by Bonaventura in the last year of his life), *Expositiones in Psalterium, Ecclesiasten, Sapientiam, et Lamentationes Hieremiæ*; in the *second volume* the *Expositio in cap. VI. Evang. Matth., De oratione Domini, In Evang. Luc., Postilla super Joannem, Collationes prædicabiles, ex Jo. ev. collectæ*; in the *third volume*, *Sermones de tempore* (sermons for all the days of the ecclesiastical year), *Sermones de sanctis totius anni, Sermones de sanctis in genere*. The *fourth* and *fifth* volumes contain the commentaries upon the *Sentences* of Lombard; the *sixth* and *seventh*, the *Opuscula*, namely (vol. vi.), *De reductione artium ad theologiam, Breviloquium, Centiloquium, Pharetra, Declaratio terminorum theologiæ, Sententiæ sententiarum, De quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus, De septem donis Sp. Sti., De resurrectione aspeccato, De tribus ternariis peccatorum infamibus, Dieta salutis, Meditationes vitæ Christi, Lignum vitæ, De quinque festivitibus pueri Jesu*; and (vol. vii.), *Sermones de decem præceptis, Viginti quinque memorabilia, De regimine animæ, Formula aurea de gradibus virtutum, De pugna spirituali contra septem vitia capitalia, Speculum animæ, Confessionale, De præparatione ad missam, De instructione sacerdotis*, etc., *Expositio missæ, De sex alis Seraphim, De contemptu sæculi, De septem gradibus contemplationis, Exercitia spiritualia, Fascicularis, Soliloquium, Itinerarium* (the older editions have also *Itinerarius*) *mentis ad Deum, De septem itineribus æternitatis, Incendium amoris, Stimuli amoris, Amatorium, De ecclesiastica hierarchia*. The *Legenda Sti. Francisci* follows, and a number of works which analyze the rules of the Order for its members, and defends them against attacks. In the Appendix are found the works whose genuineness is doubted, among them the *Mystica theologica*, which purports to be an explanation of the work of the same name by Dionysius the Areopagite; and finally the *Compendium theologicæ veritatis*.

2. Bonaventura, like his predecessors Hugo and Alexander, combines the other sciences, especially philosophy, with

theology in such a manner that the former are made to serve the latter. His treatment of the sciences is therefore only a practical carrying out of that which he had developed in his little treatise *De reductione artium ad theologiam*. In this he seeks to point out why the *lumen inferius*, the means of sense-perception, enters us through exactly five senses, and why the *lumen exterius*, the cause of our aptitude for the mechanical arts, produces just the seven reckoned by Hugo (*vid. supra*, § 165, 2). He then proceeds to consider the *lumen interius*, by virtue of which we acquire philosophical perception, and shows how each of the three divisions of philosophy, *rationalis*, *naturalis*, and *moralis*, is again subdivided into three—*Grammatica, Logica, et Rhetorica; Metaphysica, Mathematica, et Physica; Monastica, Economica, et Politica*. He shows further how all these are only hints of the *lumen superius* of grace, of which we become partakers through the Scriptures. For the very reason that this is the proper foundation of all true knowledge, it draws its parables and expressions from all the lower spheres of perception; and these, on the other hand, are rightly valued only when it is always maintained that in everything which we know *interius latet Deus*. It is true, that if we wish to perceive this, we must not stop with the historical sense of Scripture as if it were the only one, but we must interpret the Bible allegorically, as Augustine and Anselm did, in order to find in it the hidden content of belief; morally or tropically, as Gregory and Bernard did, in order to find in it hidden directions for the conduct of life; finally anagogically or mystically, as the Areopagite and Richard did, in order to find hints in regard to complete oneness with God. Hugo is said to be the only theologian who has shown equal skill in all three modes.

3. Since these higher methods of interpretation are impossible without the requisite historical comprehension of the Scriptures, and this cannot be gained without a knowledge of the entire plan of salvation, Bonaventura develops the latter briefly and without any technical apparatus in the *Breviloquium*. In this he always states the Catholic doctrine in a few short sentences, and then subjoins the *ratio ad intelligentiam prædictorum* in order to show that these propositions are not irrational. Not only the fact that Aristotle is always cited as a witness for philosophy, and that his *infinitum actu non datur* is treated as an axiom which even Divine omnipotence cannot overthrow, but also Bonaventura's doctrines in regard to the

formation of the world, in regard to the elements, the soul and its powers, the will, etc., show him to have been a follower of the peripatetic philosophy as represented by the Neo-Platonic and Arabic commentators. He finds no contradiction between this cosmology and Scripture, and that all the less because the latter is above all in his opinion the book of redemption; and therefore everything which concerns the constitution of the world must be read out of the *liber creationis*, nature. If this latter is read in the proper spirit, it teaches a knowledge of God, whose *vestigium* is perceived in the lower creation, and whose image is seen in man. The *Pharetra* is to be regarded as preliminary to the *Breviloquium* and the *Centiloquium*. The latter owes its name to the fact that in it the doctrine of evil and its guilt and punishment, as well as that of the good, and its condition, grace, with its goal, salvation, are treated in one hundred sections. The *Pharetra* is a collection of the most famous authorities upon all the points of belief that Bonaventura considers in his two works. These show how accurately acquainted he was with the doctrines of the Church, and how important he considered their systematic arrangement to be. This appears still more clearly in his commentary upon the *Sentences* of Lombard, whose third part especially later theologians were accustomed to cite as unsurpassed, just as they asserted that Duns Scotus (*vid. infra*, § 214) in his commentary upon the first part, Ægidius Colonna (*vid.* § 204, 4), in his commentary upon the second, and Richard of Middletown (*vid.* § 204, 5) on the fourth, had won first place. The *Sentences* of Lombard were, besides, so highly valued by Bonaventura that in his *Sententiæ sententiarum* he has reproduced the contents of the 162 distinctions in verse, undoubtedly for the purpose of facilitating the committal of the whole to memory.

4. In Bonaventura's opinion, however, the side of religion in virtue of which it is *affectus*, is much more important than dogma, in so far as it is the object of knowledge. He nevertheless is fond of calling theology a *scientia affectiva*. He feels himself called much more to answer the questions as to what belief is, how it is attained, and how we are to advance beyond it, than to explain the doctrines of faith. In the latter task he follows Lombard, in the former, Hugo and Richard of St. Victor, as well as his companion spirit Bernard of Clairvaux. His *Soliloquium* is patterned after Hugo's *Arrha* *animæ* *ad* *deum*.

he himself confesses. In a conversation of a man with his soul, the latter is directed to look into itself, in order to learn how it is deformed by sin ; to look without, to recognise the vanity of the world ; to look below, to see the punishment of the lost ; to look above, to behold the glory of salvation ; and thus to turn all its desire away from itself and from the world toward God. Likewise in his work *De septem itineribus eternitatis*, especially where *meditatio* is treated, a great deal is taken verbally from Richard's *Benjamin major*, which however is cited as *Arca mystica*. In addition to this, still other writers, old and new, are quoted, so that in the whole work Bonaventura has much less to say than his authorities. He appears most independent in two works which are to be regarded as the most important of this class of writings, the *Diætæ salutis* and the *Itinerarius mentis in Deum*. In the former, the nine days' journeys (*diætæ*) are described, in which the soul proceeds from vice to repentance, thence to the commandments, then to the voluntary works of holiness (poverty, celibacy, and humility), then to the virtues, afterward to the seven beatitudes (Matt. v. 3 ff.), further, to the twelve fruits of the Spirit (Gal. v. 22), then to the Judgment, and finally to heaven. The work closes with a picture of condemnation and blessedness. The *Itinerarius* is still more peculiar, and is read and praised more than any of his other works. This was written in the year 1263, and takes as its point of departure the distinction between the *vestigium* and the *imago Dei*. Bonaventura shows in it, that according as the investigation begins with the former, or the latter, or the revealed word, there will be three different theologies :—the *theologia symbolica*, which begins with that *extra nos*, and corresponds with the *sensus* ; the *theologia propria*, which begins with that *intra nos*, and corresponds with the *ratio* ; and finally, the *theologia mystica*, which takes its point of departure above us, and has the *intelligentia* as its organ. But since each one of these steps appears in a double form, six different grades of perception are distinguished. For God is discovered either *per vestigia*, the Trinity of the First Cause being concluded from the *pondus, numerus, et mensura* in things, or *in vestigiis*, the consideration of corporeal, spiritual, and mixed natures in the world leading us likewise to a Trinity. Again, God is perceived *per imaginem*, because *memoria, intellectus, and voluntas* in ourselves prove a Triune Deity ; and *in imagine*, since the three theological virtues, as

effects of the Triune God, demonstrate His presence. Finally, God is recognised *per ejus nomen*, since Being, the real name of God according to the Old Testament, can be thought of only as existent; and *in ejus nomine*, since God can be thought of as good, as the New Testament teaches Him to be, only if He is Triune. Six different steps are thus distinguished, the *sensus* being supplemented by the *imaginatio*, the *ratio* by the *intellectus*, and the *intelligentia* by the *apex mentis*. The fact that Bonaventura calls this latter also *synderesis*, proves that he does not regard a mere theoretical relation to God the highest thing, but that the experience of God is for him most important: the *experientia effectualis*, which he calls at one time a tasting of God, at another a becoming drunk in Him, again a passing over into God, a putting on of God, even a transformation into God. He speaks thus in his *Stimulus amoris*. In his *Incendium amoris*, he says, among other things, *Non disputando sed agendo scitur ars amandi*.

5. This complete devotion to God, at one time called *quies*, at another *sopor pacis*, is designated as the Sabbath of life, in contrast with the preparatory steps, which resemble the six days' work. It is attainable by man only through the grace which has appeared in Christ. The point is therefore to take Christ up entirely into oneself, to become completely one with Him. Nothing facilitates this so much as absorption in His history, especially the account of His sufferings. In the work *De quinque festivitatibus pueri Jesu*, and in the *Stimuli amoris*, the representation of how the soul is to repeat in itself all the conditions of the mother of Jesus after her conception, how the wounds of Christ are the entrance into the pharmacy which contains all the means of grace, how the lance is to be avoided, because it pierced the side of Christ, etc., is carried out to an extreme of insipid trifling. The *Meditationes vitæ Christi* are much better. They were written for a sister of the Order, and in them the blanks which the Bible leaves in the life of Christ are filled with products of poetic fancy. The strife which was carried on by the righteousness and mercy of God before the incarnation, as St. Bernard had dramatized it, forms the beginning, and investigations in regard to Martha and Mary, that is, in regard to the active and contemplative life, the close. The love of Bonaventura for the Virgin Mary is expressed in all his works with scarcely less warmth than his love for Christ. Next to Mary,

the founder of his Order receives from him the highest honour. Both of them are always cited as examples of the closest union with God. This union is sometimes (e.g., in *De tribus ternariis peccatorum*) characterized as the return of the soul to its eternal abode, in virtue of which it is eternal, since *locus est conservativus locati, unde res extra locum non conservatur*, sometimes as its dwelling in the *manerio æterno*. Although it is the highest goal, there are, nevertheless, various abodes within it which differ in rank. Bonaventura is very fond of drawing parallels with the spheres and times of creation, especially where favourite numbers come into account, above all three, and also six, as the first *numerus perfectus*, and further seven, in connection with which he likes to refer to the *septiformis septenarius vitiorum, virtutum, sacramentorum, donorum, beatitudinum, petitionum, dotum gloriosarum*; finally nine, on account of the heavenly hierarchy. This explains his speaking at one time of various degrees of intoxication in tasting God, and again his sketching more distinctly in one of his own works the *septem gradua contemplationis*. It explains too the fact that he speaks most often of three principal steps in the union with God, each of which is divided into three minor steps. The lowest is called the angelic, the highest the seraphic, in accordance with the order maintained since the Areopagite. These steps are said to be related to each other just as the classes into which mankind is divided. At their summit stand the three orders of the contemplative recluse, which are followed by the three orders of rulers (*prælati*), and these by the three orders of subjects (*subjecti*). It is no wonder that Bonaventura was subsequently drawn upon, especially by preaching mystics. The fine analyses, which are often formulated in a very pointed way, cause many of his writings to appear like a collection of exceedingly clever sermon plans. He expressly added such plans to the *Dietis salutis*.

### § 198.

While the Franciscans rear up for themselves the *Theologorum Monarcha*, under whose eyes and care the *Doctor Seraphicus* grows up in their midst, a double star arises in the Dominican Order—a star composed of a teacher and a pupil, whose beams are speedily to shine further. Among the former, theology was not only the chief end, but also the



starting-point. so that they attempted to explain and to defend with the help of Aristotle that which the great theologians of St. Victor had taught. The *Doctor Universalis*, on the contrary, follows another course. The subject of his study from the beginning was the Greek philosopher; and where the latter is not complete he supplements, where he is not clear he explains. He devoted more than ten years to the single task of gaining familiarity with the philosophy of these men, and as much more time to the work of spreading a knowledge of peripatetic doctrine as a teacher and writer. In this he is not at all hindered by the fact that the only Christian whose work he puts on a level with the Aristotelian writings as equal to them, and expounds like them, is Gilbert, who is looked upon by the Church at least with suspicion. Only after he has accomplished these tasks does he undertake a work, as the title of his principal production shows, similar to that of Alexander, whose writings he makes industrious use of. Although he knows Hugo of St. Victor as well, and prizes him as highly as Alexander did, and although a vein of mysticism, which he possesses in perhaps a greater degree than the latter, entices him toward the Victorines, his course is nevertheless not determined by them, but rather by Lombard, who, in comparison with Hugo, is prosaically rational. And he does not train up his favourite pupil, as Alexander had, to rage and riot in his own soul in the sense of the later Victorines; but he leads him in the track of the men who were regarded by those patterns of Bonaventura as perplexing labyrinths (*vid. supra*, § 173). If the statement be not taken too literally, it may be said that Albert's theological labours are related to those of Alexander as the philosophy of religion is related to speculative dogmatics.

### ALBERTUS MAGNUS.

J. Sighart: *Albertus Magnus, sein Leben und seine Wissenschaft*. Regensb., 1857.

### § 199.

#### ALBERT'S LIFE AND WRITINGS.

I. ALBERT, the oldest son of Herr von Bollstädt, was born in the Swabian city Laningen, where his father was imperial

representative, probably in the year 1193. After a careful training, he went, in the year 1212, to the University of Padua, where the *artes* flourished especially at that time. According to others, it was the University of Pavia, instead of Padua. His industrious study of Aristotle, which did not accord well with the distrust in the latter felt by the Church at that time, is said to have been at the express command of the Virgin Mary, and therefore it appears excusable. This study led directly to the natural sciences and medicine. For ten years he busied himself in this way, being already called by his fellow-pupils the Philosopher. The General of the Dominican Order (the German Jordanus, Count of Eberstein) induced him to enter that fraternity in the year 1223. From that time he began to study theology in Bologna, that is, first the text and then the Sentences. In his thirty-sixth year he was called to Cologne, where the Order had had a monastery since 1221, to teach especially the secular sciences. He soon became so famous as a teacher of philosophy, that he was sent by the Order first to one place and then to another, to arouse an interest in philosophy in its various monasteries, and to train successors wherever it was possible. He thus taught in Regensburg, Freiburg, Strasburg, Paris, Hildesheim, in the years 1232-1243, when he was called back to Cologne to undertake again the superintendence of the school there, in which Thomas Aquinas at this time began to shine. In the year 1245, he went again to Paris to grace the chair there, which had finally been secured, and to receive the highest academical honours. He returned, as Doctor, to Cologne, where the school was now organized like a university. Being appointed teacher of theology, he turned his attention more to the theological and practical calling of the priest. The commentaries upon Aristotle and the Areopagite were now followed by commentaries upon the Scriptures. At the same time he was engaged with sermons and practical compilations of the doctrines of faith. His ecclesiastical activity became still more prominent when he was appointed, in the year 1254, Provincial of his Order for Germany, and had to reform the monasteries. This made him familiar with their libraries; and every manuscript which he himself copied or had copied, increased his learning, which had early been accounted supernatural. He won new fame when, having been called for the purpose to Anagni, he victoriously defended, before the Pope

and the Council, the Mendicant Orders against the attacks of the University of Paris, and at the same time expounded before the same audience the Gospel of John, and combated the false doctrines of Averroës. Having returned to Germany, he continued to discharge the laborious duties of Provincial until the year 1259, when he was finally relieved, but only to undertake, at the express command of the Pope, the still severer labours of Bishop of Regensburg. His commentary on Luke shows that he knew how to gain time from his many duties to write this most important of all his exegetical works. The position, nevertheless, became constantly more painful to him, and in the year 1262, his resignation was accepted. The monastic life to which he returned was interrupted for a time when he wandered through Bavaria and France as a preacher of the Cross. While not thus engaged, he lived a part of the time in one, a part of the time in another monastery of his Order, and finally again in his beloved Cologne. In the year 1274, after learning of the death of his favourite pupil, Thomas, he attended the Council of Lyons, and defended publicly in Paris, on his return thence, some of the works of his beloved scholar. The theological *Summa*, which had been commenced long before, was then brought to an end, in Cologne, by the completion of the second part. He was hindered from writing the third and fourth parts, either by his age or by the fact that the *Summa* of Thomas had already been written. The little work *De adhærendo Deo* is his last, and was written when he was eighty-four years old. In his eighty-seventh year he closed his pious and in every respect model life, which had won for him the honourable names of *Magnus* and *Doctor Universalis*. Albert's works were published by Petr. Jammy, in Lyons, in the year 1651, in twenty-one folio volumes. Many unauthentic works are included, and much that is regarded as genuine is omitted. The printing, moreover, is not very correct. The philosophical works fill the first six volumes, the *first* containing the logical writings, the *second* the physical, the *third* the metaphysical and psychological, the *fourth* the ethical, the *fifth* the minor physical works, and the *sixth* the Zoology. To these is to be added the twenty-first volume, which contains the *Philosophia pauperum*.

## § 200.

## ALBERT AS A PHILOSOPHER.

1. Like Avicenna, whom he ranks above all other commentators of Aristotle, Albert, in expounding the works of the latter, reproduces his doctrines in his own style, and therefore not always in the words of the author; and wherever he believes that a break occurs he makes it good. In many works he makes use only of such translations as are made directly from the Arabic, in others he employs Græco-Latin versions. In his works upon logic, he uses as his guide the parts of the *Organon* which contain the old logic in the translation of Boëthius; but the *Analytics* and *Topics* also in the translation of John, and in the annotated editions of Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroës. He does not wish to have logic regarded as properly science, but as only a preparation for it, because it does not treat a particular being, as the other parts of philosophy do, but rather all being as it comes to verbal expression, and thus belongs to the *philosophia sermocinalis*, and not the *res* but the *intentiones* (conceptions) *rerum considerat*. Its peculiar mission is to show how we are to pass from the known to a knowledge of the unknown, and it is therefore to be divided, as Alfarabi had already correctly shown, into the doctrine of the definition and into that of the conclusion and proof, since the hitherto unknown may be an *incomplexum* or a *complexum*. The writings of the *Organon* therefore are divided into two principal parts, according as they furnish the data for correct definition, as the works *De prædicabilibus*, *De prædicamentis*, *De sex principiis*, or as they show how to find, not only the subjects and predicates of judgments and conclusions, but also the judgments and conclusions themselves, like the rest of the works of the *Organon*.

2. The nine tracts *De prædicabilibus*, also cited as *De universalibus*, give a paraphrase of the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, in which the relation of the *prædicabilia* is maintained to be such that the *differentia* is for the *genus* what the *proprium* is for the *species* and the *accidens* for the *individuum*. In this connection it is noticeable that Albert answers the question in regard to the universals in the many-sided way which had been suggested to him by Avicenna (*vid. supra*, § 184, 1).

The universals are *ante res*, as original types in the Divine mind; *in rebus*, inasmuch as they give the *quid est esse* of the latter; *post res*, since our minds deduce them from individual things. With this combination of all previous answers the strife between them is done away with. For this reason, the question whether Albert and the scholastics who follow him are realists or nominalists implies a misunderstanding of the difference between the two periods of scholasticism. In the present period the decisive questions are quite different. The work *De prædicamentis* considers under this name the Aristotelian categories, which are so arranged that the nine remaining ones are opposed as *accidentia* to *substantia*, with the express explanation, that if the *principia essendi* and *cognoscendi* were not the same, our knowledge would be a false knowledge, and therefore the distinction of substantial and accidental being runs parallel with our distinction of substance and accident. In connection with the distinction of *substantia prima* and *secunda* (*vid. supra*, § 86, 6), the former is designated as a *hoc aliquid*, which *materiam habet terminatam et signatam accidentibus individuantiis*, and is an *ens perfectum*, or has *ultimam perfectionem*. Several such *accidentia individuantiis*, up to the number of seven, among them the *hic et nunc*, are given in various places. After quantity, quality, and the *ad aliquid* are considered, it is shown that in the *qualitas* the *agere* and *pati* are also contained, in the *ad aliquid*, the *ubi*, *quando*, *positio*, and *habitus*. This last assertion, which closes the subject of the *postprædicamenta*, is really in conflict with the fact that Albert expounds Gilbert's book *De sex principiis* (*vid. supra*, § 163, 1), which was intended to fill a blank at this point, as conscientiously as if it were a work of Aristotle.

3. The two books *Perihermeneias*, divided respectively into five and into two tracts, form the transition to the theory of the conclusion and the proof. They follow the work of Aristotle (*vid. supra*, § 86, 1) step by step, expounding and defending it. The nine tracts of the *Lib. I. priorum analyticorum* come next. They ground the conclusion on the *dicti de omni et nullo*, and develop its *figuræ* and its various *conjugationes*, and then proceed to a very precise investigation of the way in which the thing forms itself always according to the modal character of the premises. At the

which concern the threefold *mirtio* of the *necessarii et inesse*, of the *inesse et contingentis*, and of the *contingentis et necessarii*. The reductions of one figure to another are discussed at considerable length, not only of the second and third to the first, but also *vice versâ*. Seven tracts upon *Lib. II. prior analyt.* follow. These treat the finished conclusion, its demonstrative power as well as its possible errors, and in the same connection notice always the strifes of the schools. *Lib. I. posteriorum* follows in five tracts; *Lib. II poster.* in four. They contain the investigations to which Albert assigns the highest place, because here the formal *necessitas consequentiæ* alone is no longer considered, but the material truth of the conclusion, the *necessitas consequentis*. Since this is dependent upon the truth and certainty of the premises, thirteen degrees of certainty are first distinguished, then follow detailed investigations upon the deductive process, and it is shown how knowledge and how ignorance result. The three degrees are distinguished of the *intellectus*, which goes beyond the proof, of the *sensus* and *opinio*, which fall short of it, and of the *scientia*, which rests upon it. The discursive knowledge of the latter is contrasted with the intuitive knowledge of the intellect, and the three degrees are closed with the *intelligentia*, as the perception of the principles of all definition and proof, which are not themselves further definable and demonstrable.

4. Between this undemonstrable certainty, and the first demonstrable proposition, a medium is needed. This may be called *inventio*. Previously the *ratio disserendi* has been considered as *ratio judicandi*, but now it is to be considered as *ratio inveniendi*. This is the subject of the eight books of *Topicorum*, which follow in twenty-nine tracts the Aristotelian work of the same name (*vid. supra*, § 86, 5). The object is to show how that which is in the highest degree certain can be deduced from the probable by dialectic conclusions, or, what is practically the same thing, how problems can be solved. In the first book dialectics in general is treated; in the six following books, dialectics as applied to individual problems; in the eighth, dialectics as the art of disputation. These are followed by the two *Libri elenchorum*,—the first in seven tracts, the second in five,—which point out, either in form or in content, the violations of the rules of the conclusion of which sophistical demonstrations are guilty. Albert in this connection justifies his divi

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sion of the investigation into two books, the relation of which he compares to the relation between dialectics and apodictics.

5. As regards the parts proper (*essentiales*) of philosophy, *theoretical* philosophy (*scientia theorica, realis, speculativa*, etc.) is divided into metaphysics, mathematics, and physics, which have to do with intelligible, imaginable, and sensible being. Although the order just given is the essential order, the beginning, nevertheless, is made, *ordine doctrinae*, with *Physics*, since our perception commences with the senses. Thus Albert presents a treatment of the *scientia naturalis*, expounding the physical writings of Aristotle (*vid. supra*, § 88) as he had already expounded the *Organon*. This treatment is intended to acquaint readers, especially of his own order, with this science, and with the *littera* of Aristotle. The second volume of his works contains *Physicorum libb. VIII.*, *De cælo et mundo libb. IV.*, *De generatione et corruptione libb. II.*, *De meteoris libb. IV.*, which follow Aristotle quite closely. In them the fundamental conceptions of mathematics are also considered, so that Albert is able to speak of these investigations as his *quadrivium*, and to cite them as his teachings in regard to the *scientiæ doctrinales*, or *disciplinares* (cf. *supra*, § 147). The discussion of meteors is followed by the first two hundred pages of the third volume, which contain the three books *De anima*, a commentary interrupted by *digressiones*, in which other views are mentioned and reconciled, wherever possible, with the opinion of Aristotle. The soul is represented as an entelechy of the body; and yet, since certain of its functions are not connected with organs, it is asserted that they, and therefore the soul, are *separata*. This is not very consistent. In the theory of the senses a prominent part is played by the *species* or *intentiones* which proceed from the things, and which are called *spirituales* because they are immaterial. With the five senses and the *sensus communis* are said to be connected the *vis imaginativa* and *æstimatoria*, which are common to all animals; further, the *phantasia*, which at least the higher animals have; and finally the *memoria*. No other part is treated with so many digressions as the *intellectus*, or the *pars rationalis*, of the human soul. The point is, to show that it is unchangeable, independent of matter, receptive of the general, and therefore not a *hoc aliquid* or *individuatum*, and yet that every man has his own intellect, by virtue of which he is immortal. For this purpose

Albert criticizes the theories of Alexander of Aphrodisias, of Themistius, Avempace, Abubacer, Averroës, Avicbron, of earlier Platonists and later ones who follow them, and defends against them what he considers to be the true opinion of Aristotle. In this connection it is shown that the *intellectus possibilis* is *potentia* in a sense entirely different from that in which matter is *potentia*. Less is said in regard to the *intellectus agens*, the *Metaphysics* being referred to upon that subject. The *intellectus practicus* is made the transition to the consideration of the *voluntas*, which is distinct from it, and which in man takes the place of the *appetitus* of animals. The will is free. It is not forced to a choice even by the demonstrations of the reason, but works as a pure *causa sui*. When action is to take place, the two must be combined; the reason declares an act good (*discernit*), the will undertakes it (*impetum facit*). The general and innate principles of the *intellectus practicus* form the *synderesis*, which errs no more than the theoretical axioms of the reason with which its content corresponds. From the *synderesis* as major premise and from the perceptive reason, which furnishes the minor premise, arises the *conscientia*. The union of the *intellectus* and *voluntas* gives the *liberum arbitrium* in which man is *arbiter*, because he has reason, and *liber*, because he has will. Not the *liberum arbitrium*, but the *libertas* involved in it, must be regarded as the seat of evil.

6. These investigations in natural science, which are all contained in the second and third volumes of Albert's works, are condensed into a comprehensive outline in the *Summa philosophiæ naturalis* (vol. xxi.), which is called also *Philosophia pauperum*, because, by means of it, the members of the Mendicant Order are to be put in a position to become acquainted with the whole of Aristotle's physics. Many doubt whether Albert himself made this epitome, which exists moreover in various recensions, some things which are contained in Jammy's edition being wanting, for instance, in those of Martin Lamsperg (Leipsic, 1513), and Jac. Thanner (Leipsic, 1514). This is the case with the section on comets. The investigations upon the *intellectus* which are connected with Aristotle's *De anima* are interesting. The distinction is first drawn between the *intellectus formalis* or *quo intelligimus*, that is between the *species intelligibilis* or the conception, and the *intellectus* as a power of the soul which grasps the former,

and in union with it becomes *intellectus in effectu* or *intellectus qui intelligit*. Albert then proceeds to show that the understanding, as *potentia cognitiva*, is either theoretical (*speculativus*) or practical. The former perceives the truth *sub ratione veri*, the latter *sub ratione boni*. The latter, further, when it aims at the general good and opposes the evil, is *sinderesis*; but when it "*non semper stat in universali*," it is *intelligentia* or *ratio* according as it aims at the eternal alone or at the lower as well. The *intelligentia*, the highest step of the *intellectus*, is distinguished from the *sinderesis* by the fact that it busies itself only with the eternal and therefore never with evil. It is again distinguished from the *ratio* by the fact that it grasps its object intuitively, while the *ratio* compares and draws deductions, that is, acts discursively. Moreover, a male (higher) and a female (lower) part are distinguished in the *ratio*. The "*vir*" attains to *intelligentia*, the "*mulier*" is *sensualitati conjuncta*. In the second volume of Albert's works are found in addition five books *De mineralibus*, which he compiled from Avicenna and other authors, and also from his own observations, only scattered hints on the subject being contained in Aristotle. The most interesting things in the work are an alphabetical list of precious stones, to which he ascribes beneficial effects, and a critique of alchemy which is exceedingly enlightened for his time. Jammy puts the work *De sensu et sensato*, as well as the remaining *Parva naturalia*, after the *Metaphysics* in the fifth volume. Why he does this is not clear, since the former is closely connected with the work upon the soul, as Albert himself recognises, and the latter are appealed to in his *Metaphysics*. The same may be said of the twenty-six books *De animalibus*, which constitute the sixth volume, and into which is incorporated all that is contained in the Aristotelian works *De part.* and *De generat. anim.*, as well as a great deal from the history of animals. This is especially true of the first nineteen books; the last seven show greater originality. Albert's own studies appear most prominently in the seven books *De vegetabilibus et plantis*, which are still mentioned with respect by botanists. In addition to these are to be mentioned the two works, *De unitate intellectus contra Averroësem*, and *De intellectu et intelligibili*. In the former, thirty-six arguments are brought against the thirty grounds with which the followers of Aver

roës combat the immortality of the individual personality. It is urged that these arguments show that the assertion of Averroës' followers proceeds from the doctrine of ideas, while the genuine Aristotelian doctrine is, that every one has not only his passive but also his active understanding. In the second work, which is a supplement of that upon the soul, the question of the universals is taken up ; and, just as above, the correct standpoint is asserted to be a mean, to a certain extent, between nominalism and realism. The terminology, however, is in this case different from that in the work *De prædicabilibus*. The genera are to be called *universalia* or *quiditates* only as they are *in rebus* ; as *ante res* they are to be called *essentiæ*, as *post res*, *intellectus*. An important part is played here also by the distinctions between *intellectus possibilis* and *intellectus in effectu*. The latter can be *actu intellectus* as well as *intellectus habitu*. At the same time it is shown that there are various degrees of the actual understanding, according as it is *adeptus*, *assimilativus*, or *sanc-tus*. The latter is characterized as a snatching up of the soul into God, and therefore almost coincides with the *raptus* of Avicenna.

7. Three fourths of the third volume are occupied by Albert's *Metaphysics*, or *Prima philosophia*, which he calls also *Divina philosophia* or *theologia*, because it comes into existence only through Divine illumination, and has to do with the Divine. In the historical utterances of the first book, all materialistic views are grouped together, in accordance with their culminating point, as Epicureanism. Epicurean philosophy always means to Albert materialistic philosophy ; Epicurus, very often, a materialist. Since the name has here become *appellativum*, his etymologizing, which is, to be sure, comical, has nevertheless some sense. In the same way the name of the opponents of Epicurus, *Stoici*, is given a wider significance ; and therefore it is not merely on account of a confusion of names that the Eleatics and Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato are designated as Stoics, that is, as those who teach that not matter but form "*dat esse*." The Peripatetic view is, in the opinion of Albert, superior to both. In the course of the work, the Aristotelian investigations are often interrupted by digressions, for instance in the *third* book, where twenty-seven *dubitationes* (aporimes) are met, first with Aristotelian arguments, and then with grounds of his own. The *fourth*

book expounds, without digressions on the part of the author, that which Aristotle had said in regard to the proposition of the non-contradictory and of the excluded middle. In the *fifth* book, on synonyms, Albert has added some things of his own. The most important addition is his effort to deduce the four *causæ* from a certain principle, the *materialis* and *formalis* (*quid erat esse, quiditas*) being combined as *causa intrinseca*, the *efficiens* and *finalis* as *extrinseca*, and then the *hoc esse* being reduced to the *materia*, the *esse* to the *forma*. Albert considers in addition, in digressions of his own, unity, number, original matter (with the conception of which absence of form is irreconcilable), the general, the genus and its relation to matter, etc. The meaning of the terms employed in relation to the *universalia* is here modified again, so that by this designation is understood only what falls within the comparing understanding, and thus it is said that *universale non est nisi dum intelligitur*. In a digression in the *sixth* book, Albert seeks, by the distinction of the first and second cause, to reconcile the accidental nature of many events with the knowledge of God, which coincides with His being. The *seventh* book is a paraphrase almost entirely free from digressions; the *eighth* contains at the close a discussion, in which an apparent contradiction in the Peripatetic doctrine of the substantiality of matter and of form is removed by a distinction. Albert has given the title *De substantia* to both of these books. The *ninth* book, *De potentia et actu*, is simply a paraphrase of Aristotle, likewise the *tenth*, *De uno et multo*, with the exception of an unimportant digression on measure. The eleventh book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* was unknown to Albert. His *eleventh* book is therefore a paraphrase of Aristotle's twelfth, while his *twelfth* corresponds to the latter's thirteenth, his *thirteenth* to the latter's fourteenth. In the eleventh alone are found a few digressions, partly summaries of what had already been developed, partly more exact definitions of Aristotelian propositions. Among the former, for instance, are the observations that the physicist considers everything in relation to motion, the metaphysician in relation to the object, and that all becoming is an *educi e materia* and needs an *actu existentis*, etc. Among the latter, the most important are those which attempt to reconcile the simplicity of the first cause with the fact that it is thought of thought, as well as with the multiplicity of its predicates.

The latter are said to belong to the first cause not *univoco* with other subjects, but only in an eminent, often in a negative sense, so that the *causa prima*, in distinction from the *intelligentia prima* and *materia prima*, is called *prmissima*. Further, it is minutely explained how the heavenly intelligences descend from the original substance and become individualized through the heavenly spheres which are assigned to them. Finally, Albert enlarges greatly upon the question why two starless heavens must be assumed above the heaven of the fixed stars, the lower being set in motion by the supreme good, its object and goal, which is enthroned in the upper. A system of intelligences, subordinated the one to the other, and setting in motion the heavenly spheres (cf. *supra*, § 184, 3), is said to constitute the true Peripatetic doctrine.

8. In addition to theoretical philosophy, Albert assumes only a *practical* philosophy, assigning poetics to logic, as an antithesis to rhetoric. Ethics is *monastica*, *œconomica*, or *politica*, according as it considers the individual man in himself, or as a member of the family, or as a citizen. The first alone is treated by Albert in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*vid. supra*, § 89, 1). The commentary on the *Politics*, which follows the *Ethics* in the fourth volume of Jammy's edition, betrays another author, not only in the external form,—a literal translation of the entire text of Aristotle preceding the analysis, as in the commentaries of Averroës and of Thomas,—but also in the language. The commentary on the *Ethics* contains little except the paraphrastic expositions of Aristotle, but it must be regarded as important that *virtutes cardinales* and *adjunctæ* are distinguished, and that Albert has given to the seventh book the title *De continentia*. Many virtues are mentioned in their Greek names, and then explained, for the most part by a very peculiar etymology. Albert seeks to show that the eighth book, *De amicitia*, and the ninth, *De impedimentis amicitiae*, form a necessary part of the *Ethics*. Otherwise the two books contain no more original matter than the tenth, which is partly a literal, partly a free translation of Aristotle. Albert sees in this fact no cause for censure. For at the end of his works on natural science, he says with a sort of pride, that he has wished only to make known the Peripatetic teachings, that no one will be able to discover what his own views are, and that therefore he is to

be criticized only after a comparison of his presentation with that of Aristotle's own works. The same statement is repeated almost word for word at the end of his commentary on the *Politics*. If it be remembered how few helps he had in his task, his pride will be found justifiable.

9. The last statement makes the difference between Albert's own doctrine and that of the Peripatetics appear greater than it is. Only in two points is Aristotle criticized, and one of these, the eternity of the world, is characterized as a denial of Aristotelian principles; and the other, the definition of the soul, as capable of being supplemented and thus improved. On the other hand, there is one work of Albert's which, not being in the form of a commentary, shows most clearly his agreement with Aristotle, and especially his relation to the writing *De causis* (*vid. supra*, § 189), and to the other Oriental Aristotelians. These are the two books *De causis et processu universitatis* (vol. v., pp. 528-655), the first of which, *De proprietatibus primæ causæ et eorum quæ a prima causa procedunt*, is divided into four, the second, *De terminatione causarum primariarum*, into five tracts. After a detailed critique of the Epicurean, that is the materialistic, and of the Stoic, or idealistic view, as well as of that of Avicbron (*vid. supra*, § 188), it is asserted that an absolutely necessary, supreme principle stands at the summit of all being, and that the most important of its twelve properties for further progress is the absolute simplicity by virtue of which there exists in it no difference between the *esse* or the *quo aliquid est* and the *quod est* or the *quo aliquid est hoc*. This difference, which later plays a very important rôle as *existentia* and *essentia*, approaches, it is true, very closely to the distinction of *forma* and *materia*; and yet Albert does not wish to identify them completely, because the *quod est* belongs also to immaterial beings. The *omnimode et omnino* being,—or, if one prefers, supra-existent being, since being is his work,—is exalted above all fixed predicates, and therefore above all names, so that there can be attributed to him only in a transcendental sense that which signifies, not relative but general usefulness. Good for instance is predicable of all, golden not of all, for it is not predicable of the living. *Summa bonitas, ens primum, prima causa, primum principium, fons omnis bonitatis*, are the names under which Albert treats the supreme principle, which for him coincides with the gracious God. This highest principle knows everything,

but manifoldness only in its unity, the temporal as eternal, the negative in its relation to the positive, and hence evil only as a want of good. His knowledge is neither universal nor individual, since it is arrested by no limit and by no contrast. As *causa sui* he is free, which is no detriment to his necessity. His will is limited only by his goodness and wisdom, in virtue of which he is not able to do anything irrational. All effects, principles as well as things, flow (*fluunt*) from this first principle, so that the further they recede from it the more imperfect they become. His fulness causes the overflow; that which has flowed out from Him is not equal to Him, but is similar, and therefore longs to return. This loss of perfection is characterized at one time as the passage of the general into the particular, at another time as limitation; and it is also said, in agreement with the Jew Isaac, that that which follows takes its rise always in the shade of that which precedes, and this *umbra* is made the *differentia coarctans*. The first outflow from that principle is distinguished from it by the fact that it is no longer absolutely simple, since in it the *esse*, which it has from the first principle, and the *quod est*, which arises out of nothing, fall apart. It is therefore *in essentia finitum*, *in virtute infinitum*. This primary emanation is the *intelligentia*, and can therefore no longer be called God. Its nature is to know. Since it knows itself, as effect, it knows *a posteriori*. The first cause, on the contrary, knows everything for the opposite reason *a priori*. Not indeed because of its own nature, but by virtue of the being imparted to it, intelligence is again outflowing and active; and its outflow, the second, mediate irradiation from the first principle, is the *anima nobilis*, the animating and vivifying principle of the heavenly spheres. These are thus set in motion by the intelligence because it is their *desideratum*, by means of the *anima* which is their *motor*. The multiplicity within the intelligence is, in the case of the higher natures, neither numerical nor specific, for they are grouped neither under a like species nor under a common genus, but each order of intelligences consists of a single individual. It is otherwise with the lower orders, which are individualized because they are materialized. The fact that the former are immaterial and yet individual, is explained by showing that, because of the contrast between *esse* and *quod est*, a principle, to a certain extent material, exists in them. This is not *materia* (*hyle*) but nevertheless *materiale* (*hyleale*),



and hence Albert calls it, in agreement with the *Liber de causis*, *hyleachim*. God, in whom this opposition is wanting, is therefore not an individual. It can be more readily admitted that God is *hoc aliquid*, but since the *suppositum* in Him coincides completely with His being, it is to be thought of by no means as *materia*, nor even as *hyleachim*. Albert calls the *natura*, the *forma corporeitatis*, the principle of the lower corporeal motions, a fourth principle which falls below (*deficiens*) the three mentioned. The *anima* and the *natura* are the tools by which the intelligence introduces the forms, which it contains in itself as content, into the *materia*, or, as it is more often put by Albert, draws them out from matter, the *inchoatio formæ*. By this means things originate. They take their (generic) name and their *quiditas* from the form, while matter contracts them to a *hoc aliquid*. The first actual (formal) body is the heavens. As the forms inherent in the *anima* are materialized in it, so the forms which have streamed into the *natura* (*formæ naturales*) are materialized first in the elements, so that there are to be added to the four first-mentioned principles, the bases of natural existence, four more—matter, form, heaven, elements. What Albert says in explaining these conceptions of matter, appears somewhat indefinite from the fact that he at one time emphasizes in it the positive element, its being *suppositum* or *subjectum* (*ὑποκείμενον*), and again the negative element, its being *privatio* (*στέρησις*) (cf. *supra*, § 87, 2). Since heaven is everlasting, he attributes matter to it only in the former sense. The second element is especially emphasized when the materiality of things is predicated as synonymous with their nonentity. Unformed matter is often designated by Albert as *pæne nihil*, because it is the capacity and impulse for form.

## § 201.

### ALBERT AS A THEOLOGIAN.

1. Albert begins his theological career also as a commentator, first as a commentator of the Scriptures, then of the *Sentences* of Lombard. The commentary on the latter fills three volumes of his works (vols. 14–16). The text of the *Sentences* is followed by the *divisio textus*, and this by the *expositio*, which formulates in separate articles the ques-

tions which arise, states the affirmative and negative arguments, and finally gives the solution. The *divisio* is wanting only in paragraphs which are very easily understood. References to what has already been said in the commentary often take the place of detailed explanations; for instance, in connection with the Sacraments, reference is made to what has been said on the cardinal virtues. Reference is also occasionally made to Albert's earlier philosophical works, especially to the tract on the soul. Only in a very few points, in reference to other *moderni*, does he express disagreement with what Lombard asserts. In general he aims, just as in his commentaries on Aristotle, to develop, not his own, but his author's view.

2. The task which Albert has set himself in his *Summa theologiæ* (vols. 17, 18) is quite different, and is to be compared with the aim of the work *De causis et processu universitatis* pointed out above (§ 200, 9). Title, method, and designation of the sections, remind us so much of Alexander of Hales (*vid. supra*, § 195), that the thought cannot be avoided that something, which the Franciscans already had, was to be offered here to the Dominicans. Albert thereby stands in somewhat the same relation to the *Sentences* of Lombard as Alexander did to the work of Hugo; that is, he follows him, not as a commentator, but as a continuator. For that very reason he calls his work a theological, not merely a doctrinal *Summa*. In the first tract it is admitted that theology as pure science is an end in itself; but the attainment of blessedness is pointed out as its aim as a practical science. The second tract takes up the distinction of the *frui* and *uti*, and shows that the *frui* is not limited to the Deity, nor the *uti* to the present world. There are also other things besides God which are *fruibilia*; and not only *in viâ*, but also *in patriâ* is found that which is *utile*. The third tract treats of the knowableness and demonstrability of God, and these are limited to the *quia est*, while the *quid est* is knowable only *infinite*, that is, not positively. The *vestigium* of God in the lower orders of creation and His *imago* in human beings, are the starting-point for the cognisance of God. Illumination by grace must be added to our natural light in order to complete the knowledge. To Lombard's five proofs for the existence of God, Albert adds two, drawn from Aristotle and Boëthius. All the previous investigations are designated as *præambula*;

and the fourth tract proceeds to the proper subject, to God as the true Being (*essentia*), of whom Anselm has correctly said, that only he who does not understand himself can think of Him as non-existent. As the absolutely simple, in whom *esse*, *quod est*, and *a quo est* coincide, God is the absolutely unchangeable. In the fifth tract the conceptions, *æternitas*, *æviternitas* (*ævum*) and *tempus*, are represented as incommensurable, because they each have another unity (*nunc*) as measure; in the sixth, the One, True, and Good is considered. These three predicates, which belong besides to all beings (*cum ente convertuntur*), belong also to God, the first on account of the fact that it is not possible for Him not to be, the second on account of His simple and unmixed being, the third on account of His unchangeableness and eternity. The distinction drawn here between *veritas rei* and *signi* serves later for the solution of many difficulties, for instance, of such as are presented by the Divine foreknowledge. True substantiality is ascribed to the good alone; evil appears only in connection with it, as limping in connection with walking. In the seventh tract the Trinity is investigated, and the ecclesiastical doctrine is established as the only correct one by means of a number of distinctions, for instance, of the *proprietas personalis* and *personæ*, of the eternal and temporal *processio*, etc. In the eighth tract very subtle investigations are undertaken in regard to the names of the three Persons, for instance, *Utrum Pater pater est quia generat, vel generat quia pater est?* Further, in regard to *filius*, *imago*, *verbum*, *Spiritus sanctus*, *donum*, *amor*. The ninth tract considers the connection and distinctions of the Persons, the tenth the conceptions *usia* (*essentia*), *usiosis* (*subsistentia*), *hypostasis* (*substantia*), *persona*, in which connection the distinctions of Augustine, Pseudo-Boëthius, Præpositivus, and certain later writers are all mentioned with praise, and finally, the Latin terminology is recommended as the most accurate. The expressions *trinus*, *trinus et unus*, *trinitas*, *trinitas in unitate*, and others are in like manner gone through with. In the eleventh tract the equality of the Divine Persons follows, by virtue of which each is equal to each and each to all. The twelfth treats *de appropriatis*, that is, of the secondary attributes of the Persons, which follow from the distinctive property of each—might being ascribed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and will to the Holy Spirit, not indeed exclusively, but in an especial sense.

3. In the thirteenth tract, under the title *De nominibus quæ temporaliter Deo conveniunt*, the conceptions *dominus*, *creator*, *causa* are discussed, and God is shown to be the only *causa formalis* or *exemplaris* of things, since in knowing Himself He knows the ideas of all things, but in such a way that they unite in Him as radii in a centre. In the same way He is the only *causa efficiens* and *finalis* of all things. In the fourteenth tract figurative names are considered, and the propriety of attributing multiplicity to the absolutely simple is discussed. The fifteenth tract treats of knowledge, foreknowledge, and decrees. The distinction drawn in logic between the *necessitas consequentiæ* and *consequentis*, as well as the theological distinction between *præscientia*, *simplicis intelligentiæ*, and *beneplaciti* or *approbationis*, are used to solve the difficulties in this connection. In the sixteenth tract practical foreknowledge, predestination, is discussed, and,—by means of a distinction between *præparatio*, *gratia*, and *gloria*,—the opinions of those who deny all merit to man, and of those who assert it are reconciled. The *reprobatio*, as the opposite of *prædestinatio* and the relation of the two are considered at the close. The next tract discusses providence and fate. By the latter is understood the causal relation of all movable things, which is established by the former. All except the immediate acts of God are subject to this; but it does not exclude other secondary causes, for instance, the free will. The eighteenth tract announces a discussion of the way in which God exists in things, the way in which things exist in God having formed the subject of the previous tracts. The omnipresence of God is defined as meaning that He is *essentialiter*, *præsentialiter*, and *potentialiter* in all things. The relation of the angels to space is next considered; and at this point, since philosophers can say little on the subject, the aid of the *Sancti*, especially of the Areopagite, is invoked. The nineteenth tract treats of the omnipotence of God, which can do everything that shows might, and that does not, as evil does, show weakness. Although an opponent of those who teach that God can do only what He actually does, Albert warns against emphasizing the omnipotence of God at the expense of His goodness and wisdom, by which His actions are determined. The investigations as to whether God can do the impossible, are in part very subtile. The last tract of the first book discusses the will of God, which is limited to

the good, that actually was, or is, or is to be, while His knowledge embraces everything, good and bad, actual and possible, and His power everything good, the possible as well as the actual. The will of God is groundless, not determined. In it *thelesis* (θέλησις) and *vulisis* (βούλησις) are distinguished. It cannot be withstood; and if it appears that it can, it is to be shown that it is not so by means of the distinction between the absolute and conditioned will, and especially by the distinction between the will itself and the revelation of it. In the latter, the *signum voluntatis*, five species are distinguished, which the verse (?)

*Præcipit et prohibet, consulit, impedit et implet*

expresses. Each of these contains again subordinate species, since the *præceptio* can be partly *executoria*, partly *probatoria*, and partly *instructoria*.

4. The second part of the *Summa theologiæ* corresponds to the second book of the *Sentences*; and in the first tract a remark, which Lombard makes in censure of the errors of philosophers, is followed by an extended polemic against them. Aristotle is also accused of error in respect to the eternity of the world, since his teaching would lead to the doctrine that it could not have originated naturally. Moses Maimonides' book is often cited as *Dux neutrorum*, and severely criticized. In the three following tracts the angels are considered. They are defined as composed, not of *materia* and *forma*, but nevertheless of the *quod sunt* and *quo sunt*, and in so far of *materiale* and *formale*. The nine orders of the heavenly hierarchy are drawn from the authority of the Saints, since philosophy has nothing to say in regard to them. The time and place of their creation, their properties, their personality, which rests, not indeed upon any particular matter, but upon a *materiale*, the *quod est* of the angel, and reveals itself as a union, not, to be sure, of accidents, but nevertheless of properties—these and many other questions are considered. In the fifth tract, the fall of the angels is discussed. It was caused by the longing for more perfect blessedness, that is, more perfect likeness to God, therefore by ambition, which results in pangs of conscience, and thus gives rise to the *synderesis*. The sixth tract considers the power of the angels, and the relations of rank among them; the seventh, the demoniacal temptations, of which six different species are given. The

eighth tract treats *de miraculo et mirabili*, and defines the former as proceeding from the will of God, and taking place above and against the ordinary course of nature; the *mirabilia*, on the other hand, are accelerations of the processes of nature, which magicians pretend to be miracles. The object of miracles is to awaken belief; their condition is faith. The ninth and tenth tracts discuss the angels again, their office as messengers and guards, as well as their familiar nine orders. The eleventh takes up the subject of the six days' work, which is what the creation,—really accomplished in a moment,—appears to be to the spectator. The expectation with which the angels await the fulfilment is their *cognitio matutina*; their praises of the accomplished work are their *cognitio vespertina*, and hence the account which Moses receives speaks of evening and morning. Since all was created at once, the chaotic state was the primitive, and was followed by acts of separation. Although Albert unites the doctrine of the nine heavens with the Mosaic account of the creation, making the crystal heaven the waters above the firmament, etc., he nevertheless cannot help confessing that peripatetic philosophy teaches much whose acceptance is forbidden by the Church. The belief in the pre-existence of matter, the identification of the stellar spirits with the angels, etc., he rebukes severely. The twelfth tract considers the creation of man from the side of the soul. The various definitions of the soul are discussed, and those of Aristotle are found insufficient, although all that concerns the relation of its chief powers is accepted. The soul, composed of *esse* (or *quo est*) and *quod est*, is, since not absolutely simple, a *totum potestativum*. Even if it is not a complete *imago Dei*, but only *ad imaginem*, it nevertheless shows more than *vestigium Dei*. The soul is not formed out of God, nor out of any matter whatever, but is created from nothing. The acceptance of the second error is due to the idea that individuality can be rescued only by giving it a material basis. It is forgotten in this connection that the real ground of individual being lies in the fact that *quod est id quod est*, and that strictly speaking, even in material things, the *hic* and *nunc* are predicated by it. Traducianism, transmigration of souls, and pre-existence are combated, and it is shown that God, notwithstanding His rest (from the creation of new *genera*) directly creates individual souls. The formal ground of man's creation is the fact

that it is possible for a likeness of God to be produced ; its end, knowledge and enjoyment of God ; its subordinate object, compensation for the fallen angels. *Sensualitas* and *calor naturalis*, from the side of the body, and the *spiritus phantasticus*, or *vivificus*, from the side of the soul, are given as the bonds of union between the two ; and afterwards the entire controversy with the Averroists (*vid. supra*, § 200, 6) is repeated, and it is maintained that the soul is *tota in toto corpore*, which may be easily reconciled with the assignment of its functions to certain organs.

5. With the fourteenth tract Albert turns to the subject of Sin. He considers first man before the fall, and proposes a number of questions as to what would have happened if man had not fallen. The further investigations upon the *liberum arbitrium* distinguish in it the two elements *ratio* and *voluntas*—the latter as *causa sui*, or as *sibi ipsa causa, agi et cogi non potest*. All previous definitions of the *liberum arbitrium* Albert attempts to reconcile with his opinion. The fifteenth tract also, whose subject is the natural powers of the soul, is devoted chiefly to free-will ; and it is maintained that the latter cannot be lost, even in a condition of sin. The sixteenth tract, which treats of Grace, forms a supplement, and contains under this title, not only the distinction between prevenient and co-operant grace, and between *gratis data* and *gratium faciens*, but also the conception of conscience in its two steps, *synderesis* and *conscientia*, as well as the division of the virtues into *virtutes acquisitæ* (four cardinal) and *infusæ* (three theological virtues). The seventeenth tract discusses original sin. The *peccatum originale originans*, where the *persona naturam corrumpit*, is distinguished from the *pecc. orig. originatum*, where the matter is reversed. Casuistical questions are then proposed, as, for instance, What if Eve alone had sinned ? Finally, the *libido* (*fames*) is defined as punishment and sin at the same time ; and the question as to how the permissive will of God is related to it, is made the subject of investigation. The propagation of evil desire from him in whom all men existed bodily, to his posterity, is considered in detail, as well as its partial disappearance in the Saints, and its total destruction in the blessed Virgin. The eighteenth tract treats of the *peccatum actuale*, its divisions, the distinction between the *p. mortale* and *veniale*, the seven principal sins, and those derived from them. The nineteenth

discusses sins of omission ; the twentieth, sins in words ; the twenty-first, distrust and partiality in forming judgments ; the twenty-second, the roots of sin. The view that the motive of action alone is to be considered, is combated. The twenty-third tract takes up the sin against the Holy Spirit, the continued sin of malice ; the twenty-fourth, the power of sinning. In so far as power belongs to sin, it comes from God ; in so far as it is sin, it does not. With this tract the work closes.

6. The *Summa de creaturis* (vol. 19 of Albert's Complete Works) is in its *first* section a recension, earlier in date, and for the most part briefer, of that which is treated in the first eleven tracts of the second part of the *Summa theologiae*. There is a difference however in the fact that the parallelism with Lombard is less conspicuous. In four tracts the four *coaequævis* (already so called by Bede), matter, time, heaven, and angels are considered. They are not, indeed, eternal, but are everlasting ; and one of them, matter, is designated as the *inchoatio formæ*, because it contains in itself all forms with the exception of the human soul, which is poured into the previously organized body at the moment of its creation. These forms are drawn out of matter through the four principles, warmth, cold, dryness, and moisture. The fact that Albert here identifies the angels with the stellar intelligences may be cited as an instance of a real difference between his early and later views. The *second* part of the *Summa creaturarum* treats of man ; and its eighty-six questions, which consider man's *status in se ipso*, discuss in detail what the *Summa theol.* II., tract. 12, 13, and the work *De anima* had developed more precisely in regard to the senses and the intellect. This is followed by *de habitaculo hominis*, where Paradise and the present order of the world are considered. The latter will probably not be disturbed by the condemnation of sinners.

### § 202.

Although Albert does not succeed in bringing all the points of his theology into such an agreement with peripatetic teaching that every reader must accept it as demonstrated, it would nevertheless be an injustice to him to suppose that the remaining differences brought him into conscious contradiction with himself, or even led him into dishonourable accommodation. He is the most honourable Catholic, and at the same time an



honourable Aristotelian. When the discrepancy is too great, he seeks to remove it by a separation of the theological and philosophical provinces; as, for instance, when he says that philosophers must look upon the world as an emanation from necessary being through the agency of the highest intelligence, while theologians, on the contrary, must regard it as it originates through the fact that God first creates the two elements heaven and earth, that is the spiritual and the corporeal; and again when he speaks in numerous passages reprovingly of *theologizare* in metaphysical questions, and finally whenever he shows a tendency to ascribe to theology a dominantly practical character, on account of its constant reference to blessedness. His sentence: *Sciendum, quod Augustino in his quæ sunt de fide et moribus, plus quam Philosophis credendum est si dissentiunt. Sed si de medicina loqueretur plus ego crederem Galeno vel Hippocrati, et si de naturis rerum loquatur credo Aristoteli plus* . . . (Sent., ii., dist. 13, art. 2), was a sure canon for him. He does not indeed decide whether the doctrine of the State belongs to the *moribus*, in regard to which Augustine is entitled to the last word, and whether the doctrine of the intelligences and of the spirits belongs to the *fides*, or to the doctrine *de naturis*, where Aristotle is the final authority. The fact that Albert, although always filled with glowing piety, had devoted himself first to secular studies alone, and only afterwards to theology, is the reason why the stream of his knowledge, like many a stream into which a tributary flows, appears bi-colored. The fusion can be much more complete where the idea exists from the beginning that everything, and therefore also the teachings of the philosophers, is to be studied only in the interest of theology and for ecclesiastical ends. If it should happen in consequence that in many points the Aristotelians were interpreted less according to their own meaning, the transformation of their teaching will nevertheless not bring the one who undertakes that transformation into the difficult position of the *persona duplex*. This is the reason not only why the Church has placed St. Thomas above the blessed Albert, but also why an undeserved superiority over his master is often assigned to him by philosophical writers. Bonaventura supplemented that which had been taught by Alexander of Hales. In the case of Albert this was not necessary. All that was needed was that the two elements which were united in him

should be more intimately interwoven. This actually took place through the agency of Thomas.

### § 203.

#### THOMAS.

Dr. Karl Werner : *Der heilige Thomas von Aquino*. 3 Bde. Regensb., 1858.

I. THOMAS, son of Laudolf, Count of AQUINO, and Lord of Loretto and Baleastro, was born in 1227 in the castle at Roccasicca. In his sixteenth year, against the will of his parents, he entered the Dominican Order, by which he was directed to Albert for theological instruction. The Master, who early recognised his genius, clung to him with touching affection which was never disturbed by jealousy. In the year 1245 Thomas went with him to Paris, and after his return, in the year 1248, became second teacher and *magister studentium* in the school at Cologne. In addition to his especial work, the interpretation of Scripture and of the *Sentences*, he was busied also with philosophical studies, a fact which is proved by the essays, *De ente et essentia* and *De principio naturæ*, which were written at that time. Four years later he was sent to Paris to take the degree of Doctor of Theology, and opened his lectures there as Baccalaureus in the midst of the greatest applause. The strife between his Order and the University hindered his promotion, which did not take place until 1257, after he had written several closely connected theological treatises. In Anagni he fought at Albert's side in defence of his Order ; and his tract in reply to William of St. Amour's work, *De periculis novissimi temporis*, is regarded by many as only a reproduction of what Albert had said there. He wrote again later upon the same subject, the accusations against the Mendicant Orders. On the 23rd of October, 1257, he received simultaneously with his intimate friend Bonaventura (*vid. supra*, § 197), the degree of Doctor of the Paris University, and laboured for a year as *regius primarius* of the Order, and afterwards with the other doctors in the professor's chair. His *Quæstiones quod libetica et disputata*, some commentaries upon the Scriptures, and his uncompleted *Compendium theologiæ* belong to this time. The *Summa philosophica contra gentiles* was also begun here, but was completed after he had been called to Italy by the Pope. There, in one

place after another, he taught and laboured for the sake of awakening the Christian life within his Order as well as outside of it. In company with others he was very active in the introduction of the festival of Corpus Christi. To this time belong also the translations of Aristotle from the Greek, which were made at his suggestion, and which became the basis of his commentaries. He spent several years in Bologna, where he completed the *Catena aurea* and began his principal theological work, the *Summa theologiae*. He returned thither again after a short stay in Paris, but soon transferred his labours to Naples. Called to the Council of Lyons, he died on the way thither, in the Cistercian monastery Fossa Nuova, in the neighbourhood of Terracina, on the 7th of March, 1274. The report arose early that he had been poisoned by Carl of Anjou. He was canonized on the 18th of July, 1323. His contemporaries had already honoured him with the title of *Doctor angelicus*. After several of his writings had been printed separately, a complete edition of his works in 17 folio volumes was published in Rome in 1570, at the command of Pius V. The Venetian edition of 1592 is a reprint of this. The edition of Morelles, Antwerp, 1612, has in addition an eighteenth volume, which contains several previously unpublished, but perhaps also some unguene, writings. The Paris edition of 1660 has twenty-three, the Venetian edition of 1787 twenty-eight volumes in quarto. The edition which has been appearing in Parma since 1852, I have not seen.

2. In view of the introductory works contributing to the understanding of Aristotle which Thomas found already written by Albert, his commentaries upon that philosopher have not the epoch-making significance which belongs to those of his master. Their chief value lies in the fact that he makes use of better (only Græco-Latin) translations, which enable him to avoid many misunderstandings that Albert could not escape, and in the fact that the reader can always see what he found in the text and what he himself added, since (like Averroës) he always gives the entire Aristotelian text in the translation, and then subjoins the commentary. In the method of Albert, which is copied from Avicenna, this is difficult, often impossible. Besides, Thomas's mode of presentation is far better, and his Latin much purer than that of his master. In the Antwerp edition the *first* volume contains the uncompleted

commentary upon the *Perihermeneia* and upon the *Analytics*, the *second* the commentary upon the *Physics*, the incomplete one upon *De cælo*, as well as that upon *De gen. et corr.* The *third* volume contains the commentaries on *De meteoris* on *De anima* and on *Parv. natural.*, the last incomplete. The *fourth* contains that on the *Metaphysics*, and on the *Liber de causis*. The original work *De ente et essentia*, which in other editions is given as No. 30 among his *Opuscula*, is here quite peculiarly placed among the commentaries. This might better have been done with No. 48 of the *Opuscula*, the *Totius Aristotelis logica summa*, which agrees perfectly with the contents of the first volume, and besides is denied by many to have been written by Thomas, and ascribed to Herveus Natalis (*vid. infra*, § 204, 3). Prantl calls attention to one passage which betrays a Spanish author. The *fifth* part contains the expositions of the *Ethics* and of the *Politics*. In these commentaries as well as in those upon the *Sentences* of Lombard, which fill the *sixth* and *seventh* volumes, and in the abridged second commentary in the *seventeenth* volume, Thomas shows only formal variations from Albert, all of which are however improvements, since the carrying back of the investigation to a smaller number of principal Questions simplifies the review of the whole. Since the exegetical writings of Thomas upon the Old and New Testaments (vols. 13–16 and 18) do not belong here, the presentation of his teachings must be drawn chiefly from his *Summa philosophica* or *Contra Gentiles* in the *ninth* volume, his *Summa theologia* (vols. 10–12) and his *Opuscula* (vol. 17). The *Quæstiones disputatæ* or *Quodlibetales* also contain some things which are of interest for his philosophical standpoint.

3. The chasm between theology and philosophy is much narrower with Thomas than with Albert, because he emphasizes more strongly than the latter the theoretical element in theology, and identifies blessedness with the knowledge of the truth. God, as the real truth, is the chief object of all knowledge, of theology therefore as well as of philosophy. Although what concerns God cannot be learned by the mere reason, since Trinity, Incarnation, etc., go beyond reason, it is nevertheless possible, even in respect to these points, to show by means of the reason that they are not irrational. For other points there are direct proofs of reason : positive and negative in regard to the existence of God (*quia est*), negative in regard

to his nature (*quid est*). Even these demonstrable things are also revealed, in order that the weak and the uneducated may be sure of them. In the proofs for the doctrines of faith, a difference must be made, according as a believer or an unbeliever is addressed. Appeals to authority and grounds of probability, which are admissible with the believer, would not do for the unbeliever, for the former would not help at all, and the latter would only make him distrustful toward a thing thus defended. It is therefore to be proved from reason and philosophy alone that the doctrines of the Church have to fear the attacks of neither. This is the end which Thomas proposes to himself in the work from which all these points have been drawn, and which rightly bears the three titles *De veritate catholica*, *Summa philosophica* and *Ad gentiles*, according as its contents, its method, or the public to whom it is addressed is thought of. In the *Proœmium* to the first book Thomas himself announces, as the course which he is to follow, the investigation first of what belongs to God in Himself, then of the progress of the creature from Him, and finally of its return to God. The first three books discuss only that which the human reason is able to investigate. As a supplement to this, the fourth book considers the points of doctrine which go beyond the reason.

4. The first book, containing 102 chapters, opposes first those who declare, as Anselm does in his ontological demonstration, that the existence of God needs no proofs, and then those who hold it to be incapable of proof, and maintains that from the fact of motion (*a posteriori* or *per posteriora*) an original Unmoved must be concluded. (The *Summa theolog.* adds to this four other proofs.) Motion first of all and then, *via remotionis*, all other limits are excluded from this original, and thus its absolute simplicity results, in virtue of which not only no opposition of matter and form, but also none of *essentia* and *existentia* are to be constituted in God. Every determination from without is thereby excluded from God. It is then remarked that no predicate can be ascribed to us and to God *univoce*, all only *analogice*; and it is afterwards shown that God is neither substance nor accidents, neither genus nor species, nor *individuum*; that His nature is one with His knowledge; that His self-knowledge and His knowledge of things are one act; that from this knowledge nothing is excluded, not even therefore the material, the accidental, the

evil. Since to know a thing as good is the same as to will it, God must will His own nature, but at the same time also things other than Himself. The difference between the two is, that the former is unconditionally, the latter conditionally (*ex suppositione*) necessary. That which is in itself impossible, that which is contradictory, God cannot will. The ultimate ground of His willing is He Himself, who is the good, and therefore God wills for the sake of the good. He does not will for the sake of something good, which He wishes to reach for the sake of gaining it, but He wills in order to dispense good. After an investigation as to whether and in how far joy, love, etc., are to be predicated of God, the book closes with the blessedness or absolute self-satisfaction of God.

5. The *second* book, containing 101 chapters, begins with the apparent contradictions between theology and philosophy in regard to eschatology. The entirely different standpoints of the two are the reasons for the difficulty. Philosophy asks always what things are, theology, on the contrary, whence they come; and therefore the former leads to the knowledge of God, the latter proceeds from it. For this reason the philosopher is obliged to pass over a great deal that is very important to the theologian, and *vice versâ*. There is no more of a contradiction in this than in the way in which the geometrician and the physicist speak of surfaces and lines. The creation of things, their manifoldness and their constitution, are given as the principal subjects of the book; and then the power of God is taken up, and from this is drawn the truth that God created things out of nothing, inasmuch as the *materia prima*, this possibility of all things, is the first work of God. Since the creation is thus no mere motion or change, it is absurd to oppose it with arguments drawn from the conception of change. That which is said by Thomas in his work *De substantiis separatis* (*Opusc.*, 15) against the Platonic doctrine of emanation, according to which things have their being from *natura*, their life from the *anima*, and their knowledge from the *intelligentia*, may be looked upon as a supplement to this polemic against the dualism which sees in God at most only the director or sculptor of things. The opinions of Dionysius the Areopagite, as a representative of the true doctrine of creation, are contrasted with the views which Albert, in his work *De caus. et proc. univ.* (*vid. supra*, § 200, 9), had closely approached. This, however,

does not prevent Thomas from calling the creation a *simplex emanatio* (*Phys.* viii.), in opposition to the *Fieri est mutari* of Averroës. Aristotle is said to have erred in maintaining the eternity of motion, but it is asserted that he never denied creation from nothing. In the *Summa philosophia* Thomas expresses himself more briefly. The activity of God is often compared with that of an artist, in accordance with the propositions of the first book, which state that His activity is neither compelled by any force from without, nor, on the other hand, is merely arbitrary. God alone prescribes Himself limits in the *mensura, numerus, et pondus* according to which He orders everything. It cannot be said that He can do only what He actually does, for He is obliged to do only this. When a thing whose creation does not rest upon unconditioned necessity, has been once created, such necessity may be asserted of many other things; for instance, it is necessary that that which is composed of opposites should die, that the absolutely immaterial cannot perish, etc. The arguments for the eternity of the world are refuted; and the objection that the eternal will of God cannot operate in time, is answered by the observation that even a physician can decide to-day that an operation shall be performed to-morrow. In the same manner, before their temporal existence, things lay in the Divine thought in an eternal way as ideas. These ideas constitute the forms or quiddities in actual things; and finally, the understanding abstracts them,—as that which is general and common to all things, and the only direct object of our knowledge,—from the things themselves; and thus realism, conceptualism, and nominalism are all three right. The agreement of things with the eternal ideas constitutes the truth of the things; the agreement of our thoughts with the things constitutes the truth of our thoughts. In passing over to the second main point, the manifoldness of things (chap. 39–44), the views of those are first combated who deduce this manifoldness from accident, as Democritus; from material differences, as Anaxagoras; from opposites, as Empedocles, the Pythagoreans, and Manichæans; from principles subordinated to the Deity, as Avicenna; from the activity of an angel, who divides matter, as some new heretics; or finally from previous sin, as Origen. The true cause of the differences between things is then taken up. It is said to lie in the fact that only an endless manifoldness can be the copy of

the Divine perfection, and can actualize the unlimited number of possibilities which exist in matter. With the forty-fifth chapter the third principal point is taken up—the nature of different things. There were needed first intellectual, free, immaterial natures, which should be not only forms but actual substances, and which should be distinguished from other substances by the fact that they do not consist of form and matter, and from God by the fact that in them the *esse* and the *quod est*, that is the *actus* and the *potentia*, are distinct. The continuation of the analysis of this important conception is found in the earlier work, *De ente et essentia*, with which the uncompleted *De substantiis separatis* may be compared. It is there shown that that which is the *materia* in the complex substance,—for instance in man,—is, in the intellectual substance, that which,—as the *quod est*, as *essentia*, as *natura*, or again as *quiditas*,—is opposed to the *esse* or *quo est*, and which the creature has from itself or from nothing, while it has its *esse* from God. In the former connection therefore, it may be called the unconceived, and in so far absolute, in the latter nonentity; so that the intelligence may be characterized as limited upwards, as limitless downwards. The book *De causis* expresses itself in the same manner. In the fifty-fourth chapter of the *Summa* the word *substantia* is used instead of *essentia*. The imperishability of the intelligences is deduced, as in the treatises named above, from the absence of matter. In the same way their knowledge is not conditioned by images of material things, but on the contrary they know themselves and things, without being stimulated to it from without. Thomas ascribes to the highest intelligences, the angels, the moving of the heavenly bodies as their first business. He seeks then to prove in a most subtle way how it is possible that a species of intellectual substances should be united with a body as its animating form. He shows further, that the nutritive, sensitive, and thinking soul is to be thought of as one, and then proceeds to the refutation of Averroës' doctrine of the unity of the human understanding. The unity of the various functions of the soul is deduced, as Thomas expressly states in his theological *Summa* (i., qu. 76. art. 3, § 4), from a general principle expressed by the formula "*unitas forma*," which became one of the watch-words of his school. In the passage referred to he formulates this principle as follows: *Nihil est simpliciter unum nisi per formam*



*unam per quam habet res esse*, and deduces from it among other things the fact that it is one and the same form by which a thing is a living thing and by which it is a man. Otherwise it would be necessary to look upon it as a *unum per accidens*. The tract *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas* (*Opusc.*, 16) serves as a continuation of chaps. 59 ff. of the *Summa*. In both places Thomas seeks to refute Averroës by means of Aristotle, according to whose doctrines, rightly understood, the *intellectus possibilis*, that is, the capacity of actively seizing the forms, is a part of the soul and therefore individually determined, but at the same time immortal. The opinions of others besides Averroës are combated in the *Summa*; of those who, in agreement with Galen, regard the soul as a temperament, or, like the Pythagoreans, consider it a harmony, or, with Democritus, hold it to be corporeal; or of those who identify the *intellectus possibilis* with the *imaginatio*. It is then shown how it is conceivable that an actual substance can nevertheless be the form of a body and thereby go beyond its union with the body, so that the latter becomes a complete substance only by the addition of the former, while at the same time the substance is not *materia immersa vel a materia totaliter comprehensa*. Aristotle's doctrine, that an intelligence animates the heavens, may perhaps be an error, but it proves that he saw no contradiction in the view that a substance may be the form of a body. Of course by its union with the body the knowledge of the intelligence so united is conditioned corporeally, begins with sensuous observations, needs phantasms, etc., all of which is not the case with the higher intelligences. The most complete presentation of how the various steps of sense,—the passive understanding, which receives the forms of material things, and finally the active understanding, which transforms them and maintains them in their purity,—are necessary to knowledge, is found in the treatise *De potentiis animæ* (*Opusc.*, 43), whose authenticity it is true is questioned. It is asserted in the *Summa* that the active understanding as well as the *intellectus possibilis* is a part of the soul, which fills the whole body, and is personally determined. Otherwise man would be responsible neither for his thoughts, the products of the *intellectus speculativus*, nor for his acts, the products of the *intellectus practicus*; and much contained in Aristotle would be quite incomprehensible. The immortality of the human

soul follows from this, as well as the mortality of the animal soul. It is true that memory in a proper sense can hardly be attributed to the soul after death. The pre-existence of the soul, its emanation from the divine substance, its propagation by the parents, are all rejected. It is created and bestowed upon the organized matter. An intelligence as (substantial) form can be united only with a human body, therefore there are no demons with ethereal bodies, but there are bodiless intelligences. Since they lack materiality they cannot be individuals belonging to a species or genus, but each forms a species by itself. This leads to the *Principium individuationis*, which Thomas discusses in the treatises already mentioned and also in an essay especially devoted to the subject (*Opusc.*, 29). This problem assumes a prominent position now that the alternative between *ante res* and *post res* has lost its significance. In its solution Thomas follows his master closely, diverging from him only in fixing more exactly what had been left by Albert somewhat indefinite, owing to his use of different expressions. To every *ens*, except the absolutely simple being, two elements belong, the *esse* or *quo est* and the *essentia* or *quod est*. The former is *actus*, the latter *potentia* (*passiva*). In material beings they are *forma* and *materia*, which are united to the *ens* or the *substantia* as specific difference and genus. The *materia prima* gives, in union with the first forms, the especial material; for instance, the elements, which can themselves become again bearers of forms which they are adapted to receive. If the material which is adapted to receive a particular form is only great enough to receive this form a single time, there will be but one individual of this species, as is the case for instance with the sun. It is different when the form is united with more than one part of the material adapted to receive it. There arises then a multiplicity of individuals of the same species, so that this participation (*quantitas*) is the ground, and the temporal and spatial determinateness of the parts of the material (*materia signata per hic et nunc*) is the principle of individuality. When others, in opposition to this doctrine of Albert and Thomas, desired to put the principle of individuality in the form, Bonaventura (*vid.* § 197), a friend of partisans of both views, sought a middle course. He taught that matter *and* form constitute the individual, as the ground of differences in impressions lies neither in the

wax nor in the seal, but in the combination of the two. Thomas taught otherwise. According to him, it is *hæc caro hæc ossa*, which, in Socrates, make of man in general an individual man. It is not thereby said that individuality ceases when the union with the body comes to an end. Since in these numerically different individuals not only the *esse* is a product, as in the case of the intelligences, but also their *quiditas* is an *a materia signata receptum*, it cannot be said of them, as above of the angels, that they are limited only upwards; they are limited both upwards and downwards. The statement that matter (designated now as *signata* and again as *quanta*) individualizes, became a second watch-word of the school of Thomas, and was attacked by his opponents as severely as the phrase *unitas formæ*. It appears that the latter was combated chiefly in Oxford, while the Thomistic *principium individui* was opposed in Paris, where the Bishop, Stephen Tempier, constituted himself the organ of a strict censorship over it. According to what was stated in §§ 151 and 194 to be the nature of scholasticism in general and of Aristotelian scholasticism in particular, its internal strifes can be carried on only in such a way that the appeal is always made to ecclesiastical dogma, which indeed reason and peripatetic philosophy in the present case subserve. It is quite in order for the Oxford teachers to urge against the *unitas formæ* the consideration that the body of Christ lying separated from His soul in the grave would then be no longer body, or for the Parisians to maintain, in opposition to the *principium individui*, that the angels would not be individuals if that principle were accepted. To admit the existence of scholasticism and yet to complain of its conduct, is foolish. It is indeed (to-day) unphilosophical to appeal to dogma in questions of logic, as it would be (to-day) madness to undertake a crusade. And nevertheless we do not consider the historian very rational who, in recounting the crusades, complains because its heroes did not think and act as a rational man of to-day would think and act. After what has been said in § 180, the grouping of these two things is more than a mere comparison.

6. The *third* book, in 163 chapters, shows how God is the end of all things, and discusses His government of the world, that is, of the complex of temporal things. All action has a good as its end, and therefore evil as such cannot be willed. As privation, it has neither complete reality nor a positive

ground, and hence much less an absolute principle as its author. The ultimate end after which everything strives is the ground of all things, God ; and in the universal struggle to become like Him there is produced a series of steps, in which each is the goal of the preceding, and man is the goal of all things that are subject to propagation. In higher natures this struggle for likeness with God becomes a thirst for knowledge of one's self and of God. The highest blessedness consists in knowledge, not indeed in the immediate knowledge of all men, nor in demonstrative knowledge, nor in belief founded upon authority, nor in speculative knowledge, but in that which goes beyond them all and is fully attained only in the future life. Here below man participates in this contemplation of God, which is eternal life, only in part, and as a result of divine illumination. The consideration of the preservation of the world is followed by the consideration of its government. The divine activity is said not to exclude the self-activity of things. On the contrary, God's goodness has given to the latter a mark of similarity to Himself, in that they too may exercise causality. Therefore the course of nature, accident, and free-will are reconcilable with the government of God, since He uses for this secondary causes, especially freely acting creatures, angels, etc., as well as the influences of the heavenly bodies. The crossing of secondary causes produces accidents which are without existence only for the first cause. Within the general order of the universe subordinate systems of causes and effects must be conceived, within which, for instance, events happen only in answer to the prayer of faith, not otherwise, without altering the order of the world as a whole. That God can never act against His own counsel is self-evident ; nor can He act contrary to nature. Miracles therefore are only phenomena which nature alone cannot produce. The government of the world is related differently to rational and irrational creatures. To the former are given laws, the latter are compelled by laws ; the former are treated as ends, the latter as means. Love to God and to one's neighbour forms the essential content of the law. Since this is the end of man, the natural and divine laws coincide, and it is false to base what is right only upon divine ordinance and not upon nature. The determination with which Thomas opposes those who maintain that a thing is good because God has commanded it and not *vice versa*, is a result of his views of the will which, in God as well as in

man, has knowledge as its presupposition and its basis. In this doctrine he left his school a third watch-word : that the good is good *per se*, and not *ex institutione*. The *perseitas boni* became a new mark of his followers. As to the details of his ethics, property and marriage are permitted by natural and divine laws, but poverty and celibacy are not for that reason to be looked upon as inferior, much less to be scoffed at. Reward and punishment, like merit and guilt, have various degrees. Punishment threatened by God in part as satisfaction, in part as a warning, may be exercised by the authorities as servants of God. The one who opposes capital punishment because it excludes reformation, forgets that the criminal who is not affected by the proclamation of the death sentence will scarcely reform himself, and overlooks the fact that in this case the danger to the whole is certain while the benefit to the individual is very questionable. Power to fulfil the law is given by grace, which is not compulsory, but at the same time cannot be earned. It makes us acceptable to God and works in us belief and hope of blessedness ; upon it depends the gift of perseverance, as well as freedom from sin, which is possible even for one who has fallen from grace. Although a man can be converted only through grace, it is nevertheless his own fault if he is not converted, as a person who shuts his eyes is to blame for not seeing that which cannot be seen without light. Only in individual cases are the eyes of these also opened by prevenient grace, and they are the predestinated or elect.

7. The *fourth* book, in 97 chapters, repeats the order of the first three, defending against the objections of opponents that which is above our reasons and has been revealed to us in regard to the nature of God (chap. 2-26), the works of God (chap. 27-28), and the chief end of man (chap. 79-97). Accordingly, in connection with the Trinity the errors are first refuted exegetically, and then in chap. 11 it is shown that the predicates of God discovered by the reason alone and given in the first book, lead to the result, that if God thinks Himself, the products of this thinking must be the eternal Word, the likeness of God and the original type of all things, in which they all as eternal pre-exist (*quod factum est in eo vita erat*), and through which they are revealed to the ones thinking. In the same way the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is first considered exegetically, and then it is shown that as soon as God is con-

ceived as willing it must rationally be admitted that He must exist as love towards Himself, and thus also as Holy Spirit, who works in us love, just as the Son produces knowledge. Reference is also made to the traces of trinity in things, and to its image in man. Among the works of God of which we could not gain a knowledge by mere reason the incarnation occupies the first place. Since this removes the effects of the fall, Thomas is confident that it is conditioned by sin, and therefore would not have taken place had there been no sin. When, however, he at the same time calls it the goal of creation, in which *quadam circulatione perfectio rerum concluditur*, sin appears clearly as a condition of the highest end, as *felix culpa*. He next combats with exegetical weapons the errors of those who reject with Plotinus the divine nature in Christ, or with Valentinus and the Manichæans, deny Him a human body, or empty the latter of a human soul, with Arius and Apollinaris, or express themselves heretically in regard to the union of the two natures, as Nestorius, Eutyches and Macarius had done. The arguments against the Catholic doctrine drawn from reason are then quoted (chap. 40), and refuted (chap. 41-49). In addition, it is directly proved why the essential points in the life of Jesus, His birth from the Virgin, etc., if not unconditionally necessary, are yet adapted to the case. After remarks similar to the preceding have been made in regard to original sin, Thomas returns to this *convenientia* and decides that the dogma of the incarnation contains *neque impossibilia neque incongrua*. The doctrine of the means of grace, which is taken up in chap. 56, forms the transition from the works of God to the exaltation and return of the creatures to God, showing as it does what He contributes towards this exaltation. The distinction between the Old and New Testament Sacraments is then pointed out, and the necessity that there should be seven of the latter is shown. Baptism and confirmation are considered very briefly, the eucharist, and especially transubstantiation, and afterwards the confessional are discussed most fully, and the subject is brought to a close with the sacrament of marriage, in connection with which reference is made to what is said elsewhere. The third section begins with objections against the resurrection, which are refuted. Since the soul is the form of the body and nevertheless immortal, it exists, in its separation from the body, in a condition contrary to its nature, so

that its subsequent re-embodiment is entirely in accordance with reason. The new body is called spiritual, because it will be entirely subordinated to the spirit; but it will not be essentially different from the present body. There can therefore quite well be bodily punishments after death. Immediately after death man receives his personal reward. At the last judgment he is given what is due to him as a member of the whole. The unchangeableness of the will after death explains the fact that many remain in condemnation, although God forgives every penitent. Since man is the end of creation, everything which has served to lead mortal man to immortality must, as unnecessary, come to an end at the close of time. Among these things Thomas reckons the motion of the heavens.

8. The express aim of the *Summa theologica* is to give to beginners in theology a simplified presentation of that which the theologian must know. The work, therefore, from a philosophical point of view, is by no means as important as the *Summa ad Gentiles*. Nevertheless it forms a supplement to the latter, since in the two sections of the second part it treats practical questions which are entirely omitted in the philosophical *Summa*. In the *prima secundæ* the virtues and their opposites are considered in general, in the *secunda secundæ* in detail, partly in and of themselves and partly in various special relations. First the three theological, then the four cardinal virtues are discussed, and all the other virtues follow as their daughters. The first thing to be emphasized is the subordination of the practical to the theoretical. Not only is *visio* put before *delectatio* in the state of blessedness (ii., 1, qu. 4), but in his theory of the will Thomas always maintains that we will a thing only when we have first recognised it as good, but then we cannot do otherwise than will it (*Ibid.*, qu. 17). On this account reason is the lawgiver for the will. It is reason which speaks in conscience, and the latter is thus not incorrectly named after knowledge (*sciens*). It has the threefold function of attribution, of prescription, and of accusation or exculpation (*Ibid.*, qu. 19 and 79). The part of the soul which has desires furnishes to the law prescribed by reason the material for conduct in the passions. Of these love and hate, joy and sorrow, hope and fear are discussed with especial fulness; and it is considered at the same time in how far they have their station in the *pars concupis-*

*cibilis* or *irascibilis*, these two sides of sensibility. The conception of the *habitus* is then explained, and thus all the data in the Aristotelian definition of virtue are given, but nevertheless instead of it an Augustinian definition is adopted and defended (*Ibid.*, qu. 55). The Platonic-Aristotelian *virtutes intellectuales et morales* are designated as the *acquisitæ*, or also as the human virtues, the three theological as the *infusæ* or as the Divine, and among the latter *charitas*, among the former *sapientia* and *justitia* are assigned the first place (*Ibid.*, qu. 62, 65, 68). *Charitas* gives to all the other virtues their proper consecration. They are all supported by the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are seven in number, like the seven principal virtues and vices. After extended discussions of sin and its propagation the author takes up law, the revealed command of reason, which is for the general good and which proceeds from Him whose place it is to care for the whole (*Ibid.*, qu. 90). The eternal law of the government of the world becomes, in the consciousness of the intelligent creature, the *lex naturalis*, the basis of all human or positive laws, whose aim is only to supplement for the general well-being that which the natural law has left undetermined. To these forms of law are to be added the law of God revealed in the Old and New Testaments. Wherever positive laws conflict with the word of God or with the *lex naturalis* they are not binding upon the conscience. In the *secunda secunda*, in connection with the discussion of justice and its activity in law, the relation of positive and natural law is more precisely treated. At first natural law is identified with the *jus gentium*, although it properly has a wider significance, since it is to be extended also to brutes. It is then pointed out that there are certain relations which are not merely legal ones, as for instance the parental and governmental, although those who stand in these relations are from another point of view subjects of law (ii. 2, qu. 57 and 58). To give to every one his due is defined as the principle of all justice. The investigations in regard to the remaining virtues, in regard to the various elements of grace and the mutual relation of the two, differ from those of Alexander and Albert only in the fact that Thomas greatly limits the *liberum arbitrium*, making it only the ability to determine our willing by calling up various considerations which act as motives. But even here it is maintained that the first impulse to this comes from God, and that our prepara-



tion also for the reception of grace is solely a work of grace. Thomas is much less of an indeterminist than Albert.

9. The diligent study of the greatest of all philosophers had led Albert to take an interest in the world, and the same was true of Thomas, except that in his case it was not, as in the case of the former, the world of sense which occupied him, but the moral world, the State. Albert had left the *Politics* of Aristotle unexpounded, and Thomas did the same with his *Natural History*. In physics in general he only repeats what Albert had taught. On the other hand, besides his commentary upon the *Politics* of Aristotle, he wrote many things which bear upon his views of the State. They are to be drawn partly from his theological *Summa* and partly from works devoted especially to the subject. Of the latter the *Eruditio principum* (vol. 17, Antwerp edition), a somewhat unscientific book of instruction for princes, is to be omitted, since it is hardly a work of Thomas himself. The four books *De regimine principum* (*Opusc.*, 20) likewise do not belong wholly to him, for in the third book the death of Adolph of Nassau is mentioned. His followers claim him as the author only of the first two books, and ascribe the others to the Dominican Tholomæus of Lucca (Bartholomæus de Fiodonibus). The principal ideas, which agree well with what is found elsewhere in his works, are as follows: the members of the body constitute a unity only by their submission to a principal organ; the powers of the soul are united only by their subjection to reason; and the parts of the world form one whole only by their subordination to God. In the same way the unity of the State becomes possible only through subjection to a ruling chief. Man's helplessness, social impulse and power of speech all prove him predestined for life in a State. The unity becomes most complete when the ruling head is only one, and the healthy monarchy is the best government, although its abuse, the tyranny, is the worst. This is distinguished from the monarchy by the fact that the ruler seeks his own instead of the common good. Besides, as experience teaches, the danger of tyranny is far greater in aristocracies and democracies, than in a monarchy; and the probability that a violent change will improve matters is always so small that a people does better even under a tyrant to await the help of God, which will come the more surely and quickly the more virtuous the nation is. The aim of the State is to bring its citizens nearer

their highest goal, the condition of blessedness, but the direct care for this has been committed to Christ and to His vicegerent upon earth, to whom, in this respect, even kings are subject. The king therefore has to provide for the arrangement and preservation of all that contributes to the attainment of the great end. This may be comprehended under the single formula: The king is to labour for the maintenance of peace. Nevertheless his calling is still higher, indeed, more godlike, inasmuch as he stands related to the people as the reason is related to the powers of the soul, as God is related to the world. The incomparably greater burdens which rest upon the king give him a right to greater honour and greater forbearance from men, as well as greater reward from God. As God first arranges the world and then preserves it as thus arranged, every king has to do the latter, and whoever first founds a State the former also. The entire second book treats of regulations which are necessary to every State, beginning with attention to the nature of the land, then giving the most minute directions in regard to means of fortification, of communication and of commerce, and closing with the subject of care for religious services.

### § 204.

1. If the number of its partisans and the duration of its existence were to decide the value of a school, none could compare with that of the Albertists, as they were originally called, or THOMISTS, as they were later designated. To the present day there are those who see in Thomas the incarnation of the philosophizing reason. The first scholars and disciples were naturally found within the order to which the teachers belonged. Thomism was declared to be the official philosophy of the Dominican order, which was therefore much incensed with Bishop Tempier of Paris when he granted every one liberty of opinion in relation to this system. If we proceed chronologically, and limit ourselves to the time in which philosophy had not yet advanced beyond Thomas, we must mention first, although conditionally,—

2. VINCENTIUS BELLOVACENSIS (cf. F. Chr. Schlosser: *Vincent von Beauvais*, etc., Frankfort, 1819, 2 vols.). This poly-

mathist is to be named only conditionally, because philosophy interests him only in so far as it is in general a subject of knowledge, and because his work breaks off just where the presentation of the true theology is to begin. He was a Dominican in the monastery of Beauvais, after which he is ordinarily called. After his *Liber gratiæ*, his writings in praise of the Virgin and of John the Evangelist, a work *De Trinitate*, and a handbook for princes of the blood (translated by Schlosser in the work mentioned above), he compiled, at the command of Louis IX., his *Speculum magnum* from the many books which were at his disposal. The work is thus named to distinguish it from his Minor Mirror, in which he had celebrated the beauty and order of the sensible world. It is an encyclopædia of everything which was known or thought to be known at that time, and when compared, for instance, with the works of Johannes Sarisberiensis, the most learned man of the twelfth century, shows the progress which had been made in a hundred years. It is divided into three parts, and should be called, not, as ordinarily, *Speculum quadruplex*, but *triplex*, since the fourth part, the *Speculum morale*, is an appendix of later date. In the Venetian edition of Hermann Lichtenstein (1494), a folio volume is devoted to each of the four *specula*. The edition of Duaci, 1624, also in four folio volumes, reads better. The historical mirror (*Spec. historiale*) shows what the views of that age were in regard to history. It was composed in 1244, and not in 1254 as Schlosser, who makes judicious extracts from the work, incorrectly says. The *Speculum naturale*, which was finished in 1250, is the fullest part. It brings together everything that passed for natural science at that time, and, among a great many other names, very frequently cites the name of Albert. The name of Thomas occurs much more rarely. Scarcely a single name is wanting which was distinguished in the history of the sciences among the ancients, and among Mohammedans, Jews and Christians, down to the author's own day. In addition to the names of individuals he often cites *Auctoritates* (abbreviated in the Venetian edition to *Actor*), which signifies a repertorium, either composed by himself or previously existing, of the nature of the one which was ascribed to Bede (*vid.* § 153). (Among the manuscripts of Santa Croce at Florence is to be found, according to Bandini, *Liber de auctoritatibus Sanctorum editus a Fratre Vincentio Belluacensi Prædicatorum*).—

The doctrinal mirror (*Speculum doctrinale*), which Vincent worked upon until shortly before his death (1264), remains unfinished. The *Spec. naturale* had closed with the misery of sin, and the *Spec. doctrinale* takes up the subject at this point, maintaining that nothing furnishes so much help in this misery as science. The divisions of science are then given. The *trivium*, which embraces the *scientiæ sermocinales*, is followed by practical philosophy, as *Monastica*, *Œconomica*, *Politica*. In the last the entire system of canonical as well as civil law is treated. A discussion of the seven *mechanical* arts follows, and finally the theoretical sciences—physics, mathematics, and theology. In connection with physics, reference is made to the *Spec. naturale*; under mathematics, the whole *quadrivium* is treated; while in the last section only false theology is discussed, the work breaking off at the point where the consideration of true theology was to begin.

3. PETRUS HISPANUS, who was born in the year 1226 and died in 1277 as Pope John XXI., stood in direct connection with the philosophy of Albert and Thomas. His fame is due rather to a translation which he made than to his original works, which were mostly on medical subjects (*Canon medicinæ*, *De problematibus*, *Thesaurus pauperum*). His *Summule*, so called in an old edition printed by Melchior Lotter in Leipsic in 1499, were published by the same man in 1510 under the title *Textus septem tractatum Petri Hispani*, and afterwards innumerable times, either as *Summule logicæ* or as *Septem tractatus Petri Hispani*, and finally as *Tredecim tractatus P. Hispani*, the seventh tract being divided. They are not only, as Ehinger, editor of the *Σύνοψις εἰς τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους λογικὴν* (Wittenb., 1567), has pointed out, in the preface to his work, closely related in their contents to that Synopsis, but are an almost verbal translation of it. The Synopsis is ascribed to the Aristotelian Michael Psellus, who was born in the year 1020. The translation of Peter was not the first, for, some decades previous, the Synopsis had been transformed by W. Shyreswood into a Latin school-book, which still exists in manuscript. Lambert of Auxerre also translated the work, and in a way which seems to show that he as well as Shyreswood had predecessors. The translation of Petrus Hispanus is distinguished from both by its greater literalness. The fact that the *Summule* contain some things which are wanting in

Ehinger's edition of the original does not signify much, for Prantl (*op. cit.* Pt. ii., p. 278), is doubtless right in thinking that these passages also belong to Psellus, and have simply dropped out of the manuscript used by Ehinger. This is of course true only of the passages which are found in the oldest editions of the *Summulæ*, above all of the *Soph. Elench.* and then of the first six chapters in the seventh tract (*De terminonum proprietatibus*, called formerly *Parvis logicalibus*). The fact that in the *Tractatus obligatoriorum* as well as in the *Tract. insolubilium* is found a reference to Buridanus and Marsilius proves that both are of later origin. The edition of Lotter does not contain them, but they are found in an annotated school edition published in Cologne in 1494. It is likewise clear that a number of the other investigations are later additions. The peculiar idea that the *Summulæ* are the original work and the Synopsis the translation, has been completely refuted by Prantl. The most important variation from the original lies in the fact that the *Summulæ logicæ* contain the familiar *voces memoriales*: *Barbara, Celarent*, etc. Even if the person who first employed these terms had before him the Greek words *γράμματα, ἔγραψε*, etc., he nevertheless rendered a service in inventing a notation in which the consonants also signify something. Shyreswood and Lambert, however, use these words as already familiar, and therefore Petrus Hispanus was not the inventor of them, though he is the earliest one to hand them down to us. However that may be, his translation, regarded as his own work, was used for a long time as a school-book, and that not by the Dominicans alone. Upon this school-book was based that method of instruction in logic which was at first called the *via moderna*, or *modernorum*, until it became the only one, having driven out the *via antiqua*, or earlier method, which was not given to grammatical and rhetorical subtleties. We pass by the contents of this mechanical logic, and especially the *suppositiones, syncategoreumata*, etc., of the seventh tract, for we are not giving a history of logic (particularly, since Prantl), and moreover, if we discussed them here, we should repeat ourselves, for they are to be treated, as is most fitting, in connection with William of Occam (*vid.* § 216), who is led by these investigations to important results. Ægidius of Lessines, Bernardus de Trilia, and Bernardus de Gannaco are Thomistic Dominicans of less importance. If HENRY GOETHALS

(Henricus Bonicollus) was actually a Dominican, he is the only one of this Order who really philosophizes, and yet occupies an independent position over against Albert and Thomas. He was born in Muda near Ghent, and died as an archdeacon in Tournai in 1293. He bore the title of *Doctor Solennis*, and taught for a time at the Sorbonne. He is called ordinarily a *Gandavo* or *Gandavensis*, sometimes also *Mudanus*. In addition to his commentaries upon the *Metaphysics* and *Physics* of Aristotle he wrote many things which have been printed, for instance an Appendix to the literary histories of Jerome, Gennadius, and Siegebert, which has been often published, most recently in the *Bibliotheca ecclesiastica* of Fabricius (Hamburg, 1718), under the title *Liber de viris s. de scriptoribus ecclesiasticis*. The most important work from which to form a judgment as to his scientific standpoint is the *Summa questionum ordinarium* (published by Jodocus Badius Ascensius in Paris, in 1520), in which he treats, in the first twenty articles, science in general and theology in particular, and then, down to the seventy-fifth article, with which the work closes, God and His most essential attributes. It is noticeable that he emphasizes more than Thomas does the *liberum arbitrium* in God. The work contains no direct polemics against the latter. But its arrangement and its contents differ considerably from those of the theological *Summa*. Henry wrote also the *Quodlibetica theologica in LL. Sententt.*, which were issued by the same publisher in Paris in 1518. They contain an account of the general disputations, written in part immediately after they were held, in part somewhat later. Fifteen disputations altogether are reported, in which 399 questions were decided. Some of these are verbally identical with those which are answered in the *Summa*. Other quite casuistical questions were evidently caused by particular cases which had arisen. The freedom of choice is emphasized in many places more strongly than in the *Summa*. The *materia prima* is said to have a degree of reality, so that it is not a contradiction to say that matter exists without any form. In the doctrine of the universals (*Quodl.*, 5, qu. 8), Henry shows more of a leaning towards nominalism than Thomas. Although the right of the Popes to remove princes is asserted, regret is expressed that the Church has its own courts of justice (*Quodl.*, 6, qu. 22). —One of the truest followers of Thomistic teaching is HERVEUS of Nedellec (NATALIS). He was a native of Brittany,

and died in the year 1325 as the fourteenth General of the Dominican Order. In his time he had as great a reputation among the Thomists as Jo. Capreolus, the *Princeps Thomistarum*, had a hundred years later. His commentary upon the *Sentences* was printed by Hervey (Venet., 1503). In 1486 appeared *Hervei Natalis Britonis quatuor quodlibeta, Venetiis impressa per Raynaldum de Novimagio Theutonicum*, which was again published in a more complete form in Venice in the year 1513 under the title *Quodlibeta undecim*.

4. Thomas' great reputation however was not confined to his own Order. One of his hearers was Ægidius of Colonna (*de Columna, Romanus, Doctor fundatissimus*), General of the Augustinian (Hermit) Order, who died as Bishop of Bourges in the year 1316. He introduced the teaching of his master among the Augustinians. At the same time he was a very prolific writer. His work *De regimine principum* was written for the son of a French king, and *De renunciatione Papæ* in defence of Boniface VIII. A long list of his works is contained in Trithem. *Script. eccl.* Some of them have been printed, among others *De ente et essentia*, *De mensura angeli*, *De cognitione angeli*, Venet. 1503, and several works on logic which Prantl mentions. His work *De erroribus philosophorum* (published in 1482), as well as many of his *Quodlibeta* (published by Löwen in 1646), condemn Averroës much more severely than Thomas had done. This hostile attitude grew constantly more decided among the Thomists, for the reason that in Paris the number of those who drew upon Averroës in the interest of heterodoxy greatly increased. The Dominicans naturally showed this hatred most. Other clerical and learned bodies also soon showed themselves favourably disposed toward Thomism. Through the agency of Humbert, Abbot of Prulli, it gained an entrance among the Cistercians, and through Siger of Brabant and Godefroy of Fontaines, the Sorbonne was opened to it. To a later period belong Thomas' triumphs among the Jesuits, as well as among the barefooted Carmelites of Spain, who produced those gigantic works of Salamanca and Alcala, the *Census theologicus collegii Salmanticensis*, which expounds in nineteen folio volumes the theological *Summa* of Thomas, and the *Disputationes collegii Complutensis*, which develops in four folios the entire Thomistic system. The third volume of Werner's work (mentioned in § 203) contains an accurate account of the

fortunes of Thomism, accompanied with a rich digest of the literature.

5. The Franciscan Order was the only one which opposed the Dominican in this matter, as it was accustomed to do in other things. It decided against the doctrines of the two great Dominican Aristotelians. Every deviation from its own Alexander and Bonaventura was denounced and looked upon as dangerous. In this sense, for instance, William de la Marre attacks the false doctrines of Thomas in his *Correctorium fratris Thomæ*, but is met with the reply that he has written a *corruptorium*. RICHARD of Middletown (*Ricardus de media valle*), *Minoritanæ familiæ jubar*, as the editor of some of his works has called him, has the greatest scientific importance among the Franciscans of this time. His commentary upon Lombard (*Super quatuor libros Sententiarum*, Brixiae, 1591) and his *Quodlibeta* (*ibid.*) show uncommon shrewdness. In almost all the points in which Duns Scotus (*vid.* § 214) later opposed the Thomists, Richard of Middletown appears as his predecessor. For instance, in the fact that he emphasizes more strongly the practical character of theology (*Prolog.*, qu. 4); and again in the fact that he puts the principle of individuality not in matter, but in something added to it (ii., dist. 3, Art. v.), although, to be sure, he wishes to regard this as a negative, as the exclusion of participation; further, in the emphasis which he lays upon the unlimited pleasure in the will of God, as well as in that of man, as a result of which much, because dependent only upon the will of God, is withdrawn from philosophical demonstration (*Fidei sacramentum a philosophicis argumentis liberum est*, he says, iii. dist. 22, Art. v., Qu. 2). The circumstance, too, that the later definitions of the Church are respected almost more than the utterances of the Bible, appears an approach to the method used somewhat later by Duns Scotus. The sinlessness of the Virgin is not yet conceived as a consequence of *conceptio immaculata*, but of *sanctificatio antequam de utero nata esset*. This sanctification in the mother's womb is said to have taken place immediately after the *infusio animæ* (iii. dist. 3, Art. i., Qu. 2). It is clearly only a short step to what Duns Scotus asserts. Richard appears to have lived until the end of the thirteenth century. Duns Scotus refers to him frequently, especially in his commentary on the fourth book of the *Sentences*, because at this point Richard had shown his strength.



## § 205.

The promise of Erigena (*vid. supra*, § 154, 2), which was regarded as blasphemous arrogance at the time it was made, was fulfilled by Albert and Thomas, and won for them the highest ecclesiastical honours. As he had promised, they showed that every objection against the teaching of the Church can be refuted by reason and philosophy, and indeed as a positive accomplishment they proved from the principles of philosophy the truth of almost every ecclesiastical doctrine. Scholasticism thereby fulfilled its mission and reached its culmination. Whenever a school reaches this point its victorious waving of banners ordinarily consists in inviting the masses to share its triumphs, in extending itself to wider circles. If the character of the school is not thereby to be lost, methods must be invented which shall make it easier to become a specialist in philosophy, a scholastically educated man. On the other hand, whenever the limitation of a system to a school, however numerous, is looked upon as a defect, the popularization of the system begins. While *scholars* are drawn in masses, when philosophizing is made mechanical, and transformed more or less into a method of reckoning, the *unschooled public* is attracted by being addressed in its own language. That which to-day is more metaphorically called a translation, since it consists in the mere omission of technical terminology, was at that time, when science actually spoke in another language, a proclamation of its contents in the national tongue. It is a strange coincidence, that in the case of both the men who occupy this position in scholasticism, disappointment in love was the first cause of their assuming it. The one, Don Raymond Lully, seeks in both the ways just mentioned to spread through wider circles what scholasticism had discovered. But the second side of his activity occupies so subordinate a position in comparison with the first, that to-day scarce any thought is given to the doctrines proclaimed by him in Provençal poetry and prose, while his name has been handed down to posterity on account of his great Art, which furnished to that age,—what a universally applicable table of categories or a rhyme of certain constantly recurring elements has been for later times,—a means of becoming with ease a scholastically educated philosopher. With the other writer referred to, it was different. He sang, not for the school, but for the world,

for the world of his contemporaries as well as for posterity. He accomplished greater things than Lucretius (*vid. supra*, § 96, 5), because the scholastic distinctions constitute a material even more unpoetical than the atomic doctrines of the Epicureans; and because his unsurpassed poem still kindles inspiration in his fatherland, even in the lowest hut, and in other lands awakens what is more than this, an admiration based upon intelligent comprehension. This man was Dante Allighieri.

## § 206.

## LULLY.

Helfferrich: *Raymund Lull und die Anfänge der Catalonischen Literatur*. Berlin, 1858.

1. RAYMOND LULLY was born in the year 1235 of an aristocratic Catalonian family in the island Majorca. He early entered court life, and rose to the position of Grand Seneschal at the knightly court of King Jacob of Majorca. A husband and father, he was occupied at the same time with various love adventures, until he was completely prostrated by the dreadful outcome of one of them, when he suddenly renounced all his public and family relations, and, confirmed by visions, decided to become a combatant for Christ, and summoned all who followed the occupation of arms to a war against the unbelievers, while he himself undertook the more difficult task of fighting with spiritual weapons, proving to unbelievers the irrational nature of their errors, and the rationality of Christian truth. The two difficulties which stood in his way, ignorance of the Arabic language and a want of the proper education, he proceeded to overcome. A Mussulman became his teacher in Arabic, and, with the passion which characterized him in everything, he threw himself into the study of the *trivii*, logic. The enthusiasm with which he pursued his analytical studies, combined with his impatience to begin his missionary activity, gave rise to the idea,—which at once took the form of a vision,—that the possession of certain general principles and of a trusty method of deducing the particular from the general, would render unnecessary the chaos of material to be learned. He was no sooner in possession of this, his scientific doctrine, than he set himself to work. A disputation

in Tunis with the most learned of the Saracens, on account of its victorious result, became a source of danger to him, and he was compelled by ill treatment to flee to Naples. From there he went to Rome, in order to win the favour of Pope Boniface VIII., in part for his own missionary activity, and in part for the advancement of the study of Arabic. Similar attempts with the King of Cyprus, as well as with many cardinals united in a council, remained without effect. He again entered into a disputation with the Mohammedans in a Saracen city, Bugia, and again victory and imprisonment were his lot. Returning to Europe he exhorted those assembled at the council of Vienne to combat Mohammedan teaching abroad, and Averroistic teaching at home, and then went, an old man, a third time to the Saracens, when he actually suffered the ever-coveted martyr's death, in the year 1315. During his restless life he wrote continually, partly in Latin, partly in Arabic, and partly in Catalanian, that is, Provençal. The latter works were early translated into Latin, some of them by himself and some by others. He wrote principally upon his great Art, but he composed also theological and devotional works. Many were lost even before his death, and many others have never been printed. He is said to have written over a thousand works. The titles of more than four hundred are still preserved. The *Opusculum Raimondinum de auditu Kabbalistico* was printed in Venice in 1518. That this work was written by Lully appears to me doubtful, and that not merely because it contains the Scotist *formalitas* and *hæcceitas* (vid. § 214, 5, 6), the latter in the form *echeitas*, in which it is found also in other writers. It carries the abstractions and the barbarisms (*homeitas*, *substantieitas*, *expulsivieitas* and the like) further than any other work. This, as well as the *Ars brevis* (first printed in 1565), is found among other treatises,—of which the most important is the *Ars magna et ultima*,—in the collection published by Zetzner at Strasburg, in the year 1598, under the title *Raimundi Lullii opera quæ ad adinventam ab ipso artem universalem pertinent*. The collection has often been republished, for instance in 1609 and 1618. In addition, works of his upon alchemy have been printed at various times. In the year 1721 the *first* part of a complete edition in folio by a priest and doctor of all four faculties, Ivo Salzinger, appeared in Mainz. It contains, in addition to a biography and full introductions, the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (that is, the *Ars magna* and *major*),

occupying 49 pages, the *Ars universalis* (the *lectura* to the former) of 124 pages, the *Principia theologiæ*, 60 pp., *philosophiæ*, 66 pp., *juris*, 34 pp., *medicinæ*, 47 pp. This first volume was followed in the year 1722 by the *second*, which is so related to the former that it shows the application to Catholic doctrine of the principles developed in the first volume, but without the scholastic cipher; representing, in the *Liber de gentili et tribus sapientibus* (94 pp.), a Jew, a Christian, and a Saracen justifying their belief on rational grounds; in the *Liber de Sancto Spiritu* (10 pp.), a Greek and Latin displaying their points of difference before a Saracen; and in the *Liber de quinque sapientibus* (51 pp.) proving philosophically, in a similar setting, the Latin, Greek, Nestorian, and Monophysitic doctrines. The four books *Mirandæ demonstrationes* (244 pp.) follow, and the *Liber de quatuordecim articulis SSæ. Rom. Cath. fidei* (190 pp.). The *third* volume, which also appeared in 1722, contains, like the first, only esoteric writings: first the *Introductoria artis demonstrativæ* (38 pp.), and then the *Ars demonstrativa* (112 pp.), which was evidently written before the former. The latter is followed by the *Lectura super figuras artis demonstrativæ* (51 pp.), this by the *Liber chaos* (44 pp.), the *Compendium s. commentum artis demonstrativæ* (160 pp.), the *Ars inveniendi particularia in universalibus* (50 pp.), and finally the *Liber propositionum secundum artem demonstrativam* (62 pp.). After the issue of the third volume the publication was delayed for a time by Salzinger's death. Finally, in the year 1729, the *fourth* volume appeared, edited by a number of men appointed for the purpose. Upon its title-page it announces a relation to the third volume similar to that which the second bears to the first. It contains *Liber exponens figuram elementarem artis demonstrativæ* (10 pp.), *Regulæ introductoriæ in practicam artis demonstrativæ* (6 pp.), *Quæstiones per artem demonstrativæ seu inventivam solubiles* (210 pp.), *Disputatio Eremitæ et Raymundi sup. lib. Sentt.* (122 pp.), *Liber super Psalmum quicumque s. liber Tartari et Christiani* (30 pp.), *Disputatio fidelis et infidelis* (33 pp.), *Disputatio Raimondi Christiani et Hamar Saraceni* (47 pp.), *Disputatio fidei et intellectus* (26 pp.), *Liber apostrophe* (51 pp.), *Supplicatio professoribus Parisiensibus* (8 pp.), *Liber de convenientia fidei et intellectus in objecto* (5 pp.), *Liber de demonstratione per æquiparantiam* (6 pp.), *Liber facilis scientiæ* (11 pp.), *Liber de novo modo demonstrandi s. ars prædicativæ*

*magnitudinis* (166 pp.). The *fifth* volume, also published in 1729, contains *Ars inventiva veritatis s. ars intellectiva veri* (210 pp.), *Tabula generalis* (80 pp.), *Brevis practica tabulæ generalis* (43 pp.), *Lectura compendiosa tabulæ generalis* (15 pp.), *Lectura supra artem inventivam et tabulam generalem* (388 pp.). It may have been the attack of a Jesuit upon the orthodoxy of Lully, published in Bamberg in 1730, which so delayed the appearance of the *sixth* volume; at least, when it did appear, in 1737, the editors considered it necessary to appeal to the authority of the Jesuits. The volume contains, in Latin translation, the *Ars amativa* (151 pp.), the *Arbor philosophiæ amoris* (66 pp.), *Flores amoris et intelligentiæ* (14 pp.), *Arbor philosophiæ desideratæ* (41 pp.), *Liber proverbiorum* (130 pp.), *Liber de anima rationali* (60 pp.), *de homine* (62 pp.), *de prima et secunda intentione* (24 pp.), *de Deo et Jesu Christo* (38 pp.). In the year 1740 the *ninth* volume appeared; in the year 1742 the *tenth*. The two contain only the *Liber magnus contemplationum in Deum*, in 366 chapters, of thirty paragraphs each. Since no library, so far as is known, possesses the seventh and eighth volumes, Savigny's supposition, that they were never issued, is probably correct. Only forty-five works are contained in the eight printed volumes, while Salzinger, in his first volume, gives the first and last words of 282 works, and to these are to be added those which he had not seen. Among those mentioned by him, seventy-seven are upon Alchemy. Salzinger himself says in regard to many of the latter, that they were finished more than a decade after Lully's death.

2. Lully is not satisfied with the claim that all objections to the doctrines of the Church can be refuted. He ascribes to philosophy also the power of proving positively, with irrefutable grounds of reason, the Church's teaching in all its parts. From this he excepts neither the Trinity nor the Incarnation, as Thomas does, for according to his *Mirand. demonstr.*, to do this is to dishonour the human understanding. The foolish principle, he says, that it increases the merit of belief to accept undemonstrable things, drives away from Christianity the best and wisest of the heathen and the Saracens (*De quinque sapient.* 8). If one wishes to convert them, one should learn to prove to them, not only that they are wrong, but that the Christians are right. This conduct at the same time honours God most, who does not wish to be more jealous and disobliging than nature, which conceals nothing. If the understanding

could not perceive God, His purpose would have miscarried, for He created man in order that He Himself might be known. For this reason the most pious theologians, Augustine, Anselm, and others, have refuted the doubts of unbelievers, not by the citation of authorities, but with rational grounds; and one of the many proofs that the Catholic Church possesses the truth more than the Jews and Saracens, is that she has not only more monks and hermits, but also many more who busy themselves with philosophy. *Rationes necessariae* are the best weapons of defence. Antichrist also will do wonders, but he will not prove the truth of his doctrines (*Mirand. demonstr.*). For this reason Lully is never weary of contradicting the statement, which he ascribes to the Averroists, that a thing which is false in philosophy may be true in theology. It is true, that not every one can demonstrate the truth; and the proofs for it are not so easy that every uneducated person, and every one whose time is taken up with wife, children, and worldly business, can find them. They may be content with faith. God, who wishes to be honoured by all, has also cared for them. They are not, however, to draw limits about those who are accessible to arguments, nor are they to forbid them to doubt, for man "*quam primum incipit dubitare incipit philosophari*" (*Tabula gener.*, p. 15). The latter, however, are not to think that the proofs for these truths are as easy to grasp as those for geometrical or physical propositions. In these spheres it is the custom to limit oneself to drawing conclusions downward from the cause to the effect, or upward from the effect to the cause. A third method, of drawing conclusions sideways *per æquiparantiam*, is not known in these branches, but it is this very mode which plays the most important rôle in the higher science. For instance, the compatibility of predestination and of free-will is proved by representing the former as an effect of the divine wisdom, the latter of the divine righteousness; and it is then proved of these two divine attributes, that they mutually promote each other (*De quinque sap.*, *Mirand. demonstr.*, *Introductoria*, etc.).

3. In accordance with the principles here given, Lully, in a great number of works, represented the whole doctrinal system of the Church as answering the demands of reason. Here belong his *Liber de quatuordecim articulis*, etc., that is, Upon the Apostles' Creed, his *Apostrophe*, originally written in Provençal, his dialogue with a hermit upon 140 contested

points in the *Sentences* of Lombard, as well as the dialogue of the hermit Blanquerna upon the *Quicunque*, finally his *Disputatio fidelis et infidelis*, which discusses nearly all the points of faith. Two fundamental ideas, in regard to which he likes to appeal to Anselm, recur frequently in his reasoning: the idea that God wishes to be known, and that nothing greater than God can be conceived. The former insures to him the possibility of theology as a science, the latter is a constant guide in the determination of its content. Every predicate that is convertible with the *minoritas* is *eo ipso* to be denied of God. Every one that stands and falls with the *majoritas* is to be ascribed to Him. The works of Lully which have been mentioned treat only theological questions. In the *Quæstt. art. dem. volubiles*, physical and psychological questions are joined to these. His followers have regarded as one of his most important productions, his fullest work, the *Liber magnus contemplationis*, the five books of which are divided into 10,980 paragraphs, each beginning with an address to God. Lully's entire teaching is contained in this work. The merit of belief, he repeats here, does not consist in accepting the unproved, but in accepting the supernatural. In so far it agrees with knowledge, but falls below the latter, inasmuch as it can contain also what is false, while knowledge can contain only truth. In belief the will, in knowledge the understanding is the proper organ. Those of slow understanding are directed to belief as the easier of the two.

4. The fact that the few dogmas pronounced by Thomas undemonstrable are represented by Lully as admitting of proof, would not of itself be sufficient to account for the phenomenon that a school of Lullists arose, in number almost equal to the Thomists, and that long after it had vanished voices were continually heard which called him the keenest of all philosophers. This is all the more difficult to account for, since it is not to be denied that his proofs are often mere arguments in a circle, and are always quite devoid of artistic form. His fame in fact rests rather upon that which has won for him the title *Doctor illuminatus*, and which he himself regarded as his chief service, his "great Art." The spread of this was dearer to him than his missionary activity; for when he was informed in a vision that membership in the Dominican Order would best promote the latter, he nevertheless entered the Franciscan Order, because he expected thereby better to advance his "great Art." Since

this Art varied in its forms at different times in Lully's own hands, it is necessary to begin with the simplest form, and to show how it constantly expanded. The *Introductoria*, evidently written in his later years, precedes the *Ars demonstrativa* of earlier date (*Opp.*, vol. 3), and forms the best introduction to an understanding of the system, because in it the relation of the Art to logic and to metaphysics is shown. The former considers the *res* as it is *in anima*, the latter as it is *extra animam*, while the new Art is said to consider the *ens* without reference to this difference, and therefore forms the common foundation for both the others. While these two sciences therefore take as their starting-point principles which are furnished them, this fundamental science has rather to invent the principles for both of them, as well as for all sciences. It is therefore related to invention in the same way that logic is related to deductive thinking. Since the principles of all demonstration are contained in this fundamental doctrine and theory of the sciences, it is possible to trace back to its formula every correct proof which is given in any science. In grammar, the scholar, when he has once learned the inflectional endings of the conjugations, can inflect every verb, and thus in this basal science certain *termini*, the proper principles of all thinking and being, sometimes figuratively called *flores*, are to be fixed, and the use of them to become familiar. For the latter purpose nothing is so helpful as the employment of letters to indicate these fundamental conceptions. Salzinger rightly compares this with the use of letters as numerical signs, and urges in justification of it the great advance made in mathematics since the time of Vieta. The first step is therefore to learn the meaning of these letters.

5. Since God is the principle of all being, and the chief object of all thought and knowledge, He is designated by the letter A. It is then further considered what the attributes of God (*potentiæ, dignitates*) are, through which He acts as the principle of all things, and these are then assigned their letters. Since the last six letters of the alphabet, as will be seen below, are called into use elsewhere, there remain, as designations of the fundamental predicates of God, to which all others can be traced back, the sixteen letters B-R. Their attributive relation to God is now represented in such a way that about a circle, which is designated by the letter A, a ring is laid, divided into sixteen equal parts, whose separate segments are as



follows: B *bonitas*, C *magnitudo*, D *æternitas*, E *potestas*, F *sapientia*, G *voluntas*, H *virtus*, I *veritas*, K *gloria*, L *perfectio*, M *justitia*, N *largitas*, O *simplicitas*, P *nobilitas* (instead of the last two *humilitas* and *patientia* were originally used), Q *misericordia*, R *dominium*. This scheme, the *Figura A* or *Figura Dei*, thus contains the entire doctrine of God, since by the union of the central circle A with any one of the surrounding segments, sixteen propositions result. But the matter does not stop here. All these predicates are so completely one in God that each imparts itself to the others, and thus combinations result. This process of mutual participation Lully designates by the derivative syllable *ficare*, since *bonitas bonificat magnitudinem*, *æternitas æternificat bonitatem*, etc. He now places the sixteen combinations BB, BC, BD, etc., very mechanically in a perpendicular line one below the other, and then beside them CC, CD, CE, etc., and thus obtains sixteen columns of constantly decreasing height, which form a triangle, and this he calls the *secunda Figura A*. The hundred and thirty-six combinations of ideas (*conditiones*) are ordinarily called *cameræ*, since the various columns, and in them the various combinations, are separated by lines, so that squares result. Afterward he gives a shorter method of reaching these combinations. It is not necessary to write down these columns, but only to divide two concentric rings into sixteen parts, designating them with the letters A to R, and to make the one movable about its centre. Then, if the like letters are first placed opposite each other, and afterward the movable circle is turned a sixteenth of a revolution upon its axis, and so on, the 136 combinations which are given in the *secunda Figura A* will be successively obtained. These combinations are Lully's pride, since they not only give a hold for the memory, but also serve as a topic for exhausting the circle of questions, and, indeed, are designed to supply data for answers (*vid. infra sub 12*).

6. To the *Figura Dei*, or A, is now to be added a second, the *Figura animæ*, or S. The former has to do with the chief object of our knowledge, the latter with the subject of it, the thinking spirit, which is designated by the letter S. While God has the scheme of the circle, to S is given the square. The four corners are designated by the letters B–E, B indicating *memoria*, C *intellectus*, D *voluntas* and E the union of all three *potentiæ*, so that it seems to be identical with S.

There is a great difference, however, inasmuch as E signifies only the perfectly normal condition of S, when the memory retains, the understanding knows, and the will loves, a condition which is represented in the scheme by making the square blue (*lividum*). If this condition is changed, hatred taking the place of love, the union of the *memoria recolens* (F), of the *intellectus intelligens* (G), and of the *voluntas odiens* (H), is denoted by the letter I, and the square is made black. Since however many things, for instance evil, may, indeed must, be hated, I or *quadratum nigrum* is not always an anomalous condition. This, however, is the case in the *quadratum rubeum* and *viride*. The square becomes red when the *memoria obliviscens* as K is joined with the *intellectus ignorans* as L, and the *voluntas diligens vel odiens* as M, to form N. Finally it becomes green, denoting that the soul is in a state of conjecture and of doubt, when its first corner O unites the characters of B, F, and K, that is, the memory retains and forgets; when the second corner P combines the natures of C, G, and L, that is, the *intellectus* both knows and is ignorant; and finally, when its third corner Q joins in itself D, H, and M, that is, when love and hatred mingle in the will. When the soul therefore is R, or *quadratum viride*, it is not as it ought to be, and should strive to be E or I, or at least N. When these four squares are now laid one upon the other in the order given, not in such a way as to cover each other, but so that the different coloured corners show at equal distances, a circle will be formed with sixteen points in the following order; B, F, K, O, C, G, L, P, D, H, M, Q, E, I, N, R. In later representations, where the important thing is to emphasize the parallelism of the separate figures, this order is replaced by the alphabetical. When further, as in the figure A, the sixteen *termini* are combined, there results a *secunda Figura S*, which contains the same number of *camerae* as the *secunda Figura A*, namely 136. (Thus, for instance, in the *Ars demonstrativa*, *Opp.*, 3.) In virtue of this *tabula animæ*, E I N R is very often used as the formula for the entire soul. Still oftener E alone is employed, because it denotes the normal condition. This designation became such a habit with Lully that, in works which have no scholastic character and which do not employ the system of notation at all, E is nevertheless used instead of *anima*.

7. To the two figures already mentioned is to be added the

*Figura T*, called the *figura instrumentalis*, because it is needed with all the others. The equilateral triangle here takes the place of the circle and of the square. The principal ideas of relation which serve as points of view in the consideration, and especially in the comparison of things, constitute the content of this figure, to which Lully was led through the doctrines of the predicables, predicaments and post-predicaments. The three are united to form a triangle, and five differently coloured ones are placed one above the other (*lividum, viride, rubeum, croceum, nigrum*), as in the case of the squares, so that their points divide the circle drawn about them into fifteen segments or *camerae*, each of which has the colour of the triangle of which it forms a part. The three blue segments B, C, D, are *Deus, creatura, operatio*, the green E *differentia*, F *concordantia*, G *contrarietas*, the red H *principium*, I *medium*, K *finis*, the yellow L *majoritas*, M *aequalitas*, N *minoritas*, the black O *affirmatio*, P *dubitatio*, Q *negatio*. The separate corners are then subdivided, in B (*Deus*) *essentia, unitas, dignitas* being written, in C (*creatura*) *intellectualis, animalis, sensualis*, in D (*operatio*) *artificialis, naturalis, intellectualis*. To the three corners of the green triangle E, F, G, are added the words *intellectualis et intellectualis, int. et. sens., sens. et. sens.* H (*principium*) is more closely defined by the words *causæ quantitatis temporis*, I (*medium*) by *extrematum mensurationis conjunctionis*; and finally, to K (*finis*) are added *perfectionis, privationis, terminationis*. The yellow triangle L M N is defined as having to do with the relation of substances, accidents, substances and accidents. Finally, O P Q, affirmation, doubt, and negation, are supplemented by *possibile, impossibile, ens, non ens* as their object. These colour definitions are always given with their subjects, so that *angulus de essentia Dei, de creatura intellectuali, de differentia sensualis et sensualis, de minoritate substantiæ, de negatione entis*, etc., is spoken of. The *Figura elementalis* was originally treated as an appendix to the *Figura T*, and in the *Ars universalis* was even called the *secunda Figura T*. It results from the combination of four colours and the names of the four elements, which form four squares, each containing sixteen smaller squares. It is seen in this connection that Lully did not look upon the elements as combinations of original antitheses, as the Aristotelians did. According to him fire is of itself only warm; it is dry merely *per accidens* on account of the communication of earth, as the

latter, dry in itself, is cold only on account of the communication of the atmosphere, etc. Every element therefore contains at the same time the others. This doctrine is further developed in the *Liber chaos*. The original order of the letters in the *Figura T*, as well as their meaning, was later modified. The original order was a result of the fact that, between every two of the like coloured points, four differently coloured ones were inserted, and thus between A and B the letters D G K N. This order was changed by the substitution of the alphabetical order, as in the case of the *Figura S*. The meaning of the letters was altered, because in the *Figura Dei*, God was designated by the letter A, while in the blue triangle He was denoted by B. In order to bring them into agreement, the triangle was marked A B C instead of, as at first, B C D, and thus in Lully's later writings each letter has the meaning which originally belonged to the following one. But the matter does not stop here. Lully soon finds that these five triads of instrumental concepts are not enough. He is obliged to add to the *Figura T* a *Figura T'*, which is formed, like the former, of five triangles revolving about a common centre. In order to avoid confusion he calls these *semi-lividum*, *semi-viride*, etc., and the whole often *semi-triangula*. To the first triangle (*semi-lividum*) belong A *modus*, B *species*, C *ordo*, to the second (*semi-viride*) D *alteritas*, E *identitas*, F *communitas*, to the third (*semi-rubeum*) G *prioritas*, H *simultas*, I *posteritas*, to the fourth (*semi-croceum*) K *superioritas*, L *convertibilitas*, M *inferioritas*, to the fifth (*semi-nigrum*) N *universale*, O *indefinitum*, P *singulare*. As in the case of the figures A and S, there are formed also in the present instances *secunda figura* by the combination of the separate segments. Originally there were only 120 *camera ipsius T*, later just as many in the *secunda Figura T*, 120 being the necessary number with fifteen elements. The two are then finally united, and 465 *camera* result, which are represented first by thirty columns, each shorter by one than its predecessor, afterwards by two concentric rings, one of them movable.

8. The figures A, S, and T (*Dei, animæ, instrumentalis*) are the fundamental and most important ones. The figures V (*virtutum et vitiorum*) and X (*oppositorum*), however, were early added. The former contains, in fourteen segments, alternately red and blue the seven virtues and mortal sins,

and its *secunda figura* is of course a triangle of 105 combinations. The second gives eight opposites, *sapientia et justitia*, *prædestinatio et liberum arbitrium*, *perfectio et defectus*, *meritum et culpa*, *potestas et voluntas*, *gloria et pœna*, *esse et privatio*, *scientia et ignorantia*. The first members of each couplet are blue and designated by the letters B–I, the second are green and denoted by the letters K–R. Later the first, fifth, sixth, and eighth pairs are omitted, *prædestinatio* and *liberum arbitrium* become B and K, *esse* and *privatio* C and L, the two following pairs retain their positions and their letters, and instead of the omitted ones, *suppositio* and *demonstratio* are given as F and O, *immediate* and *mediate* as G and P, *realitas* and *ratio* as H and Q, and *potentia* and *objectum* as I and R. If now these sixteen *termini* are brought into alphabetical order, and combined, with or without revolution, there will result the *secunda figura X* with 136 *camerae*. Lully appears likewise to have employed the figures Y and Z in the beginning, or at least soon after the invention of his Art. These are represented as two undivided circles, and designate, the one the value of truth, the other that of falsehood, and thus, if the letters of the table S be employed, the normally loving soul E loves Y, and the normally hating soul I hates Z, and every combination of ideas which falls in Z, or into which Z falls, is false.

9. Originally Lully can scarcely have thought of going beyond the figures A, S, T, V, X, Y, Z. This is shown by the fact that he treats these letters themselves as elements of combinations, from which a new figure results, containing in 28 *camerae* the combinations A A, A S, A T, etc., S S, S T, etc., and calls it the *figura demonstrativa*, as if the whole *Ars demonstrativa* were contained in it. We need not be surprised at the name *figura nona* for this, since the *figura elementalis*, the appendix to the figure T, is reckoned with the others (not the *Figura T*, which is certainly of much later origin). But the more thoroughly these *termini* are carried out, the more clearly must it appear that not all knowledge is capable of being brought within the propositions which are contained in the 633, or if the 28 be added, 661 combinations. It seems as if this first appeared when Lully began to treat the four University studies according to his new method. The three figures, which, with a full commentary upon them, are contained in the first volume of his works,

were then proposed. They are called *Principia Theologicæ*, *Philosophiæ*, and *Juris*. Each one of these sciences is reduced to sixteen principles: theology to *divina essentia, dignitates, operatio, articuli, præcepta, sacramenta, virtus, cognitio, dilectio, simplicitas, compositio, ordinatio, suppositio, expositio, prima intentio, secunda intentio*; philosophy to *prima causa, motus, intelligentia, orbis, forma, materia prima, natura, elementa, appetitus, potentia, habitus, actus, mixtio, digestio, compositio, alteratio*; law to *forma, materia, jus compositum, jus commune, jus speciale, jus naturale, jus positivum, jus canonicum, jus civile, jus consuetudinale, jus theoricum, jus practicum, jus nutritivum, jus comparativum, jus antiquum, jus novum*. These sixteen principles, designated by the letters B–R, form in each of the three cases a large triangle containing 136 combinations, which the commentary treats at length. The *Principles of Medicine* follow another scheme. They are represented as a tree whose roots form the four *humores*, and from whose trunk, by means of the four principles, warmth, dryness, cold, and moisture, the natural (healthy) and unnatural (unhealthy) phenomena are drawn.

10. But when now in so great a number of figures the same letters are used with constantly changing significations, rules must be given to avoid confusion. Lully therefore introduces numbers as indices, for the purpose of distinguishing the letters and the combinations of the various figures. The same method was subsequently employed by Descartes in designating the different forces. The letters of the figure S stand unaltered, those of the figure A are changed to A<sup>1</sup>, B<sup>1</sup>, C<sup>1</sup>, etc., those of the figure T to A<sup>2</sup>, B<sup>2</sup>, C<sup>2</sup>, etc., those of the figure V to A<sup>3</sup>, B<sup>3</sup>, etc., those of the figure X to A<sup>4</sup>, B<sup>4</sup>, etc., those of the *Figura Theologiæ* to A<sup>5</sup>, B<sup>5</sup>, etc., the *Principia Philosophiæ* to A<sup>6</sup>, B<sup>6</sup>, etc., the *Principia Juris* to A<sup>7</sup>, B<sup>7</sup>, etc. The fact that in the *Termini* of the *Figura T*, a comma takes the place of the numerical index, is one argument going to prove the later date of this figure. Later, the number of the figures is increased to sixteen, and as there are no letters left to designate them, a new method of notation must be found. A *T signatum* (T') had been inserted among the *titulis*, and in the same way V' is now used for the *titulus figura Juris*, X' designates the *figura Theologiæ*, and Z' the *figura Philosophiæ*. A', S' and Y' still remain, and these are used to denote those figures which have not yet been men-

tioned. *Figura A'*, or *influentia*, is a blue triangle whose three points correspond to the *Termini*, B *influentia*, C *dispositio*, D *diffusio*, which divide the ring surrounding them into three parts. Y' denotes the *figura finium* or *finalis*, which shows a ring divided into six parts designated by the letters B–G, in which C *conueniens* is blue, E *inconueniens* red, G *partim sic partim sic* a mixture of the two, and in which B represents a blue, D a red, and F a mixed combination of *Termini* of the earlier figures. By this figure and by a variation of it (*secunda figura finalis*) it is said to be possible to post oneself in all investigations. The *Figura S'* or *figura derivationum* refers to the fact that grammar has contributed not a little to the invention of the entire system. Thirteen divisions of a ring with the syllables *re, ri, ans, us, le, tas, mus, do, ne, er, in, præ*, denote the most important etymological forms. *Magnificare, magnificabile, and magnitudo*, are related to one another, as *re, le, and do*, etc. The *figura elementalis*, which has also a second figure just like the others, remains without any distinguishing letter, since the last seven letters of the alphabet have already served twice as designations of figures. The same is the case with the *figura universalis*, in which, as the sixteenth figure, Lully unites all the previous ones. This figure shows the methods of rotation in the forming of combinations carried to its furthest extent. A metal apparatus is constructed whose centre is formed by a round surface, about which the various coloured rings revolve. The immovable centre is blue, and contains the figure A' (*influentia*) in the form of a triangle B C D. The next ring, surrounding the centre, contains for the sake of the combinations the same three *termini*, and the ring being tinted, so that the point B' comes between B and C of the stationary triangle, there results a hexagon, which stands in the middle of the whole apparatus, and has at its angles the letters B B', C C', D D'. The next two rings, likewise blue, contain the letters of the *figura finium* Y'. There are two of these rings, in order to be able to bring out, by turning one of them, all the possible combinations of the *termini* of this figure. For the same reason, the *figura S'* or *derivationum*, which follows, is likewise represented by two rings. These rings, green in colour, contain in their thirteen divisions the syllables given above. Two equal rings next follow, each divided into four differently coloured parts. These represent the *figura elemen-*

*talis*, which has no letter to designate it. The next two rings are divided into fourteen parts, each of which is assigned one of the letters which designate the figures, and thus does not represent a *terminus*, but an entire figure, the *figura elemental* being omitted. The colours in these rings are various. It is easy to see why Z is red and V a mixture of red and blue, but why T' should be red and S' green, etc., is harder to understand. Next come rings divided into sixteen parts, which bear the letters B-R. Lully does not consider it necessary to employ so many of these rings that every figure, which has sixteen *termini*, shall have two rings. Four appear to him sufficient to form the combinations of the *termini* which belong to the same figure, as well as of those which belong to different figures. This must have shown him that it was not a good idea to begin the *termini* of the figure T with the letter A instead of B.

11. Lully's doctrine of principles and of sciences, in the form which it assumes in this *figura naturalis*, reaches its greatest perfection, and at the same time is in full agreement with what is taught in the *Ars compendiosa*, in the commentary (*Lectura*) upon it (both in vol. i.), and in other writings of a similar character. Consequently the *Ars demonstrativa* and the *Introductoria* to it must be regarded as a more important source from which to learn his system, than other works, in which it appears simpler because the number of the *termini* is less. This is especially true of the *Ars inventiva veritatis* (vol. v.), with which the *Tabula generalis*, and the works related to it, are in comparatively close agreement. The most important variations from the earlier teaching are as follows. The figure hitherto named A is here called the *first*. It loses its last seven *termini* and forms a ring of only nine *camera* with the unchanged *termini* B-K. At the same time the *tabula derivationum*, again greatly abbreviated, is united with it, and it is stated that every principle must be thought of as *tivum* (formerly called *ans*), *bile* and *are*. (H as *tivum virtutificativum*, as *bile virtutificabile*, and as *are virtutificare*.) What was formerly called *figura T* is now usually cited simply as the *second* figure. It loses the blue and black triangle, and there remain therefore but nine *termini*, which no longer have their original letters, since B C D are applied to the green triangle and replace the original E F G, while the latter appear as the corners of the red triangle, that is *princi-*



*pium*, *medium* and *finis* formerly represented by I, K, and L. Finally, H, I, and K take the place of L, M, and N in the *triangulum croceum*. A third figure gives the possible combinations of the nine letters which form a triangle of only thirty-six *camerae*, the repetitions (BB, CC, DD, etc.) being omitted. In these *camerae*, therefore, BC, for instance, may represent four different combinations, *bonitas* and *magnitudo*, *bonitas* and *concordantia*, *differentia* and *magnitudo*, *differentia* and *concordantia*. Much may be said in favour of these simplifications, since by means of them conceptions like *Deus*, *dubitatio*, etc. are removed from the series of relations, and the *figura T* contains only *termini* of that kind. Nevertheless it must be regarded as a very unfortunate step when, for the sake of avoiding the ambiguity in B C just pointed out, a new method is used instead of the earlier system of indices. According to the new method, when a *terminus* belongs to the first figure it remains unchanged, but when it belongs to the second (T) a T is inserted before its letters, so that if the combination should be *bonitas et magnitudo* it would be written B C, but if *bonitas et concordantia* it would be written, not B C, but B T C, as if it were a combination of three elements. The designation by means of indices has so many superiorities over this method, that it may be doubted whether this, which is here represented as a later simplification of the system, was not really the more primitive form of it. Leaving out of consideration, however, the fact that when Lully wrote the *Tabula generalis* he was already fifty-eight years old, and when he wrote the *brevis practica tabula generalis* he was sixty-eight, it is difficult to believe that he could later have added to such conceptions as *differentia*, *prioritas*, etc., the conceptions *Deus*, *suppositio*, etc. Lully describes at this time, under the name of the *fourth* figure, an apparatus in which combinations of the third order are produced. These concentric rings, each divided into nine segments, can form with the letters B–R 84 combinations, when the two other rings are revolved. Every such combination consists properly of six elements, since every *terminus* has two significations, and these can of course be combined in twenty different ways, and hence the *Tabula* which follows the four figures is formed of eighty-four columns, each containing twenty combinations of the third order. The greater number of these however consist of four letters, on account of the unfortunate system of

notation just criticized. More than four letters are not needed, since the *termini* of the first figure are always placed before those of the second, and hence the T governs all the letters which follow it. Lully says in regard to these tables, that the philosopher should have them always at his elbow (as the mathematician of to-day his logarithmic and trigonometric tables), in order to know immediately to what column any problem belongs. Soon however a third signification is added to the two meanings which each of the nine letters already has. The *regulæ investigandi*, although not always deduced in the same manner, are nine in number, and hence are denoted by the letters B–K. Lully mentions them in the *ars inventiva veritatis*, in the *tabula generalis* and its *brevis practica*, in the *ars compendiosa* and the commentary upon it. Since the investigation proceeds toward a solution of the questions *utrum? quid? de quo? quare? quantum? quale? ubi? quando? quomodo? cum quo?* the *regulæ investigandi* coincide with these, and therefore nearly with the Aristotelian categories, which must then indeed submit to having two of their number denoted by the same letter K. Hitherto B had designated *bonitas* and *differentia*, and now it denotes also the *prima regula investigationis* and the *quæstio utrum?* so that the entire series of letters becomes a *tabula quæstionum*. The chief objects of thought also, in the series God, intelligence (angel), firmament, soul, etc., which is constantly recurring among the Aristotelians, are brought together, nine in number, in a *tabula subjectorum*, to which correct investigation is referred. The system of Lully is considered by later commentators, such as Bruno (*vid.* § 247), Agrippa of Nettesheim (*vid.* § 237, 4), Bernard de Lavineta, and by admirers such as Alsted, Leibnitz and others, only in this simplified form. In the works published by Zetzner also it appears in the same form. Since the more recent presentations of the system for the most part follow these works, there are to be found in them only extracts from the *Ars magna et ultima*, and from the *De audit. kabbal.* But this leads the reader to do an injustice to Lully. For if it is not known how he came gradually to give various meanings to the same letters in the different tables, it must appear very arbitrary when the system opens with the statement “B signifies goodness, difference, whether? God, justice, avarice.” And further, it must appear inexplicable, when the construction with coloured triangles is

not known to have preceded, why the *angulus viridis*, etc. is continually spoken of. And it is thus easy to understand why one should hasten to complete the perusal of this system, so as to be able to say to the world that one has to deal here with a man at least half crazy. Like the *Ars magna et ultima* in the edition of Zetzner, all the writings in the fifth volume of Lully's complete works are devoted in their last part to questions. In the *Ars inventiva* the elements are given for the solution of 842 questions, and then to make up the thousand, 158 more questions are proposed, unaccompanied with such hints, *extra volumen artis*. The *Tabula generalis* contains 167 answered questions, the commentary upon it promises 1000, but breaks off at the 912th, and so on. In this connection reference is often made to earlier investigations, and it is shown how the demonstration is to be carried on *per definitiones*, how *per figuras*, how *per tabulam*, how *per regulas*, and how *per questiones*. The works *Ars amativa* and *Arbor philosophiæ amoris* (written in Paris in 1298) emphasize especially the fact that science as the knowledge of God is love for Him, and likewise that repentance and conversion promote knowledge. Otherwise the views in regard to scientific method are the same as in the *Tabula generalis*. But in the *Arbor philosophiæ desideratæ*, also contained in the sixth volume, a modification appears. The work was thus named because in it Lully explains to his son how, from the tree of memory, intelligence and will, that is, of the collective powers of the soul, if it be preserved by faith, love, and hope, the tree of philosophy grows, whose trunk is *ens*, since it has to do only with being, and from which nine branches and nine blossoms spring. He begins then with the latter and gives us the twenty-seven *flores*, the nine principles of the first and the nine of the second figure (as in the works last characterized), that is, *bonitas*, *magnitudo*, etc., *differentia*, *concordantia*, etc., and in addition to these nine other conceptions, B *potentia*, C *objectum*, D *memoria*, E *intentio*, F *punctum transcendens*, G *vacuum*, H *operatio*, I *justitia*, K *ordo*. Nine objects, designated by the letters L–T, then follow as the *rami* of this tree. They are L *ens quod est Deus et ens quod non est Deus*, M *ens reale et ens phantastium*, N *genus et species*, O *movens et mobile*, P *unitas et pluralitas*, Q *abstractum et concretum*, R *intensum et extensum*, S *similitudo et dissimilitudo*, T *generatio et corruptio*. This presentation is then followed by the

description of an apparatus. Four concentric rings are divided each into nine segments, the two outer ones containing the letters B–K, the two inner ones the letters L–T. By turning the rings upon their axes all possible combinations may be obtained of the elements B–K (*flores*) and L–T (*rami*) among themselves, as well as among each other. The circles, it is true, do not state which of the three *flores* each letter indicates. With the *rami* error is not possible. The work *De anima rationali* divides the material into ten chapters, according to the questions *utrum? quid?* etc. In the *Liber de homine*, written six years later, the number nine is once more secured by the omission of the *utrum?* But the work *De Deo et Jesu Christo*, written in the same year, goes back again to the number ten.

12. It was certainly not Lully's intention that the turning of the rings should take the place of one's own thinking. At the same time it is certain that he expected thinking to be greatly aided by his system and his apparatus. The mnemonic assistance which they both furnish must have aroused his enthusiasm, for with all the Schoolmen he assigned a very high place to the memory. In his opinion the *voluntas odiens* may, under certain circumstances, be compatible with a healthy condition of the soul, but the *memoria obliuens* never. Such a man must be interested in a system which is at least an *ars recolendi*. But his Art is in fact more. It accomplishes namely what is accomplished by all topical schemes, from the hints of Cicero down to the models after which sermons are arranged: it furnishes points of view under which the object is to be considered. He himself shows how extraordinarily great the number of points of view are which offer themselves, when one,—in discussing the question, for instance, whether there can be a good and a bad God,—takes up the *tabula instrumentalis*, and asks in which of its triangles the conceptions under consideration lie. They will be found in all five triangles, so that the object is to be compared with all the conceptions contained in the five. Indeed this is not all, because the investigator will be referred to the figure A, etc. In short, Lully is right when he says that his system is an *ars investigandi*. But he claims still more for it. The difficulty, the apparent impossibility, of bringing some things into union, often has its ground only in the fact that the two are not carried back to the real principle which underlies them. If they were thus carried back

they might prove themselves to be one. When two trees standing at a distance from one another are attacked by the same disorder, he who has discovered that they both spring from one root, will see that the phenomenon is natural, while another man will regard it as an accident, or even a miracle. In the same way, according to Lully, a mass of difficulties will be easily solved, when we do not stop with the mere facts, which appear perhaps contradictory, but inquire in what the ultimate ground and principle of this and of that fact consist. If it is found that the reason for the one and the source of the other are identical, the difficulty disappears. The doctrine of principles alone leads to these proofs *ex æquiparantia*, as to many others, and it is thus an *ars demonstrandi*. Since all other sciences proceed in their demonstrations from certain presuppositions which are not further proved, and which no other science establishes, it appears as if the various sciences stood upon no certain foundation, or as if they contradicted each other, until their apparently irreconcilable propositions are deduced from the principles of all knowledge. But since demonstration only establishes that which we already know, the true significance of the doctrine of the sciences is not yet exhausted. It teaches us also what we have not hitherto known, is therefore an *ars inveniendi*. The experience that often an entirely accidental combination of two thoughts carries the mind into new paths, and that mere accidents often lead to the discovery of new truths, should teach us the advisability of combining every thought with as many others as possible. It often happens that a combination of ideas is trustworthy when one predicate, untrustworthy when another, is applied to it: for instance, the propositions, the mountain goat is an absurdity, and, it exists. If the system of designations by letters be used, it will be seen at once that a combination, in which the sign Z (falsehood) occurs, cannot be combined with another in which the sign Y (truth) is found. This is like mathematical calculations, which are seen to be false when they result in an imaginary quantity. When we realize how many problems have become soluble only since the extraction of higher roots has been reduced to a process of division, in connection with which the logarithmic table is employed, we shall not be surprised that Lully should hope for such great results from a combination of signs and of formulæ drawn from his tables. How little he intended

to leave to accident, and how far he was from thinking that the mere turning of the rings could make a master, is shown by the many hundreds of examples which he gives in his various works, to illustrate how the figures are to be used for the solution of questions. In some cases he divides the question into the conceptions contained in it, and then inquires in which *conditionibus* each of them is found; that is, he gives the complete demonstration. Thus, for instance, in the fourth distinction of the *Ars demonstrativa*, where he takes up the *Quæstiones* in connection with the first thirty-eight questions. In other cases he gives only the combinations of the *tituli*, that is, the figures by means of which the solution is to be reached, leaving the choice of the *cameræ* in the figures to the reader; thus in the 1044 questions upon all sorts of subjects which follow those just mentioned. Lully is well aware that the reduction of all investigation and demonstration to these souls of all proof gives to reasoning a garb of mystery. This is all the better, for he wishes to make science easy only to adepts in it, who study it thoroughly. In connection with Lully's system we are reminded constantly of the new paths which mathematics later entered, and that not without feeling the influence of his Art. In the same way is suggested the mystery with which a Fermat hurled his propositions into the world, without giving the proofs for them.

## § 207.

In connection with Lully the common experience is exemplified, that the invention of a method applicable to everything speedily leads a person to take up the sciences as a whole. He had scarcely become a pupil when he became a teacher, an example which is often repeated. The case is different when the acquired material is to be handled poetically. A true poem does not result when a mere external scheme gives to the material furnished, whether complete or fragmentary, the appearance of an organism, but only when the material crystallizes itself, upon the coming together of all the elements. A man is able to play only with that which he understands thoroughly. To handle a subject poetically is play, in distinction from the worry and hard work of the mere rhymster. If the scholastic doctrines are not only to be made easier to scholars by means of rhymes to aid the memory, but are also to be

brought home in a true work of art to the spirit of all who have a soul for beauty, there is needed a man who, more learned than the most learned of his age, combines poetical genius with the learning which made him a living encyclopædia of all the knowledge of his time, and joins to both an accurate knowledge of the world for which he sings. Lully, in order to accomplish his work, was obliged to renounce the world. Dante was all the more fitted to carry out his mission because of the active part which he took in worldly affairs.

### § 208.

#### DANTE.

M. A. F. Ozanam : *Dante et la philosophie catholique au treizième siècle. Nouv. édit.* Paris, 1845. Fr. X. Wegele : *Dante's Leben und Werke, kulturgeschichtlich dargestellt.* Jena, 1852. Karl Witte : *Dante Forschungen. Altes und Neues.* Halle, 1869.

I. DURANTE ALLIGHIERI (also Alighieri, and originally Aldighieri) was born at Florence in May, 1265. He was aroused to poetic enthusiasm by very early love, and through his intercourse with Brunetto Latini, and afterwards with Guido Cavalcanti, he was led to a style of poetic composition which owes its origin to the study of the Roman bards, as well as to a knowledge of the Provençals on the one side, and of the Schoolmen on the other. The death of the object of his affections nearly drove him wild, and he then became better acquainted with the Schoolmen, devoting himself earnestly to the study of philosophy, and hearing lectures upon it in Paris and perhaps in Bologna. The Thomist Siger (*vid. supra*, § 204, 4) seems to have attracted him especially. His long residence in a foreign country may have contributed to the opinion that the rule of the party to which he had hitherto belonged was no longer for the good of his fatherland. However that was, at a period when the victory of the Papacy over the Empire had put an end to the influence of foreigners in Italy, but at the same time to the unity of the country, Dante went over to the Ghibelline party, and declared the well-being of Italy and of the world to be dependent upon the possession of strong power by an Emperor, Italian or non-Italian, ordained of God but not of the Pope. Holding such opinions, he could not have loved Pope Boniface VIII., even if the latter had not schemed against the party of which he was a member. In

the year 1301 he was sent to Rome as an ambassador from his native city, and was retained there until Charles of Anjou entered Florence in the interest of the Pope. He was then, in company with many others, exiled from Florence by the opposite party, on the 27th of January, 1302. From that time on he lived in various places, always hoping, either through the might of weapons or through the withdrawal of the edict of banishment, to be able to return to his home. He was however always deceived, and especially by the failure of the Roman expedition of Henry VII. After that he was for a long time the welcome guest of Can (Grande) della Scala, and later of Guido of Ravenna; but he always felt himself to be an exiled stranger. He died in Ravenna on the 14th of September, 1321.

2. The first extended work which he wrote was the *De monarchia libb. III.*, completed probably in the year 1298 (cf. Böhmer: *Ueber Dante's Monarchia*, Halle 1866). This was followed by the *Vita Nuova*, containing the history of his love for Beatrice down to the year 1300. The greater part of this work had been composed earlier. Dante places the events which are described in his principal work in the same year. After the *Vita Nuova*, he laboured, apparently contemporaneously, upon the two unfinished works, the *Convivio* (commonly called *Convito*), written in Italian, and the *De vulgari eloquentia* (not *eloquio*) in Latin. He appears to have devoted the last thirteen years of his life solely to the great work which has made him immortal—the wonderful *Commedia*, which was very early called the *Divina Commedia*. None of his works has been so often published as this. It has been printed with the greatest diplomatic accuracy in the edition of Karl Witte (Berlin, 1862). Among the editions of his remaining works, that of Fraticelli is especially worthy of praise. Among the German translations of the *Divine Comedy*, that of Philaethes, the late King of Saxony, is especially noteworthy, not only on account of the faithfulness of the rendering, but also on account of its accurate development of the scholastic doctrines. It has recently appeared in a new edition which is accessible to all. In 1864 appeared the translations of the two foremost Dante scholars in Germany, Blanc and Witte. That of the latter has already (1876) reached a third edition, and a volume of notes has been added.



3. The thread upon which Dante in his poem hangs his doctrines, is a passage through Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise, to each of which a third part of the work is devoted. Not only his eschatological, but also his political, dogmatic, and philosophical views are unfolded in the poem. He says expressly in his dedicatory epistle, that his work has more than one meaning. In the midst of the forest of errors where the principal passions roam,—lust of the flesh, pride, and avarice, the three which caused the fall, according to the greatest scholastic theologians,—he is met by Virgil, who appears as the instrument of grace, and is led by him first into the *Lower World*. This is thought of as an inverted cone, whose apex coincides with the middle of the earth and with the centre of gravity of the prince of hell. The first of its various stories (the *Limbus*) is destined for pious heathen and for unbaptized children, the remainder of them for sinners of all kinds. His visit to the different parts, and his conversation with his guide or with various ones among the damned, give him the opportunity of showing that the degree of punishment is proportioned to the guilt, the Aristotelian scale serving as an analogy. At the same time he takes occasion to express himself in regard to the condition and the chief personages of his fatherland, and to complain loudly that the Church has been given over to destruction by worldly possessions and worldly power. As the two most severely punished offenders, there appear, in the deepest abyss of hell, Judas and Brutus, the one the betrayer of Christ, the founder of the Church, the other the betrayer of Cæsar, the founder of the empire. Their treason was directed against that which conditioned earthly happiness and heavenly blessedness. They deserve therefore the greatest misery.

4. In the second part of the poem the journey upon and around the *Mount of Purification* is described. Its base is the antipodes of the gulf of hell, and upon its summit is found the earthly paradise. Not only is the ecclesiastical doctrine of purification after death here drawn out, but it is shown also how it is man's sinfulness which is to blame for the want of happiness on earth. Virgil, the symbol of the wisdom drawn from reason without the help of revelation, is here too the guide. This wisdom serves to show that only repentance can lead to the goal, and that all sins must be done away one after the other, and the mark upon the forehead erased, before the

summit of earthly happiness can be reached. Balconies encircling the mountain, and smaller in diameter the higher up they are, form the scene for the expiation of the seven mortal sins. When almost at the summit, Virgil is relieved by Statius, who is to be regarded as the symbol of philosophy already sanctified by Christianity. The earthly paradise upon the loftiest point of the earth shows, in an exalted vision, how the highest earthly happiness can be reached only when the Church (the chariot) rests upon the empire (the tree). It shows also that the gift of worldly possessions to the Church, although well meant, was destructive, and is one of the principal reasons why the relation of Church and State, as well as all well-being on earth, is disturbed.

5. Virgil had been honoured as the representative of all human knowledge before Dante's time. To Dante the Ghibelline he was especially dear, as the glorifier of imperialism, to Dante the writer, as the model of style. But he can at most lead the way only to the place where the symbols of knowledge and of imperialism are to be found. Into the heavenly *Paradise*, to which the third part of the poem is devoted, the wandering soul, as in the *Anticlaudian* of Alanus (*vid. supra*, § 170, 5), is led by another figure. Beatrice, the early departed object of his boyish and youthful love, whom he had once vowed to glorify above all women, is represented as the symbol of the highest wisdom imparted by revealing grace, that is, of theology; and she shows the way to the truths which are above reason. At her side and under her guidance the poet rises above the earth, and wanders through the nine heavenly spheres, ruled by the three hierarchies of superhuman beings. The description of the journey gives him the opportunity, not only to unfold the cosmical views of his time, but also to judge those in regard to whose blessedness and holiness he had no doubts, and finally to explain the relation between the active and contemplative life. Upon the way, which closes with a hasty contemplation of the Trinity, the most intricate theological and philosophical questions are discussed.

6. To say that Dante gives nothing, or at least very little, which is not to be found in Albert or in Thomas, is not to criticize him. In accordance with the position assigned to him, all that can be demanded is that these doctrines shall

have been so infused into his heart's blood that he may be able to reproduce them in such a way that they shall cease to be the property of the Schools. This is accomplished when he divests the scholastic doctrines of the language of the Schools and of the Church; and when he goes still further, and gives them a form in which, not only the scholar, but business men, knights, women, even the common man, can grow enthusiastic over them, that is, the poetical form. In his hands this form is not merely a garment put on for mnemonic or other purposes, like the rhymed *Sententiae sententiarum* of Bonaventura (*vid. supra*, § 197, 3). In Dante genuine poetry and scholasticism so intermingle, that in his *Convivio* he analyses his love poems rhetorically, and comments upon them scholastically, without feeling that he thus sins against them, and in his *Divine Comedy* transforms the very arcana of scholastic philosophy, with its syllogistic arguments, so dry in the hands of every one else, into the description of a pilgrimage which at one moment terrifies and at the next inspires the reader. At the same time the poem does not make the frosty impression of an allegory, like the *Anti-claudianus*, for instance; but even if the fact, that Virgil, Statius, Beatrice, Matilda signify something other than themselves, be left out of account, it remains a charming thing, a poetical composition of the first rank, not only on account of the magical music of the language, but for many other reasons. Only complete mastery of the material could make possible such a poetical transfiguration of it.

7. It is not to be wondered at, after what has been said above (§ 203, 9), that of the two whom Dante especially follows, Albert should be his master in physics, and Thomas in politics and theology. Of the *natural sciences* none appears more familiar to him than astronomy. The designations of time in his poem show how well-known to him the constellations were; and there are not wanting instances in which he makes attacks upon the corrupt calendar of his day. The nine heavenly spheres were at that time commonly accepted. Of these, seven belong to the planets, the eighth to the fixed stars, while the ninth is the *primum mobile*, and all move within the extra-spatial empyrean. As remarked above, these are combined by Dante with the three hierarchies of the Areopagite, (*vid.* § 146), and that in such a way that the lowest (the sphere of the moon) has an angel, the highest (*primum mobile*) a seraph

as its mover ; in the *Convivio*, where Dante differs with the Areopagite as well as with Gregory the Great in regard to the order of the angels, they are combined also with the arts and sciences of the *trivium* and *quadrivium*. Although Aristotle is for Dante, as well as for Albert and Thomas, the highest authority in physical matters, he differs with him where the two Schoolmen do. The eternity of matter he regards as an error. The original material was created, and not entirely without form, for an actual substance without form is a contradiction. But it has as its form immensity, so that the distinction, made by many Schoolmen in the six days' work, between the *creatio* (*confusio*), *dispositio*, and *ornatus*, can be adopted by him. Dante, in agreement with his great teachers, differs with Aristotle not only in regard to the lowest, but also in regard to the highest physical conception. The soul is not merely the form of the body, but is itself substance, and can therefore exist without the body. To be sure, such independent existence is only temporary, for the impulse to embody itself remains, and produces at one time the phantom body of the intermediate state, and at another the resurrection body.

8. In *politics* also Dante appears as a strict Thomist, wherever principles are concerned, and not merely questions of the day. He owes most to the works of Thomas and of Ægidius Colonna which bear the same title (*vid. supra*, § 203, 9, § 204, 4). The goal of man is a double happiness, an earthly and a heavenly. The way to the former is pointed out by reason (Virgil), and the moral and intellectual virtues which spring from reason suffice for attaining it. Nothing contributes more to it than peace, and the institution for the preservation of peace is the State. The State should be a monarchy, since a division of power weakens it. Beginning with these Thomistic propositions Dante goes on further. Strife may arise, not only among the subjects of a prince, but also among princes themselves, and therefore the latter as much as the former need a monarch over them. This leads to a universal monarchy, to a prince over princes, that is, to an emperor. In his *De Monarchia* Dante seeks to establish in the three books the three following ideas : first, an empire must exist ; secondly, Rome for reasons drawn both from secular and religious history may lay claim to be the centre of such a monarchy ; and finally the emperor is emperor, not by virtue of papal but by

virtue of Divine authority. The Emperor, as the feudal lord of all princes, is feudal lord of the Pope, if the Pope possesses land. Heavenly blessedness is to be distinguished from earthly happiness. The acquired virtues are not sufficient for its attainment; there is needed also the infusion of the theological virtues of which we become participants only through revelation and grace (Beatrice). The institution which leads to the attainment of this end is the Church, whose government is entrusted, not to the Emperor but to the Pope. It is a mortal sin, to renounce the duty of leading the Church, as Celestine had done. The more the Papacy keeps in view only spiritual rule, and only spiritual means to that end, the greater and more glorious it is. In this position it rightly demands that even the Emperor shall bow before the spiritual father. With the same anger with which he attacks the secularization of the Papacy, Dante (although his enemy) stigmatizes the violence inflicted upon Pope Boniface VIII. by the temporal power. That which had been seen once in the history of the world (*vid.* § 152), a ruler of Christendom who was at the same time feudal lord and favourite son of the Church, is what Dante longs for, as Plato had longed for a true republic. It is this which he does not cease to hope for, although he changes his mind in regard to the pillars of his hope.

### § 209.

#### CONCLUDING REMARK.

If the philosophy of an age is only the outspoken secret of the age (*vid.* § 3), the popularization of it ushers in its end. The greater the number to whom a secret is known, the less is it a secret. That which is known by many, or indeed by all, becomes trivial because universally known, and is no longer the peculiar property of the wise. The Sophists, by popularizing the pre-Socratic philosophy (*vid. supra*, § 62) did away with it; Cicero did the same for the entire classical philosophy (*vid.* § 106); and the popular philosophy of the eighteenth century did away with all that preceded Kant. In the same way, when the mastery of the mysteries of scholasticism has become an easily learned artifice, or melodious triplets initiate into the doctrines of the Aristotelians, the thorough investigator of necessity begins to feel that philosophy must be something different and something more. The concluding and therefore

negative reaction of the popularizing activity upon scholastic wisdom arouses the anger of the representatives of the latter, the Thomists, against the Lullists, for so neglecting the Latin language, and leads many modern writers to hail Dante as the beginner of a new period. They are more correct who have called his poem the dying strain of a system that has run its course.

### THIRD DIVISION.

#### The Decadence of Scholasticism.

##### § 210.

THE fact that at its very culmination the fall of scholasticism begins, is explained by its position in the history of the world. The adoption of Aristotelian philosophy by that scholasticism which was honoured by the Church has been characterized as an antitype of the crusades (*vid.* § 180). The first glorious and romantic crusade was followed by later ones in which religious need was a mere side issue, if not indeed wholly a pretence. Only the ignorant masses thought of the holy sepulchre as the object; those who saw more clearly had in view the weakening of the imperial power, the plundering of Constantinople, or commercial and other like ends, so that finally an Emperor infected with Mohammedan ideas, a recognised enemy of the Church under the ban of excommunication, recovered Jerusalem by means of a treaty with the unbelievers, while the really pious King of France, who is honoured as a saint, appeared as a reactionary who was vainly fighting for a lost cause. In the same way, in the diagram of the development of scholastic Aristotelianism, the dominion of faith secured by Albert, asserted by Thomas, and glorified by Dante, must prove itself but temporary. The crusades, instead of promoting the ends of the Church, in the end only call into being new worldly creations and satisfy worldly interests. In the same way, out of the subjection to dogma of heathen secular wisdom must be developed a philosophy which renounces its allegiance to dogma.

##### § 211.

Leaving this parallel out of account, however, it is easy to

explain why the introduction of Aristotelianism into scholasticism necessarily endangered the ecclesiastical character of the latter. It seemed to the Church unobjectionable that Aristotle should testify to the truth of her doctrines; but more carefully considered it was a very serious matter for her. It is plain that the trustworthiness of a person whose testimony is appealed to, is really regarded as higher than that of the person to whom he testifies. As a consequence, whoever becomes accustomed to demand that Aristotle and his commentators shall go surety for the doctrines of the Church, is in a fair way to seek for the testimony of that spirit which inspired Aristotle to write his works and the Arabs to produce their commentaries, instead of searching for the witness of the Holy Ghost. That spirit was one of reverence for the world, indeed of world deification, and the example of Albert and Thomas shows how soon the study of those philosophers leads a person to take an interest in the world—in the case of Albert in the physical, in the case of Thomas in the moral world. If familiarity with them and respect for them increase, it is unavoidable that an enhanced desire should result to know the world, and to find satisfaction in comprehending it scientifically. Roger Bacon, a younger contemporary of Albert, proves this. He was unable to sacrifice to the aims of his Order his love for natural science, as the latter had done. On the contrary, he sacrificed to the study of secular philosophy, and more still to the study of the world itself, first his property, then his peaceful life with his fellow-monks, and finally freedom itself. It is sometimes impossible to avoid smiling, when one sees how artfully this personified thirst for knowledge seeks to persuade himself, or his readers, that knowledge interests him only for ecclesiastical ends. No one has believed it: neither posterity, which is therefore accustomed to separate Bacon from the Schoolmen already considered, nor his contemporaries, who distrusted him as worldly-minded.

### § 212.

#### ROGER BACON.

Emile Charles : *Roger Bacon, sa vie, ses ouvrages, ses doctrines.* Paris, 1861.

I. ROGERUS BACON, who belonged to a well-to-do English family, was born in Ilchester in the year 1214. He first com-

pleted the *trivium* in Oxford, where he distinguished himself by his great industry. He then went to Paris, where he devoted himself wholly to the study of mathematics (*quadrivium*), which was followed by that of the three professions, medicine, law (especially canonical), and finally theology. Adorned with the doctor's hat, he returned to Oxford, and only then entered the Franciscan Order. This was done at the advice of the learned Bishop of Lincoln, Robert Grossetête, who was one of the few men for whom Roger shows esteem. He was not only busied with books, but associated also a great deal with celebrated scholars, and was occupied in teaching poor disciples, and especially in making experiments in physics. The latter occupation gradually consumed his entire property, some two thousand pounds, and, like the Picard, Petrus de Mahan-curia, whom he highly honoured, he learned by experience how greatly a want of money hinders the progress of science. Still more, his labour was looked upon with suspicion by the Order, especially after the death of his patron Grossetête (1253), and he was forbidden by his superior to record his discoveries or to impart them to others. It was perhaps an attempt to disobey orders that brought upon him a severe punishment. At any rate, a residence of ten years in France (1257-67) was doubtless the result of a sentence of exile. It must then have been a welcome event to him when Pope Clement IV., who had become acquainted with him while papal legate in England, requested Roger to write down for his benefit his views upon philosophy. Since the Pope gave him no papers to secure him against his superiors, and sent him no money to meet the expenses incurred, the difficulties of the undertaking were very great. Nevertheless in fifteen months he completed his work proper, the *Opus majus*, and sent it to Rome by his favourite pupil, John of London. He wrote in addition the *Opus minus*, and the *Opus tertium*, which he sent at another opportunity. A year afterward, soon after Bacon's return to Oxford, Pope Clement died. With his successor Roger found little favour, so that when he was imprisoned upon suspicion of using magical arts, an appeal to the Pope produced no effect. How long he remained in prison is not known. He lived at least until the year 1292. Many titles of books ascribed to him designate only parts of his larger works. Of these there have been printed *Speculum alchimie*, 1541, *De mirabili potestate artis et natura*, Paris, 1542, *Libellus de retardandis senectutis acci-*



*dentibus et de senibus conservandis*, Oxon., 1590, *Sanioris medicinæ magistri D. Rogerii Baconis Angli de arte Chymia scripta*, 1603, *Rogeri Baconis Angli viri eminentissimi perspectiva*, Francof., 1614, *Specula mathematica*, Francof., 1614. I have seen none of these works. I therefore suggest it only as a possibility that the *Perspectiva* may be the fifth book of the *Opus majus*, and that the second work named may be the *Epistola de secretis operibus artis et naturæ*. The works known to me are the *Opus majus*, ed. Jebb, London, 1733 (of which the seventh part, the *philosophia moralis*, is omitted), the *Opus minus* (incomplete), and the *Opus tertium* (entire), as well as the *Compendium philosophiæ*, all published in octavo in London, 1859, by J. S. Brewer. The previously printed *Epistola de secretis operibus artis et naturæ, et de nullitate magiæ* is published in connection with them as an appendix.

2. The commission of the Pope included only philosophy ; but in Roger's opinion it depended only upon the pleasure of the Pope whether the necessary means should be furnished for the advancement of science. It is therefore clear why he takes every opportunity to represent philosophy as the buttress of theology, and to point out how Church life, conversion, and, if necessary, the uprooting of unbelievers, are promoted by it. Philosophy, however, according to him, coincides exactly with the teaching of Aristotle. Avicenna follows as second, and Averroës only as the third philosopher. Although all three were unbelievers, they nevertheless received their philosophy from God, and are regarded as such high authorities by Roger that, especially in the case of Aristotle, he repeatedly assumes mistakes of translation in order not to accuse him of error. Although, in accordance with the principle *Ecclesiæ servire regnare est* (*Opus tert.*, 82), he intends to bring the Aristotelian philosophy into the service of the Church, he nevertheless does not wish to be ranked with Alexander (*vid. supra*, § 195), nor with Albert (§ 199–201), nor with Thomas (§ 203). The first he treats rather disdainfully, the two latter, "those boys, who became teachers before they had learned," with open scorn. The bitter outbreaks in the *Opus minus* and *tertium* in regard to the thick books upon Aristotle, written by a philosopher suddenly become famous, but understanding no Greek, etc., refer to Thomas. The theology of these men he considers of no value, since they expound the Sentences instead of the text, as if the former were of more

worth than the latter. Their philosophy, which finally drives out all true theology, is good for nothing, because the preconditions are wanting, without which progress in philosophy is impossible: a familiarity with the language in which the greatest teachers of philosophy wrote, and a knowledge of mathematics and of physics, by means of which they reached their results.

3. The *Opus majus* is quite correctly called in many manuscripts *De utilitate scientiarum*, and is later cited frequently as *De emendandis scientiis*. It aims to show the most correct way to attain a true philosophy, which shall be helpful also to the Church. In the *first* part (pp. 1-22) are given as the hindrances which stand in the way, presuppositions which are based upon authority, custom, and imitation, and are held fast with proud obstinacy. The objection, that the Church has declared against philosophy, is then refuted by the statement that another philosophy was under consideration then, and that the Church itself has since determined differently. The *second* part (pp. 23-43) treats the relation of theology and philosophy, both of which have been inspired by God, the only *intellectus agens*. They are so related to each other that the former shows to what end things are destined by God, the latter how and by what means their destiny is fulfilled. Therefore the Bible, which says that the rainbow appeared in order that the waters should disperse themselves, agrees perfectly with science, which teaches that the rainbow arises in connection with the dispersion of water. The author then relates how the divine illumination is propagated from the first man to his posterity, and how philosophy reached its climax in Aristotle and his school, at which point it was adopted by Christ, who drew from it many arguments for His belief, and in turn added to it much from His faith.

4. The *third* part (pp. 44-56) begins the subject proper. Whoever should desire to draw, from the fact that this part treats *de utilitate grammaticæ*, an agreement on the part of Roger with the old Hibernian method, would forget that he always expresses himself with great disdain in regard to the formal mental training which results from the study of the *trivium*. Grammar and logic, according to him, are native to all men; and the names for a thing which every one knows have little value. What he wishes, is not grammar as such, but the *grammatica aliarum linguarum*, that is, he wishes Hebrew and

Greek to be learned first of all, in order that the Bible and Aristotle may be read in the original, then Arabic, that Avicenna and Averroës may be read ; for translations even of the Scriptures are not entirely correct, and those of the philosophers are so bad that one could wish that Aristotle had never been translated, or that the translations were all burned. The majority of the translators have understood neither the language nor the subject. A great many examples are given to show how neglected linguistics revenges itself. In the *Opus tertium* it is especially pointed out how, particularly in Paris, the Dominicans have as a consequence falsified the text of the Bible by entirely arbitrary conjectures. Therefore, instead of grammar and logic, these *scientiæ accidentales*, *linguæ* should be studied. Not these alone, however, but also *doctrina*, and above all mathematics.

5. The importance of this subject is shown in the *fourth* part (pp. 57-225). Under the name mathematics are embraced all the branches of the *quadrivium*. Mathematics, the *alphabetum philosophiæ* according to the *Opus tert.*, is the foundation of all sciences, of theology as well as of logic. To the latter is especially related that part of mathematics which has to do with the heavenly bodies, *astrologia speculativa* and *practica*. The bad name which astrology has acquired is a result of its being confounded with magic. Roger confines himself almost exclusively to it in the *Opus majus*, after arithmetic and geometry have been only hastily touched upon. The *Opus tert.*, on the other hand, contains very careful investigations upon music. In that part of the larger work in which astrology is treated, Ptolemy and Alhazen are extolled as the unsurpassed, often as the unsurpassable masters. A familiarity with astronomy lies at the basis not only of a comprehension of many passages of the Bible, but also of all geographical and chronological knowledge, without which missions would be impossible, and a fixed ecclesiastical calendar could not exist. The condition of the calendar is in fact a disgrace, and needs the energetic hand of a scientific Pope. Finally, the power of the constellations must be considered, which is always sufficiently important, even though it can be overruled by the grace of God. A knowledge of them gives us also the comforting assurance that among all six existing religions none has been born under such fortunate constellations as the Christian, and that Mohammedanism is ap-

proaching the end of the course fixed by its stars. The freedom of the will is just as compatible with the might of the heavenly bodies as with strong temptations to evil. This part of the work closes with a detailed description of the then known world, in which connection Roger makes especial use of the reports brought home by the Franciscan William, who had been sent as an ambassador to the grandson of the *Dschingis Khan*. The section contains also medical counsel in respect to constellation and geographical situation.

6. In the *fifth* part (pp. 256-444) *Perspectiva* (optics) is treated as an especially important science. The subject of vision in general is first taken up, and then direct, refracted, and reflected light. The discussion is preceded by anthropological investigations in regard to the *anima sensitiva*. There belong to the latter, in addition to the five senses, the *sensus communis*, by means of which every sensation is first made our own, the *vis imaginativa*, which fixes the sensations, the *vis æstimatoria*, which shows itself among brutes as the power of scent, and finally the *vis memorativa*. The last two faculties reside in the back part, the first two in the front of the brain. In the centre of the brain is enthroned the *vis cogitativa* or *logistica*, with which the *anima rationalis* is joined, but that only in man. An accurate anatomical description of the eye is then given, and it is shown how dim, double, and cross sight is to be avoided. Ptolemy, Alhazen, and Avicenna are especially employed in this connection. Roger opposes those who teach that light takes no time to travel. It is only the great rapidity which causes the appearance of instantaneousness. We are to distinguish in our seeing between that which is pure sensation, and that which is perceived *per scientiam et syllogismum*. Judgment is mingled with every act of sight, even of the brute. By the help of geometrical constructions it is shown how we have the power of throwing rays of light and pictures wherever we wish, by means of flat, concave, and convex mirrors.

7. The *Tractatus de multiplicatione specierum* (pp. 358-444) forms an appendix to the preceding investigations. Roger uses the name *species* (*simulacrum*, *idolum*, *phantasma*, *intentio*, *impressio*, *umbra philosophorum*, etc.) to denote that by means of which a thing reveals itself, something therefore of like nature with it, which does not emanate from it, but is rather produced by it, and from which then another

is produced, so that it is thus successively propagated. Thus light, heat, colour, etc., manifest themselves in their *species*. This however is not the case with sound, for that which is propagated is plainly something different from the original vibration of a body. Not only accidents but also substances, and the latter not merely through their form but as a whole, are able to reveal themselves, that is, to propagate their *species*, which will then be something substantial. This revelation however is not a pouring into or an impression upon the passive *recipiens*, but a stimulation to co-production, so that the *species* is produced by both, as for instance the light of the sun produces that of the moon, which could not be seen everywhere if it shone only by reflected light. But since at every point the *species* thus produced give rise to new ones, an increase and a crossing of the various primary and secondary images result, which explains why the corner of a room, for instance, is light, although the sunlight which shines through the window does not fall directly upon it. All these *species* move through inorganic media in straight lines. In the nerves they move also in crooked lines. It is possible with concave mirrors, especially if they are not spherical but rather elliptical in form, to concentrate the rays of the sun at any desired point, and thus to work miracles in war, for instance against unbelievers. A friend, he says in the *Opus tert.*, was quite on the track of this mirror, but he was *Latinorum sapientissimus*. These *species* are not spiritual. They are corporeal, although incomplete and not perceptible to the senses. The great opticians Ptolemy and Alhazen are to be understood only in this way, and they teach in this connection *sine falsitate qualibet*. Of course the further the *species* are from the proper *agens*, the weaker they are; and on the other hand, the nearer the one acted upon stands to the one acting, that is, the shorter the working pyramid whose summit is formed by the *recipiens*, the more powerful the effect must be.

8. The *sixth* part (pp. 445-477) treats of the *scientia experimentalis*. According to Aristotle, the ultimate principles of none of the sciences can themselves be proved, and they must therefore be discovered by experiment. The peculiar superiority of the *scientia experimentalis* may, therefore, be regarded as lying in the fact that in it principles and conclusion are found in the same way. As an example of the

way in which the nature of anything is discovered by experiment, he shows how the fact that each one sees his own rainbow leads to the conclusion that it owes its origin to reflected light, and is not itself an actually existing thing, but only an appearance. By means of experiments, the way in which most things are discovered before the grounds are known, that equilibrium of the elements, among other things, is to be sought for, which, if it existed in man, would make death impossible; if in metals, would restore the purest gold, since silver and all other metals are only crude gold. That equilibrium has not yet been found; but many very important things have been discovered by experiment, as for instance an inextinguishable fire similar to that of the Greeks, that substance which contains saltpetre and which produces a thunderous explosion when ignited in a small tube, and also the attraction between a magnet and iron, or between the two halves of a split hazel rod. Since he has seen this, he says in the *Secret. operib. nat.*, nothing appears to him beyond belief. In the same work he says also that wagons and ships could be built which would propel themselves with the swiftness of an arrow, without horses and without sails. In the same work, and also in the *Opus maj.*, he says that, since the apparent size of an object depends upon the focus of the rays which come together in the eye, it is possible so to arrange concave and convex lenses that the giant will appear like a dwarf, and the dwarf like a giant. It is certain that Roger Bacon knew a great deal which was known by scarcely any one else among his contemporaries. At the same time it is not to be overlooked, that when he scoffs at the ignorant who know no Greek, he himself confounds *διὰ* and *ὅτι* in tracing etymologies, and that, where he boasts most of his mathematics, he condescendingly pities Aristotle because he did not know the squaring of the circle. It sounds rather strange, too, when he offers to teach a person to read and understand Hebrew or Greek in three days, and when he considers a week long enough for learning arithmetic and geometry (*Opus tert.*).

9. His moral philosophy, which forms the *seventh* part of the *Opus majus*, and to which Bacon often refers in his *Op. tert.*, has unfortunately not been published by Jebb. It appears from the *Op. tert.* that it was considered under six different points of view: theological, political, purely ethical, apologetic, parenetic, and legal. We may gather from the

*Op. tert.* that in the fifth section, which treated of eloquence whose theory he refers in part to logic, in part to practical philosophy, he must have judged the preaching of that day very severely. He commends the Frater Bertholdus Alemannus, as a preacher who accomplishes more than the two mendicant Orders together. It is impossible to avoid thinking, that if Roger, instead of becoming a Franciscan monk, had made the attempt to teach as *secularis* in the Paris University, his lot would have been more favourable, and he would have worked with better results and with greater contentment.

### § 213.

The fact that the Aristotelianism which was introduced into scholasticism estranged the Church from the latter, as shown by the example of Roger Bacon, might be looked upon as a proof that the introduction of a foreign element was the only thing which caused the break. But if Aristotelianism be left quite out of account, it may be shown from the very conception of scholasticism, that sooner or later the same result must follow. Scholastic philosophy had received the Church dogmas from the Fathers (cf. § 151). Their content was looked upon as unchangeably fixed. All scholasticism had to do was, in its first period, to conform them to the understanding, in its second period, to bring them into line with the demands of philosophy. Since the content of the doctrines was not at all brought into question, the Church suffered scholasticism to go on with its task, and even encouraged it in it. She did not realize, that the subject with which a philosophy chiefly and exclusively busies itself must become its principal, indeed its sole object, while everything which it puts outside of its sphere of investigation, as indisputably established, must cease to exist so far as the philosophy itself is concerned. A philosophy which does not have to concern itself with the content of dogma, but devotes itself all the more to rational and scientific demonstration, must make the discovery, when it comes to think about itself, that the substance of the doctrine is its smallest concern, while reason and science are its greatest, that is, it must break with dogma. Up to the present time scholasticism, entirely absorbed in its task, had not begun to reflect upon itself. Its commencing to do this must, since philosophy is self-consciousness (cf. § 29).

be looked upon as more philosophical, and therefore as an advance, even if the hitherto existing form be thereby done away with. This advance is made by Duns Scotus, who differs from Thomas, not chiefly in the doctrinal points in regard to which he disagrees with him, but in the object of his labours. Thomas takes the *doctrines* which are to be proved, while Duns Scotus takes the *proofs* for these doctrines, as the peculiar subject of study. In the criticism of the proofs the latter often forgets to come to a decision in regard to the doctrines themselves. That which scholasticism had hitherto actually done became for him the chief object, and this is the reason why he must appear very abstruse to those who compare him with Thomas on the assumption that they pursued one and the same end. It was the same with him as with Fichte at the end of the eighteenth century. The teachings of the *Science of Knowledge* appeared abstruse when compared with the works which treated of the known, while Fichte was speaking of a knowledge of the same. In both cases the men who wrote abstrusely had the clearer heads.

### § 214.

#### JOHN DUNS SCOTUS.

1. If the disputed question, as to whether Duns Scotus was an Englishman, a Scotchman, or an Irishman were to be decided by asking which land was the most devoted to the extension of his fame, he belongs unquestionably to Ireland. Not Duns in Scotland, not Dunston in England, but Dun in the North of Ireland, saw, then, the birth of the man whose name, SCOTUS, according to some, is a designation of his Irish origin, according to others, a family name. He was born in the year 1274, or, according to others, in 1266. He entered the Franciscan Order at an early age, and studied in Oxford, where he learned more from books than from oral instruction, and while still very young became *Magister* in all the sciences. He wrote in Oxford his notes upon the works of Aristotle, as well as his commentary upon the *Sentences*, called *Opus Oxoniense*, also *Anglicanum* or *Ordinarium*. In the year 1304 he went to Paris, and there, by his victorious defence of the *conceptio immaculata b. Virginis*, won the name of *Doctor subtilis*, and from that time on eclipsed all other teachers, including the Provincial of his Order. His commentary upon



the *Sentences* was revised here, many of the later distinctions before the earlier, for instance those of the fourth book before those of the second. This was not, however, the case with all. The unpublished material found after his death was collected and issued under the title *Quæstiones reportatæ*, or *Reportata Parisiensia*, or *Opus Parisiense*, *Parisiense*, or *Parisiacum*. It is naturally far inferior to the *Opus Oxoniense* in its form, but surpasses it in definiteness and clearness. In the year 1308, Duns was sent to Cologne to adorn the school there. He survived only a short time his triumphal entry, which was more splendid than that of a prince, and died suddenly in November of the same year.

2. The edition of his works in twelve folio volumes, which appeared in Lyons in 1639, is ordinarily named after Lucas Wadding, the learned annalist of the Franciscan Order, who really performed great service in connection with its publication, and added a biography of Duns Scotus. The edition bears the title *R. P. F. Joannis Duns Scoti, doctoris subtilis, ordinis minorum, opera omnia quæ hucusque reperiri potuerunt, collecta, recognita, notis scholiis et commentariis illustrata a PP. Hibernis Collegii Romani S. Isidori Professoribus*. This edition contains only "*quæ ad rem speculativam s. dissertationes scholasticas spectant.*" The "*positiva s. S. Sæ. commentarii*" are promised in another collection, which was to contain the commentaries upon Genesis, upon the Gospels, and upon the Pauline epistles, as well as the sermons. The Lyons edition is wanting in most German libraries. The majority of the copies are said to have gone to England. The first volume contains the *Logicialia*, including the *Grammatica speculativa* (pp. 39–76), whose genuineness has been wrongly disputed, then expository *Quæstiones in universalis Porphyrii* (pp. 77–123), *In librum Prædicamentorum* (pp. 124–185), two different redactions of *In libros perihermeneias* (pp. 186–223), *In libros elenchorum* (pp. 224–272), *In libros analyticorum* (pp. 273–430). In an appendix is given a lengthy exposition of the work upon Porphyry, by the Archbishop of Thuan. The second volume contains *In octo libros physicorum Aristotelis*, which are shown by Wadding to be unauthentic. The *Quæstiones supra libros Aristotelis de anima* (pp. 477–582), which the Franciscan Hugo Cavellus attempted to continue in the spirit of Duns Scotus, are genuine. The third volume contains *Tractatus de rerum principio* (pp. 1–208), *de primo*

*brincipio* (209-259), *Theormata* (pp. 260-340), *Collationes s. disputationes subtilissimæ* (341-420), *Collationes quatuor nuper additæ* (421-430), *Tractatus de cognitione Dei* (uncompleted) (pp. 431-440), *de formalitatibus* (441 ff.). *Quæstiones miscellaneæ* and *Meteorologicorum libb. iv.*, conclude the volume. The *fourth* contains the *Expositio in duodecim libros Aristotelis Metaphysicorum*, prefaced with a detailed proof of its genuineness by the editor, which is in contradiction with a brief appendix, in which, after the statement that no one had expounded the thirteenth and fourteenth books, "*nec ipsos aliquando vidi*," it is added that the author has constantly followed Duns Scotus, "*cujus verba frequenter reperies*." The *Expositio* is followed by the *Conclusiones metaphysicæ* and the *Quæstiones in Metaphysicum*. The next six volumes (vols. 5-10) contain the Oxford commentary, the first three each one book, while the fourth book fills three volumes. The expositions of Lychetus, Ponzius, Cavellus, Hiquæus and others which accompany this book cause its unusual extent. The *eleventh* volume contains the *Reportata Parisiensia*, the *twelfth* the *Quæstiones quodlibetales*, which Duns, according to custom, had answered on the occasion of his receiving for the second time (in Paris) the degree of doctor, and had later worked over, and perhaps, as was also customary, had supplemented with additions. The Oxford commentary and the *Quodlibetales* have often been printed, for instance in Nuremberg, by Koburger, in 1481. The same is true of the *Reportata Parisiensia*, which appeared in the year 1518 in an edition which speaks of them as *nunquam antea impressa*. The publisher is Joannes Solo, *cogn. major*, the editor Jehan Gräion. Another edition, Colon., 1635, bears the title *Quæstiones reportatæ per Hugonem Cavellum noviter recognitæ*, etc. The text in the complete edition differs greatly from that of these earlier ones. The editor not only divides the *Quæstiones* into sections (*Scholia*), corresponding to the *Opus Oxoniense*, as Cavellus does, but also takes the liberty of amplifying expressions which seem too brief, and of substituting for such as appear too barbaric what, in his opinion, are improvements, so that he really becomes often a paraphrast. A more important fact is, that he had before him more complete manuscripts. For instance, in the Paris and Cologne editions the third question of Lib. iv., dist. 43, is wanting, only its contents being given. In the complete

edition it is treated at great length. The four sections of this discussion follow essentially the same line as the *Opus Oxoniense*, but differ from it sufficiently to show that the editor gives, with variations in style, what Duns had said in his Paris lectures. The citations which follow, all refer to the Lyons complete edition.

3. Almost the greater part of Duns' discussions consists in a polemical critique of Albert, of Thomas, still more of Henry of Ghent, and further of Ægidius Colonna, Bonaventura, Roger Bacon, Richard of Middletown, and others. It is thus natural to compare him with his predecessors. A difference between his Aristotelianism and that of the Dominicans lies in the fact that he is better acquainted with Aristotle than they were, not, to be sure, without owing much to their labours. He not only argues from passages which they seem to have overlooked, but also often understands better what they too quote: for instance, where Aristotle (*vid. supra*, § 88, 6) speaks of the *extrinsecus advenire* of the *anima intellectiva* (*vid. Report. Paris. IV. dist. 23, quæst. 2*). The investigations also, in regard to individuality, which were undertaken at the same time, show that Duns pays more attention than the others to Aristotle's distinction between τὸ τί ἐστὶ and τὸδε τι. He shows how familiar the synonymous investigations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* are to him, and how thoroughly acquainted he is with the teachings of the *Topics*, by the easy way in which he refers to both. But this clearer perception of the real meaning of Aristotle must necessarily reveal the contradiction between his teaching and the teaching of the Bible and of the Church Fathers, and for that reason threaten the peace between philosophy and theology. This danger is somewhat lessened by the fact that Duns maintains rather the form to which the doctrines of each had developed, than the original doctrines themselves. His theology is far less Biblical than ecclesiastical. Our belief in the Bible, he says, and in the fact that the Apostles, fallible men as they were, were infallible when they wrote, rests solely upon the judgment of the Church (*Report. Paris.*, III., d. 23). In the same way he appeals to later ecclesiastical definitions when he rejects Augustine's propositions as erroneous (*Op. Oxon.*, III., d. 6, qu. 3). Accordingly he allows himself to supplement the Bible and earlier doctrines of the Church. The Biblical statement that eternal life consists in the knowledge of God,

does not hinder him from maintaining that it consists rather in love, for, as he contends, the Bible does not say in knowledge without love (*Report., Paris., IV. d. 49, qu. 2*). In opposition to Anselm he claims the right of introducing new *termini* into theology (*Op. Oxon., I., d. 28, qu. 2*). On the other hand, he is not so free in regard to the papal decrees; they are for him decisive. It is characteristic also that he differs far oftener from Augustine than from Lombard. He holds that the Holy Spirit has not let the Church stand still, and therefore, while admitting that the *conceptio immaculata Virginis*, and many ecclesiastical customs, such as the celibacy of the clergy, etc., are not taught in the Bible, he nevertheless upholds them strongly (*Report. Paris., III., d. 3*). As theology, in his opinion, is not the word of Scripture but that which has grown from it, in the same way philosophy has not remained at a stand-still since the time of Aristotle. It is true that he puts the master so high as sometimes to say that a certain thing cannot be demonstrated, for then either Aristotle or his commentator, the *maximus philosophus* Averroës, would have proved it (*Report. Paris., IV., d. 43, qu. 2*). In the *Opus Oxon.*, in connection with the same passage, he expresses himself quite differently about the *maledictus Averroys*). On the other hand, he often shows much more freedom in his relations to Aristotle. He says that the latter had taken many things from his predecessors as probable, which we now understand better (*Ibid., II. d. 1, qu. 3*). Wherever Aristotle and his expounders contradict each other we must adopt the more rational position (*Quodl., qu. 7*), etc. His familiarity with the additions which the Byzantine philosophers and their Latin editors had made to the Aristotelian logic, makes him certain that here Aristotelianism has really advanced. The *Summulæ*, as well as Shyreswood's revision, are used very often and quoted as opportunity arises. The belief that the Spirit which leads the Church, as well as the Spirit which begets philosophy, constantly moves forward, made it possible to investigate more freely than before the original sources of theology and philosophy, and to retain the hope that, in spite of all the variety of those sources, that which springs from them can be finally united.

4. To this is to be added the fact, that the full agreement of Church doctrine and philosophy is no longer a matter of so great moment to Duns as it was to Thomas, and hence is by

no means so complete. When he criticizes those who confound theology and philosophy, and give neither to theologians nor to philosophers their dues, he is thinking, amongst others, of Thomas (*Op. Oxon.*, II., d. 3, qu. 7). He carries the distinction of the two almost to complete separation. He says that the order of things which the philosopher accepts as natural is for the theologian a result of the fall (*Quodl.*, qu. 14); that the philosopher understands by blessedness the blessedness of this world, the theologian that of the world beyond (*Report. Paris.*, IV., d. 43, qu. 2); that philosophers and theologians think in quite a different way of the *potentia activa* (*Op. Oxon.*, IV., dist. 43, qu. 3 fin.). Indeed, he goes further than this, and even says that a proposition may be true for the philosopher but false for the theologian (*Report. Paris.*, IV., d. 43, qu. 3. *Schol.*, 4, p. 848). We often find in his works a contrast also between *Catholici* and *Philosophi*. Duns avoids the necessity of choosing between philosophy and theology, which seems to be a result of such a contrast, by attributing to the former, as Albert had done, but much more distinctly than he, a purely theoretical character, while he emphasizes the decidedly practical nature of theology, whose proper content is Christ. He carries this so far as to say that God's theology, that is, the way in which God conceives the subject of theology, is practical and not speculative (*Disp. subt.* 30), and that he often doubts whether theology, since it is unable to prove its chief propositions, can actually be called a science (*Theorem.* 14; *Op. Oxon.* and *Report. Paris.*, II., d. 24). If it is held to be such, however, because the theological propositions have as their content not merely a knowledge of principles, which is an *evidentia ex terminis*, but a knowledge deduced from them (*Report. Paris.*, Prol., qu. 1), it must at least be maintained that theology is a science different from all others, resting upon principles peculiar to itself, and of a character more practical than speculative (*Op. Oxon.*, Prol., qu. 4, 5).

5. If, in accordance with these hints, we consider separately Duns' purely philosophical investigations, and commence with his dialectics, the first question that presents itself is, How is his doctrine of the universals related to that of his predecessors? He is a decided opponent of those who see in the universals mere *fictiones intellectus*. If their opinion were correct, science would be transformed into mere logic, since all

science has to do with the universal. Those who hold this opinion are treated rather scornfully by him as *loquentes, garruli*, etc. When he says that *cuiuslibet universali correspondet in re aliquis gradus entitatis in quo conveniunt contenta sub ipso*, he is a conceptualist, as Abelard and Gilbert were (*vid. supra*, § 163, 3). Duns shows, however, in the same way that Avicenna, and after him Albert and Thomas had done, by maintaining alongside of the conceptualistic formula *in rebus*, the realistic *ante res*, and the nominalistic *post res* (cf. § 114, 1; § 200, 2), that the strife between the nominalists and the realists is a thing of the past (cf. *Op. Oxon.*, I., d. 3, qu. 4). He agrees word for word with the Schoolmen mentioned, when he teaches that the general exists *first* as the original type, after which things are formed, that it exists *secondly* in them as the *quiditas* which gives the nature of the thing, and *thirdly* that it is discovered by our understanding, which abstracts it from the things (hence *post res*), as that which is common to them. Since Duns often limits the word *universale* to this third signification, and emphasizes the fact that the *universale* as such (potentially) lies in the understanding (*In sup. Pophyr.*, p. 90), many have wrongly regarded him as a nominalist, quite forgetting that he says immediately afterward, that the *universalitas* is *in re* and *no figmentum*. Since he named the universals *formæ*, his view, in accordance with the principle of nomenclature stated above (§ 158), has been called the formal. In regard to the origin of general conceptions in the thinking soul, Duns is much more exact than Albert and Thomas. As they had done, he bases them here on the *species*, which he calls *intelligibiles* in agreement with Thomas, instead of *spirituales* as Albert had named them; and he distinguishes them from the *species sensibiles*, the impressions of individual things. They are neither mere effects of the genera which exist in the things,—as is taught by the Platonists and by Thomas also, who makes knowledge quite passive,—nor are they simple figments of the intellect; but the impression received from them, as mere *ocasio* or *concausa*, causes the understanding to form those *species intelligibiles* to which the general *in rebus* corresponds. Since only these *species* are expressed in words, the latter designate the things only indirectly, and are direct symbols of the *species* alone. The difference between Thomas and Duns Scotus becomes much more apparent in the question, How and in what are the

general and individual distinguished? They are both real (*in natura*), or, what is the same thing, reality has a like relation to both (*natura est indifferens*) (*Op. Oxon.*, II., d. 3, qu. 1). The difference must therefore lie in something else. According to Thomas (§ 203, 5), it was the *materia signata* which individualized. The result of this opinion was the position rejected by the Church, that angels could not be individuals of a species, and hence Duns concludes that the opinion itself is heretical (*De anima*, qu. 22). On philosophical grounds also, it is to be rejected. For since, according to Thomas, matter is a limit and a defect, it follows from his theory that it is really an imperfection for a thing to be *hoc* or *hæc*. In opposition to this Duns asserts that that which makes a thing *hoc* or *hæc*, is something positive (*ultima realitas*, *Op. Oxon.*, II., d. 3, qu. 6), and that the individual is more perfect, and is the true end of nature (*Report. Paris.*, I., d. 36, qu. 4). Individuality is designated by Duns by various names. In the *Expositio ad duod. libri Met. Ar.*, which may perhaps be regarded as unauthentic on account of its postscript referred to above, and also in the *Report. Paris.* (II., d. 12, qu. 6), occurs the expression *hæcceitas* (in very old editions, *ecceitas*), which was subsequently often made use of by the Scotists. It is employed in such a way as to denote sometimes the individual and specific being itself, sometimes that which makes the individual specific. Other expressions used by Duns are *unitas signata ut hæc*, *hoc signatum hac singularitate*, *individuitas*, *natura atoma*, etc. (*Op. Oxon.*, II., d. 3, qu. 4). The constantly recurring objection brought against Thomas is, that according to him that which more closely defines a *quid*, and makes of it a *hoc* (*contrahit*), is a negative, while it should really be conceived as something positive, something which makes more perfect (*Op. Oxon.*, II., d. 3, qu. 6, and other passages). In opposition to this (pantheizing) disparagement of individual beings, we are not to go so far, however, according to Duns, as certain (atomizing) deifiers of the individual go. The assertion of Brother Adam, that material things are individuals *ex se* or *per se*, appears to him blasphemous and nominalistic (*Ibid.*, qu. 1): blasphemous, because in God alone is the *quiditas per se hæc* (*Report. Paris.*, II., d. 3, qu. 1), nominalistic, because it is thereby denied that anything actual outside of their individuality exists in things. According to Duns the correct view is, that the individual existence of

things, which are not, like God, *purus actus*, is something simultaneously composed (*Report. Paris.*, II., d. 12, qu. 8). With this distinction, in the way in which the *essentia divina* and the *substantia materialis* are one and *hæc*, is connected the fact that, since the former is common to the three Persons, there is in God a *commune*, which is nevertheless *realiter individuum* (*Op. Oxon.*, II., d. 3, qu. 1), while in man *incommunicabilitas* is a necessary property of *singularitas* (*Quodl.*, qu. 19). In the *Opus Oxon.* (III., d. 1) Duns distinguishes between the *communicabile ut quod*, which can be predicated only of the *singulare illimitatum*, that is of God, and the *ut quo*, so that every created individual nature is *incommunicabile ut quod*; while on the other hand he does not deny it a *communicabilitas ut quo*. On account of this distinction Duns often shows the tendency to limit the word *individuum* to the sphere where there is also *dividuum* (*Report. Paris.*, I., d. 23), and hence not to call the Divine nature *individuum*, as in the case just cited. But whatever it may be called, individuality constitutes always the precondition of personality. *Individuari prius est quam personari* (*Report. Paris.*, III., d. 1, qu. 8) is true of Divine as well as of human being.

6. To pass on to the metaphysical investigations, Duns makes the *ens* their first object as well as the first object of our reflective understanding in general. Since it is the predicate of everything, of God, of substance, of accidents, etc., and that too *univoce*; and since in metaphysics we must take our start from being, in order to prove the existence of God, the *ens* is really the conception which has the priority of all others (*De anima*, qu. 21; *Report. Paris.*, I., d. 3, qu. 1). Since *ens* is the opposite of *non-ens*, but *non-ens* or *nihil* is for the most part that which is contradictory to itself (*Quodl.*, qu. 3), the proposition of identity is true of every being, and every being, even the Divine, is subject to it. The *impossibilitas contrariorum* is absolute necessity. Although *ens* is the highest conception, it cannot properly be called the highest genus, but, as that which embraces all, has only a position analogous to that of the genus (*De rer. princ.*, qu. 3). The *ens* stands in fact above the genus of predicables and predicaments; it is *transcendens* just as its predicates of unity, of truth, etc., are transcendent because they are true of the *ens* before it *descendit in decem genera* (*Theorem.* 14, *Report. Paris.*, I. d. 19; *Quodl.* qu. 5) The *ens* as such is therefore neither the first genus,



nor the highest substance, nor accident ; as that which embraces everything, it stands not in, but above these relations. The lowest position within the sphere of being is occupied by matter. This therefore is not to be thought of as mere limit, for in that case it would be *non-ens* ; it is in fact a something positive. Even without form it is an actual something (*Report. Paris.*, II., d. 12). It is an *absolutum quid*, and is not to be thought of as a mere correlate, as is maintained by those who say that it cannot be conceived without form (*Op. Oxon.*, II., d. 12, qu. 2). With this may be easily reconciled the fact that it is the possibility of new effects, and that there is a condition of it which has been preceded by no effect, where it is thus indeed *actu* but *nullius actus*, the principle of passivity (*De rer. princ.*, qu. 11), the purely determinable. It is this as *materia primo-prima*, which, as receptivity for every form, contains only the form of the *primum agens* in the creation of things. The *materia secundo-prima* would then be that which is formed in propagation (*informatur*), the *materia tertio-prima* that which underlies other transformations, etc. (*De rer. princ.*, qu. 7, 8). The *materia primo-prima* is thus common to all things ; not even souls and angels are without it. When a soul therefore is called the form of its body, it must not be forgotten that it, this *informans*, is itself a substance, and therefore *materia informata*, a union of matter and form (*Ibid.*). In this lies the possibility that a soul may exist separated from the body. It follows however from the same fact, that since an angel can never be united with a body as its form, the *materia primo-prima* in angels must be joined with its form in a different way from that of man, must be otherwise informed, and thus a specific difference exists between angels and disembodied souls (*Op. Oxon.*, II., d. 1. qu. 5). When we find these fine distinctions drawn in respect to matter, we are led to look for similar ones in regard to its correlate, form. Duns does in fact draw such distinctions, and employs them especially when he combats the second watch-word of the Thomists, the *unitas formæ*. He asserts, namely, a *pluralitas formarum* in man, with which the fact is easily reconcilable that the last added, highest (*ultima*) form has all the lower ones under itself, in such a way that it may be called one element in man, while the rest of them, together with matter, constitute the other element (*Op. Oxon.*, IV., d. 11, qu. 3). As Albert had previously distinguished the *materiale* (*hyleale*) from *materia* proper (*hyle*), Duns in the present

instance distinguishes *formalitas* from *forma*; and thus, since his *formalitates* present a succession of degrees, it comes to pass that the *formalitates* and the question as to the *intensio et remissio formarum* are made for a time the favourite point of strife. Since the *formalitas* as well as the *forma* gives the what and therefore the name of the *informatum*, Duns often treats *formalitas* and *quiditas* as synonymous. As matter occupies the lowest, God assumes the highest position among the *entia*. He is the nature to which perfection belongs, and therefore reaches beyond everything which is not Himself (*De prim. omn. rer. princ.*, 4). The existence of this endless Being, since He has no cause, cannot be deduced from one, that is, cannot be proved *propter quid* or *a priori*. At the same time one has no right to look upon His existence as *ex terminis* certain and therefore needing no proof, as Anselm had done in his ontological argument. There is a *demonstratio quia*, or an *a posteriori* proof of His existence drawn from His works (*Op. Oxon.*, I., d. 1, 2). By this means we arrive at the existence of a first cause and of a highest end, *quo majus cogitari nequit*. The cosmological, teleological, and ontological arguments are thus combined by Duns in a peculiar way. No supernatural illumination is necessary for this knowledge of God; it is possible *in puris naturalibus*, and is scientific because deduced or proved (*Op. Oxon.*, I., d. 3, qu. 4). The argument however leads only to a highest cause. That it is the only one, that it is almighty and needs no material cannot be proved (*Op. Oxon.* and *Report. Paris.*, I., d. 42; *Quodl.*, qu. 7). The nature of God also may be reached by a like process of reasoning. All things contain at least the *vestigium*, the more perfect the *imago Dei*, that is, the former resemble a part of the Divine, these the Divine itself, and so we are able by examining ourselves (*via eminentiæ*) to rise to a knowledge of the Divine nature (*Op. Oxon.*, I., d. 3, qu. 5). Psychology therefore forms the bridge between ontology and theology.

7 The chief point of difference between the psychology of Thomas and that of Duns lies in their view of the relation between thinking and willing. Both, although found *unitive* in the soul, are nevertheless actually (*formaliter*) distinct from one another and from the soul (*Op. Oxon.*, II., d. 16). Thomas had so conceived of their relation that the will must follow thought, and must choose that which the reason represents to it as good. This is combated by Duns. He not only ascribes

to the will the power of determining itself quite independently of the reason (*Op. Oxon.*, II., d. 25), and under certain circumstances deciding in opposition to it, but he also points out that very often thinking follows willing, as for instance when I try to perceive, when I will to think, etc. Over against the objections of his opponents, he assumes a first and a second act of thinking, between which the act of willing falls. But even the first does not determine the will, for *voluntas superior est intellectu* (*Rep. Paris.*, d. 42, qu. 4). For Duns the will coincides completely with the *liberum arbitrium*. What it does is *contingens et evitabile*, while the intellect is subject to necessity (*Op. Oxon.*, ii., d. 25). Duns is a most decided indeterminist. The intellect according to him only furnishes the material, while the will shows itself free, that is, able to choose either of two opposites (*Ibid.*, I., d. 39). Indeed this doctrine of freedom reacts upon his theory of knowledge. The beginning of all knowledge can be called an act of receiving in so far as every act of perception has, as its *basis et seminarium*, sensation, which is possible only as a result of an impression and image (*species*) of the object. At the same time, aside from the fact that this is so only as a result of the fall, the act of receiving is not, as Thomas holds, a mere passivity. The object and the perceiving subject work together. The former is not the sole cause, but only the associate cause, the occasion, of the image which arises in our mind (*Op. Oxon.*, I., d. 3, qu. 4, 7, 8; *Disput. subt.*, 8). The self-activity of the mind is still more prominent in the subsequent steps through which the process of perception passes. Since the images remain in the mind after the act of appropriation, for the most part (again on account of the fall) as *phantasmata* (*De anima*, qu. 17), but also in part as *species* which represent the intelligible, and since both can be called up by the memory, the latter is plainly a transforming, indeed, as is proved in the production of words, actually a producing power (*Report. Paris.*, IV., d. 45, q. 2). Self-activity is shown still more in the *intellectus agens*, that power of the soul which is related to sensible images as light to colours, to the *intellectus possibilis* as light to the eye, to actual perception as light to the act of seeing (*De rer. princ.*, qu. 14), and which makes actual knowledge out of fancies. To these acts is finally added, however, a pure act of will, the act namely of concurrence, which necessarily follows only in the few cases in which a thing is *ex terminis* certain, otherwise, if not entirely at

pleasure, yet not without the consent of our will (*Disp. subt.*, 9). This concurrence, where a thing is not certain and the concurrence therefore not necessary, is belief (*fides*), and hence it follows that a great deal of knowledge is based upon *fides*, indeed that the greater part of knowledge is a completion of belief and therefore more than the latter (*Report. Paris.*, Prol., qu. 2). This superiority of knowledge does not exclude the superiority of belief in other respects (*Op. Oxon.*, III., d. 23). A distinction, in fact, is to be drawn between the *fides acquisita*, which even the unbaptized may have in respect to the doctrines of the Church, if he does not distrust those who testify to him of their truth, and the *fides infusa* by means of which we become partakers of grace. While the former, as concurrence without compulsion, is an act of the will, there must be recognised in the latter the element of passivity, which Thomas wrongly ascribes to all belief and therefore to all knowledge (*Op. Oxon.*, I., d. 3, qu. 7). If this *fides infusa* were ever accompanied by the *fides acquisita*, a condition would result of which, as it appears, man is not capable in this world (*Quodl.*, qu. 14).

8. From these psychological doctrines conclusions are drawn in regard to the Divine nature, which can also be known *ex puris naturalibus*, but likewise only *a posteriori* (*Theorem.* 14, *Report. Paris.*, I., d. 2, qu. 7). Our knowledge therefore of the Divine nature is not intuitive but deductive (*Ibid.*, Prol., qu. 2). The two modes are so distinguished that the latter *abstrahit ab esse fuisse et fore*, while the former presupposes the presence of the object with which it ends. As in us there is a difference between *intellectus* (and its central point, *memoria*) and *voluntas*, in God also understanding and will must be distinguished. The former works *naturaliter*, the latter *libere*. The former is the ground and the content of all that is necessary, the latter causes all that is accidental, and causes it *contingenter* (*Report. Paris.*, II., d. 1, qu. 3). The ultimate ground of all contingency is this power of the accidental in God (*Ibid.*, I., d. 40). With these two definitions of Duns the doctrine of the Trinity is closely connected, since the Son, as *verbum*, has His ground in the *memoria perfecta*, while the Holy Spirit has His in the *Spiratio* of the first two Persons mediated by the will (*Report. Paris.*, I., d. 11; *Op. Oxon.*, I., d. 10). He therefore does not hesitate to ascribe to the natural man the ability to apprehend the Trinity (*Quodl.*,

qu. 14). These relations within the Godhead (*rationalia*), by virtue of which there are three Persons, are the first results which spring from the Divine nature, and are therefore to be deduced from the known *essentiales* (*Ibid.*, qu. 1). It is different with all God's relations *ad extra*. Since every being outside of God owes its origin to His will, which *contingenter causat* (*Op. Oxon.*, I. d., 39), it can by no means be proved that anything outside of God must exist. God wills necessarily only His own nature; everything else is *secundario volitum* (*Report. Paris.*, I., d. 17). There is no *impossibilitas contrariorum* in the fact that God might have created other things than those He did create, or that He might do other than He does (*Report. Paris.*, I., d. 43, qu. 2). We can therefore only say that in the course of the customary order which may be pleasing to God, this or that will certainly take place (*Ibid.*, IV., d. 49, qu. 11). Duns is forced to the assumption of such a customary order by the distinction between creation, that is the passage of nothing into being, and preservation, the passage of being into being. He calls them two different relations of God to things (*Quodl.*, qu. 12), or rather of things to God (*Op. Oxon.*, I. d., 30, qu. 2). God's willing the things is preceded by the idea of them in the Divine understanding, which thinks them as separate things. These ideas, however, by no means determine God, least of all in such a way that He chooses a thing because it is the best. Rather is it the best only because He chooses it (*Op. Oxon.*, III., d. 19, and other passages). The Incarnation and the sending of the Spirit are, like the Creation, works solely of Divine pleasure. If God had wished, He could have become a stone instead of a man. Although it is certain that the Incarnation would have taken place even if there had been no Fall, it nevertheless cannot be proved. Nor can it be proved that the Redemption had to take place by the death of Christ. It has pleased God that the death of the guiltless should be the ransom (*Op. Oxon.*, III., d. 7, qu. 1, d. 30, IV., d. 15). (With these assertions are later connected the strifes with the Thomists on the merit of Christ, on adoption, acceptilation, etc.). All of these doctrines require the *gratia infusa*, if we are to be certain of them; they are articles of faith, which admit no scientific proof (*Ibid.*, d. 24). The same is true of the practical part of revelation. That which God commands is good, and it is good only because He prescribes it. If He had commanded

murder or any other crime, it would be no crime, it would not be sin (*Ibid.*, d. 37). There is thus no idea here of the *per-seitas* of the good (*vid.* § 203, 6).

9. When the indeterminateness of the will is so emphasized there must arise an opposition, much sharper than before, against the Aristotelian elevation of theory above everything, and against Augustine's Anti-Pelagianism, that is, against the two chief doctrines of scholasticism as it had been. Accordingly we hear Duns saying, the philosopher, it is true, puts blessedness in knowledge, but he concerns himself only with this world, while the really Christian opinion is the theological one, according to which blessedness consists in love, therefore in willing. For this very reason it appears to him almost too quietistic, when blessedness is conceived as *delectatio* (*Report. Paris.*, IV., d. 49, qu. 1, 2, 6). How he reconciles the words of the Bible with his view has been already shown. It is true that the will alone cannot attain blessedness, it needs to be supported by the infusion of the theological virtue *charitas* (*Ibid.*, qu. 40). But this infusion does not take place without our co-operation. Christ is the door and opens the way to salvation. It is not however the door, but the act of walking which brings us in (*Op. Oxon.*, III., d. 9). Holding such synergism, it is quite natural that Duns should ascribe to the faith, which appropriates salvation, merit which will be rewarded. Only in the dispensation of mercy does God alone decide; in the execution of righteousness the deed of man co-operates (*Report. Paris.* IV., d. 46). Indeed it cannot be said to be absolutely impossible that man should attain blessedness by his own morality, for there is no real contradiction in this, but under the established order of things it does not take place (*Ibid.*, d. 49, qu. 11). It is clear that Duns here goes very far in the direction of Pelagianism.

10. As the followers of Thomas were chiefly from the Dominicans, those of Duns, the SCOTISTS, are almost exclusively from the Franciscan Order. Among his personal pupils the first place is occupied by a FRANCISCUS, who is called from his birth-place Mayro, or DE MAYRONIS. Some place him almost on an equality with his master. His ability in deductive reasoning is evidenced by his honorary title *Magister abstractionum*, and for his skill in disputation speaks the fact that he became the inventor of that *actus Sorbonicus*, or "*Sorbonica*," in connection with which a disputation was held for a whole

day without interruption and without presiding officers. His Commentary upon the *Sentences* appeared in Venice, 1520, together with other works. The commentary upon the first book had been previously printed in Treviso. Franz Mayro died in Piacenza in 1327. The Aragonian Andreas, with the cognomen *Doctor Mellifluus*, John Dumbleton of Oxford, Gerard Odo, eighteenth general of the Franciscan Order, John Bassolis, the *Doctor Ornatissimus*, Nicolas of Lyra, Peter of Aquila, the Oxonian Walter Burleigh, the *Doctor planus et perspicuus*, who died in 1157, John Jandunus (Gandavensis), the greatest Averroist of his age, are cited as Scotists with especial frequency. Later the strife against nominalism, and still more the danger which threatened the Scotists as well as the Thomists from the new tendencies in philosophy, caused them to forget their conflicts with each other and to make attempts at a compromise. From the beginning, however, the two parties, especially where the rivalry between the Orders fell out of sight, were not so widely separated but that, in one or another of the contested points, the Thomists approached Duns, and the Scotists the doctrines of Thomas. Especially in the sphere of Logic there resulted a number of intermediate forms, which are given in the third volume of Prantl's work, already so often referred to.

### § 215.

When Duns combats not only Thomas, but also just as often the latter's opponent, Henry of Ghent; when he contends not only against the two renowned Dominicans, but also against the glittering stars of his own Order, Alexander and Bonaventura; when he is further just as severe in his polemics in cases where he agrees in doctrine with his opponents, as in the opposite cases,—all this is due to the fact mentioned above (§ 213), that the object of his study is not the thing to be proved but the act of proving itself. He stands, therefore, in a position essentially different from that of Albert and Thomas. If this fact is overlooked he will be ranked far below the two latter; below Thomas, because in most cases where he differs with him he goes back to Albert; below both of them because the chasm which he makes between theology and philosophy is far greater than it was with them. But, on the other hand, when his position is more correctly

estimated, it will be seen that, in reflecting upon their action, he goes beyond them ; and therefore it is not true, as in the case of Albert, that for him theology and philosophy do *not yet* agree, but that they *no longer* agree. The harmony between them rests upon the fact that the proofs of science stood at the service of doctrine. When they are made the principal thing they are raised above a position of servitude, and therefore cease to act as the handmaids of doctrine. In spite of the fact, therefore, that Duns is the truest son of the Romish Church, he has brought scholastic philosophy to a point where it is obliged to announce to Rome the termination of its period of service. This attitude of scholasticism of course appears as a victory of earlier nominalism to those who represent the interests of ecclesiasticism alone. The assertion that only the individual actually exists, united with the statement that philosophy does not confirm the doctrines of the Romish Church, was enough to make their author looked upon as a pure Roscellinus, and to cause the latter's watch-word, *universalia sunt nomina et flatusoris*, to be ascribed to the moderns. It was quite out of order that the name nominalist, which in its original meaning was rightly, indeed necessarily, disclaimed by Occam, should in strictly scientific discussion be applied first to him, and then to all whom we prefer to call individualists. This has however taken place ; and to refuse to employ the customary nomenclature would be to give up all idea of being understood. Accordingly we shall speak here always of the victory, not of Occamism, but of nominalism ; but we wish to point out at the start, as H. Ritter has done, that the nominalism of the fourteenth century is *something entirely different* from that which had previously borne that name. The later nominalism, in so far as it is different from the earlier, rests upon that into which scholastic Aristotelianism had grown. The two principal propositions which Duns opposed to Thomism, became the chief pillars of fourteenth century nominalism. Occam so unites the two propositions, that individual being is the true and perfect being, and that God acts with absolutely unrestrained arbitrariness, that they mutually support each other, as well as his whole system of philosophy and theology. The time for nominalism being come, it is the men mentally best endowed who now show a tendency to it, a state of affairs exactly opposite to that which existed in Anselm's time. Thomism is farther from nomi-



nalism, and therefore Durand of St. Pourçain (died 1333), in becoming a nominalist, changes from a disciple to an opponent of Thomas. In his work upon the *Sentences* (Lyons, 1569), and in another *De statu animarum*, he gives utterance to the proposition, that to be individual means in general to be. Scotism leads more clearly to nominalism, and therefore Peter Aureolus was looked upon as a follower of Duns even after he had declared himself to be a complete nominalist. He was first a teacher in Paris, and finally Archbishop of Aix, and died, according to the common view, in 1321, according to Prantl, not before 1345. The report that it was Occam's instruction that made a nominalist of Durand is unfounded. Another report makes Aureolus the teacher of Occam, but this is no better supported than the former. He and Occam were perhaps fellow-students. In any case the cardinal points upon which Occam's doctrines rest are to be found in the works both of Durand and of Aureolus, as well as of other contemporaries.

## § 216.

### WILLIAM OF OCCAM.

I. WILLIAM, called, from his birthplace in Surrey, OCCAM or Ockam, after studying at Merton College, Oxford, and holding for a time a position as pastor, is said to have entered the Franciscan Order and to have become a hearer of Duns, and later to have taught philosophy and theology in Paris. His innovations in both branches procured him the title of *Venerabilis inceptor*, and the acuteness which he displayed in connection with them, that of *Doctor invincibilis*. At this time he wrote *Super quatuor libros Sententiarum* (Lyons, 1495, fol.), in which only the first book of the *Sentences* is expounded in all its distinctions, also the *Quotlibeta septem* (Strasb., 1491, which contains also the *Tractatus de sacramento altaris*), the *Centilogium theologicum* (Lyons, 1495), the commentaries upon Porphyry and upon the first two works of the *Organon*, which was issued in Bologna (1497) by Marcus of Benevento, under the title *Expositio aurea super artem veterem*, finally the *Disputatio inter clericum et militem*, in which he attacks the pretensions of Boniface VIII. and the temporal power of the popes in general. The last work was written according to Goldast in the year 1305, but this is

probably too late a date. It has often been published, for instance in Paris in 1598, and also in Goldast's *Monarchia*, vol. i., p. 13 ff. Occam also expounded some of the physical works of Aristotle, as appears from his *Logic*; but no such commentaries are known. After these works, he composed at the request of a brother of his Order, Adam, the *Tractatus logices in tres partes divisus* (Paris, 1488), which is cited also as *Summa totius logicae* and *Summa logices ad Adamum*. In this work the doctrines of logic are exhibited more briefly than in the expository essays, and yet at the same time more completely, because the *ars nova* and *moderna* are noticed, that is, the Aristotelian writings which had become known later, as well as those which had come into circulation through Byzantine agency. After this, Occam appears to have devoted himself entirely to questions of Church politics. In agreement with the stricter division of his Order (the *Spirituales*), he had always deduced from the humility of Christ and of the Apostles the conclusion that the pope ought not to possess temporal power. To this was added later the conviction that as the pope must be subject to princes in worldly affairs he ought to be subject to the Church in spiritual matters. In this opinion he was confirmed more and more by the party spirit shown by the incumbent of the papal chair against the *Spirituales*. The *Dialogus in tres partes distinctus* (Paris, 1476), together with its appendices, the *Opus nonaginta dierum* (Lyons, 1495), and the *Compendium errorum Joannis Papæ XXII.* (Lyons, 1495), as well as the *Quæstiones octo de potestate summi pontificis* (Lyons, 1496), contain his views upon this subject. In his *Tractatus de jurisdictione imperatoris in causis matrimonialibus*, if it was really written by him, he goes still further. This *Tractatus* was composed in 1342, and is given by Goldast, p. 31. Imprisonment in Avignon was the result of his polemics. He escaped in the year 1328, and took refuge with Ludwig of Bavaria in Munich, as his brother monks John of Jandun and Marsilius of Padua (the author of the *Defensor pacis*) had done before him. He died there in the year 1347, or according to others some years later in Carinolæ in the kingdom of Naples.

2. No Schoolman since Abelard had devoted himself to the study of logic with such fondness as William. He calls it the *omnium artium aptissimum instrumentum*, and ascribes to its neglect the rise of most errors in theology. It is

therefore well to begin with this subject. He concerns himself always with forms, and employs the expressions which had been familiar to all logicians since the *Summulæ* had been used as a text book. They cannot therefore be passed over in silence, as has hitherto been done (cf. § 204, 3). It is scarcely necessary to remark, however, that when investigations and expressions are here brought up for the first time, it is not the intention to imply that William was the first to teach all this. This idea has been completely refuted by Prantl in the third part of his work. The *Tractatus logices* serves as a guide; in addition, the *Quotlibeta* and the notes upon the *Sentences*, especially upon the second distinction of the first book, in connection with which it had become the traditional practice to treat the subject of the universals. As a theoretical question this latter does not belong properly to logic, which, according to William, is, like grammar and the mechanical arts, a practical discipline, an art (so *Expositio aurea*, Proœm.). Nevertheless in order to avoid logical errors, the metaphysical sphere, where this question properly belongs, must be glanced at. For the realm of logic proper the proposition, *Logica non tractat de rebus quæ non sunt signa* (*Quotl.*, v. 5), is decisive. This limitation is carried so far that Occam asserts that the questions: How these signs arise, Whether they are acts of the soul or something else, etc., do not properly belong in logic, since they concern reality (the reality of the signs) (*Expos. aur.*, Proœm.). Nevertheless he often discusses them, and always decides that *species intelligibiles* should not be inserted between the things and the activity of the spirit, as is done by the Scotists. On the contrary, it is the *actus intelligendi* itself by which the thing is revealed to us, that is, this *actus* is itself a sign of the thing. By a sign (as used in the sentence *Logica non tractat*, etc., quoted above), William means that which stands for something else. *Significare* or *importare aliquid*, *stare*, and especially *supponere pro aliquo* are the expressions by which this representation is designated. In the first place, a distinction is to be drawn between natural signs, that is, such as have arisen involuntarily, and those that have been fixed by the will (*ad placitum instituta*). To the former belong our thoughts about things, which arise as spontaneously as a sigh, the sign of pain, or as smoke, the sign of fire. Thoughts are conditions of the soul, and therefore *passiones* or *intentiones animæ*,

and *conceptus*, *intellectus*, *intellectiones rerum* are used as synonymous expressions. William constantly insists that these occurrences in the soul are no more images, properly so called (*species*), of the things, than the sigh is of pain or smoke of fire (cf. *Expos. aurea de specie*). When he nevertheless calls them *similitudines rerum* he justifies himself by the consideration that they assume the same place in the *esse objectivum*, that is, in the *cognosci*, or in the realm of that which is thought, as is occupied by the things designated by them in the *esse subjectivum*, that is, in being which is independent of our thinking (*Ad. I. Sentt.* 2, 8; *Tract. log.*, I. 12). From these signs of the presence of things, involuntarily called up in us by them, are to be distinguished the signs which have been made *ad placitum* (κατὰ συνθήκην in Aristotle, *vid. supra*, § 86, 8) to point out or designate something. These are words, *voces* or *nomina*, which are properly signs of signs, since in them an *intentio animæ* is expressed (*Tract. log.*, i. 11). Since words are not only spoken but also written, there are three varieties of *signa* or *significancia* to be distinguished: *concepta s. mentalia*, *prolata s. vocalia*, finally *scripta*. If, in speaking and in writing, the communication of thoughts were the only object, grammatical and logical forms would necessarily be identical. That this is not the case is, according to William, due to the fact that many grammatical forms exist only for the sake of ornament. The fact that synonyms are not always of the same gender, is to him a proof that no logical analogue corresponds to the grammatical *genus*. The distinction between singular and plural, on the other hand, is not only vocal but also mental (*Quottl.*, v. 8, and in other passages). Since the former disagreement is only exceptional, the divisions of logic have force also in grammar. In the first place, namely, are to be considered the simplest elements of every complex of thoughts or of words, the *termini*, then the simplest combinations of them, the *propositiones*, and finally the establishment of them, so that the third part bears the title *De argumentatione*.

3. The first part of William's logic, which treats of the *termini*, is the most important, and is decisive for his view. In connection with the distinction between the broader and narrower application of the word *terminus*, is considered the distinction between the *cathegreumata* and *syncathegreumata* (to retain his barbaric orthography), so important in the eyes

of the mediæval logicians, that is, the distinction between the words which in themselves fix a concept and those which do it only when supplemented. Passing this by, we shall first determine the distinction between a *terminus primæ* and a *terminus secundæ intentionis*. By the former is to be understood the *actus intelligendi*, which implies a *res*, by the latter that which implies a *signum* (*Tract. log.*, i. 11; *Quotl.*, iv. 19). Simple as this distinction appears to be, and clear as it is that, by reflecting upon the formation of my conceptions, I can only obtain a *conceptus secundæ intentionis*, we must nevertheless avoid limiting too closely the sphere of the *prima intentio*. Not only is that which exists outside of the mind (*extra animam*, *extra intellectum*, or even *extra* alone) a *res*, but mental processes, passions, etc., whose being does not coincide with the *cognosci*, are also *res*; they have a subjective, that is, not a mere predicative, being, and thus give, when they are thought, *conceptus primæ intentionis* (cf. *Log.*, i. 40, *ad i. Sentt.*, 2, 8). To the distinction between the first and the second intention, in connection with conceptions, corresponds the first and the second *impositio*, in connection with names, and the words "stone" and "pronoun" serve to mark this distinction (*Tract. log.*, i. 11). Still more important than this is the distinction between the various *suppositiones* or representations of the object. The *suppositio* (that is *pro aliis positio*, *Tract. log.*, i. 63) is various, not only when it is silently thought, but also when it is spoken. In the two propositions *homo est animal* and *homo est substantivum*, the word *homo* stands in the first case for a thing, in the second case only for the word itself. The same thing occurs in connection with every thought, and therefore every *terminus* can predicate in three ways, *personaliter i.e. pro re*, *simpliciter i.e. pro intentione animæ*, and *materialiter i.e. pro voce*. The sentences *homo currit*, *homo est species*, *homo est vox dissyllaba* serve as examples of these three ways of predication, which William discusses very frequently (*Tr. log.*, i. 64; *ad i. Sentt.* 2, 4, and in other places), because a great many paralogisms can be solved only when the particular *suppositio* in the premises is pointed out. In the *Expositio aurea* the phrase *supponere pro se* is commonly used instead of *simpliciter supponere*.

4. The distinctions just given are employed in connection with the investigation in regard to the universals. By the universals are to be understood first of all the five predicables

of Porphyry, which are looked upon as corresponding with the five questions which William deduces from the single *quid est hoc* (*Tract. log.*, i. 18), and of which the first two, genus and species, are especially considered. He maintains that they are *termini secundæ intentionis* (*Ibid.* i. 14, cf. *Expos. aur.*, cap. *de genere*) and that therefore they correspond with nothing real *extra animam*, but express (predicate) solely that which is *in mente* (*ad i. Sentt.*, 2, 8). Everthing which exists, whether a *res extra animam*, or a process in the mind, for instance a *qualitas* which exists subjectively in it, is an *individuum* or *singulare*. The question therefore arises, How does it happen that a *terminus*, as for instance *homo*, is used as *universale*, that is, is predicated of a number? (*Tract. log.*, i. 15). The *moderni*, that is, the realists (it is interesting to compare the earlier use of *moderni*, *vid.* § 159), have invented the theory of a *commune* to which they ascribe the power, which belongs only to the Divine nature, of being one, and yet in many *supposita*, and which (not the individual *homines*) is designated by the word *homo*, is *personaliter* predicated. Even Scotus, who far outshines all the rest of the *moderni*, when taken with precision agrees with them, since his modified view that the *commune* is not *realiter*, but *formaliter* distinct from the individual things, does not improve their untenable opinion (*ad i. Sentt.*, 2, 6). In beginning with the general, and then seeking for the ground of individuality, they have perverted the whole thing. The individual is in and of itself individual and is alone actual. That which is to be explained is rather the general (*Ibid.*). Of the many absurdities to which, according to William, this (realistic) view leads, we mention only one: every individual being would then be an aggregate of an endless number of actual beings, namely of those *communia* which are predicated of it. Again, Aristotle, the greatest authority in philosophy, and his commentator Averroës, as well as John of Damascus in his *Logic*, can be understood only when this opinion of the modern Platonists is rejected. The true view, which is also that of Aristotle, is that the universals exist only *in mente*, and that therefore in the proposition *homo est risibilis* the *terminus homo* does not stand for such a fiction as a general man, but for actual individual men who are alone able to laugh (*ad i. Sentt.*, 2, 4). But even among those who agree that the universals have reality only in our mind, different opinions may rule as to the

manner of this existence. William gives some of these without deciding in regard to them. At the same time he enunciates a principle which in various forms is to be found a hundred times in his works: where one is sufficient, it is useless to assume many. According to one view, the universals are mere objects of thought, mere fictions which exist only in virtue of their being thought, and therefore have mere *esse obiectivum*. According to others they are images of individual things, confused on account of the less definite impressions of the things themselves. Still others regard them as existing independently (*subjective*) in the mind, as certain somethings (*qualitates*) which are to be distinguished from the mind's own activity. Finally, the universals may be looked upon as *actus intelligendi*, an opinion which recommends itself by its simplicity (*Tract. log.*, i. 12 and other passages; cf. *Expos. aur. lib. peryarmenias, Proœm.*). Neither here nor elsewhere does William use the expression which had given rise to the party names, *Vocales, Nominales* (*vid. supra*, § 158). Nor can he from his point of view admit that the universals are mere *voces* or *nomina*, for he regards them as signs which have arisen naturally, and not signs which have been voluntarily formed. He would therefore have been literally right if he had repudiated the name nominalist, but he could have urged nothing against the name *Terminista*, which has actually been applied to him.

5. As the assumption of actual *communia* seemed to William an unnecessary *multiplicatio entium*, in the same way he regards a number of other names as equally unjustifiable personifications. Not only does he ridicule those who add to *ubi* an *ubitas*, to *quando* a *quandeitas* (*Tract. log.*, i. 59, 60), but he denies that there is a *quantitas* which is anything else than the *res quanta*, or a *relatio* which is other than the related things (*Ibid.*, 44 ff., cf., *Expos. aur. de prædicament.*, c. 9). He makes use of the first assertion in connection with the question as to the quantity (extension) of the body of Christ; of the second when he shows that the conception of creation is not a third one in addition to those of God and of the creature. Since the case is the same with quality, *qualitas* could be translated above (*sub* 4) as if it were *quale* or *quid*. As a whole, the result in respect to the predicaments (categories) is the same as in connection with the predicables: they do not express anything real, but rather modes of our

thinking. In his *Expos. aur. de prædicament*, c. 7, William had already asserted that Aristotle in his categories does not divide things, but words. He therefore constantly refers afterwards to their connection with verbal expression, and traces back the distinction between the first and the second substance to the *nomen proprium* and *commune*. He also lays weight upon the fact that the fifth and sixth categories are adverbs, that the seventh coincides with the active, the eighth with the passive voice, etc., and continually repeats, that Aristotle's view leads to the same result. The reduction of the Aristotelian categories to *substantia*, *qualitas*, and *respectus* (*Sentt.*, I., d. 8, qu. 2) does not appear to him a deviation from the master, whom he ranks supreme. He could not therefore look with indifference upon the fact that the Platonizing *moderni* continually appealed to one of Aristotle's own propositions. The assertion of the latter that science has to do only with the general, must lead to the renunciation of all real knowledge, if nominalism be true. William replies, that even the most decided realist must admit that our knowledge consists of (mental) propositions. It is clear, however, that propositions consist, not of things *extra animam*, but of *termini*. Every rational person must then admit that there is no knowledge except such as falls within our mind and is in so far mental (*ad i. Sentt.*, 2, 4. *et al. loc.*). Nevertheless we are justified in characterizing some knowledge as real, and in distinguishing it from that which is rational. For instance, if the *termini*, which form a sentence, predicate *personaliter*, that is are the representatives of *res*, the sentence expresses real knowledge, as for example *homo currit*, *homo est risibilis*, where it makes no difference whether *homo* stands for a single man, as in the first case, or for all individual men, as in the second (*Tract. log.*, i. 63). On the other hand, if the *termini* of a proposition do not stand for things but for *termini*, if they are therefore *secundæ intentionis* and predicate *simpliciter*, as in the sentence *genus prædicatur de speciebus*, the knowledge thus expressed is rational, as for instance, all logical knowledge. Since, then, in the propositions which express real knowledge, *termini* almost always occur, which stand not for a single thing but for many, that is, general *termini*, Aristotle is quite right in saying that knowledge has to do with the general, namely, with general *termini*, not with general *res*.

6. It may be mentioned as peculiar, that in the second part



of his logic, *de propositionibus*, William regards the modal judgments as the results of combination, just as Aristotle had done (*vid. supra*, § 86, 1). Since, however, according to him, a judgment, in addition to the predicate *possibile*, etc., can have also the predicates *scibile*, *dubitabile*, *credibile*, etc., he wishes to assume a greater variety of modal judgments than is common. The third part of his logic, *de argumentatione*, the fullest of all, is divided into four sections which treat of conclusion, definitions and proofs, reasons and deductions, finally, false conclusions. He maintains Aristotle's original three figures in opposition to the later four, and defends him against the charge of incompleteness. In each figure he gives the sixteen possible combinations of two premises, eliminates the useless ones, and designates the remaining four of the first figure by the words *Barbara*, etc., of the second figure by *Cesare*, etc. For the six combinations of the third figure no similarly formed words are used. He then shows that the *modi* of the so-called fourth figure *Baralippton*, etc., arise from those of the first figure by subalternation and conversion of the conclusion, and calls them, as the earliest Peripatetics had done, indirect *modi* of the first figure. He then shows, however, that in the second and third figures similar ones can be formed by a similar process. He enumerates them, but invents for them no such *voces memoriales*. In connection with deductions those cases are treated with especial fulness in which simple and modal judgments are united as premises. A paraphrase of the second Analytics of Aristotle then follows, into which are worked, however, the conceptions current in the existing logic of the schools. Finally he takes up fallacies. Three more fallacies are to be added to the thirteen enumerated by Aristotle. It is sometimes surprising, when he discusses the subject in detail, to hear him say that he expresses himself briefly, and that a fuller treatment will be found in his commentaries on the *Organon*.

7. This terministic view is held to agree, not only with Aristotle, but also with theology, much more closely than the modern Platonizing opinion; above all, because the assumption of such actual generalities, preceding individual things, makes the latter proceed from the former as the material, and thus does away with the creation from nothing, and hence with God's unlimited omnipotence (*Tract. log.*, i. 15, *ad i. Sentt.*, 38, 1 and in other places). This omnipotence how-

ever, with God's voluntariness which is always combined with it, is for William, almost more than for Duns, the most important dogma; and he maintains, in verbal agreement with his predecessors, that things were not created because they are good, but that they are good because God willed them. The only limit to Divine power is the logical contradiction. Although he sometimes (e.g. *ad i.*, *Sentt.*, 1, 4) shows a tendency not to stop even with this, when Scripture and ecclesiastical decisions seem to demand it; he nevertheless maintains on the whole that God can do everything which involves no logical contradiction (*Centilog. concl.*, 5 et al.), and that He therefore could have assumed the nature of an ass or of an ox, as well as of a man (*Ibid.*, *concl.*, 6). The assumption of ideal models seems to him to deprive God of freedom. He admits that ideas of things are in God's mind, but he wishes to have understood by this only their being thought, the *esse objectivum* of the individual things, the things as God thinks them. An independent (subjective) existence does not belong to them (*ad i.*, *Sentt.*, 35, 5). William, still more than his predecessor Duns, emphasizes God's arbitrary pleasure, and thus withdraws from knowledge and leaves to belief a great deal which rests upon necessity. By far the greater part of the hundred conclusions, of which his *Centilogium* consists, show either that all proofs for the principal dogmas, the existence of God, His unity, His infinity, etc., are uncertain, or that the most important doctrines, such as the Trinity, Creation, Incarnation, the sacramental presence of the body of Christ, lead to results which contradict the recognised axioms of reason: namely, that nothing can at the same time exist and not exist, that nothing can exist before itself, that a conclusion drawn from sound premises must be correct, that a part is smaller than the whole, that two bodies cannot occupy the same place at the same time, etc. We are the less justified in seeing irony in this, as Rettberg and von Baur do, or scepticism, as is done by others, since in that case it would at least remain a question whether the irony were not levelled at the reason. It may seem strange to the Protestant that William, who is led by his own tendency, and by consistency, to explain the sacramental presence of the body of Christ by means of His all-permeating ubiquity, should nevertheless hold to transubstantiation. He may further be surprised to hear William so often repeat, that whatever he may say in disagreement with the teaching of the

Church is to be regarded, not as an assertion on his part, but only as something which he has formulated for the sake of mental practice, or as a mere review. Still more, he even says that he is ready, not for the sake of pleasing any obscure authority, but at the bidding of the Romish Church, to defend what he has just combated (cf. *ad I. Sentt.*, 2, 1; *de Sacr. alt.*, c. 36, and in other places). This may all seem strange to the Protestant, but to assert that no one could be in earnest in making such statements is to brand as rascals the most honest men of the most various ages, who have made like declarations. That a thing may be true for the theologian, but false for the philosopher, an opinion expressed by Duns only in passing (*vid. supra*, § 214, 4), William is firmly convinced, and he is nevertheless, while holding this dualism, an upright Aristotelian and a believing Catholic.

8. The question, to be sure, arises, whether theology still has a right to be called science. William's theory of knowledge and of science is found in part in the questions contained in the prologue to the *Sentences*, where all the commentators of Lombard treat the subject, in part in the second section of the third part of his *Tract. log.* He adopts Duns' distinction between intuitive and deductive knowledge, and defines it at one time as lying in the fact that the former has to do with the existence or non-existence of the thing known, while the latter has to do with its "what," and hence is just as possible of the non-existent (*Quoth.*, v. 5), again as due to the fact that the former concerns only that which is present, the latter also that which is absent. Our apprehension of sensible objects is therefore intuitive knowledge. But this does not mean that intuitive knowledge is limited to the objects of our senses. It embraces also the intellectual: for instance, we observe our own sadness. Thus in this case also the *species*, inserted by Thomas and others between our conditions and the observation of them, disappears. Intuitive knowledge is very often represented as forming the basis for deductive knowledge, so that all knowledge rests finally upon external and internal experience. For this very reason, however, man cannot properly know God in this life. At least he cannot gain a knowledge of Him in the natural way; that God can reveal Himself, that is, make Himself an object of intuitive knowledge, is not to be denied. It is true, that not only the basis of knowledge, the intuition of God, is lacking in theology, but

also the form of knowledge, the proof. Deity has no cause and hence cannot be proved *propter quid* or *per prius*, that is, the effect from the cause, as when an eclipse of the moon is deduced from the passage of the earth between the sun and the moon. The proof *quia* or *per posterius* (by which the intervention of the earth is deduced from the occurrence of the eclipse) is also inapplicable to God, because it rests upon a number of presumptions, the impossibility of endless progress, etc. (*ad I. Sentt.*, 2, 3; *Tract. log.*, iii. 2, 19, etc.). Finally, the statement that God's existence is *ex terminis* certain, as made in the ontological argument, is regarded by William as unfounded; and the argument itself is criticized by him in a way very similar to that pursued later by Kant. Since, then, God is the chief, if not the only, object of theology (*ad Prol. Sentt.*, qu. 9), we cannot properly speak of the latter as a science in the strictest sense of the term.

9. In consequence of this, Occam's theology contains rather negative propositions than positive assertions, and the process of deduction is often replaced by the statement that a thing is accepted on authority, that it is only *theologice loquendo* correct, etc. His chief service is, that he prepared the way for the banishment of a great deal of trash from theology. In accordance with his favourite saying, *Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate*, he rejects a number of distinctions which had hitherto been drawn; for instance, between the nature and the attributes of God. God Himself, he says, is His wisdom, and *vice versâ* (*ad I. Sentt.*, 1, 1 and 2). He praises the "Ancients" who spoke of the name of God, where we speak of His attributes (*Quotl.*, 3, qu. 2). He declares against all the multiplication by means of which *paternitas* is distinguished from *pater*, *filitio* from *filius* (*Quotl.*, i. 3, iv. 15). He will have nothing to do with the statement that the Son has His cause in the understanding, the Holy Spirit in the will of the Father. Both proceed from the nature of God, and understanding and will are the same (*ad I. Sentt.*, 7, 2). Nor is anything added to the nature of God by His unity (*Ibid.*, 23, 1). The same tendency to simplification is shown by William in connection with his consideration of the creature, especially of man. He denies the plurality of the powers of the soul, maintains the unity of understanding and will, as well as that of the vegetative and sensitive soul (*Quotl.*, ii. 11). Only when phenomena arise which are

opposed to each other are we to conclude a like opposition, and hence twofoldness, in the causes. The strife of the senses with the reason is a confirmation of the real difference, which may also be assumed on other grounds, between the sensitive and intellectual soul. Although the latter is in this life in the body, it is nevertheless not *circumscriptive* so, that is, in such a way that it dwells in the whole body, each of its parts inhabiting a part of the body, but *diffinitive*, that is, the whole of it in every part, as the body of Christ in the Host (*Quotl.*, i. 10, 15, iv. 26, etc.). The sensitive soul, on the contrary, is extended, and united with the body as its form (*Quotl.*, ii. 10). Since the two are really different, we cannot ascribe to the one what belongs to the other : for instance, merit belongs only to the internal act of the higher soul ; the external work which is carried out by the lower one is morally indifferent (*Quotl.*, I. 20). The objection that the punishment of hell-fire cannot touch the higher soul, is answered by the statement that it is real pain for the latter to be in the fire against its will (*Ibid.*, 19).

### § 217.

1. The command given in 1339 to the Paris University not to use Occam's text-books, which was followed in the next year by the formal rejection of nominalism, proves that Occam must have had a numerous following even in his life-time. Nor was this confined to his own Order. The Dominicans, beginning with Armand of Beauvoir (*De bello viso*), who died, according to Prantl, in 1334, according to others in 1340, and Robert Holkot (died 1349), and the Augustinians, beginning with Thomas of Strasburg (died 1357) and his successor Gregory of Rimini, go over in crowds to nominalism ; and the Thomists and Scotists, who unite themselves against the common enemy, although they count such men as the *Doctor planus et perspicuus* (*vid. supra*, § 214) and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Bradwardine, can nevertheless only prove by the fruitlessness of their struggle that the time for nominalism is come, and that therefore he who declares for it best understands his age, that is, is the most philosophical. The last attempt which was made to put it down by force was in the year 1473, when an edict of Louis XI. bound all the teachers of the Paris University by an oath to realism. The

pretended obedience was not long required, for in 1481 nominalism was again made free.

2. JOHN BURIDANUS, born in Bethune in Artois, is one of the most celebrated Nominalists of the fourteenth century. He was professor in the faculty of Arts at Paris, and in the year 1327 Rector, and is said to have been instrumental in founding the University of Vienna in 1365. His work *Supra summulas*, which was very famous at the time, and which is often cited under the title *Pons asini*, the writer is unacquainted with. It was probably intended to simplify the study of logic. Buridan's commentaries on Aristotle, on the other hand, are very common. That upon the *De anima* was published at Paris in 1616 in folio, the *Quæstiones in Politic. Arist.* at Oxford in 1640 in quarto, the *In quæstiones super decem libros Ethicorum Arist.* at Paris in 1513, and the commentary on the *Metaphys. Arist.* at Paris in 1518, both in folio. It is only the nominalistic separation of philosophy and theology which puts him in a position to philosophize on the freedom of the will in the manner in which he does in the first question of the third book, and yet at the same time to assert it.

3. Buridan is worthily supported by his younger contemporary and friend Marsilius of Inghen. He was born in the Moselle district, and in the year 1362 began teaching in Paris, where he gained quite a reputation, and afterward under the Palsgrave Robert became one of the founders of the University of Heidelberg, where he died in 1392. I have not seen what he wrote on some of the physical works of Aristotle (on the *Physics* and the *De gen. et corr.*). His *Quæstiones supra IV. Libb. Sentt.* (Strasburg: Flach, 1501, folio) were written in Heidelberg, but expound the distinctions only of the first book, a proof of the prominence of the speculative interest. Every doubt as to the nominalism of Marsilius must vanish when we hear him say in his prologue *non sunt res universales in essendo*, and when we find him developing the idea that the similarity of things leads us to deduce from them the general, not voluntarily but involuntarily (*naturaliter*). He agrees with Occam likewise in the opinion that theology is not a science in the strict sense of the term (Fol. xvii. b), in his constantly recurring polemics against unnecessary distinctions, for instance, of the nature and attributes of God, and finally in his emphasis upon God's unlimited arbitrariness. He also conceives the relation of intuitive and abstract (*per dis-*

*cursum acquisita*) knowledge as Occam does, and with him makes the intuitive the ground of every other kind. The fact that he cites Occam rarely, Durand much oftener, and that he quotes Thomas of Strasburg and Rob. Holkot alongside of Thomas and Ægidius, seems to show that he was won to nominalism less by the Franciscans than by others. Jellineck has discovered a Hebrew translation of his *Dialectica*, for a long time regarded as lost, which proves a progress toward nominalistic tendencies among the Jews also.

4. The bloom of scholastic philosophy was looked upon as so completely dependent upon that of the University of Paris, that voices were raised which demanded the sanction of the law for that which was practically already established, *viz.* that the judgment of that University should be decisive in every scientific question. Realizing this, we must not under-rate the importance of the fact that Buridan and Marsilius assisted in founding new scientific centres which showed from the beginning more of a national character than Paris. Decentralization is incompatible, not only with Roman Catholicism, but also with the philosophy which stands in the service of the latter (and that is what the position of scholasticism had been). When this took place it ceased to be the case that the publication of *articuli Parisienses* put an end to all strife. Scholastic philosophy was at last better represented in Tübingen than in Paris. Gabriel Biel (died 1495), who is commonly called the last of the Schoolmen, taught their doctrines in the former University as they are found developed in his *Collectorium* (printed in 1512 in folio and often afterward), in his commentary on the *IV. libb. Sentt.*, and in other works. It is incorrect to call him the last of the Schoolmen, even when German Universities alone are thought of, for scholasticism was taught in them long after his time. It is still more incorrect when France and especially Spain are taken into consideration. In the former land Salabert's *Philosophia Nominalium vindicata* could appear as late as 1651. The last section of Stöckl's work (mentioned in § 149), and still better Werner's monograph (mentioned below), contain detailed accounts of the men who, especially by hushing up the internal strifes, sought to impart a new life to scholasticism and to secure it against the attacks of new opinions.

Cf. K. Werner: *Frans Suarez und die Scholastik der letzten Jahrhunderte*. 2 vols. Regensburg, 1861.

## § 218.

The nominalism which grew out of Thomism, still more that which Occam had drawn from Scotism, in bringing the two elements of scholasticism, philosophy and Christian doctrine, into opposition, left but the one course open, to pursue each independently of the other, and thus to unfold the ideal content of belief without any reference to science, or, on the other hand, to represent science as philosophy limited to reality. When minds, which are able to do more than merely repeat Durand and Occam, struggle against this result, there remains to them only to unite doctrine and science in a way different from that in which they had been united. If with this novelty in form were combined an advance in the content, that is, if the consequence just mentioned were drawn, they would secure a following as the beginners of a new period. But since they scarcely go as far as those who brought so near the result feared by them, the position, in any case isolated, of a reactionary doctrine is only made more marked by the formal innovation. Even extraordinary endowment procures at most only personal esteem, not enduring scientific influence, in a school. The fact that the later anti-scholastic philosophy looks upon these men, who are separated from the rest of the Schoolmen at least in their method of philosophizing, as more akin to itself does not affect what has been said. The first to be considered are Pierre d'Ailly and Jean Charlier of Gerson, successively Chancellors of the University of Paris. Although they were thoroughly initiated into the distinctions of scholasticism, yet they do not make use of these, but rather of edifying discourses and paranetic observations as the instrument by means of which they bring their belief into accord with their nominalistically coloured Aristotelianism. They agree in regarding faith, which results from the preaching of the Gospel, as of more worth than all scholastic investigations, and are therefore in a position to be influenced by and at the same time to move those who, having broken entirely with scholasticism, are to be counted as belonging to the next period. They nevertheless differ from each other in the fact that, in the belief of the former, ecclesiasticism occupies the more prominent place, in that of the latter, subjective piety. With this might be connected the fact that the former praises Thomas Aquinas almost more than the Victorines, while



the latter honours above all others Bonaventura as his teacher and predecessor.

### § 219.

#### PIERRE D'AILLY.

1. PIERRE D'AILLY, Latinized Petrus de Alliaco, was born in Compiègne in the year 1350, and received his philosophical training in Paris. In 1372 he entered the college of Navarre as a theologian, and in 1375 began to lecture upon the *Sentences*. In 1380 he was made Doctor, in the following year became president of his college, in 1389 Chancellor of the University as well as Almoner and Confessor of the King, afterwards Bishop of Puy and finally of Cambrai, in which positions he laboured constantly to heal the schism in the Church by endeavouring to induce both Popes to abdicate. In the year 1411 he was made a cardinal, and was the real soul of the Council of Kostnitz. He died as Cardinal Legate in Germany, Oct. 9, 1425. He wrote a great many works. His *Tractatus et sermones* and *Quæstt. sup. I. III. et IV. libb. Sententt.* appeared in Strasburg in the year 1490. Among the former are the *Speculum considerationis*, the *Compendium contemplationis*, the *Verbum abbreviatum super libro psalmorum*, his Observations upon the Song of Songs, upon the Penitential Psalms, upon the Lord's Prayer, upon the Ave Maria, etc., the *Tractatus de anima*, Sermons upon the Advent, and upon many saints. To the questions are appended *Recommendatio sacre Scripturæ*, *Principium in cursum bibliæ*, the *Quæstio utrum ecclesia Petri sit ecclesia Christi?* which is treated in his *Vesperii*, as well as the *Quæstio resumpta* upon the same subject. The latter essays are found also in the appendices of the first and second volumes of du Pin's edition of Gerson's works (*vid.* § 220), which contains in addition some shorter previously unprinted writings of d'Ailly whose titles had already been given in part by Bulæus. Here is found the treatise upon the Necessity and the Difficulty of Reforming the Church, also the tracts upon the False Prophets. These last are followed in their contents by the treatise *Concordantia astronomiæ cum theologia* (Augsburg, 1490), which was written in 1416, and moderates the teachings of Roger Bacon.

2. The questions upon the *Sentences* contain in the beginning pure Occamistic teaching; and again especially in connec-

tion with the third distinction of the second book, where it is declared in question six that God has ideas only of individual beings, since these alone are *extra producibilia*, while the *universalia*, on the other hand, are only *in anima* as the common predicates of things. If we add to this the assertion, that all truths are propositions (*qu. 1*), that what we know is always a proposition, and not that for which the proposition stands (*qu. 3*), the theological watch-words of nominalism, That theology is not properly science, That God is not distinct from His attributes, etc., will not cause surprise. The much-discussed proposition also, that we have a knowledge of material things only under the presupposition that God will not change the laws of nature, is one which another nominalist might have formulated in the same way. Although d'Ailly is thus far like the other nominalists, he is surpassed by them in the completeness of their commentaries. He passes over the second book entirely, devotes only a single question to the third, and so on. In another point, however, he shows quite a peculiar and marked difference from them. The *Principia* of the various books, that is, the ordinary introductory lectures, are far more interesting than the commentaries. They contain rather praise of the service rendered by their author, than an outline of the contents of the different books. They might almost be called homilies upon the Scripture text, *Quænam doctrina hæc nova?* in which the homiletic artist proceeds in ingenious antitheses seasoned with alliterations and rhyme, such as the ceremonious wit of celebrated preachers has always invented. Their author seems to be contented only when he can show (*in cursu bibliæ*) how the *quæstiones subtiles et studiosæ in scola theorica philosophorum*, the *quæstiones difficiles et curiosæ in scola phantastica mathematicorum*, the *quæstiones civiles et contentiosæ in scola politica jurisperitorum*, and finally the *utiles et virtuosæ in scola catholica theologorum*, are solved.

3. Not only in these works does he remind us of the Victorines (*vid. supra*, § 171 ff.), but also still more in the writings in which he seems to be only a compiler of that which they and kindred spirits after them had taught. This is especially the case in the closely connected *Speculum considerationis* and *Compendium contemplationis*. In the former the security of monastic life is contrasted with the dangers of worldly life; the system of the seven principal virtues and their offshoots is developed, and the foretaste of blessedness pointed out in them; and finally

the relation of the contemplative and active life is displayed under the traditional image of Rachel and Leah. The main point is to begin with self-examination. The contemplative soul passes from that which is in us to that which is about us, in order to rest finally in that which is above us. The six steps of contemplation mentioned by Richard of St. Victor (*vid. supra*, § 172, 3) are cited, as well as those given by others, and the aids to it and the tokens of it are pointed out. The *Compendium contemplationis* contains in its first part general remarks upon the contemplative life quite in the style of Thomas Aquinas. In the second part the *spiritualis genealogia*, i.e. the various elements of contemplation, are given in connection with the family of Jacob. In the third (*de spiritualibus sensibus*) spiritual sight, hearing, taste, etc., are discussed. At the close, d'Ailly mentions those from whom he has especially drawn, but adds that others also, particularly those who have preached in the language of the people, have been made use of.

4. It is not impossible, since his character was rather pliable, that d'Ailly's appointment as cardinal modified somewhat his views upon the papacy. This opinion, expressed by his pupil Nicolas of Clémange, has been adopted by others. At any rate he fell later into a strife with the Paris University, whose favourite child he had formerly been, when the subject of the withholding of the taxes due to Pope Benedict XII. came up. Nevertheless it would be doing him an injustice to assert a contradiction in his teachings at different times. He seems throughout his life to have believed in the primacy of the Roman bishops, which he discussed in his lecture *De ecclesia Petri* which is contained in his *Vesperis*. According to this there belongs to Peter no higher consecration, no greater *potestas ordinis*, than to the other Apostles, for the words of Jesus "upon this rock," etc., refer to Christ Himself. The words "feed my sheep," however, give him a greater *potestas regiminis*, therefore an administrative superiority. This was personal, and the administrative centre of the Church moved with Peter's diocese from Jerusalem to Antioch, and thence to Rome. In the same way it is not now bound to Rome. If the latter should become a Sodom the *Summus episcopus* would have his seat elsewhere. As regards the temporal power of the Pope, he contrasts with the position of the strict Franciscans (*spirituales*), who condemned it abso-

lutely, that of Herod, who saw in Christ a worldly prince and trembled. D'Ailly himself does not object to the fact that the Pope as a result of circumstances, for instance, the gift of Constantine, has become *also* a worldly potentate. As regards the subordination of the Pope to a general council, the decree of the Council of Kostnitz is hardly at variance with d'Ailly's earlier opinions, and that, in the formulation of the decree, he should have asserted such a subordination for this case alone seems scarcely probable. It is true that he departs from that which the Roman Catholic Church had proclaimed in its greatest representatives, Gregory VII. and Innocent III., those incarnations of its triumph. Nothing else is to be expected from a man who, although initiated into all the subtleties of scholasticism, yet does not, like Duns and others, draw the truth with the help of Aristotle from the dogmatic handbook adopted by the Church and from the decrees of canonical law alone, but who has learned also from popular mystical preachers, and who always zealously maintains that the study of canonical law leads away from the perusal of the Bible, the real foundation of the Church.

### § 220.

#### JOHN GERSON.

Jo. Bapt. Schwab: *Johann Gerson, Professor der Theologie und Kanzler der Universität Paris.* Würzburg, 1859.

1. Jean Charlier is better known under the name GERSON, as the village in the neighbourhood of Rheims was called in which he was born on the 14th of December, 1363. In his fourteenth year he went to Paris and entered the Artsdepartment of the College of Navarra, where d'Ailly and Henry of Oyta initiated him into logic. The former was also his teacher in theology, and became so fond of him that he recommended him as his own successor, both as professor and chancellor, a recommendation which was followed by Gerson's appointment. In the year 1397 he became dean in Bruges, and left the office of chancellor to be administered by a substitute. His study of Bonaventura, which he then began to pursue with much greater industry, as well as his intercourse with Beghards, Fraticelli, and Brothers of the Free Spirit, more and more ripened his mysticism, which was in full agreement with the doctrines of the Church. His work upon false and true

visions belongs to this time. He continued his praises of mysticism after he had returned to Paris, in 1401, and took up again the calling of professor and chancellor, and later that of pastor of St. Jean en Grève. He lectured on theoretical mysticism in 1404, and wrote a treatise on practical mysticism, in Genoa, in 1407. His pain at the papal schism caused him to seek constantly for a remedy, and, although he did not take part in the council of Pisa, his work, *De auferibilitate Papæ*, was nevertheless intended to justify the steps taken by the council against both Popes. He worked in the same spirit as ambassador of his king and University at the council of Kostnitz, as is proved by the work *De potestate ecclesiastica*, which was written there. Another work, which goes much further, *De modis uniendi et reformandi ecclesiam*, is said, by the best authorities upon the subject, not to be from his hand. In any case, he was less influenced by consideration for the papacy than d'Ailly was. This deprived him of favour and protection at the papal court, and the utterances which he gave voice to both in Paris and later in Kostnitz, against the murder of tyrants (*i.e.* against the murder of the Duke of Orleans by the Duke of Burgundy), made a prominent position in France impossible for him. He was therefore compelled to live for a time outside of France, and after 1419 at least away from Paris. In Lyons, where he died on the 12th of July, 1429, he wrote a number of treatises, for instance, *De perfectione cordis*, *De elucidatione theologiæ mysticæ*, *De susceptione humanitatis Christi*, etc. His works were among the earliest printed. The first edition appeared in Cologne in 1483, in four folio volumes, the most complete one in Antwerp in 1706, in five folio volumes edited by du Pin.

2. As in the case of d'Ailly, whom he is never tired of calling his honoured teacher, his philosophical standpoint is that of Occam, which he always designates as Aristotelian. His nature was so averse to controversy that the bitter attacks which the "Formalizantes" and "Metapysicantes," as he calls them, that is the Scotists, made upon the followers of Occam, ridiculed by them as "*rudes et terministæ nec reales in metaphysica*," necessarily caused him great pain. He therefore endeavoured to heal the schism between them. Of the works devoted to this purpose there are to be especially mentioned: *Centilogium de conceptibus*, *De modis significandi*, and its second part *De concordantia metaphysicæ cum logica* (vol. iv. pp. 793 ff.,

816 ff.). They deserve the name of attempts at mediation only in so far as they oppose those Nominalists who go beyond Occam in constituting only such *termini* as *materialiter supponunt* (cf. *supra*, § 216, 3). As regards Occam's own teaching, Gerson merely repeats that all knowledge consists only of *termini*, but that, since these denote either things outside of us or processes in us, there is a difference between real and logical (*sermocinalis*) knowledge, and therefore between metaphysics and logic. He combats further, just as Occam does, the assumption of universals existing outside of the thinking mind, since this is in conflict with the principles of Aristotle, and limits the omnipotence of God (p. 805). He puts, as Occam does, in place of the eternal genera in temporal thought, the ideas of individual things, and asserts accordingly that God thinks everything as an individual thing, since only the individual has reality *extra animam* (p. 825). His only peculiarity is that he tries to prove that the opposite realistic doctrine is anti-Catholic and has always been condemned by the Church. He sees quite rightly, that realism consistently carried out leads to the denial of reality to everything except God. In every condemnation of Pantheistic doctrines therefore, e.g. that of Amalrich (*vid. supra*, § 176), he sees the condemnation of the system which leads to such consequences. He appeals above all, however, to the conclusions of the Council of Kostnitz, which had condemned in the Bohemian heretics the same erroneous doctrine of the reality of the universals (p. 827). But Gerson is an Occamist not only in his doctrine of the universals, but also in his complete separation of philosophy and theology. He criticizes Albert because he had devoted more time and labour to philosophy than was befitting a Christian teacher (*Trilog. astrol. theologiz.*, vol. i. p. 201), and therefore prefers to him Alexander of Hales (i. p. 117). This is easily understood when we consider his fondness for Hugo of St. Victor, and his opinion that the traditional custom of expounding Lombard is not right. He says himself, in a letter to d'Ailly, that much is declared true and right by reason which, according to an enlightened theology, is false (vol. iii. p. 432).

3. In Gerson's opinion no theologian ranks above Bonaventura. In his thoughts upon mystic theology he repeats what the latter says in his *Itinerarium* (*vid. supra*, § 197, 4), and what Hugo says in his mystical writings, and draws a distinc-

tion between symbolic, real, and mystic theology, the first two belonging more to the *cognitio*, the last to the *affectus*. He connects them with the three eyes of human perception, *sensus*, *ratio*, *intelligentia*, which Hugo, and before him Erigena, had distinguished. Since mystic theology is a knowledge and experience of God, it is related to philosophy, which also takes its departure from experience. For that reason we should trust also the experiences of others, as the mystic theology of Dionysius the Areopagite has its origin in that which Paul had communicated to him concerning his inner experiences. A great deal, it is true, is incommunicable. The proper seat of mystic theology is the *apex mentis*, the *synderesis*. Since this is the heaven of the soul, the being carried up into the third heaven means the suspension of the lower functions of the soul, and not only seeing but also feeling and tasting God. *Raptus* and *amor ecstaticus* are therefore often used synonymously. Mystic theology, being grounded in the *synderesis*, has a practical character, is often identified with *religio* and *charitas*, and raised far above the two other kinds of theology. The latter have no value without the former, but the former has without the latter. Mystic theology is also independent of all learning and therefore is found even in the simple. Its training school is not study, but prayer. The union with God, brought about by the agency of love, may be called a transformation into God, if we do not thereby understand that man ceases in God, which is nonsense. According to Gerson, Ruysbroek, in his *Glory of the Spiritual Marriage*, appears at least to share this heretical error of Amalrich. It is most correct to say that in the moments of mystic love the spirit is separated from the soul and united with God. It cannot be said that in the moments in which we taste God all consciousness is excluded; it is, however, true that all reflection is shut out and that we immediately feel God. The chief works upon mystic theology, from which all the preceding sentences are drawn, are *Considerationes de theologia mystica speculativa*, *De theologia mystica practica*, *Tractatus de elucidatione scholastica mysticæ theologiæ*, all of which are contained in the second part of the third volume of du Pin's edition.

4. As to Gerson's ecclesiastical position, the common opinion, that he belongs to the reformers before the Reformation, has given rise to many errors. We shall give up the idea that he was not a true son of the Roman Catholic

Church, if we only read his *Lectio contra vanam curiositatem*, and find how he expresses himself there against the reading of translations of the Bible on the part of the uneducated (i. p. 85), or when we hear his utterances in another work (*De exam. doctrin.*, Opera, vol. i.) in regard to the celibacy of the priesthood and the Lord's supper in both kinds, or again when we hear him assert that not even a general council may venture to do away with the monarchical constitution of the Church, etc. He is the enemy of all innovation, even when this concerns only a dogmatic *terminus*. He is never tired of quoting Augustine's saying, that we should hold fast to traditional expressions, and he is continually holding up to the Universities of England and of Prague that of Paris as a model in this respect. It is quite consistent with this dread of innovation, that he should hold that a council cannot indeed do away with the papacy, but may unseat a Pope. The opposite doctrine, that the Pope is superior to the council, he calls *pestifera et perversissima*, because this is the doctrine which is new. It has been accepted from the beginning that the Pope and his aristocratic advisers, the college of cardinals, may err in regard to doctrine, but a general council not (*De potest. eccles.*, Works, vols. i. and ii.). Although he agrees essentially with d'Ailly, he is yet much more decided than his teacher and friend, who is himself a member of the college of cardinals, and in duty bound to the Pope. In Gerson speaks the University man and the pastor. These he was passionately, but only these. In neither capacity could he have a fondness for the mendicant orders which had pushed themselves into professorial chairs and into the confessional. A certain lack of respect for them often appears in his writings.

### § 221.

The correlate to d'Ailly and Gerson is furnished by a man who feels the pressure of the second half of the dilemma presented by nominalistic scholasticism (*vid.* § 218), namely, to limit philosophy to the world as its sole object. He however wishes no more than they did to break with scholasticism, that is, with theology; in their case it meant with philosophy. Nothing is left to him but to base philosophy entirely upon the observation of the world, but at the same time to use the latter as a bridge to the theology of the Church. Gerson



declared for nominalism because the opposite doctrine was un-Christian. Here it is shown that that which the church teaches is indispensable to the system of the world. In the former case the Church had to confirm philosophy, in the latter cosmology testifies to that which the Church teaches. It was a true discernment which led Gerson to call his theology *mystical*, and Raymond of Sabunde to call his *natural*. We have seen (§ 194) that it was not without significance that scholasticism at its height was represented by members of the mendicant orders. The fact that d'Ailly and Gerson are University men and secular clergymen, and that they stand in no warm relation to the mendicant orders, as well as the fact that Raymond is a physician, must be looked upon as a sign that philosophy has begun to cast off its strictly clerical character.

## § 222.

### RAYMOND OF SABUNDE.

Hutter: *Die Religionsphilosophie des Raymundus von Sabunde*. Augsburg, 1851.

1. RAYMOND OF SABUNDE (Sebunde and Sabeyda also occur) is said to have been born in Barcelona. He was a Doctor of Philosophy and of Medicine, and at the same time professor of theology in Toulouse, and published there in the year 1436 (if not earlier) his *Theologia naturalis s. liber creaturarum*. It has been often printed, according to Bayle in Strasburg in 1496, then in Paris in 1509, and again, among other places, in Frankfort in 1635. The edition of Solisbaci, 1852, omits the prologue. An extract from this work made by Raymond himself constitutes the six *Dialogi de natura hominis*, which are said to occur also under the title *Viola animæ*. Among the editions of these dialogues is that of Lyons, 1568, in which is contained an interpolated seventh dialogue. Even Montaigne knew nothing more in regard to Raymond's life, although at the command of his father he translated his work.

2. The oft-repeated assertion (made also by Ritter) that Raymond was a realist, is disproved not only by his express statement that things lose their *modum particularum et singularem et individualement* and receive a *modum communem et universalem* which they *extra animam non habent* (*Theol. nat.*,

*Tit.* 217), but also by the emphasis which he lays upon the *liberum arbitrium*, as the sovereignty of the will over the intellect, in God as well as in man. That he differs so often with Occam is not due to the fact that Scotus, much less Thomas, is more to his liking, but that he cannot be satisfied with that separation of science and faith which appears so sharply defined in Occam's *Centilogium*. Since he mentions no authors in his work, it is difficult to say in how far he was acquainted with his predecessors. In respect to one only no doubt is possible, for he sometimes almost transcribes Anselm, whose ontological argument and Christology are adopted by him more nearly in their original form than by any other Schoolman (*Tit.* 250-265). This is easily explained. The theology established with the help of Aristotelianism had led to nominalism, whose correctness appeared indisputable, but also to the assertion that the dogmas teach the opposite of Aristotelianism. Whoever therefore wished to philosophize, but at the same time did not wish to give up the agreement of philosophy and dogma, was obliged to place himself upon the standpoint, not of Aristotelianism, but of the natural understanding, and with this first to examine the world, and then see whether and in how far Catholic doctrine agrees with the latter. But this was the very end which scholasticism had pursued in its earlier period (*vid. supra*, § 194). The guides therefore are to be sought in that period, and not in the time of scholasticism's greatest glory, when it was ruled by Aristotle. Raymond's clear understanding necessarily impels him to choose the keen Anselm rather than the deep Erigena, and his decided orthodoxy leads him to prefer the former, even though he was a realist, to Roscellinus, or even to Abelard.

3. In the prologue (strangely put upon the "Index" by the Council of Trent) to Raymond's *Natural Theology*, the science of the world, including man, is made the really fundamental science, and is characterized as the perusal of one of the books which is given us, the *liber naturæ*, in which every creature is a letter, whose combination constitutes the sense of that which is written. This book is supplemented by the revealed word of God, which is necessary on account of sin, and which is not, like the former, accessible to the laity, nor secure against falsifications. Although therefore this second book, on account of its supernatural character, is holier and higher than the former, our study must nevertheless begin with the reading of

the book of nature, because in it is to be found a science which presupposes no other, because it can be conceived by the simplest man, if he has only purified his heart from sin, and because it is really a warrant of the truth and certainty of that which is contained in the other book. A man is absolutely sure only of that which he himself witnesses (*Tit.* 1), and therefore self-certainty and self-knowledge are that upon which all other certainty must finally base itself. Man however, since he is the highest of the four orders of beings (the four which the Stoics [§ 97, 3], following a hint of Aristotle, Philo [§ 114, 4], and after them the Neo-Platonists and others, had distinguished), and unites in himself the *esse*, *vivere*, *sentire* and *intelligere*, cannot know himself unless he considers first the orders below him; and thus, in order to make him familiar with himself, he must be led to investigate the previous steps of which he is the end and aim. At the end of this process, which constitutes only the first day's journey (*diata*), he finds that he belongs to nature as that for whose sake everything else is there, and in whom is brought into unity all that exists in the other orders in a multiplicity of species (*Tit.* 2, 3). Here begins a second day's journey. As the many species of the lower steps point to the one species man, which is raised above them all by the *liberum arbitrium*, which has *velle* and *intelligere* as its pre-conditions, men point again to a unity in which not only no specific but also no individual differences exist, which is wholly one, and in which therefore not only are *esse* and *vivere*, but which is itself *esse*, etc., and which can consequently be thought only as a being. This unity, this nature, which is before all and which cannot be non-existent, is God (*Tit.* 4-12). From the fact, however, that God excludes all non-being, follows not only His existence, but also very important conclusions in regard to His nature. Everything which is found in the creature, especially man, as an actual being, must be postulated, free from every limit (*i.e.* non-being), of God, whose being is the general being of all things (*Tit.* 14). We thus clearly conclude that God has created the world, and that out of nothing, and the *ascensus* by which we learn from the world that God exists, is combined with the *descensus*, by which we deduce the world only from God, and thus perceive that it is created out of nothing (*Tit.* 16). How the most important dogmas are deduced in detail is of less interest, since Raymond often makes light

work of it. The essential point is, that he establishes it as the chief, indeed as the only, rule, that in every case the best that is conceivable must be attributed to God, and that this rule *oritur ex nobis* (*Tit.* 63, 64), so that the chief doctrines of the Church as to the nature of God are to be deduced, in accordance with that rule, not from the Scriptures nor from other authorities, but from self-observation. He does not fail to remind his readers from time to time that this knowledge of God drawn from ourselves is the most certain and the clearest (*Tit.* 82).

4. The two propositions reached at the close of this *dieta*, that man is the goal and the object of the rest of creation, but that God is the goal and the end of all things—these propositions have as their consequence the principle that man's profit and God's glory are the highest aim of conduct, are our chief duty. Belief can never contradict the natural duty of preserving and advancing our being, since it is itself only *complementum naturæ* (*Tit.* 80). That duty in fact rather supports our belief; and we must believe that God sent His Son into the world, etc., because it promotes our welfare (*Tit.* 70, 74). If we do not limit that which is beneficial to man merely to the bodily, if we especially remember that the perception of things secures *gaudium et doctrinam*, i.e. the highest profit (*Tit.* 98), and that the knowledge of them leads to a knowledge of God, we shall neither deny that all things exist for the benefit of man, nor assume a conflict between this benefit and the glory of God. Man, as the mean between creatures and God, unites the two extremes (*Tit.* 119) in performing for God the service which the rest of creation performs for him (*Tit.* 114), and thus answers and thanks God in behalf of all creatures (*Tit.* 100). This thanksgiving consists in love towards God, which coincides with the knowledge of God. God wishes to be known, and thus grow in the creature (*Tit.* 154, 190). But since God is not in need of service and cannot grow in Himself, worship is given for the creature's good, and it is the latter that really grows (into God) (*Tit.* 116, 190). The more, therefore, man seeks the glory of God, the more does he promote his own salvation, and *vice versâ*. The more certain, too, does he become of the existence of one who will reward merit, and of a place where this will be done (*Tit.* 91). Love to God, however, implies love to our neighbours, the images of God. Natural love for

them precedes that true love for God, so that we have here too the same *ascensus* and *descensus*: we first love our neighbour for our own, and then for God's sake (*Tit.* 120, 121).

5. But if we inquire whether love for God and love for ourselves always coincide, experience teaches us that we put love for God beneath false self-love and the desire for false honour, and thereby become punishable, and as a consequence gain the certainty of a strict judge, as well as of a place of suffering. Experience likewise teaches us that strife and enmity rule everywhere, instead of love toward our neighbours (*Tit.* 140, 157, 91, etc.). This cannot be the original condition, for the canon given above demands that the first men, who on account of the unity of the human species must have been a single pair, proceeded pure from the hand of God, if not perfect (*bene, non optime, Tit.* 232, 274). The only conceivable way in which that condition could have been lost is disobedience toward God. This is easily explained without the assumption that the first men were led to it by one who was stronger than they, but who could fall more easily. Among creatures the *liberum arbitrium*, and therefore the *vertibilitas*, is greater in purely spiritual natures than in those upon whom all sorts of bonds are laid by their corporeality. The tempter, therefore, must have been an incorporeal, purely spiritual, but created being, that is, an angel (*Tit.* 239-242). If there were no angels, moreover, there would be a break in the succession of creatures, and analogy demands that as there are three orders below man there should be three above him (the familiar hierarchies) (*Tit.* 218). The fact that the glory of God, for which there is no equivalent, was impaired by the fall, and that man therefore can be redeemed only through the suffering of a God-man, is developed (*Tit.* 250-265), as mentioned above, in complete verbal agreement with Anselm's *Cur Deus homo* (*vid. supra*, § 156, 8). Raymond's only peculiarity is, that he asks the question, How we can be sure that this God-man, in any case necessary, has appeared in the historical personality, Jesus of Nazareth? Jesus' own testimony is decisive; for if it were false we should be obliged to regard Him either as a liar or as a maniac. And again the fate of the Jews is an argument; for if He lied they slew Him justly, and should then have been rewarded (*Tit.* 206). In order that this testimony and all that confirms it should be known, an authentic account was necessary, which should be above all

doubt, and this is given us in the *second* book, in which God offers us, not His *factum*, but His *verbum*: the Scripture of the Old and New Testaments. This is not in conflict with the *liber naturæ*. The latter is rather the *via, janua et introductorium* of the former, because it teaches us that the God, by whom the second book, the Bible, claims to be given, exists (*Tit.* 210, 211). Moreover the entire contents of the Bible, as well as the way in which it teaches, *e.g.* its total lack of argumentation, etc., testify to every unprejudiced reader of its Divine origin (*Tit.* 212 ff.). On account of the redemption, by means of which man is created a second time out of nothing, not this time out of the *nihil negativum* but out of the *nihil privativum*,—on account of the redemption he has a three-fold origin: bodily, from his parents; psychic, from God; and redemptive (*bene esse*) from Christ, and He lives therefore in a threefold relation of brotherhood toward all men (*Tit.* 275, 276, 278). For the last and highest relation, the churchly, the means of support are the seven sacraments. A consideration of these, together with a discussion of eschatology, closes the work. In connection with the sacraments, it is proved, not from authority but from the nature of the case, that it is most fitting for the internal purification to be brought about by a water-bath, the nourishment of the spirit by food and drink, etc., and in the same way it is proved that the necessary and natural end of the two opposite ways in which the good and the bad walk, the two dwellings, also locally separated, must be in the highest heaven and in the middle of the earth (*Tit.* 91 *et al.*). As the natural force of gravity draws the arm downward, and only that which is above its nature can raise it upward, in the same way the natural tendency of the sinning soul, without supernatural help, is toward nothing and its dwelling (*Tit.* 277).

### § 223.

The contrast between Gerson, whose mystical tendency leads him often to a mere repetition of Bonaventura's teaching, and Raymond, who follows no one so closely as the keen Anselm, devoid of all mysticism, is done away in a man in connection with whom it is hard to decide whether his depth of mind or the keenness of his understanding, whether his inner piety or his interest in the world, are more to be ad-

mired. That man is Nicolas of Cusa. With remarkable many-sidedness he combined the most various tendencies which had previously appeared in scholasticism. That this should carry him back to Erigena, who had united them all in himself, is natural; but the starting-point appears in the present case expanded to a circle which embraces all that the subsequent stages had produced. The question which played so great a part in the first period of scholasticism appears settled here, for he acquits the Realists from the charge of pantheism, their opponents from that of a godless deification of the world, and represents the intermediate conceptualistic tendency. Platonism, and its opposite, atomism, which brought that period into strife, are here united in a way which reminds us sometimes of William of Conches (*vid.* § 162). Nicolas, however, like the Schoolmen of the second period, draws continually from the Mohammedan Peripatetics, and from Aristotle himself. He ventures to praise the first who had done this, David of Dinant (*vid.* § 192), and like him and his successors, the great Peripatetics of the thirteenth century, makes Avicenna or Jewish teachers authorities for his assertions. Finally, however, his love for mathematical and cosmological studies reveals so strong a resemblance between his mind and that of Roger Bacon, his emphasis of individuality shows so great a likeness between him and William of Occam, and he agrees in so many points almost verbally with Gerson and Raymond, that we can scarcely avoid assuming that he borrowed from all the principal representatives of scholasticism in its period of decline. The rays which emanated from Erigena, that epoch-making sun of scholasticism, are gathered as in a focus in Nicolas, who brings scholasticism to a close.

### § 224.

#### NICOLAS OF CUSA.

F. A. Scharpff: *Der Cardinal Nicolaus von Cusa*. Mainz, 1843. Also: *Des Cardinals und Bischofs Nicolaus von Cusa wichtigste Schriften in deutscher Uebersetzung*. Freiburg, 1862. Also: *Der Cardinal und Bischof Nicolaus von Cusa als Reformator in Kirche, Reich und Philosophie des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts*. Tübingen, 1871. F. I. Clemens: *Giordano Bruno und Nicolaus von Cusa*. Bonn, 1847. I. M. Dux: *Der deutsche Cardinal Nicolaus von Cusa und die Kirche seiner Zeit*. Regensburg, 1847.

1. NICOLAUS CHRYPFFS (*i.e.* Krebs) was born in the year 1401, in Cues near Trier, and is called from his birth-place

CUSANUS. He received his first school training at Deventer in the Society of the Brethren of the Common Life, founded by Geert de Groot. Later he himself entered their ranks. Thomas à Kempis (*vid. infra*, § 231, 4), was educated in this school and left it to enter his cloister. It was therefore natural that Nicolas should early have become acquainted with the latter's celebrated *Imitation of Christ*. He next went to Padua where he studied law, and in the year 1424 became doctor of canonical law. At the same time he had trained himself thoroughly in mathematics. In the year 1428, he gave up the business of attorney, in which he had been engaged in Mainz, and adopted the clerical calling. From the year 1431 he was a deacon in Coblenz, where he preached frequently, and afterward he filled an ecclesiastical office in Lüttich. He was called to the council of Basel in 1433, where he finished his work *De concordantia catholica* which he had begun some time before. In this work he is led by his distinction between the Roman Church and the Church Catholic, to opinions upon Pope and councils which he later modified, perhaps frightened at the consequences which others had drawn from them. In opposition to heretics he emphasizes constantly the primacy of the Pope, as he does in his epistle to the Bohemians on the form of the sacrament. The work *De reparatione calendarii*, which was written in the year 1436, shows the astronomical learning of its author, who proposes, in order to bring the *computus* in accord with nature and with the decisions of the Church, to leap, in the year 1439, from the 24th of May to the first of June, and to omit a day in every 304 years. He was made the representative of papal rights, and was entrusted by Pope Eugene IV. with important commissions in France, in Constantinople, and at the Reichstag of Frankfort. In the midst of these missions, however, he was very active in scientific labours. The plan of his first work, *De docta ignorantia*, which was written in 1440, was conceived upon the journey from Constantinople. In the same year followed the work *De conjecturis*; not much later *De filiatione Dei* and *De genesi*. On the 28th of December, 1448, he was appointed cardinal by Pope Nicolas V., an honour hitherto unheard-of for a German. In the year 1450, he became Bishop of Brixen, but did not enter upon the duties of his office until he had finished some extended missionary journeys in Germany and the Netherlands. His dealings with the Archduke Sigismund,



of Austria, who, as Count of Tyrol, was his vassal, embittered his life and brought him into a violent imprisonment. After some years absence from his diocese, he died in Todi, on the 11th of August, 1464. The first edition of his works, most of which were written while he was cardinal, consists of a single volume, in small folio, printed probably in 1476. The edition of Ascensius (Paris, 1514), which is cited here, consists of three folio volumes, and is more complete than the former. The first volume contains : *De docta ignorantia libb. III.*, the *Apologia doctæ ignorantie* (ostensibly the work of his pupil, Bernard of Waging), *De conjecturis libb. II.*, *De filiatione Dei*, *De genesi*, *Idiotæ libb. IV.*, *De visione Dei s. de icone*, *De pace fidei*, *Cribrationum Alchoran libb. III.*, *De ludo globi libb. II.*, *Compendium*, *Dialogus de possest*, *De beryllo*, *De dato patris luminum*, *De quærendo Deum*, *De venatione Sapientie*, *De apice theoriæ*. The second volume contains : *De Deo abscondito*, *Dialogus de annunciatione*, *De æqualitate*, *Excitationum libb. X.*, *Conjectura de novissimis diebus*, *Septem epistolæ*, *Reparatio calendarii*, *Correctio tabularum alphonsi*, *De transmutationibus geometriæ*, *De arithmetiis complementis*, *De mathematicis complementis*, *Complementum theologicum*, *De mathematica perfectione*. The third volume contains : *De catholica concordantia libb. III.* Besides these editions there is the one of Henric-Peters (Basel, 1565), which is also in three parts, but follows another order and contains some works omitted in the Parisian. Many things are still unprinted.

2. In agreement with Erigena, whom he often speaks of with praise under the name of Scotigena (cf. § 154, 1), Nicolas distinguishes sense, understanding, and reason in man (*sensus*, *ratio*, and *intellectus*. *Vid. De doct. ign.*, iii. 6). Although sense is the lowest, all knowledge nevertheless begins with it, since the senses give us the first positive elements of all knowledge, which the abstracting, and therefore denying understanding then further works over (*De conject.*, i. 10). The Peripatetics are quite right in asserting that there is nothing in the understanding which has not first been in sense (*Idiot.*, iii. 2), and that the understanding needs the images or *phantasmata*, which are the result of observation. It is, however, not to be forgotten that the Platonists also are right when they claim that the understanding draws its knowledge from itself. Without external objects and without light, it is impossible to see; but it is just as impossible

without the power of sight (*Idiot.*, iii. 4). Observation by the senses acquaints us with the actual, that is, with that which is *hic* and *in hic rebus* (i.e. *hæcceitas* of Duns), and therefore more than a mere thing of thought (*Ibid.*, c. 11). This superiority of the senses, however, is diminished by the fact that their observations are very confused, and this because of their completely positive character, no distinction being drawn within them. The drawing of distinctions is the work of the understanding, whose activity thus has a positive and a negative character, since it affirms and denies, and therefore has as its fundamental law the contrast between affirmation and negation, that is, the incompatibility of opposites (*De conject.* i. 11. ii. 2). A distinction can further be drawn within the understanding between the lower representation, *imaginatio*, which is more closely related to the senses, and the higher, *ratio* proper, which is nearer the reason (*Ibid.*, c. 11). The senses have to do with the material but actual, the understanding with the forms, with genera, species, etc., in short with the universals, which really exist only in the things, and in themselves or abstracted from the things have merely mental existence (*Doct. ign.*, ii. 6, iii 1). Of all the forms which the understanding employs in order to attain knowledge, numbers occupy the first place. Mathematics, that pride of the understanding, rests therefore upon the fundamental proposition of the incompatibility of opposites, just like the earlier, especially the Aristotelian philosophy (*De beryllo*, c. 25 ; *De conject.*, i, 3, *et al.*). Nevertheless the easiest transition to the sphere of the reason is to be made from mathematics ; and numbers, those symbolical models of things (*De conject.*, i. 4), as the Pythagoreans have correctly observed, or also other mathematical conceptions, give the most convenient means of passing from the rational or intelligible to the intellectual, or from the *disciplina* to the *intelligentia* (*Idiot.*, iii. 8, *et al.*). If we think, namely, of the contrast between straight and crooked, as of that between the string and the bow, or of the contrast between line and angle, as of that between the hypotenuse and the right angle of a triangle ; and if we imagine the bow or the angle growing constantly greater, the distance between string and bow and between hypotenuse and angle will become correspondingly less, and since according to philosophy there is no endless progress, bow and string, angle and line finally coincide. This would give, therefore,

a *coincidentia contradictoriorum* which the Peripatetics would not recognise, but which points to the highest sphere, that of reason (*Apol. doct. ignor.*, fol. 35, and other passages). That which the understanding separates the reason combines (*De conject.*, i. 11). If by knowledge we understand, as is usual, cognition by the analyzing understanding, i.e., by the *discursus*, comprehension by the reason is a not-knowing, hence is *ignorantia*. He, however, who raises himself to this point *knows* that it is not intellectual knowledge, and therefore it is a conscious ignorance, a *docta ignorantia*, by which words Nicolas designates his stand-point not only in his first but also in his later works. Other expressions for this going beyond the knowledge of the understanding are *visio sine comprehensione* (*De apice theor.*), *comprehensio incomprehensibilis*, *speculatio*, *intuitio*, *mystica theologia* (*De vis. Dei*), *tertius cœlus* (*Doct. ign.*, iii. 11), *sapientia*, i.e., *sapida scientia* (*Apol. Doc. ign.*, *De ludo globi*, et al.), *fides formata* (*Doct. ign.*), etc. Rational knowledge is equally related to the senses and to the understanding, since the former contain only affirmations, the second affirmations and denials, while rational knowledge, as had been formerly taught by the Areopagite, contains only negative propositions (*De conject.*, i. 10; *Doct. ign.*, i. 26). Since this rational knowledge denies all contradictories, there is thus something which puts it into a position to recognise truth in all opinions, because the most opposite views here coincide (*De filiat. Dei*). In accord with this elevation above onesidedness, Nicolas not only endeavours to reconcile the Greek with the Roman Church, but also makes the attempt, in his *Cribrat. Alchor.*, to separate error from truth in the religious teaching of the Mohammedans.

3. The Deity is the first object of this mystical intuition, not only in rank but also in time, since without Him knowledge would be impossible. God is the content of all being; since He contains all, and unfolds all from Himself (*Doct. ign.*, ii. 3), He exists in all in a limited, concrete manner ("*contracte.*" *Ibid.*, c. 9). Since God is above all contradictions, He is not opposed to non-being; He is and is not; indeed He is more closely related to the *nihil* than to the *aliquid* (*De genesi*, *Doct. ign.*, i. 17). He must be the greatest of all, for He embraces all, and the smallest, since He is in all (*De ludo globi*, ii.; *Init. doct. ign.*, i. 2). He dwells on the other side of the coincidence of opposites (*De vis. Dei*, 9), and for that reason

no contrast of "can be" and "is" exists in Him; He may be called the Can-is (*Possest*), who only cannot not be (*Dial. de possest*). Or, since in Him *esse* has not been added to *posse*, He may be called pure ability, *posse ipsum*, to which the *posse esse*, *posse vivere*, etc., are related as a *posse cum addito*, therefore as a limited ability. This pure ability, which lies at the basis of and precedes all other ability, as light does visibility, is God (*De apice theor.*). He must be thought of as triune, since all things are of, through, and to God; as tri-causal, since He is the moving, formal, and final cause of all things, and presents the distinction of *unitas*, *æqualitas*, and *nexus*, as He who as Father is omnipresent, as Son all powerful, as Holy Spirit all-effective (*De ludo globi*, i.; *De dat. patr. lum.*, 5). In addition to this *posse ipsum*, the *posse esse* of things must be thought before them, and this limited possibility of things is their material, which, since it pre-supposes that absolute possibility which is not a *posse esse* but a *posse facere*, is not the absolute but the limited ground of things. An absolute possibility for them outside of God does not exist (*Doct. ign.*, ii. 8). Since matter is only the *posse esse* of things, it is nothing real (*actu*), it is in itself considered nothing, and therefore it can be said that things originate when God unfolds Himself into the nothing (*Ibid.*, ii. 3). The entirely different relation in which these two pre-conditions of things, God and matter, stand towards them, God being that which gives them their real being, matter that which gives them limitation, has often been expressed by Nicolas in the exact terminology of Erigena, things being designated as theophanies. He appears much more original, however, when he summons to his aid in this connection also the doctrine of numbers. Since God is the content of all being He may be designated as the absolute unity. Since every number is really one (the number seven *one* seven, ten *one* ten) and since this oneness is not affected by the difference in the numbers (the ten is no less *one* ten than the seven *one* seven), in the same way God is the absolute unity without any otherness (*alteritas*), which really does not exist for Him. In things unity appears burdened with the *alteritas*, and this is the cause of all limitations, of all evil, etc., all of which is nothing real (*Doct. ign.*, i. 24; *De ludo globi*, i.). For the same reason that God stands above all plurality He stands also above all finiteness. His infinitude, however, is not only negative absence of an

end or of limits, as is the case with the limitless universe, but His infinitude is actual and absolute, because He is Himself the end (*De vis. Dei*, 13 ; *Doct. ign.*, ii. 1).

4. From God as the content (*complicatio*) of all true being the transition is to be made to the universe as the *explicatio Dei*. At this point Nicolas expresses himself with decision against all views which have since been called pantheistic. Not only against the doctrine that all things are God (*Doct. ign.*, ii. 2), but also against emanation of every kind, whether it be thought of as an immediate emanation, or as effected by intermediate beings, by a world-soul, by nature, etc. He demands, on the contrary, although he himself admits that the "law" remains hidden from the understanding, that the world, this image of God, which may for that reason, be called the finite God, shall be thought of as created (*Doct. ign.*, ii. 2). The world is therefore related to God, the absolutely greatest and the absolute unity, as the concretely (*contracte*) greatest and one, which is for that very reason not without plurality. God, as the absolute being of things, is in an absolute way that which the things *are*, that is, that which is true being in them. The universe also is what the things are, but in a limited, concrete way. While, therefore, God, the absolute being, is in the sun not otherwise than in the moon, the universe is in the sun, as sun, or in a condition adapted to the sun, in the moon in a condition adapted to it. It may be said that as God appears in the universe in a limited way, the universe appears in individual things in a limited way, so that the universe forms as it were the mean between God and things (*Doct. ign.*, ii. 4). The universe, as this limited image of God, must partake also only in a limited way of the predicates of God. God is the absolutely greatest, than whom nothing greater and better is conceivable, while the universe is not, to be sure, such that nothing greater is conceivable, but is the best under the given circumstances. It is the relatively most perfect. God is the eternal; to the universe belongs the predicate of endless duration, which is a limited image of eternity (*De genesi*). God is the absolutely infinite; the universe the limitless, whose centre, since there are no limits, is everywhere, that is, nowhere (*Doct. ign.*, ii. 11). Finally, the universe exhibits a limited image of the Trinity, in the fact that in it the idea contained in the Divine word joins itself, as form, with matter, the possibility of being, to produce a unity which appears in motion, this really animat

ing principle of the world. Since motion is this principle there can be nothing in the universe which is entirely destitute of motion. Even the earth moves (*Doct. ign.*, ii. 7). Passing from the universe as a whole to the individual elements of it we find in every nature otherness, which is not really actual, and which for that very reason cannot be looked upon as a gift of God, added to being proper, in virtue of which it is a participation in and a mirror of God—if this fortuitous appearance of a deficiency (*defectus*) can be called an addition. Since in virtue of this everything differs more or less from its model in God, just as every circle deviates from perfect roundness, there are no two things in the world exactly alike (*Doct. ign.*, ii. 11). This varying reproduction of one and the same thing has however the result, that an absolute harmony exists among things, that they form a cosmos (*De genes.*). It is due to the fact that there are limits to things, that the universe is an actual order, a system. But since, now, we are hardly able to think of an order without summoning numbers to our aid, and since the order of numbers appears especially in the fact that the number ten, composed of the quaternary of the first four numbers, constantly recurs in our numeral system, it is not at all surprising that in Nicolas' exhibition of the order in the universe the number ten and its powers play an important part. Absolute unity, which is without distinctions, is placed, as the divine, before the first three powers of ten, as the sums of the three quaternaries  $1+2+3+4$ ,  $10+20+30+40$ ,  $100+200+300+400$ , which are considered at length as symbols of the rational, intellectual, and sensible, in the work *De conjecturia*. Elsewhere weight is again laid upon the fact that the orders of purely spiritual beings, the familiar heavenly hierarchies, give with the Deity the number ten, and that there corresponds to them as the opposite extreme the same number of grades of purely sensible beings, and that finally in the mean between the two, in man, who is the microcosm, or the human world, and at the same time God in miniature, or the human God, the same number repeats itself again (*int. al. De conj.*, ii. 14). Man in his likeness to God is, like God, the content of things, but he does not contain them, as God does, in a creative, but in an imitative manner. God's thinking produces things, man's thinking represents them. And therefore the forms of things in the Divine mind are the models which

precede them, while their forms in the human mind are the universal images gained by abstraction. The former are ideas, the latter are concepts (*De conject.*, ii. 14). For that very reason, however, man, although he draws his concepts, numbers, etc., out of himself, is nevertheless able by them to grasp the things. His numbers as well as the things mirror the same thing, the divine archetypes, the primitive numbers in the Divine mind. Individual men also, like all individual things, are different each from the other, and they none of them think exactly alike. Their thought of God and of the world can be compared with the way in which differently curved concave mirrors reproduce objects; except that these living mirrors are themselves able to change their curved surfaces.

5. The doctrine of God as the infinite, of the universe as the limitless, and of things, especially man, as the finite, is followed, in the third and last part of Nicolas' chief work, by the doctrine of the God-man as the infinitely-finite (*Doct. ign.*, iii. *De vis. Dei*). He makes the attempt to show on purely philosophical grounds that, if a concrete thing (*contractum*) should appear so great that no greater would be conceivable, this could be only a spiritually-sensuous being, that is, a man who was at the same time God; that for such Godlikeness it was necessary that the *likeness* in God, that is the Son, should unite with man; that everything goes to show that Jesus was this God-man; that the supernatural birth was necessary; that by belief in the God-man believers become *Christiformes* and partakers of His merit, thereby also *Deiformes* and one with God, without injury to their personal independence. Since the *Christiformitas* is different in each one, and in none becomes a complete likeness to Christ, the complex of believers forms an organism, which therefore presents a *diversitas in concordantia in uno Jesu*. Since in this union of different individuals it is the Holy Spirit that unites them, the way which mystic theology follows is plainly a circle in which God is both the starting-point and the goal. The becoming Christ and God without confusion and loss of individuality is constantly given as the end which God had in the creation, an end which is reached when our love for God is one with our being loved by Him, our seeing God one with our being seen by Him.

## § 225.

## CONCLUDING REMARK.

A justification is needed of the fact that here the question, whether the philosophers last considered (§ 217 ff.) are to be counted among the Schoolmen or to be assigned to the following period, is answered in a manner different from that commonly accepted, especially in relation to Nicolas of Cusa, who, according to many writers, opened an entirely new road in philosophy. This is all the more necessary, since it has been admitted that those who are to be considered in the next period exerted an influence upon the development of these men. A decisive reason for this arrangement, to which the chronological is forced to yield in the present case, is the relation of Gerson, Raymond, and Nicolas to the Roman Catholic Church. The nature of scholasticism was stated to consist in the fact that it undertook to justify by means of reason and philosophy the dogmas framed by the Fathers, and that it was therefore ecclesiastical, *in specie* Roman Catholic philosophy, a thing which could not be said of Patristic philosophy, since the latter helped to form the Church. A necessary consequence of this, and therefore no non-essential circumstance, was its bondage to the ecclesiastical language, the Latin. Another no less characteristic circumstance was its dependence upon the scientific centre authorized by the Church, upon Paris, as a consequence of which it became customary to call the scholastic style the "*Parisiensis*." It is true that a change is beginning in all these respects. Gerson writes a good deal in French, Raymond has never been a teacher in Paris, Nicolas pursues his studies outside of Paris, indeed, as it seems, he pursues his theological and philosophical studies outside of all Universities. At the same time it is only a beginning. Gerson continues to claim for Paris the right to render the final decision in scientific questions; Raymond as well as Nicolas write in the official language of the Church, though the latter admits that he finds it difficult, and is driven to invent the strangest words. All three, however, maintain unwaveringly the authority of the Roman Catholic Church and of its dogma, and the orthodoxy of none of them is attacked as long as they live. They therefore do not belong to a new age, even though they learn from those who represent that age. They do not adopt from the latter that element which has been called from the modern



stand-point the pre-Reformation element; they appropriate only that which is in agreement with the dogmas of the mediæval Church. The question whether the last of them, Nicolas, to whom the position was assigned above (§ 223) of one who unites in himself all the tendencies of scholasticism, and therefore brings them to a conclusion, still belongs to the scholastic or to the following period, is almost like the vexed question whether the first glimmering of dawn belongs still to the night or already to the day. Similar doubts arose in regard to the originator of scholasticism, Erigena. Some might be in doubt whether he was already, others whether Nicolas was still, a Schoolman.

## THIRD PERIOD OF MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

### TRANSITION PERIOD.

K. Hagen: *Deutschlands literarische und religiöse Verhältnisse im Reformationszeitalter*. 3 Bde. Erlangen, 1841-44. M. Carrière: *Die philosophische Weltanschauung der Reformationszeit*. Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1847.

### INTRODUCTION.

#### § 226.

CRUSADING Christendom had looked for its salvation from two causes (cf. *sup.*, § 179): from the conflict with Antichrist and from the possession of the Holy Land and Sepulchre. Both proved to have a saving efficacy, although indeed in another manner than had been thought of. The former proved so, inasmuch as the crusaders became acquainted among the infidels, in whom they expected to find monsters, with a sense of art and science, a tenderness and nobility of sentiment, and finally with a cultus which if it was abstract was yet simple,—all of which could not fail to make an impression and to leave behind lasting traces. Similarly the latter cause proved efficacious, inasmuch as the experience that Palestine was in no respect holier than Germany, that Jerusalem was just as lacking in holiness as Paris, and that the Holy Sepulchre was empty, made plain to them that salvation and holiness are not confined to one locality, and that the only Redeemer who can save is He who having risen lives in believers' hearts. Richer in experience, poorer in sensuous expectations, Christendom returns to European conditions, which, during the Crusades and, in a great measure because of them, had been essentially transformed. Everything appears more rational, spiritualized, it may be said. The relationship between rulers and subjects has begun to be rationally regulated, in France through the growth of the power of the king, hitherto weak as against the vassals; in

England, on the other hand, through the limitation of the despotic ascendancy which the kings had arrogated to themselves. Out of rude highway robbers, which for the most part at least they had been, the knights have been transformed into well-bred men, lovers of art, and, by contact with the Saracens and under their influence, what is called the romance of knighthood has been developed. Amongst the dwellers in towns, acquaintance with foreign lands has called forth the spirit of enterprise, and an inclination for many institutions, especially of a financial kind, which they had found in the East, has roused the feeling for order and security, while both together have elicited that consciousness of the third estate which forms the foundation of the true sense of civic life. Simultaneously there appears in the towns the hitherto unheard of phenomenon, that laymen should concern themselves with science, as they had learned to do abroad. And even the very humblest countrymen appear less destitute of rights than hitherto, for in the sacred Fehmic Courts there arise here and there institutions which assure the execution of the adjudgment to every one to whom weak tribunals had failed to secure the justice which they had awarded. There is this growing dominion of reason and mind in all the conditions of life; the Church alone does not exhibit it. She indeed remained in Europe, but because she stood still, she has allowed herself to be overtaken by the advancing world. For that reason she no longer, as in previous conflicts with the world, appears bold and sure of victory; but, mistrustful and anxious, she watches each new movement of the time-spirit, foreboding now, as she needed not to forebode before, that each new conquest that the world achieves must become dangerous to her.

### § 227.

As long as the two powers which the Middle Ages held to be mightiest, the Pope and the Emperor, kept steadily to the principle that each of them was bound to use what was allotted him by the swords of both, for the defence of Christ, so long did the two resplendent institutions of the Middle Ages, the feudal state culminating in the Empire, and the hierarchy of Rome, mutually support one another. Men like Charlemagne, Otto I., Henry II., Gregory VII., and Innocent III. exhibited approximations to the ideal of mediæval glory.

But the same Emperor, at whose court, according to the legend, there originated treatises *de tribus impostoribus*, was brought to lose to his vassals the most important imperial privileges; and again in cases where Popes aspired to purely worldly lordship over the princes, they were themselves the means of bringing about a condition of affairs in which Kings laid violent hands on a Pope "who denied immortality," and in which the anti-popes whom they had nominated called one another Antichrist, and thereby brought the Papacy itself into danger of contempt. More and more the paths of the worldly and the spiritual powers diverge, although by that very fact the Empire on the one hand, was bound to fall asunder, seeing that it could only hold its authority as Holy and Roman, while similarly the Church could only become and remain catholic so long as the all-embracing secular power granted her the protection of its arm (cf. *supra*, § 131). The Church looks with ever sharper aversion upon the foundations of all national life—on property, on marriage, on obedience freely conceded because it refers only to laws voluntarily approved—as mere worldliness, and her favourite children are obliged to bind themselves by vows to renounce all these. This separation from the world which was demanded of the truly elect (the clergy), stands to the flight from the world which had shown itself in the youthful community, in the little gathering of the chosen, as a tendency to celibacy, the abandonment of property, and as voluntary suffering (*v.* § 121), in the same relation as the forced and artificial does to the natural, and as the efforts after repristination made by the forces of reaction stand to the institutions of the good old times. Quite in accordance with this state of affairs, the principle of nationality, which in pre-Christian times had outrivalled all others, but which still more than in the empire of the Romans was bound to disappear in the mediæval Empire where all spoke one tongue (*vid. supra*, § 116), asserts itself in the State as soon as the latter places itself in a negative attitude to the kingdom of Christ. And the principle is now conscious and reflective, which in antiquity had never been the case. It was national interests which brought into prominence princes fighting against the Popes, it was national interests which created adherents for them, often unconsciously, even among religious minds. As the Church had chosen its champions more especially from among the regular clergy who belonged

to no country, to whom before long there are allied the members of a new order, which, on account of its clear consciousness of the end for which it is destined, became the order of orders and for the most part devoid of the feeling of patriotism, so on the other hand, it is intelligible that political opposition to the encroachments of the Church should be universally allied with nationalism, *i.e.*, with special accentuation of the principle of nationality.

### § 228.

As Scholasticism from its nature as the philosophy of the Church corresponded to the conditions under which the world had to fulfil the aims of the Church, and repeated (of course always in succession, according to § 4) the individual phases of that condition, so a complete dissolution of the elements of scholasticism, of which it has already been shown in treating of the period of their decay how they had begun to assume diversity of character and how they must separate in the end, corresponds to the long death struggle of the Middle Ages which begins with the close of the crusades. These elements had been, faith and secular learning, which, even before the Schoolmen had attained to an ecclesiastical theology the Church Fathers had blended into an ecclesiastical theory, *i.e.*, into dogmas. Now that one of these elements succeeds in again freeing itself from the other, the antagonism between Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism, in the adjustment of which the patristic philosophy had consisted (*vid. supra*, § 132), will again to a certain extent repeat itself. It would also be no difficult matter to establish numerous points of contact between the theosophists of this period and the Gnostics, as likewise between the followers of secular learning and the Neo-Platonists. (Stöckl has made numerous pertinent observations on the former in his attacks on the anti-scholastic Mystics.) Yet it is necessary to maintain a recurrence "to a certain extent" only, inasmuch as in relation to the Gnostics and Neo-Platonists the system of Church doctrine, and further the body of Church learning, were still in the future, while now, on the other hand, in relation to the two opposing tendencies, these are in the past. The anti-scholastic character is common to both, the followers of divine wisdom or Theosophists on the one hand, and the followers of secular wisdom or Cosmo-

phists on the other. It announces its points of contact especially among the earliest exhibitors of these tendencies, while among those who belong to the period of their culmination, how forgotten of the world are the followers of divine wisdom, and how nearly do the followers of secular wisdom verge on being forgotten of God!

## FIRST DIVISION.

### Philosophy as Divine Wisdom.

#### THE THEOSOPHISTS.

C. Ullmann : *Reformatoren vor der Reformation*, 2 Bde. Hamburg, 1842. W. Preger : *Geschichte der deutschen Mystik im Mittelalter*. 1<sup>r</sup>. Th. Lpz., 1864.

#### § 229.

ALONGSIDE of all their kinship, partly based on demonstrable influences, with the Mystics of the earlier period, the Theosophists of the transition period are, however, essentially distinguished from the Victorines, from Bonaventura, and even from Gerson. While, that is to say, the latter attached themselves to the firmly established dogma of the Church, and thus to what had been the outcome of the original preaching of salvation, but never on that account ceased to speculate from the Church standpoint, the former link their profound speculations to the original *κήρυγμα* (cf. § 131), and so take their stand rather upon the basis of the congregation than on that of the Church. This circumstance obviously explains how it was that they were looked upon with mistrust and even condemned as heretics by the Roman Catholic Church, and similarly how Protestants looked upon those of them who did not actually side with themselves, as the precursors of their own view. According to the conception of scholasticism established above, the older Mystics cannot be separated from it, and the single example of Bonaventura would suffice to prove that mysticism and scholasticism are in no way opposed. It is only the Mystics of the transition period, those precisely who have been designated Theosophists, who are anti-scholastic. From what has been said above, it will be regarded as no unessential circumstance, that the Victorines and Bonaventura wrote in Latin, the latter even as a poet, while the Mystics of the four-

teenth and following centuries wrote in the vulgar tongue, the earlier of them being of the number of those to whom their own language owes an incalculable debt. It must also be regarded as characteristic that they developed their doctrines not in commentaries on the Sentences, but in sermons addressed to the people. Gerson's sermons are addressed to the clergy and professors, and are therefore in Latin

### § 230.

#### A.—MASTER ECKHART AND SPECULATIVE MYSTICISM.

K. Schmidt: in *Studien und Kritiken* by Umbreit and Ullmann. Jahrg. 1839. 3tes Heft. Martensen: *Meister Eckart*. Hamburg, 1842. Jos. Bach: *Meister Eckhart der Vater der deutschen Speculation*. Wien, 1864. A. Lasson: *Meister Eckhart der Mystiker. Zur Geschichte der religiösen Speculation in Deutschland*. Berlin, 1868.

1. Born about the year 1260, probably in Thuringia, having become thoroughly versed in the Church Fathers and the Schoolmen, as well as in the Aristotelian philosophy, by his studies at Cologne and his later residence in Paris, Brother Eckhart appears in the last decade of the thirteenth century as Prior of Erfurt and provincial vicar of Thuringia. Then, after a three years' residence in Paris the "Brother" gives place to the "Master," for at that time he became Magister. In 1304 he exercises the functions of Provincial of the Dominican order in Saxony, in one of the following years those of the Vicar-general in Bohemia, and distinguishes himself in both positions by his beneficent reforms and by his sermons. After the completion of his term of office as Provincial in 1311, and a residence in Paris for the year still required of him as *Magister legens*, there follows a period in which he is lost to history and in which he appears to have been in relation, probably in Strasburg, with the Beghards and Brethren of the Free Spirit. Later, his activity in the school and the pulpit of his monastery at Cologne gathers many scholars round him; among them Suso and Tauler. The most vehement opponent of the Beghards, Heinrich von Virneburg, Archbishop of Cologne, censures his doctrines, and as Eckhart will not submit himself, requests the confirmation of his judgment by the Pope, whereupon the former in 1327 formally withdraws his doctrines, but soon thereafter dies. Such is the usual tradition. According to Lasson, the withdrawal, which

moreover was conditional, took place before the Pope had expressed his opinion. But neither does this view correspond to the facts of the case. Preger has documentarily proved that the so-called withdrawal is nothing more than a public declaration of Eckhart's, made at the same time as his protest against the competence of the archiepiscopal inquisition, in which he maintains all his doctrines along with the formula (usual in all cases) that he renounced whichever of them should be proved to be heretical. It was not till two years after his death that the papal Curia gave utterance and pronounced that declaration a sufficient withdrawal. Eckhart's learned works, of which Tritheim has specified many, are mostly lost. His sermons which appeared for the first time in the Tauler collection at Basel, 1521-22, have been published complete, along with some smaller essays by Pfeiffer. (*Deutsche Mystiker des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts*. Vol. ii. Leipsic, 1857.)

2. The fundamental thought to which Eckhart always recurs, is that God, in order from the dim and dark divinity in which He is mere essence to become a real and living God, must utter and apprehend Himself, "profess Himself and speak His word" (Pfeiff., pp. 180, 181, 11). Now the word which God utters, is the Son, to whom the Father communicates all things, so that He retains nothing at all to Himself; therefore, not even the power of production, so that the Son likewise produces and "in the same origin in which He originates, the Holy Spirit originates also and flows forth" (p. 63). Inasmuch as the Spirit links the Father and the Son, He is Love ("*Minne*") and very desire itself; therefore, "His essence and life" consist "in that He must love, be He lief or loath" (p. 31). God remains, inasmuch as He utters Himself, in Himself; His going forth is His return (p. 92), and this out-going and in-coming took place, takes place and will take place, only because He is an eternal flowing forth (p. 391). But further, corresponding with this Divine outflowing, there is also postulated an outflowing of that which is not God. Since God alone is real existence, the latter is what He is not, Nothing (non-being). The creature is therefore not only created out of nothing, but taken in itself it is itself nothing (p. 136). Were God to withdraw His own from them, things would again become nothings (p. 51). This own is Himself, for to God alone can "*isness*" be attributed, for He



alone is (p. 162). That which things really are, they are in God (p. 162), or, what is the same thing, the true reality in them is God. This true reality in things God utters in uttering Himself; He is to such a degree their being and essence, that Eckhart even goes the length of saying that God is all things and all things are God (pp. 163, 37, 14). God is in things not according to His nature, not as a person, but things are full of God according to His essence (p. 389). Because He is in the creatures, He loves the creatures, yearns for Himself in them. With the same yearning with which God yearns for the only begotten Son, He yearns also for me, and in this way the Holy Spirit goes forth (p. 146). With the same love with which God yearns for Himself, He yearns for all creatures. Not however as creatures (p. 180). That, namely, which makes them creatures and things, is their otherness, their being here and now, their number, quality and mode, without which all were only one essence (p. 87). But all these are properly nothing, and therefore for God non-existent. From all these, from time, space, quality, mode we must abstract if we desire to see that in them which really is; this naturally is in all things good, all the limitation and all the evil of things are to it mere nothing. As the coal only burns my hand, because my hand has not the warmth of the coal, so the pangs of Hell properly consist in non-being, so that it may be said: It is nothing which pains in Hell (p. 65). Naturally, however, the creature so far as it stands by itself is not good (p. 184).

3. God therefore is revealed in all things, only in each in a special manner, and therefore in a manner infected by nothingness; they are copies of Him. But because God is a thinking being, the non-thinking beings are only His foot-prints, but the soul is His very image (p. 11). Above all such is man, in whom the soul is bound up with the body, and whom Eckhart, not indeed always, but frequently places above the angels (*int. al.*, p. 36). As God is all things because He contains all things in Himself, so the soul also is all things because it is the noblest of things (p. 323). In the three highest faculties of the human soul, knowledge, the military or wrathful faculty (*irascibile*) and the will, Father, Son and Holy Spirit are mirrored (p. 171). As all things seek to return to the first principle from which they sprang, so also does man, only with man this return is conscious, and therefore

God knows Himself in man as known by him. But since all things are contained in idea in the human soul, they are carried back to God by the return to God of the thinking soul (p. 180). Between God and the creature there comes about a relationship of mutual surrender, which is equally essential to both. To see and know God and to be seen and known by Him are all one (p. 38). Hence God can as little do without us as we without Him (p. 60). The mutual union between God and man, the yearning or love, is on the side of God an action, but not an arbitrary one, for "to Him it is more necessary to give than to us to take" (p. 149); this however does not relieve us of gratitude, much rather do we thank Him that He must love us. On man's side that union is in the first place a suffering, to which, however, there is joined an activity of alternate self-surrender and self-assertion: the soul is to be "a virgin who is a wife," *i.e.*, it is to receive in order to bring forth (p. 43). Since this love is not actually in us, but we in it (p. 31), and since it consists in the fact that God thinks and wills in man, man must surrender his own thought and will, must will nothing but God. He who desires something besides God finds it not, he who only desires Him finds with and in addition to Him, all things (*int. al.*, p. 56). When the man's will becomes God's will, good; but when God's will becomes man's will, that is better: in the former case man only submits himself, in the latter, God is born in him, and thereby the aim of the world's creation is attained (pp. 55, 104). This being born of God in the soul unites both in that unity in which there can happen no greater sorrow to God, than that man should do anything against his own blessedness, and to man, no greater happiness than that God's will should come to pass and God's honour be regarded. The man who entirely surrenders his will to God, "seizes and binds" the will of God, so that the latter may not do what the former does not will (p. 54). In this surrender man becomes through grace what God is by nature (p. 185). At the same time it must never be forgotten, that there is a great distinction between the individual (Burchard, Heinrich), and man or humanity. It was the latter, the nature of humanity, that Christ assumed; and well so, for had He only become a particular man, that would have availed us little (p. 64). But now, so far as I am not Burchard or Heinrich, but man, what God bestowed on Christ is mine also.

It is indeed bestowed on me more than on Him, for He possessed all things from all eternity (p. 56). But to that end, all that goes to make up a particular man must be given up, and I may not make the smallest distinction between myself my friend, and any one beyond the sea, whom I never saw. The particular personality must cease, in order that the man may be (p. 65). Where the mode of the person, the creature, is gone out, where God is born in the soul, the man knows himself like unto Christ, as Child and Son of God; then nothing is any longer withheld from him; as God works in him to will, so does He also to know, and hides nothing from him (pp. 66, 63). We apprehend God, not by our natural understanding, for to it He is impossible of apprehension, but because by Him we are elevated into the light in which He reveals Himself.

4. What separates man from God is only the clinging to himself and what is his. With the cessation of this, separation from God also ceases. So far, therefore, as man abandons himself he becomes God, and therefore all things (p. 163). Abandonment of self, emptiness of all that can be called mine, and poverty, are the names of this condition (pp. 223, 280, 283).—"Thou shalt sink thy thine-ness, and thy thine shall become a Mine in His Mine," Eckhart cries to the soul and promises it as the reward therefor, union with God, not as He is this or that (particular thing), but as He is above all particular determinations, and to a certain extent nothing (pp. 318, 319). Man is to take up into himself pure Godhead without any "co-essence" (*accidens*) (pp. 163, 164). The means to that end is humility and eager desire, which God cannot withstand, which compel Him (p. 168). Because the soul has its true home in God (p. 154), blessed union with God is rest; it is the aim of the creation of the world (p. 152). Rest however is not inactivity, it is "freedom and movement" (p. 605). Eckhart does not desire that from his assertion that the eternal life consists in knowledge, it should be inferred that it does not consist in yearning love, *i.e.*, in the will; accordingly he warns his readers against all inactive quietism, especially in the sermon on Martha and Mary (pp. 47-53), which is remarkable on general grounds. Only, works are not to be exalted apart from disposition of heart. Absence of intention excuses all transgressions; without pious intention, all fasting, watching and praying avail nothing. In general let men not trouble

themselves at first as to what they are to do, but surrender the soul to God and then follow its inclination. As, according to Eckhart, the individual faculties of the soul correspond to the three persons of the Divine essence, the surrender of only one of these faculties to God permits only of the apprehension of one aspect of the Godhead. The unexplained totality of the Godhead must much rather be comprehended by the innermost principle of the soul, that little fortress (*castellum*); so shall we bury ourselves in the depths of the Divine. Thereby the immediate intuition is united with as immediate a consciousness, and therefore the word "spark" (*fünklein*) is here used with its reminiscence of the *scintilla conscientiæ* of the Church Fathers and the Schoolmen. Once one is in the right path, one sees, that to the individual, God is ever more dear, things ever more indifferent (pp. 178, 179). The soul is set between the two, between time and eternity. Appropriated by nature to neither of the two, the soul is free to surrender itself either to the one or the other. If it hold fast to nothingness, to the distinction between to-day and to-morrow and yesterday, it lives in perdition, because it exists in God but yet against its will (p. 169); but if it desires not to hold fast to nothingness, contemns the temporal, including its own will and opinion, then it is blessed and for the same reason, because it is in God, and willingly. Then all things become to it an eternal now, as they are to God; time becomes to it as eternity, and the three higher faculties of the soul become the seats of the highest virtues of faith, hope and love (p. 171 ff., somewhat different at p. 319 ff.). The last of the three, the really eternal life, consists in the composure to which all is right that God does, even were it that He should leave us alone and comfortless as once Christ was (p. 182). At this stage God is born in the human soul, and so reveals Himself and so repeats the eternal generation in the human soul, that just as God in the soul again becomes man, so man is deified or made like unto God (pp. 643, 640). Such a man may be called Christ, even God, only that he *became* through grace what God by nature eternally is (pp. 185, 382, 398).

5. Eckhart's influence upon HEINRICH SUSO was of the most decided character (cf. M. Diepenbrock: *Heinrich Suso's genannt Amandus Leben und Schriften*. Regensburg, 1829). Born in Swabia in the year 1300, of the von Berg family, he called himself for the sake of his mother's piety after her

family name Seuss or Süss, which Latinized became Suso. After his death he received the surname Amandus. Early entered into the Dominican order, his poetical spirit found its chief contentment in the "sweet draught," held out to him by the "high and holy" Master Eckhart. "Love," which he apprehended in its chivalrous sense as well, became the leading thought of his life, to which he gave expression, partly as a wandering preacher, partly as an author, in metrical or unmetrical writings. He died at Ulm, on Jan. 25th, 1365, in the monastery of his order. Among his writings, which were probably all written in German, and partly translated by himself into Latin, that "On the Nine Rocks" was formerly counted, but it is now pretty generally attributed to Rulmann Meerswein, a pious layman of Strasburg. The book was written in 1352, and portrays in a vision the corruption of all ranks, and the nine steps which must be climbed if man is to attain to the extinction of his self-will.

Cf. Ed. Böhmer: *Heinrich Seuss* (in *Giesebrecht's und Böhmer's Damaris*. Stettin, 1865, p. 291 ff.)

6. For JOHANN TAULER (1290-1361) also, the instruction and the ravishing eloquence of Eckhart, rather than his own scholastic studies, became the groundwork on which rested his early won reputation as a preacher. From the way, however, in which in riper years the brilliant and celebrated orator is converted into the heart-stirring messenger of the faith, through the influence of a pious layman (Nicolas of Basel, who was the head of the secret society of Mystics, called The Friends of God, and who was subsequently burnt at Vienna as a heretic [cf. K. Schmidt: *Nicolaus' von Basel Leben und ausgewählte Schriften*, Vienna, 1866], was long thought to be this "Friend of God in the Oberland." Recently, however, Preger and Lütolf [in *Jahrb. für schweizerische Geschichte*, 1 Bd., 1876] have opposed this view),—it appears that at first he only appreciated the rational, it might almost be said, the intellectual side of Eckhart's mysticism, and perhaps more than Eckhart himself brought it into play in his preaching. But after the layman above-mentioned had drawn his attention to the fact that his discourses glittered more than they warmed, there was a change. The practical side is much more prominent in the sermons he delivered during the first ten years after his conversion. As Eckhart dwelt especially on the being of God, the Friends of God on the other hand,

especially on the will of God, this influence on Tauler is intelligible. Ruysbroek (*v.* § 231), whose society he sought at this time, may have strengthened him in this tendency. It is now, not as with Eckhart the mystical repetition of Christ in us, which he preaches, but rather the exhortation that we should follow the example of Christ's poor and humble life. But his treatise *On Following after the Poverty of Christ's Life*, is counted one of his most excellent. Where sentences of a purely speculative character occur in his works, they coincide, often verbally, with those of Eckhart. The oldest edition of his sermons is that published at Leipsic in 1498; then follows that of Augsburg, 1508, then Rynmann's Basel edition, 1521; Surius' Latin paraphrase [Cologne, 1548, Fol.], is based on the Cologne edition of Peter von Nymwegen, 1543. Editions in modern languages are frequent. Amongst those in High German, that of Schlosser (Frankfort, 1826), and, as the most recent, that of Kuntze and Biesenthal (Berlin, 3 vols.), may be mentioned. It cannot appear strange that Luther placed Tauler very high, while Doctor Eck, on the other hand, calls him one of the dreamers suspected of heresy.

Cf. K. Schmidt: *Johannes Tauler von Strassburg*. Hamburg, 1841. Ed. Böhmer: *Nicolas von Basel und Tauler*. *Op. cit.*, p. 148, *et seq.*

7. The unknown author of GERMAN THEOLOGY (published by Luther, 1518, afterwards frequently) shows much more agreement with Master Eckhart than do these personal disciples of his. A great part of the propositions contained in the fifty-sixth chapter of this little book is to be found verbally in Eckhart. Scarcely one will be found to disagree with what Eckhart has said, except that in his case the sermon form has often given rise to a liveliness of expression verging on hyperbole, which the quiet tone of the later treatise does not demand. But it is to make too much of this distinction to say that Eckhart's pantheism is avoided in the *German Theology*: Eckhart is not so very pantheistic, the *Theology* not so free from that tendency as such a criticism would infer. The fundamental ideas: That God is the perfect, because the One, because He is all and above all; that things on the contrary, are imperfect, because divided into parts and particularized as this and that,—that the God-head only becomes God by uttering itself ("*verihet*"),—that God indeed, even without the existence of the creature, is

Revelation and Love, but only essentially and originally, not formally and actually,—that the creature only falls away from God by willing the I, me, and mine, instead of God—so that Adam, old man, Nature, the Devil, to be self-interested, I and mine, all mean exactly the same thing,—that only in the humanised God or the deified man *i.e.*, in him in whom, because he has surrendered himself, Christ lives, is salvation to be found,—that the will is free and noble so long as God lives in it, but by turning away from God it becomes the affair of the body, *i.e.*, unfree will,—that Hell itself becomes Heaven so soon as the private will ceases, etc.,—all these doctrines are already found in Eckhart. But the *German Theology* has grasped them more concisely, and because its author knew of the errors of the “free spirit” which he often denounces, they are expressed in such a manner as to minimise the danger of misunderstanding. Eckhart, who is often especially striking on account of the boldness of his expression, frequently suggests the thought that he is intentionally paradoxical. In that way it was not altogether without fault of his that he was and is regarded as heterodox. He certainly is not so to such a degree as is often thought by those who have not read him, or at least not thoroughly.

### § 231.

#### B.—RUYSBROEK AND PRACTICAL MYSTICISM.

L. G. V. Englehardt: *Richard von St. Victor und Johannes Ruysbroek*. Erlangen, 1838 (cf. § 172).

1. JOHANNES, to whom instead of his forgotten family name, that of his birthplace RUYSBROEK (also Rusbrock, Rusbroch and the like) was ascribed, was born in the year 1293, became in his four-and-twentieth year, having been decently educated, priest and vicar of St. Gudule, at Brussels, but retired to the Augustine monastery at Grünthal in his sixtieth year, perhaps moved thereto by the Friends of God above mentioned. There he died in the capacity of Prior on the 2nd December, 1381, having acquired by his mystical raptures the surname of *Doctor extaticus*. Most of his writings are in the language of Brabant (Flemish), but his disciple Gerhard, and after him Surius, translated them into Latin, and in this form they were printed in the year 1552,

and afterwards in 1609 and 1613. Among the fourteen writings which this collection contains—(*Speculum æternæ salutis, Commentaria in tabernaculum fœderis, De præcipuis quibusdam virtutibus, De fide et iudicio, De quatuor subtilibus tentationibus, De septem custodiis, De septem gradibus amoris, De ornatu spiritualium nuptiarum, De calculo, Regnum Dei amantium, De vera contemplatione, Epistolæ septem, Cantiones duæ, Samuel s. de alta contemplatione*)—that on the ornament of the spiritual marriage is the most important.

2. Unity with God, which with Ruysbroek also is the highest end, is in his view to be attained either by a practical asceticism, or by the inner life, in which we so surrender ourselves to God, that He is hourly born in us, or finally by the highest degree of contemplation, in which even the lust of the inner life ceases and gives place to pure rest and calmness. The main distinction between Ruysbroek and Eckhart consists in the fact that the latter always represents the union as already attained, while the former rather portrays the process of attainment and therefore the means thereto. He is accordingly never tired of enumerating the different sorts of Christ's indwelling, the different meetings with Him, the individual moments of favour, prevenient grace, free will, good conscience, etc., and it may be regarded as characteristic that while Eckhart is always pleased to show that man is a Christ, Ruysbroek exhorts him to become a Peter, a James, or a John. A comparison of the two must therefore throw upon Eckhart an appearance of Pantheism. The distinction, however, between the unity with God which the pantheist teaches, and the *unio mystica*, consists especially in the fact that the latter is conditioned by the blotting out of sin, while the former is immediate and natural; so that Ruysbroek accurately hits the mark, when, after portraying and classifying a number of pantheistic errors, in the end he especially censures pantheists for this, that in their way rest is attained by mere nature. Eckhart, certainly, often passes by the conditional processes which lead to that end somewhat hastily. It need not surprise us to find that as regards this point of difference, Eckhart has more points of contact with Erigena, Ruysbroek with the followers of St. Victor.

3. The doctrine of the trinity, however much Ruysbroek tries to separate it from that of creation, stands in his works



in the closest connection with it : by the eternal generation of the Word all creatures from eternity have proceeded forth from God. God apprehended them in Himself, before they became creatures under conditions of time, under the form of a certain, but not an entire, otherness. This eternal life of the creatures is the proper ground (*ratio*) of their temporal, created existence ; it is their idea. By it, their type, things are like to God who perceives Himself in them, so far as He perceives Himself in their original type. In their original type things have their likeness to God ; their aspiration after the original type as the ground of their being, is therefore an aspiration after likeness to God. In man, with whom this aspiration is conscious, its attainment coincides with the dominion of love, which gives to men the form of God. In the highest stage the consciousness of God and of ourselves ceases ; we become not God, but love, and of ourselves become rest and bliss. The condition of the attainment of the end is that man himself should die. This dying is on the theoretical side, a giving up of knowledge and a plunge into the darkness of non-knowledge, in which the sun of revelation arises ; on the practical side, it is a giving up of our own doing and working for the sake of being wrought upon by God. By this abandonment of self and overthrow of the private will, man attains to the point at which God's will is his highest joy, and therein consists true calmness and rest.

4. As Suso, Tauler, and later the *German Theology* connect themselves with Eckhart, so Ruysbroek also has followers who depend on him, and develop his doctrines. The first to be named is GEERT DE GROOT (*Gerhardus Magnus*), who was born in 1340, was educated in Paris, and taught philosophy at Cologne for some time with approbation, but thereafter, on a sudden change of mind came forward as a popular preacher, and as the result of his acquaintance with the grey-haired Ruysbroek, became the founder of the Brotherhood of the Common Life (*Collatienbrüder, Fraterherren, Hieronymianer*, etc.), which soon found itself in possession of many households of brethren. Gerhard died on Aug. 20, 1384, but the Brotherhood further followed out his purposes, among which not the least important was that of winning the common people to the religious and churchly life by the use in the Church of translations of the Scriptures and the vulgar tongue. In the oldest of these households

of the Brethren, at Deventer, there was now trained the man to whom the Brotherhood owes its greatest fame, THOMAS (Hamerken, Latinised Malleolus, but usually entitled after his birthplace, Kempen, near Cologne, A KEMPIS). He was born in the year 1380, instructed at Deventer from his thirteenth to his twentieth year, and after a seven years' noviciate entered as a regular canon the cloister of St. Agnes, near Zwolle, which had sprung from the Brotherhood, and there he lived, in the end as Superior, till his death (1471). His works were first published in 1494, and afterwards at Antwerp by the Jesuit Sommalius, in the year 1609 (3 vols. 8vo), which latter edition is the basis of many others, especially of the Cologne edition, in 2 vols. quarto, 1725. Among them none has become so famous as the *De imitatione Christi*, lib. 6. iv. (in the second vol. of the octavo edition). This work, containing no author's name in the oldest MSS., even in those prepared by Thomas himself, has also been ascribed to others. Thus it was ascribed to St. Bernard; by others to Gerson. With the greatest appearance of probability, the Benedictine Constantius Cajetanus, in the year 1616, sought to ascribe it to Johann Gersen, Abbot of Vercelli, who lived in the thirteenth century. That he was credited, may be proved, amongst other evidence, by the preface to Du Cange's glossary. It is essentially a mere repetition of his reasoning which has appeared in modern times, by Gregory, in Paris, in 1827, by Paravia, in Turin, in 1853, and by Renan, in Paris, in 1862. As, however, he had already been conclusively refuted by Amort, it was only necessary for Silbert, Ullmann, and others to repeat what Amort had already said. That Nicolas of Cusa, who probably owes much to the *Imitation*, in passages where he mentions Eckhart with honour names alongside of him "*abbatem Vercellensem*" (*Apolog. doct. ignor.*, fol. 37), is not weighty enough evidence to weaken the many counter reasons, amongst which the fact that the treatise contains so many Germanisms is not the least important. As matters stand at this date, Thomas must be regarded as the author of this work, which, next to the Bible, may perhaps have been the most frequently printed. Including all translations, there must exist about two thousand editions, of which there are a thousand in French alone. This circumstance by itself is sufficient to show that the work cannot be judged from the scientific point of view, but has a larger public than concerns itself with scientific matters. For the

same reason it is also an unfortunate fancy to compare the *Imitation* with the *German Theology*. To do so is to harm both writings, which are, each in its way, so worthy of admiration. The *Imitation of Christ* is meant only to be a book of devotions, and as such is excellent, perhaps unsurpassed. That the Jesuits have especially brought it into use, has harmed it in the eyes of narrow anti-Jesuits. It is interesting, when we compare this book with the homiletic writings, *e.g.*, of Bonaventura or Gerson, to see how much the doctrines which subsequent Protestantism rejected, *e.g.*, mariolatry, here fall into the background.

Cf. Karl Hirsche : *Prolegomena zu einer neuen Ausgabe der Imitatio Christi*. 1st vol., Berlin, 1873.

### § 232.

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GERMAN ECCLESIASTICAL REFORMERS FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

1. The fact that the two men among the reformers of the faith who had a bent for philosophy, and in fact were only accidentally led aside from it to theological activity, should have made no impression, or only a moderate impression on the progress of philosophy, while Luther, the enemy of philosophy, gave its advance a direction, if not, indeed, an original impulse, as well as impressed it with a peculiar character which remains to this day, ceases to be so surprising when we consider that the philosophy which was so prized by the two reformers above-mentioned, was that of the Renaissance. When we come to consider it (*v.* § 235), it will be seen that because it took its rise in a misunderstood want of the age, it does not indeed coincide, but gains relationship with that reaction which failed to understand the age or its problems, and therefore must remain, if not so absolutely as the latter, yet relatively unfruitful.

2. The great Swiss Reformer, ULRICH ZWINGLI (Jan. 1, 1484, to Oct. 11, 1531), is not, like his great Thuringian contemporary, driven out of the hitherto zealously defended Roman Catholic view of the universe, because his deep consciousness of sin leads him to see in it a comfortless salvation by works, but exhibits an inner development of quite another sort. The main cause of the awakening of this at no time zealous Catholic to an interest in theology, was Wyttenbach's

demonstration that the Romanists had falsified the words of Scripture. The impression which this made upon him was indeed so potent as to induce him to surrender the cherished plan of his life, of devoting himself to the advance of Humanism, for a life of practical activity in the Church, especially devoted to preaching the Bible doctrines. In like manner he never felt the accusations of reproachful conscience so heavily, that in horror of his own inner depravity, the single manifestations of this depravity, and the difference between them, seemed inconsiderable. One always feels with the strenuous moral preacher of Glarus and Zürich, that what above all made him what he was, was the resentment with which the patriot perceived the selfish interest of mere birds of passage in his fatherland. Finally, the attempt to induce him to take the step which Luther had taken on the promptings of his own inner nature—to renounce the world by assuming the monastic garb—had miscarried in his case, and so he always maintained his sensitiveness to the world's wants and an open ear for its wisdom. But as to the form of the world's wisdom to which at that time he owed obedience, there could in this case be scarcely a doubt. Humanism, to which Zwingli was early won, being itself a manifestation of the Renaissance, could not but make him ready to receive a philosophy which belonged to the same circle of phenomena, and accordingly the philosophy which he zealously studied at Vienna was in all probability the Florentine Platonism. Conjecture concerning the subsequent period of his career becomes more certain. Wyttenbach, whose influence on Zwingli was so decisive, had come to Basel from Tübingen, and had therefore breathed for years the air of Würtemberg, and with it imbibed the ideas which Reuchlin, the friend of Marsilio and Pico, had spread abroad in his fatherland. If we consider, finally, that he subsequently visited Italy, and that Pico's works had been for some time printed, not indeed at Basel, but at Venice, it is impossible to be surprised at the fact which has been established in particular by Sigwart, that in his writings sentences occur whose verbal agreement with Pico's oration : *On the Dignity of Man*, prove that they have been directly borrowed from it. Only the mystical element, which is foreign to Zwingli, is, where it occurs in Pico, entirely ignored.

Cf. Sigwart: *Ulrich Zwingli*. Stuttg., 1855. R. Christoffel: *Huldreich Zwingli. Leben und auserwählte Schriften*. Elberfeld, 1857.

3. Like Zwingli, PHILIPPUS MELANCHTHON (Philipp Schwarzerd : 16 Feb., 1497–19 April, 1560) also starts from Humanism, and even as Magister in Tübingen still regards it as the highest task of his life to lay Aristotle, the greatest of all philosophers, before the world in a correct Greek text, so that the world may learn to know him as he actually taught and not as he was distorted by the Schoolmen. We observe that the young scholar takes up the side of the Hellenists of Padua in opposition to the Arabians (*v.* § 238, 1). Luther's impressive personality induces the newly appointed Professor at Wittenberg to moderate his admiration for the detested Aristotle. He had subsequently the good fortune to modify Luther's dislike, particularly of the Logic, and the zeal with which Luther demands that Aristotle should be taught, but "without commentary," proves that Master Philippus had converted him from the Arabian, with which alone he had previously been acquainted, to the Hellenistic conception of Aristotle.

Where Melanchthon's splendid influence on popular education, which has earned for him the honourable title of *Præceptor Germaniæ*, begins, we again find him in the character of an admirer of Aristotle. But it will not on that account occur to any one to call him the German philosopher, for in him the Churchman and the Scholar always preponderate. Because it is for the good of the evangelical Church and education, dialectics, physics and ethics shall be taught, and they shall be taught in such a way as to afford the proper preparation for the future preacher. This is his intention in writing his *Compendia*, in which Aristotle's doctrine is expounded, but in such a manner as to be compatible with the Creation out of Nothing, and the like. The *Dialectic* which exists in three forms (*Compendiaria dialectices ratio*, *Dialectices libri quatuor*, *Erotemata dialectices*), is related to the Introduction of Porphyry and the *Organon* of Aristotle, but borrows also, in some points, from Agricola, whom Melanchthon held in high esteem (*v.* § 239, 2), and whose posthumous work, *De inventione dialectica*, contains much which was regarded in subsequent times as the discovery of Ramus (*v.* § 239, 3). The *Physics*, in the preparation of which he availed himself of the help of Paulus Eberus, places in the foreground the subjects with the treatment of which Aristotle's *Physics* begins—the idea of God and the proofs for His existence, with the addition of the Peripatetic doctrine,

that all things exist for the sake of man, but man for the sake of God's glory, which consists in being known. The closing chapter of Aristotle's *Physics* is treated in a separate book (*de Anima*). As regards the *Ethics*, the following treatises belong to this branch of the subject: *In ethica Aristotelis commentarius*, *Philosophiæ moralis epitome*, *Ethicæ doctrinæ elementa*, *Commentarii in aliquot Ethices libros Aristotelis*. The task which Melanchthon here sets himself is to show that Aristotle derives his moral dictates from natural law, but that the latter, as the unwritten part of the Divine law, could not possibly be in opposition to the written law, and therefore that the natural law is to be found in the Decalogue as well as in Aristotle. The significance of Melanchthon is excellently characterised in the work of Arthur Richter, referred to below, when he regards him as the scholar, not the philosopher, philosophising and as having rendered philosophy great services in the way of information, but not in the way of theoretical advance. But in the province of natural and civil law more can be admitted (*v.* § 252, 2), because there the circumstance that jurists of practical and theoretical experience attached themselves to him, and, by his substitution of the doctrine of the Bible for canonical law, were emancipated from superstitious reverence for the latter, made him a co-operator in bringing about the evolution of the philosophy of law through the phases which are depicted below (§ 253-266).

Cf. C. Schmidt: *Philipp Melanchthon. Leben und ausgewählte Schriften*. Elberfeld, 1859. Arthur Richter: *Melanchthon's Verdienste um den philosophischen Unterricht*. Leipzig, 1870.

## § 233.

### TRANSITION TO THE CULMINATION OF MYSTICISM.

1. In every respect matters shape themselves differently with Dr. MARTIN LUTHER (10 Nov., 1483-18 Feb., 1546). With the passion with which he seizes upon everything, and which has made him the greatest personality of this epoch, he throws himself upon the study of theology, which at that time and especially at Erfurt was as much as to say that he became an Aristotelian in the sense of subsequent Nominalism (§ 215). The degrees of Bachelor and Master, and the dignity of

Sententiarius prove that his study was not fruitless, and likewise explain his subsequent hatred, when enlightened by profound experience, of the "Commentaries," in particular *i.e.*, of the expounders who had made Aristotle an instrument of Romish dogma. Even more than by this personal experience, he is distinguished from the two leaders referred to in the preceding paragraph, by a deep mystical trait, which is entirely lacking in both of them. Weisse rendered a valuable service in the work mentioned below, by again drawing attention to this mysticism of Luther's, and by emphasizing the fact that Osiander, so often branded as a heretic, stands much nearer to Luther than his judges. He is untouched by no tendency of the mysticism then dominant. The speculative tendency belonging to the upper and middle Rhine, early captivates the venerator of Tauler and the subsequent translator of the *German Theology*; at the same time he learns to know and to love in Staupitz a worthy representative of practical mysticism, which belongs to the lower Rhine. Now if mysticism, as has been shown above, arose, not through a misunderstanding which obscured the wants of the age, but just because those wants were rightly understood, this fact already gives Luther, in contrast with the two others, the advantage of one who swims with the current of the future. But such a nature as his does not allow itself to be merely borne along, but rather gives a certain modification to the spiritual tendency to which he surrenders himself. His great mission (*vid. infra*, § 261), to show how the individual must repeat in himself the process through which the Church has passed, from the preaching of redemption to the doctrine of redemption, from the latter to the establishment of a system of doctrine (§ 151), requires that, in unfolding the result so won, he should pass through all these stages, but of course in the reverse order. Thus, at first, he will be misled by what the masters of the Church have said, and goes back to the Fathers, to pure Augustinism; but there too he cannot stay, Paulinism expels Augustinism, *i.e.*, he takes his stand at a point where there is nothing but the original gospel, no *δόγμα*, only *κήρυγμα*. These three stages which may be designated by the three terms, Romish, ecclesiastical, evangelical (apostolical), are reflected also in his mysticism. Although at first the latter resembled the mysticism of Eckhart, to whom the idea of a commentary on the Sentences was still possible, it nevertheless soon loses

the magisterial quality calculated to impress scholars, and even goes the length of being accessible to all who are untouched by any scholastic or patristic tradition, and stand quite outside the Roman Catholic Church. This process of development in all Luther's views, including his mysticism, served therefore as a filter by which mysticism, freed from all impure elements of the past, was handed down to subsequent times. In this purified form, the mystical thoughts contained in Luther's writings become a fruitful seed; and as to the saying of his faithful contemporaries, that he might well have become a *præceptor Germaniæ*, but not indeed a *philosophus Teutonicus*, so much must be conceded to Luther, that even while he himself despised the idea of becoming a philosopher, he inspired one to whom the name has rightly been ascribed (v. § 234).

Cf. Köstlin : *Martin Luther. Sein Leben und seine Schriften*. Elberfeld, 1875. Weisse : *Martinus Lutherus*. Lips., 1845; and also : *Die Christologie Luther's*. Leipzig, 1852.

2. One of the first to show how fruitful a seed Luther's mystical doctrines contained, is Schwenkfeld; and it was perhaps the feeling that the latter expressed the actual outcome of his own teaching, that made Luther so hard in his judgment of this noble man. Born at his father's seat at Ossing, in the year 1490, CASPAR SCHWENKFELD VON OSSING was won over to the Lutheran reforms in the year 1519. His earnest character and pure zeal for truth would not permit him to stop at that stage. To use his own words, he was unable merely to follow, he must advance on his own account, and all his life he despised and censured seeing through other men's eyes. As early as the year 1527, he published from Liegnitz, where he occupied a ducal office, his *Epistle to all Christian believers on the ground and cause of error in the article of the Sacrament of the Supper*, in which he contests the carnal conception of the sacraments of Catholics and Lutherans, but also the views of Zwingli and the Anabaptists, and develops his own doctrine, which he characterises as the *via media* between these four sects. It is the same doctrine to which he remains faithful during his whole life, and which, taking *this* as predicate, in the sentence, "This is My body," he also regards as the only doctrine exegetically tenable, viz., that in the partaking of Christ, the spiritual food, the external



act in which Christ's memory is celebrated and His death proclaimed, must be related to the command bidding us do so by faith and self-surrender. The persecutions by the Lutherans, which he thereby drew down upon his head, obliged him in the very next year to leave his native country, and from that time onward he moved from place to place, lived in concealment, especially in Swabia and on the Rhine, and died in the year 1561, probably at Ulm. That in all the controversies into which he was really drawn, for he was himself a man of a peaceable disposition, Schwenkfeld always comes back to the sacrament, is to be explained from the fact that he saw in the Lutheran doctrine of the sacraments, the culmination of that tendency in Lutheranism which he always censures as carnal. The thing, namely, with which he ever and anon reproaches them is, that they confuse the inward and eternal with the outward and temporal, and so in place of the true and only saving faith, substitute the historic or rational faith. What is perfectly true of the eternal Word of God, who became flesh in Christ, and as glorified man sits at the right hand of God—that in Him alone is salvation—they attribute to the written word of scripture, and even to the word which comes from the mouth of their pastors in the pulpit. What is perfectly true of the glorified Christ, that the participation in His glorified flesh and blood alone guarantees to believers forgiveness of sins, they refer to the carnal participation in the bread and wine, and assert that thereby Christ unites Himself even with the unbeliever. In place of the *ecclesia interna*, apart from which there is nevertheless no salvation, they have substituted their only too depraved *ecclesia externa*, without excommunication or Church order, without regeneration and sanctification, and so hush consciences instead of rousing them. More and more, he says, the glory and honour of Christ are by them diminished, His influence fettered by their preaching, finally their pastors set in the position of guarantors of forgiveness, instead of their calling being taken for its witness. Of collections of the works of Schwenkfeld, I am acquainted with the following: *The Epistolary of the noble and divinely favoured Herr Caspar Schwenkfeld von Ossing in Silesia, etc.*, First Part, 1566 (*s. l.*, perhaps Strasburg), fol., which contains a hundred letters written in the years 1531–33. The Second Part, published 1570 (*s. l.*, *id.*), contains firstly, four epistles to all Christian believers, secondly,

fifty-eight letters to particular persons, which form the first of the four books into which this second part was meant to be divided. I am unaware whether the subsequent books appeared. In addition to this collection, there is the first (and only published) part of the *Orthodox Christian Books and Writings of the Noble, etc.*, 1564, fol. (s. l.). Therein are contained twenty-three essays: a Confession of the year 1547, an Account of C. S.'s calling, an Epistle on the Holy Trinity, 1544, an Exhortation to the True Knowledge of Christ, the (great) Confession, in three parts, On the Gospel, On Sin and Grace, Adam and Christ, an Epistle on Justification, On Divine Sonship, Clear Witnesses to Christ outside of the New Testament, an Epistle on Saving Knowledge of Christ, Summary of Two sorts of Estates, Three Christian Epistles, On the Eternal Life of God, a Catechism on the Word of the Cross, German Theology for Laymen, On the Three Sorts of Human Life, 1545, On the Christian Warfare, Summarium on Warfare and Conscience, On Heavenly Medicine, On Christian Men, on the article of Forgiveness of Sins, A Consideration of the Freedom of Faith, A Short Confession of Christ. Besides these I know of individual printed writings: *On Prayer*, 1547; *On the Office of Teacher of the New Testament*, 1555; *Christian Church Questions*; *Repudiation of Dr. Luther's Malediction*, 1555; *Two Responses to Melancthon*; *Short Repudiation of the Calumnies of Simon Museus*, 1556. As early as the year 1556, in his Second Response to Melancthon, Schwenkfeld says that he has written more than fifty pamphlets. He mentions several, mostly such as have been here referred to, but of some I have been unable to get possession. The Wolfenbüttel Library must possess many more of Schwenkfeld's MSS.

3. In more than one respect SEBASTIAN FRANCK of Donauwörth is associated with Schwenkfeld. Born in the year 1500, he was very early awakened by Luther whose preface to the *Turkenchronik*, Franck translated along with the latter. In Nürnberg, where he lived for some years, he came into closer intimacy with Schwenkfeld and Melchior Hofmann, from whom he perhaps received the first impulse to give himself entirely to mysticism by a study of Tauler's writings and the *German Theology*. After experiencing hostilities of all sorts, which drove him, distinguished as he was for scholarship, profundity, patriotism, from Nürnberg,

Strasburg, Ulm and Esslingen, he died at Basel in the year 1545. For Karl Hagen, who alone hitherto has thoroughly considered the question of his philosophic importance, to call him the herald of modern philosophy, may be too much, but it is certainly more correct than for expositions of Church History and the History of Philosophy not even to mention his name. The tone of dismissal with which Melanchthon speaks of him; the bitterness of Luther, who much better recognises his importance; the circumstance that even Schwenkfeld abjures him, because his piety is too spiritualistic and sectarian; but above all the fact that those who have despoiled and even plundered his writings never mention him by name—all combined to draw attention away from him, and his writings gradually disappeared. This was the case even with regard to the works which repeated publication shows to have found a great welcome, namely, the two histories: *History-bible* (*Chronica*), and *German Chronicle* (*Germaniæ Chronicon*), and the geography: *World-book* (*Cosmographia*). Much more was it the case with the others which never had such a large circle of readers. How much Franck was forgotten is shown by the number of errors which could be pointed out in the graduation thesis of Wald, mentioned below. Nopitsch in his continuation of Will's *Nürnbergger Gelehrten-Lexicon* gives the complete list of Franck's writings (pp. 347-355). A monograph which should appreciate him as a philosopher with the same penetrating justice with which the prize essay of Bischof, mentioned below, appraises his value as a historian, is still wanting, although Hase's book referred to by Bischof is a good one. The phrases here following are extracted from the two writings, both printed in Ulm by Varnier, and therefore not before the year 1536: *On the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil* (said to be appended to his German translation of the *Moria* of Erasmus). This is not true of my copy of this translation (1696). The "Praise of Holy Folly," appended to the translation, cites "the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil," but is not the same work. I am acquainted with the writing only in the Latin translation: *De arbore scientiæ boni et mali ant. Augustino Eleutherio, Mülhusii per Petr. Fabrum*, 1561. Somewhat later there appeared without date the *Paradoxa*, of which the second edition appeared in 1542. Franck calls the two hundred and eighty propositions in which he lays down his doctrines,

paradoxes or "wonder speeches," because everything that is true and rational before God and the children of God, must appear to the world as error, or as a strange riddle, since the world looks on God as the Devil and on the Devil as God, holds faith to be heresy and heresy faith, so that one only requires to take the reverse of what passes current in the world to have the truth. According to the true philosophy of the children of God, God is, as His very name expresses, the highest, the only good, which is known only by Himself, whom none can either hurt or help, since He is the absolutely self-satisfying one, who, "without affection, will, or personality," by His eternal word or *Fiat*, *i.e.*, by wisdom and spirit, created things, not at any particular time, but from eternity creates and sustains them. Things, since they are created out of nothing, when regarded apart from that which God puts into them, *i.e.*, the divine in them, are nothing; therefore God is in everything as the "free-following power," which makes each existence what it is, or constitutes its *Is*,—in the metal as the sheen, in the bird as flight and song, in man as that which makes him man, the will. While, that is to say, the bird does not so much fly and sing, as it is flown and sung, willing and choosing are the proper act of man. In this God leaves man quite free, does not force him at all, and while the man is limited in his action, inasmuch as that only happens which must happen, at the same time he is unfettered in his choice or will. If man choose to surrender himself to God, to renounce all will for other things, then God wills Himself in him; if man chooses the opposite, and wills to be himself, it is still God who is perverted in the perverse man, through whom He wills or who wills in him. Although this latter act of will in man is evil-doing or sin, yet God works or does no sin. God, that is to say, can do all things, except one: do nothing. But man by willing himself, since without God he is nothing, wills nothing, but God in permitting (willing) this, wills, since sin serves to punish sin, not nothing but something, and is therefore as little guilty of the sin, as the flower is guilty, when the spider makes into poison what the bee makes into honey. However great the difference may be for man, according as his choice is the one way or the other, this difference does not touch God at all, and when the sinner experiences the wrath of God, he is like any one who runs against a rock and experiences a shock, although the

rock never struck him. Man has therefore the choice whether he will acquire the experience and knowledge of a life which, without thought of God, he lives to himself (the forbidden tree), or whether he will experience a life in which he denies himself and allows God to live in him (tree of life). The choice is present, not past. For, as the timeless God does all things timelessly, eternally, as He has created each of us timelessly (from all eternity), and surveys our whole life as present, although it appears to us as if we lived at one time and died at another, so the history of Adam is also the eternal history of man, *i.e.*, of all men, for all mankind are one man. In man, therefore in every man, there are two principles to be distinguished, the human and the anti-human, the flesh and the spirit, Adam and Christ, the seed of the serpent and the seed of the woman, the old or outer and the new or inner man. According to which of the two an individual submits himself to, and which of the two he willingly permits to live in himself, he receives his name, and so stands before God. Therefore the sins of his outer man do not harm the spiritual man; but likewise it avails not the carnal that the "little spark" and conscience exhort him to good. Moreover, seeing that this takes place eternally, it is impossible to think of an irrevocable decision taken once for all; in every moment, the transition from the carnal to the spiritual mind is possible. But the contrary is also true, for only a short time intervenes between the moment when Christ esteems Peter blessed, and that when he calls him Satan. Since Adam and Christ are to be found in all men, it is explicable that Christians are maintained to have existed before the appearance of Christ. That every man is an invisible Christ, that God is also the God of the heathen, that Socrates stands near to Christ, that the Old and New Testaments are one in spirit, etc., are perpetually recurring propositions with Franck. For that reason he censures as a dangerous error the habit of looking on the work of redemption as only begun fifteen hundred years ago; already in Abel the lamb was slain, and Abraham saw Christ's day. Jesus Christ only proclaimed what existed from eternity; He brought us nothing new. He only gave us the kingdom so far as He revealed to us that we had long possessed it. Since Christ's appearance, what previously was only known to an Abraham or a Hermes Trismegistus, is now preached to all the world. We must, however, guard against

seeing in the "History" which is proclaimed to us, and especially in the letter of it, more than a mere instrument of knowledge or "figure." It is never to be forgotten that the history of Adam and Christ, is not Adam and Christ. As figure or outward drapery, on which in itself nothing depends, which has value only so far as it attains its end, Franck regards all that is historical in the Scriptures, as well as all ceremonial acts. He is never tired of emphasising that all sects and all unrighteousness may receive specious warrant from Scripture, which is not itself the Word of God and of life, but only the shadow and image of it—of the Spirit which maketh alive. As everything in general seeks honour according to its own nature, the fish in the water, so does God the Spirit, in the spirit; before Pentecost there were no Christians. To ignore this, is to transform the saving faith, which is an indwelling of Christ in us, into an assent to a mere history of Christ outside of us. Such an one is of absolutely no avail to us, for he cannot suffer instead of us. On the contrary the Christ, who was and is man eternally, eternally therefore in us also, if we will receive Him, eat and drink of Him, suffers and dies. Faith consists in the quiet putting on of Christ, which saves us by itself alone and without any works, although indeed it brings forth the fruits of sanctification and is attested by them. Faith, to be one with God, goes before love which goes out towards our neighbour, as the first table of the law of Moses goes before the second. It consists in a man being dead to himself as to his bitterest foe, and being united to God so that he serves not God, but himself. He who not so much does this, as suffers it in the stillness of the Sabbath, is a Christian, even though he has never received the name of Christ, and belongs to the Holy Church, which is something quite other than a visible cathedral,—the invisible community of the children of God. When it is maliciously reported of such, and of the eternal gospel written in their hearts, that they are raising a tumult, it is the tumult which the sun creates among the bats. But faith, and the theology of the children of God, is not an art to be learned from men, it is experience.

Cf. Th. Wald: *De vita scriptis et systemate mystico Seb. Franci* diss. Erlangen, 1793-4. In addition to which, cf. *am Ende: Kleine Nachlese und Fortgesetzte kleine Nachlese zu den vielen unvollständigen Nachrichten von S. F. Leben und Schriften.* Nürnberg. 1796-1798, 4.  
—Herm. Bischof: *Sebastian Franck und die deutsche Geschichtschreibung.*

*Gekrönte Preisschrift.* Tübingen, 1857.—C. A. Hase: *Sebastian Franck von Wörd, der Schwarmgeist.* Leipz. 1869.—A. Feldner. *Die Ansichten Sebastian Francks von Wörd nach ihrem Ursprunge und Zusammenhange.* Berlin, 1872.

4. Spiritually akin to Schwenkfeld, and still more to Franck, is VALENTIN WEIGEL. Born in 1533 at Hayna, now Grossenhayn, near Dresden (hence called Haynensis and Hainensis), he passed his school days at Meissen, then studied thirteen years at Leipsic and Wittenberg, entered the office of pastor at Zschopau, which he occupied, with the love and respect of all, till his death, on the 10th June, 1588. He avoided all the attacks of the orthodox by subscribing to the public formulas of agreement, and developed his mystical doctrines in the presence of trusted friends only, or wrote them down only for their benefit. Of what he himself published only a funeral oration is known, which is reproduced in the monograph by Opel, mentioned below. His colleague and successor Bened. Biedermann, and his precentor Weickert, were the first to undertake the spread of his doctrines; not, however, without his own assistance. In the long period in which Weigel's works were only circulated in MS. several pieces appear to have been inserted, which, when publication began, were regarded as his. This holds not only with regard to the *Theologia Weigeliana*, which, as is implied in the preface, was written after Weigel's death; but it has been shown to be probable by Opel, that all the writings are unauthentic in which the apocalypticist Lautensack is mentioned with praise, because he declares the Revelation to be the most important book of the Holy Scriptures, but at the same time insists that it should be called not the Revelation of John, but of Jesus Christ, since Christ is its sole content. The first writings of Weigel which appeared publicly and are undoubtedly genuine, were published by Krusicke, the Halle bookseller. Such are the *Libellus de vita beata*, 1609; *A beautiful Prayer Booklet*, 1612; *The Golden Hilt*, 1613; *On the Place of the World*, 1613; *Dialogus de Christianismo*, 1614. At this point the mention of his own name seems to have appeared a doubtful course to the publisher, for on the title pages of the subsequent works there appears a fictitious printer, Knuber, of Neuenstadt (probably Magdeburg), who not only reprints several of the above-mentioned works, but also publishes others, though of course without critical revision. Such are Γνωθὶ σεαυτὸν (of

which only the first part is genuine), 1615; *Informatorium*, 1616; *Principal and chief Tractate* (of very doubtful authenticity), 1618; *Church and House Homily* (unknown to me), 1618; *Soli Deo Gloria* (not without interpolations), 1618; *Libellus disputatorius*, 1618; *Short Account, etc.*, 1618. Only in the *Philosophia mystica*, a collection of the writings of Paracelsus and Weigel printed by Jenes at Newstadt in 1618, has the publisher Bachsmeier revealed himself in the appendix. Of Weigel's works it contains: the *Short Account and Introduction to the "German Theology;" Scholasterium christianum; On the Heavenly Jerusalem; Consideration of the Life of Jesus*, and *That God alone is Good*. Opel gives a complete list of all Weigel's works, authentic and unauthentic. The spare selection above-mentioned is specially referred to in the following representation of Weigel's doctrine. As regards his predecessors, he indirectly recognises his dependence on Osiander and Schwenkfeld, when he anticipates that his doctrines will be regarded as "Osiandrian" or as "Schwenkfeldism." He makes direct reference to no authority more frequently than to Paracelsus (v. § 241). After him come the *German Theology*, Tauler, and, though less frequently, Thomas à Kempis (v. § 230, 6.7). Luther is less frequently cited; his earliest writings alone are unconditionally praised. Melanchthon is treated almost contemptuously, as no theologian, but a grammarian, physicist, etc. Unnamed but often made use of, is Nicolas of Cusa (v. § 224). From none, however, does he borrow with more ingratitude than from Sebastian Franck, who is never named, but often almost verbally copied. The bad repute into which the Donauwörth mystic had been brought by the severe censures of Luther, Melanchthon, and even Schwenkfeld, were a warning to the quiet-loving Zschopau pastor, not to betray the fact that he was a venerator of his. Thus it came about that Weigel was regarded as the discoverer of many doctrines which he merely assumed. The main points of what he regarded as truth, either traditional, or newly discovered, are as follows:—

5. At creation, which with a self-sufficient God who "needs nought" is the result, not of a want, but of pure goodness, there exist three worlds (called also heavens): the divine world (the third heaven to which the children of God are transported); secondly, and comprehended by it, the



invisible world of angels (usually called heaven); finally, the earth, which comprises the three elements and all that is formed of them, in short all the visible. All three worlds are united in man, the microcosm, or "little world. His mortal body is formed of the earth-clod, *i.e.*, the extract or quintessence, the "fifth essence," of all visible substances, for which reason he again takes all these up into himself for his maintenance, both in food and in apprehension by sense and imagination. His spirit, which although it survives the body is likewise transitory, and returns to the stellar world, is of sidereal origin and exhibits the angel in man, for the starry firmament has its being from the angels. Corresponding to the maintenance of the body the spirit draws its nourishment from heaven, and consists in the arts and sciences which are won by reason with the help of the stars. To body and spirit there is added a third element, the *spiraculum vitæ*, the immortal soul breathed into by God, which requires divine nourishment, the Sacraments, etc., and possesses understanding, the faculty of the highest knowledge, intellectual or mental. Through the soul man is an image of God, and as in the character of *microcosm*, he apprehends the world, so now he apprehends God from his own nature. In almost all his writings Weigel contests the view, that seeing and knowing are the effect of the object ("*gegenwurf*"); rather are they wrought by the eye and only awakened by the object; hence man only knows and understands what he bears in himself. This also holds especially of God. In opposition to the theologians of the letter, who, as if blind men could be made to see by the sunlight, seek to bring men to salvation by means of doctrines and confessions, it is to be maintained that *Nosce te ipsum* is the Holy Spirit, which leads to the knowledge of God. Him in whom the word of God is not, and who does not receive it into himself, the letter, that shadow of the eternal word, will not teach. Thus it is that the fact that all sects take their stand upon the letter, proves them "double-dealers." The true theologian, the divinely wise man, searches in himself, the image, for Him whose image he is. Then he finds that in God, the All-One, from whom all doubleness or *alteritas* is excluded, no distinction exists between what He is and what He utters. Therefore also, the light in which He dwells is purely Himself, and He is His own dwelling. In this resting in Himself, God only

seeks Himself. All His desire tends only to whence He came, *i.e.* to Himself alone, and in this self-love which in Him only is no sin, He is the triune God. To Him this self-desire is the key of David, with which He opens all the closed springs of truth and knowledge. It is otherwise with the creature made in the image of God. Man as created, like every creature, is maintained and comprehended by God, and like all things has his dwelling in Him, and indeed by necessity, for all that comes of God is in Him and cannot escape from Him. But because man is created in the image of God, it is given him not by necessity, but by grace, to exist in himself, "to have a dwelling in himself." While, therefore, God is only one, there is in man doubleness, *alteritas*; God therefore alone is good, but in man there is good and evil. So long as the evil is only secretly present, and only the good is openly present, there is no harm done and no sin present. Such was the case, while Adam (man) was in Paradise, or rather while Paradise was in man. The Paradise of innocence, namely, is the condition in which man has not yet appropriated the power of dwelling in himself, only seeks to be an image of God, does not desire himself as his sole dwelling, like an actual God beside God. In this Paradise stands the tree of temptation along with the tree of life. It may always be supposed that such real trees actually existed externally to the first man, but the main point is not on that account to be forgotten, that they existed in Adam, for Adam (*i.e.*, every man) is his own tree of temptation. The poisonous snake, the back-bending one—(reflection?) which by means of the above-mentioned doubleness lurks as seed in man, brings man, as it brought Lucifer before him, to use for his own ends that key of David which was meant only for God, to turn to himself, to look upon himself, and thereby to know himself (the good and evil in himself). As self-conceit is implied in the very first act of self-wonder, Adam, by eating of the fruit of self-knowledge, *i.e.*, appropriating or assuming it to himself, revealed and therefore made harmful and sinful, the hitherto hidden, and therefore harmless evil. He now knows himself as one who, like God and therefore beside God, dwells in himself and lives by his own life. He does not indeed attain to separation from God who besets Adam behind and before, so that sin is therefore a perpetually vain *conatus* to get free of God. Adam, however, by his self-accession and finding of

himself has thereby fallen into unrest and unhappiness. That is to say, the former relation between good and evil has been reversed, what was formerly hidden is now revealed and become harmful; on the other hand, what was formerly revealed is now hidden and no longer of any use. But it must not be thought, as is done by the pseudo-theologians bemused with the letter, that Adam's fate is a long past history. Much more is Adam in us, and each of us is Adam, and therefore each also his own tree of knowledge and his own serpent which, by appropriation and consciousness (eating and knowing), change what was harmless hitherto, into depravity and judgment.

6. If the fall consists in the desire to live for oneself, the resurrection can only be regarded as dying to self. Hence the decision with which Weigel demands, that one must abandon one's self and all one's own (the I-ness, selfness, mineness), in which self-abandonment consists the "calmness," the condition in which we meet God, not with activity, but with passivity, not as workday but as "Sabbath." If we cease to live to ourselves, permit God to live in us, He becomes in us the perceiving eye, perceives Himself in us and through us, and the heavenly Adam or Christ is born in us. Therefore, both the "high and weighty persons," Adam and Christ, the old or outer, and the new or inner man, are in us and make war upon each other. As with the desire to live for self the seed of the serpent made its appearance, so with the death to self, there appears the seed of the woman, and Christ arises in us. In *us*, for it is an error of the literalists, that it is the merit of a stranger, the work of another than ourselves, by which we attain bliss, *per justitiam imputativam*, therefore, "that we drink on his score." As nothing which goes into a man defiles him, so nothing which is external and strange to him can sanctify him. But as each of us is Adam, so also each of us in whom the old Adam died, is a son of God. As an exhortation and "memorial" to us, that we must crucify the flesh, the incarnation of God took place ages ago, from which we call ourselves Christians. But that is of no avail to him who lives for himself; he is no Christian. On the other hand, he who is dead to self is a Christian, even though the Confession of Augsburg and the *Formula Concordiæ* declare against it, and even though he be numbered among the Jews or the Turks; he is a member of the Catholic

Church, *i.e.* of the invisible community of those who are born again and anew, and in whom Christ lives. As the birth of Christ coincides with the death of the old man, Weigel, in what is perhaps his most remarkable writing, the *Dialogus de Christianismo*, can even go the length of identifying Christ with death, and puts the distinction between his own theosophy and Lutheran orthodoxy in the mouth of Mors, who intervened between them. The special reproach which is made to the orthodox, is that by their confessions (creeds) they have established a human authority over spirits, so that individuals are now forbidden to see and find out for themselves what God's Word teaches. Further, that even where they set Holy Scripture above their formulas, they set the letter of the Bible above the spirit which inspired it, so that, seeing that the Bible was not written by aid of the Bible, they really have no word of God at all. In general they externalise everything ; making no distinction between the inner and the outer man, they cannot understand that even Christ *had* sins, but yet that he did not commit sin, that not all who *are* in God *walk* in God, etc. They have no notion of the meaning of bliss, or the lack of it. Accordingly in all his dialogues the orthodox, comforting himself with the merits of Jesus, goes cheerfully to the grave—and is damned ; while the theosophic layman experiences before his death all the sufferings of Christ on the cross, the being deserted of God, etc., dies without the sacrament, receives no honourable burial,—and goes to bliss. To believe is to have Christ live in one, but therefore also to bear the fruits of this new man. But the literalists, who call themselves Christians, show how little God lives in them, by condemning all who belong to another sect, by waging war, by executing traitors, etc., and vainly imagine that they belong to Him who finds in all nations those who are pleasing to Him, who forbids killing, and willeth not the death of the sinner. The man who knows what salvation is, *i.e.* he who has tasted of it, knows that the man in whom Christ were born would be blessed in Hell, while he in whom the old Adam lives, cannot be made blessed by God Himself, even in the highest heaven. No man can be, and therefore no man ought to be forced into salvation ; faith accordingly is not every man's affair, and pearls are not to be cast before swine. Weigel's oft-repeated saying : " If I am free from myself I am free from the foul fiend, for every man is his

own worst foe," may be regarded as the sum of his whole doctrine.

Cf. Jul. Otto Opel: *Valentin Weigel, ein Beitrag zur Literatur- und Culturgeschichte des 17. Jahrh.* Leipz., 1864.

7. All those mentioned in the above paragraphs came to their mystical doctrine through their theological studies, or at least along with them. They remain therefore, as is shown in their terminology, in a constant connection with the teaching of traditional dogmatics and traditional exegesis. Where they differ from it, they only assert that on the point in question, exegesis has hitherto been erroneous. The affair takes another form where an individual undisciplined by university studies, whose inner religious life, though indeed nourished by zealous reading of the Holy Scriptures, was much more fed by deep self-absorption, became acquainted with the writings of the above-named theosophists. Not being in a position to become acquainted with the middle terms which link biblical and ecclesiastical tradition with the luxuriant growth of mystical ideas in his own spirit, he was obliged to regard the latter as quite new revelations, imparted for the first time to himself, and to seek names for these new thoughts within the limits of the vocabulary of the unlearned man, or for which, at least, it supplies the material. In this way mysticism becomes entirely stripped of the learned robe which she had borrowed of earlier science, and becomes what is generally called theosophy, in distinction from theology: in place of gentle discursive reflection there comes the intuition of enthusiasm, and nothing is set before the reader as the result of the researches of the writer, but as dictated to him by the self-revealing Godhead. What assures to this form of theosophy, more than to others, an effect on the further development of philosophy, and therefore a place in its history, is the fact that it is a phenomenon postulated by the age, and therefore, although expressed in a fantastic form, an interpretation of the age and so also a philosophy (v. § 3).

### § 234.

#### C.—JACOB BÖHME AND THEOSOPHIC MYSTICISM.

J. Hamberger: *Die Lehre des deutschen Philosophen Jacob Böhme.* München, 1844. H. A. Fechner: *Jacob Böhme. Sein Leben und seine Schriften.* Görlitz, 1857.

I. JACOB BÖHME (Böhm) was born in 1575, at Altseiden-

berg, near Görlitz. After receiving a comparatively good school education, in the course of which he even, as it appears, acquired the rudiments of Latin, he was apprenticed to a shoemaker, and having been made a freeman of the craft in 1592 betook himself to his *Wanderschaft*. During the latter, being repelled by the confessional controversial writings, he read, along with the Bible with which at an earlier period he was already familiar, all sorts of mystical writings, among them those of Paracelsus and Schwenkfeld certainly, but probably also circulating MSS. of Weigel. Returning to Görlitz in his nineteenth year, he there became a master of his craft, married in 1599, and as the father of six children lived a quiet life, distinguished by industry and piety. The sight of a pewter vessel lighted up by the sun seems to have been the occasion which, in 1610, first called forth in chaotic unity, the thoughts which he sought to develop three years later in his *Aurora*. When the MS. became known to wider circles through Herr von Ender, a follower of Schwenkfeld, and as a result a couple of Paracelsian physicians, Walther of Glogau and Kober of Görlitz, and besides them several Görlitz citizens, attached themselves to Böhme, the result was to evoke the wrath of the senior rector, Richter. In consequence, Böhme was forbidden by the magistrate to write. -For seven years he obeyed this command, then declared he could do so no longer, and the following works were written:—in the year 1619: *Of the three Principles of the Divine Being*, with the appendix; *On the Threefold Life of Man*. In 1620, *Forty Questions on the Soul*, with the appendix, *On the Eye turned Inward*; *On the Incarnation of Jesus Christ*; *Six Theosophic Points*; *Six Mystical Points*; *On the Earthly and Heavenly Mystery*. In 1621, *On Four Complexions*; *A Defence against Balthasar Tilcken*; and two controversial writings, *Against Esaias Stiefel*. In 1622, *Signatura rerum*; *On True Repentance*; *On True Calm*; *On the Supra-sensual Life*; *On Regeneration*; *On the Divine Intuition*. (The five latter were printed without his previous knowledge, in 1623, under the general title: *Way to Christ*.) In the year 1623 were written: *On Election by Grace*; *On Holy Baptism*; *On the Holy Supper*; *Mysterium Magnum*. Finally in 1624: *Dialogue of an Illuminated and an Unilluminated Soul*; *On Holy Prayer*; *Tables of the Three Principal Revelations*; *Clavis, or Key of the Chief Points*;

*One hundred and seventy-seven Theosophic Questions.* Besides these there are extant his *Theosophic Epistles* written 1618–1624. The publication of the *Way to Christ* renewed the attacks of the local clergy, against which Böhme was finally secured by a journey to Dresden, where he came into contact with the highest clergy, and perhaps with the Elector himself. Soon thereafter he died of the first illness which had ever overtaken him, on the 7th (17th) November, 1624. His works were first published by Betke, in Amsterdam, 1675, then in a completer form by Gichtel in ten volumes, Amsterdam, 1682. The Amsterdam edition in six vols., of 1730, is most prized. Others prefer the Leipsic edition in eight vols., edited by Ueberfeld in 1730. I am acquainted with neither. The newest edition (which I have used) is that of Schiebler, Leipsic, 1831 ff., in seven octavo volumes.

2. As Böhme's main endeavour is simultaneously to apprehend God as the fundamental source of all existence, and at the same time not to deny the enormous power of evil, it is easy to understand how to those who lean towards pantheism he should appear a Manichæan, while to those again who betray an almost blind fear of Pantheism he should appear a pantheist. But how far he stood from pantheism is shown by his unceasing polemic against the believers in election by grace, who make God the origin of evil, even of sin. He of course knows the danger which is involved in the flight from pantheism, and at this danger he may have pointed when he relates, that the sight of evil had brought him to melancholy, in which the devil had often inspired him with "heathen" thoughts, on which he desired here to be silent. True understanding is only won, when the spirit breaks through to the inmost birth of the Godhead. (*Auror.*, xix. 4, 6, 9–11). The fear that this is impossible for man, is the inspiration of the devil, to whom indeed it is due that men do not attain to it. Not without purpose are we images of God and gods, destined to know God (*Auror.*, xxii. 12). Because we are so, self-knowledge leads to the knowledge of God, and only because it is too lazy for the task, does the reason speak so willingly of the incomprehensibility of God, in presence of which she stands like the cow before the new barn-door (*Myst. Magn.*, x. 2). That in which and from which God's essence and inner birth may be known, is borne alike within himself by the wisest and the least learned

Hence when Böhme names as the sources of his doctrine not books, but the immediate revelation of God, as whose will-less and often unconscious instrument he writes to express the true philosophic knowledge and to proclaim the day of the Lord, the dawn of which has broken (*Auror.*, xxiii. 10, 85), he yet concedes to every reader the ability to understand his writings (*Ibid.* xxii. 62). Of course they must not be read out of mere idle prying curiosity, but in the disposition in which they were written, in such a way as "when one submits oneself as dead" to the illuminating spirit, and desires to know no more than the spirit wills to reveal. One must let God Himself search in him (*Key*, Preface). Mere reason is not sufficient, for this is the attribute of the spirit, the sidereal seat of skill and art, which is descended from the stars, as sense is the attribute of the earthly body formed of the elements. There is rather required for it the understanding, which has for its seat the soul breathed into it by God, and which, as everything tends towards its source, aspires to the knowledge of God (*Sig., rer.* iii., 8). It is true that by Adam's fall this knowledge has also been much darkened, and without the death of the old man, which is no easy matter, God cannot be known. But the man who is born again, *i.e.*, he in whom God was born, can read God's eternal birth, in the manner in which his own re-birth took place, for as God is to-day, he was from eternity and will be to eternity.

3. Now God is first of all to be thought as He is eternal rest, a "stillness without being," as causeless, and will without object (*Myst. magn.*, xxix. 1). So regarded, He is not this or that, but rather an eternal nothingness, without any "pain" (*Qual*), *i.e.* without quality or motion, nothing and all things, neither light nor darkness, the eternal one (*Elec. by Grace*, i. 4). In this His depth, where He is not even essence, but the primitive condition of all essences, God is not revealed, not even to Himself (*Myst. magn.*, v. 10). In order to think of Him as such, we must abstract nature and creature, for then God is all (*Elec. by Grace*, i. 9). Therefore He is often called also, the unnatural, uncreaturely, and the like. By a glance into Himself, He may see what He Himself is, and make Himself into a mirror whereby the eternal comprehending will becomes an apprehending power, the Father, and an apprehensible power, the Son; and the undiscoverable, unfathomable will by its eternal discovery, goes out of itself and



ushers itself into eternal intuition of itself. The out-going of the uncaused will through the Son is the Spirit, so that therefore the one will of the causeless divides into three kinds of action, but yet at the same time remains one will (*Elec. by Grace*, i. 5, 6, 18). There now exist therefore the undiscoverable and the discoverable, the causeless has comprehended itself in a cause, the eternal nothing has comprehended itself in an eternal eye or power of seeing (*Elec. by Grace*, i. 5, 6, 8). In this process of birth the disposition stands over against the will, but the outcome of both is the spirit (*Myst. magn.*, i. 2). The fourth influence takes place in the out-breathed power as in the Divine intuition or wisdom, since the Spirit of God makes play from itself and introduces the forms of things (*Elec. by Grace*, i. 14). At the same time wisdom is not to be regarded, as its designation as the fourth influence might lead us to do, as a co-ordinated moment with the three others. It is much rather that which comprehends the three, it is the place in which God from all eternity sees all the possibilities with which His Spirit plays (*Elec. by Grace*, v. 12). The eternal wisdom or understanding is the dwelling of God, He, the will of the wisdom (*Myst. magn.*, i. 2). As this dwelling and place of the Divine images, Wisdom is passive, accordingly this containing whole is usually designated as the Virgin who neither conceives nor brings forth (*Threefold Life*, v. 44), and is also so contrasted with the Holy Spirit that the latter is the act of ex-spíration, the former that which is ex-spíred (*Myst. magn.*, vii. 9). According to Böhme's express explanation the trinity thus developed is not that of the three persons of the Divine being. For the term person he has no preference; it is not only liable to be misunderstood, it is also inexact, as properly speaking "God is not a person except in Christ" (*Myst. magn.*, vii. 5). At the same he will not contest the matter "with the ancients who have so given it" (*Ibid.*, vii. 8). But "at this point" it cannot be said with any reason that God is three persons, for in this eternal bringing forth He is only one life and good (*Ibid.*, vii. 11). The difference hitherto is only one of "understanding" (in the present day we would say ideal, Master Eckhart said, "rational"); but in order to vindicate the distinction, as is demanded by the ecclesiastical doctrine of the trinity, the hitherto quiet single essence must pass into a state of "divisibility" or "distinction." The principle of the latter is what Böhme calls eternal or spiritual nature,

or simply, nature. The above threefoldness attains being and revelation, becomes more than mere understanding, inasmuch as the eternal will apprehends itself in nature, whereby its power passes into divisibility and sensibility (*Elec. by Grace*, iv. 6; ii. 28). The doctrine of the eternal nature, by which Böhme approximately understands what Nicolas of Cusa called *alteritas*, the earlier mystics *otherness* (cf. § 224, 3, and 229, 2), and what to-day would perhaps be called being for self or substantiality, comes under consideration as the most important point in almost all his writings. It is treated at greatest length in the *Aurora* (cap. viii.—xi.), most summarily in the *Myst. magn.*, cap. vi. Almost everywhere the same order of treatment is followed, as in the earliest work: the seven moments of nature are considered in the same serial order, though not always under the same names. At the same time it will facilitate our understanding of it to choose another manner of presentation in accordance with hints which are given in later works. Böhme follows the rule that from what is known in the creature we may infer backwards to its original cause, even where he seeks to investigate the transition of the hidden God to revelation. In that case, now, the external world affords him knowledge—which may have started into consciousness at the sight of the pewter vessel, which though itself dark reveals the light of the sun—that everywhere there is a contrast of opposites, not in hostility, but that the one may excite and reveal the other (*Elec. by Grace*, ii. 22). And again, self-knowledge tells him that in the stillness of the mind, expression only takes place when desire is kindled (*Key*, viii. 55, 60). In accordance with this, the transition of the calm cause-less into “sensibility,” *i.e.* perceptibility, is so conceived that in the desire of wisdom, passion awakes, which is characterized as the *Fiat* and primitive condition of all beings, but at the same time also as fire, by which God reveals Himself, and life in general comes into existence (*Myst. magn.*, iii. 4, 8, 18). Fire however, contains the condition of the revelation of all things: it combines with destroying power the power of illuminating, with anger love, so that therefore the divine fire divides into two principles, “in order that each may be revealed to the other” (*Myst. magn.*, viii. 27). As the opposite of light, the fire of anger is called darkness, by which we are not to understand evil, although as will be shown later, evil in the

creature arises from it (*Elec. by Grace*, iv. 17). Böhme himself, however, does not remain faithful to the law here enunciated, and often calls this root of evil—the evil in God, in which case one must not forget that as with Weigel, so also here evil and sin are distinguished. If now, as in the consideration of the matter we must, we separate the anger from the love, although in God they are never separated, three moments (conditions, properties, qualities, spirits, source spirits, forms, species, essences, etc.) may be distinguished which, inasmuch as fire appears as the medium betwixt them, gives that number of seven from which Böhme never deviates, although the thought often forces itself on the reader, why seeing that he very often adds to the three primal forms the fire of anger as a fourth, the same thing does not happen with the fire of love, whence the number eight would arise. As the question is here concerning the transition to determined form, but as at the same time the notion of *contractio* was familiar to the Middle Ages, it is intelligible, that with Böhme the contracting principle, which he also names the bitter, and hardness, heat, and the like, should appear as the first quality. Without it everything that he names compaction, coagulation, etc., is unthinkable. So also multiplicity. Its nature is to hold, and accordingly a contrast to it is formed by the second property, which “extends,” in which “flight” shows itself. First of all there is also indeed the quality called sweetness, and water; afterwards it is variously designated, often in particular as “the sting.” The combination of these two gives the third quality, anxiety, the pain of anxiety, the bitter quality, etc. All the three are then also designated by the Paracelsian (*v. infra*, § 241) names salt, mercury and sulphur, their sum being saltpetre. Out of them, as the spark flies from flint and steel, fire now breaks as the fourth form, called, on account of the suddenness of its outburst, lightning, more frequently fright, with the kindling of which sensitive and intelligent life first begins (*Myst. magn.*, iii. 18). On its one side, as fire of anger or fire in the narrower sense, it constitutes, along with the three first forms, desire, impulsiveness, and sensibility (*Right Art of Prayer*, 45), the kingdom of rage and darkness; while on its other side, with the forms to be immediately considered, it gives the kingdom of joy, triumphing in free desire (*Myst. magn.*, iv. 6). The fifth form is, namely, warm light, in which heat and the pang of anxiety

are suppressed, "water burns like an oil;" the sixth gives the report or sound which accompanies the fire, as the thunder accompanies the lightning, by which in general all means of understanding are to be understood, so that "smoke," "taste," etc., all come under consideration here, and the sixth form is often called, "understanding and knowledge" (so *Right Art of Prayer*, 45). Finally the seventh form or quality, "corporeality," comprises all the former qualities in itself, as it were as their tenement and body, in which they work as the life does in the flesh (*Key*, viii. 55). Inasmuch as the last form is not only called the proper spirit of nature, but also simply nature, this word comes to have many significations. In the first place it comprises all these qualities together, whence they are called nature-forms, nature-spirits, etc. Secondly it has, as has been said, to designate the synthesis of the six other qualities, and so the seventh quality alone, with which is connected the fact that the similarity of nature with wisdom or the virgin, is very often brought into prominence. Thirdly, it very often happens, that only the three (or four) first forms are designated by the word nature, and the others are contrasted with it as "the Spiritual" (so *int. al.*, *Myst. magn.*, iii. 9). But finally, because amongst these the bitter quality is the first and properly characteristic one, it is called not only the *centrum naturæ*, but even simply nature. Amid all these ambiguities, one thing stands fast: by the fact that the eternal will moved itself, passed into desire and fire, it did not indeed suffer any division, for the properties form a harmony in which each of the forms contains the other, and all are one (*Myst. magn.*, v. 14; vi. 2), but it did suffer a distinction; the Divine will, inasmuch as "it passed into the condition of properties," is no longer untouched by any opposition, but has in the fire-terror divided itself into two kingdoms (*Ibid.*, iii. 21; iv. 6), which indeed are not hostile to one another, for terror serves life,—the sternest and most terrible is the most useful, because it is the cause of movement and life,—but which are distinguished, and of which the one, the darkness, is wont to be called not God, but *natura*, the second, on the other hand, as A and Ω is wont to be called God (*Threefold Life*, ii. 8, 10). Either stands in such relationship to the other, that the former is the primitive condition or root of the latter; out of anger, in which God is a destroying fire, there proceeds mercy in which He shows His

heart, and Light becomes visible to the Darkness (*int. al., Myst. magn.*, viii. 27). By means of this distinguishableness, there arises from the threefoldness, which was "mere understanding," the triplicity of such as have advanced "to essence," the three persons. The eternal nature is therefore, as it were, the substance for the trinity of persons, and is therefore called their mother or *matrix*. As to the mode, however, in which this process of becoming independent takes place, and which of the properties are the most important for it, Böhme does not succeed in expressing himself clearly and intelligibly. Perhaps because the point was not clear to himself. Now, for instance, the first and seventh forms are attributed to the Father, the second and sixth to the Son, the third and fifth to the Holy Spirit, and the fourth as the number of division forms the mean (so *Key*, 75-78); again, of the seven properties, the first, fourth and seventh are so emphasised, that stern anger is entirely attributed to the Father, while the Son as the Father's heart is wholly likened to fire; and, further, corporeality or the whole of Nature is conceived as the body in which the Holy Spirit mirrors itself (so *int. al., Threefold Life*, v. 50); lastly, this also occurs, that darkness or nature is in God, *i.e.*, the three first fiery forms are wholly likened to the Father, the three last fiery forms to the Son, which then relate themselves to one another as anger and mercy, destroying fire and the gentleness of love (so *int. al., Threefold Life*, i. 42). From this mode of conception it is intelligible how Böhme comes to call the Son "a thousand times greater" than the Father (*Threefold Life*, vi. 98), and on the other hand, why he has been reproached with dualism. But this reproach only too readily forgets that neither was the dualism original, nor was there wanting a unity which transcends it.

4. It is now intelligible, that what was for God Himself an indispensable means of realization also conditions the actuality of what is outside of God. Böhme expresses himself as very discontented with the usual formula, that God created the world out of nothing, not only because it is negative, but because it contradicts the axiom that out of nothing comes nothing (*Aur.*, xix. 56). His own doctrine gives him the data for another and positive doctrine of creation. If one distinguishes as he does, though somewhat arbitrarily, between the divine ternary and the *ternarius sanctus* in such a way that

the latter comprehends the former along with the seven nature-forms (*Threefold Life*, iii. 18), then the world is the work of the latter. In these essences, that is to say, the will has the substance out of which it makes things. This already holds of their spiritual condition, where, so to speak, they exist as Divine playthings in the eternal wisdom, for these "images" are only the different possible combinations of the essences. From this condition they are by the Divine will transformed into visibility and being (*Key*, viii. 41), inasmuch as the eternal will creates another will out of itself, for otherwise it were at one (united) with itself, would not go out of itself (*Threefold Life*, i. 51). This transformation into "compacted" beings, or coagulation, naturally required a force to draw them together, i.e., the bitter quality which therefore appears as the *matrix* of visible things (*Elec. by Gr.*, i. 20; *Threefold Life*, iv. 30), and without which (as without the dark and fiery principle) no creature would exist (*Elec. by Gr.*, ii. 38). Accordingly God is often conceived as the father, the eternal nature as the mother of things (*Threefold Life*, iv. 89), and it is said of their children, that they bear in themselves anger and love, the former as the primitive condition of the latter (*Ibid.*, v. 81; vi. 93). Since both are eternal, not only that which before creation is found in the Divine Wisdom as "an invisible figure" (*Ibid.*, ix. 6), but also that which God by His creative word places outside of Himself, is in the first instance eternal. Accordingly the world begins with the creation of the eternal angels. As God desired to reveal all the wonders of eternal nature, and therefore there proceeded spirits from all nature-forms according to their kind, the angels form a multiplicity of orders subject to their different thrones and princes. Among these the highest places are taken by the three powers, who appear as the first types of the three-personed Godhead: Michael, who corresponds to the Father, Lucifer to the Son, Uriel to the Holy Spirit (*Aur.*, xii. 88, 101, 108). Inasmuch as Lucifer, instead of "imagining" himself in, and "growing" into the heart of God, rather fell in love with the *centrum naturæ*, and roused and excited the bitter *matrix*, so that his fall does not consist so much in his desire to be like a god, as in his desire to make the fiery *matrix* dominate over the gentleness of God, he has his way; viz., he stands entirely under God's wrath (*Threefold Life*, viii. 23, 24). God undergoes no change when He thus stands opposed as consuming

fire, to one who has become the devil, full of hatred (*Regeneration*, ii. 4; *Aur.*, xxiv. 50). Lucifer's fall, however, has evoked the opposition of two principles (principalities, kingdoms), inasmuch as by him, the kingdom of wrath only being firmly adhered to, it becomes the kingdom of Hell, in which God rules only according to His wrath, but in which the devil dwells as an executioner, while in the kingdom of Heaven God rules in His totality (*Threefold Life*, v. 113). God comprehends both kingdoms, the kingdom of Hell, in which the devil opens the seals of the Divine wrath, and the kingdom of Heaven or the angel world, where the heart of God proves itself the centre by silencing the wrath of God (*Threefold Life*, iv. 90; v. 18). When we consider the inter-connexion of the three first nature-forms and the superior importance among them of the bitter *centrumnaturæ*, it is easy to understand how it is that Böhme often represents the fallen Lucifer as retaining the first three qualities and forfeiting the last three (*Aur.*, xxi. 102). But out of these two principles (kingdoms) there springs by the fall, a third. By the power which is given to the bitter contracting essence, there originates the hard and the stiff, such things as earth, stones, etc., which God rolls together into a ball, and round about which He lays the heavens, so that "this world," in which Lucifer dwells as prince, is surrounded by the dwelling-place of Michael and Uriel (*Threefold Life*, viii. 23). With the separation of the two, Moses' narrative begins. Since neither he nor any man was present at these events, the narrative of them can only have been revealed to our first parents by God, in the same immediate fashion in which Böhme himself received his revelations. But the memory of it was not maintained in its purity, and much came down to post-diluvian man, and to Moses in a distorted form (*Aur.*, xviii. 1-5; xix. 79). God perhaps permitted this distortion in order that the Devil might not become privy to all the Divine secrets, which now that by the approach of the end of the world, the power of the Devil is also brought near its end, may be expressed (*Aur.*, xx. 3, 7). Hence Böhme does not hesitate to reject much in the Mosaic narrative, because "it runs contrary to philosophy, and reason" (*Aur.*, 19, 79), as *e.g.*, the mention of morning and evening before there was a sun. Other points he interprets spiritually, as for instance the "firmament" between the waters above and those below, which to him only means the distinction

between the tangible sublunary waters and the life-giving heavenly waters, that water, after partaking of which none thirsts again (*Ibid.*, xx. 28). Finally, however, along with the correctness of the narrative, he recognises still another and deeper sense hidden in it (*int. al.*, *Aur.*, xxi. 10, *et seq.*). In this way he manages to link to the Mosaic narrative his own philosophy of nature, which in many points he borrowed from Paracelsus. According to it, the earth was born of the eternal nitre, *i.e.*, the nature-spirit or unity of all the creative spirits; but after Lucifer's fall, it was "spued forth" hard and stiff (*Ibid.*, xxi. 23, 55), *i.e.* divided from heaven. On the third day the "flame of fire," light, arises, and awakens the power of the seven spirits which was already latent in the depraved earthly nitre, and only imprisoned in it, not destroyed, and causes it to bring forth grass and herbs, which, although destined to death, are yet better than the soil which bears them (*Ibid.*, xxi. 19; xxvi. 101). Although every growth contains in itself all the seven qualities, yet each of them has a different "*Primus*," and therefore each has its own kind. Hence, among other consequences, for the purification of metal seven smeltings are necessary. Each detaches one quality (*Aur.*, xxii. 90). The remarks on the fourth day of creation afford an opportunity for treating of the "incorporation of the bodies of the stars," and of "the seven chief qualities of the planets, and of their heart, which is the sun," in the manner not of Philosophy, Astrology, and Theology, but of another teacher, namely, "the whole of nature with her instant production" (*Ibid.*, xxii. 8. 11). What Moses says of the stars, satisfies Böhme even less than the teachings of the wise heathen, who in their worship of the constellations, have forced their way to the very face of God (*Ibid.*, xxii. 26, 29). To understand their essence rightly, we must not be content with the teaching of the senses, which only show us death and wrath. It is also insufficient to exalt one's thoughts by reason, and search and ask questions: thereby we only reach the strife between anger and love. But by the understanding we must break through heaven, and grasp God in His heart (*Ibid.*, xxiii. 12, 13). When this is done we perceive that the stars are the power of the seven spirits of God, inasmuch as God has placed the qualities in the world which has become dark, in order that as ever, so now they may bring forth creations and images in the house of darkness (*Aur.*, xxiv. 14, 19).



Hence the stars are the mediators of all births ; of the sidereal births, that is to say, where wrath and love war with one another, for they have nothing to do with the second birth, which takes place by the water of life (*Ibid.*, xxiv. 47, 48). The sun occupies the chief place among the stars ; although in it also love and wrath struggle with one another, and hence it may not be prayed to, yet it is the central heart and from it goes forth the soft and vivifying light, which illuminates the earth and the planets circling around it (*Ibid.*, xxiv. 64 ; xxv. 41, 60, 61). The birth or origination of the stars and planets is, as also is every other birth, only a repetition of the eternal birth of God (xxvi. 20), and as in the outgrowth of the earth, even so in the individual planets each of the seven creative spirits may again be recognised.

5. The stars have their proper and final end in being means to the creation of man, who was created as the image of God, in the place of the expelled devil (*Aur.*, xxi. 41),—man, himself an angel, aye, more than an angel, who should produce of himself creatures like himself, from among whom in the course of time there should arise a king who should rule the world instead of the rejected Lucifer (*Aur.*, xxi. 18). Even in regard to his body, man is more than all creatures, for he is not brought forth by the earth, but was formed by God *out* of it, *i.e.*, of an extract of all its elements, and therefore unites all creatures in himself and is them all (*Threefold Life*, v. 137 ; vi. 49). To the body there is added in the second place, the spirit sprung from the stars, by means of which man, like the beasts, leads a sidereal life, and possesses reason and artistic skill. Finally, there combines itself with the two, something which does not come of stars and elements, the spark from the light and power of God, the soul, which, because it is sprung from the Godhead, draws nourishment from the latter, its mother, and beholds her (*Aur.*, Pref., 96, 94). As thus a threefold man must be distinguished, the earthly, the sidereal, and the heavenly, it often happens that Böhme treats of three spirits and three bodies of man, of which the first shall consist of the elements, the second of the sidereal substances, the third of living water or holy elements (*Myst. magn.*, x. 20). At the same time, man not only carries all creatures in himself, but also the Divine trinity ; we are God's images and Sons, "little Gods" in Him, by which He reveals Himself (*Threefold Life*, vi. 49 ; *Aur.*, xxvi. 74). In

this likeness to God the primitive (Paradisaical) man had the power of creating all things anew ; this takes place above all in speech, in which the essence of all things is once more (after God) created, and on that very account man becomes the lord of things (*Aur.*, xx. 90, 91 ; *Threefold Life*, vi. 2). Accordingly our own real mother tongue, the speech of Adam in Paradise, is the proper "*signatura rerum.*" This it is which Böhme calls the language of nature, in opposition to the language of fallen mankind (*int. al.*, *Sign. rer.*, i. 17). Just as the Divine spirit has its receptacle in wisdom or the virgin, in which it projects images and thinks out things, so man as the creator after God possessed this eternal virgin and bore her in himself. It was by her means also, that man, being like to the angels and free from the sexual nature of the beasts, should have begotten his successors, who thus would all have been children of a virgin (*Threefold Life*, vi. 68). But man does not remain in this condition. Rather, inasmuch as he, who was destined to rule over the four elements, falls under the sway of the elements, yearns after the life of the beasts, he sinks beneath this condition. Only now, when God sees that man is pricked by lust, does God say that it is not good that man should be alone, a saying that is not contradictory with the fact that all was good, only because man had been lowered, had become foolish ; which is also shown by his sleep, which perfect man would not have required. (*Threefold Life*, v. 135 *et seq.*). During this sleep the woman is given him, his help-meet, together with whom he must henceforth fulfil his destiny, seeing that the virgin within him is become dim. Now that the one half is divided from him, the two "tinctures" which hitherto were combined with him are separated. The *matrix Veneris*, which he formerly bore in himself, man now finds set outside of himself in the woman (*Elec. by Gr.*, vi. 5 ; *Regen.*, ii. 18). It is only now, to man thus degraded, that there arises the tree of temptation, *i.e.*, it only now becomes a temptation to him to eat of earthly fruit, that makes earthly flesh (*Threefold Life*, vi. 92), instead of, as was his true destiny, imagining himself into the heart of God and drawing nourishment and power from the *verbum divinum* (*Ibid.*, vi. 39). His surrender to this temptation completes his fall, and now he falls entirely under the sway of the third principle, this world, the spirit of which holds him prisoner (*Threefold Life*, viii. 37) ; so that, placed between the kingdoms of Heaven and

Hell, he can decide for the one or the other according to his own choice, and all the three kingdoms contend for him (*Threefold Life*, ix. 17, 18). As Lucifer's fall was followed by the first corruption of external nature, so the fall of man is followed by a new cursing and a still greater degeneration of nature. That man, having become brutish, should become quite devilish is natural, as it is only through man that Lucifer can regain the chief power in the world, which is his perpetual object. But he is opposed by God, inasmuch as the latter causes his heart, the Son, to enter into the third principle and become man, in order that He may slay death in the human soul and destroy the soul of the *centrum naturæ* (*Threefold Life*, viii. 39, 40). What all the successors of Adam ought to have been, that this man actually is: Son of the eternal virgin, who was hidden, as in all mankind, so also in the not sinless but pure and human virgin Mary (*Ibid.*, vi. 70). So likewise, because all the seductive arts of Lucifer are frustrated in him, He is Lord of the elements, Lord of the world. But this holds not only of Him; for, as the name Christian signifies, what He is, every man becomes who believes on Him, through the inborn essence (*Regen.*, v. 1, 12). We are not indeed to understand by faith the acceptance of a history as true. That avails as little as the acceptance of a fable, and many a Jew or Turk is more of a Christian, and child of God, than one who knows of the life and death of Christ, which for that matter even the devils do. To reason, indeed, the letter and scripture are supreme (*Sign. rer.*, Pref. 4). But such faith of reason is not enough; the true faith is that man should allow Christ to be born and to repeat in him the process of His life, so as to experience everything along with Him, His baptism, temptation, suffering, death, etc. (*True Repentance*, xxxiv.). When this takes place, and instead of the corrupt, "monstrous" man, there emerges the "inner man," the soul by becoming ruler of the mightiest of all things, the wrath of God, becomes to a certain degree stronger than God (*Threefold Life*, viii. 9). With this power there is connected the increased knowledge which man attains inasmuch as he again acquires power over the language of nature, of which the outer man is ignorant (*Threefold Life*, vi. 16). This explains how Böhme came to give the equivalents in the language of nature of both German and foreign words, and even of their individual syllables, Sul-Phur, Barm-Herz-Ig, etc.—As all creatures reveal God's wonders,

—the devils reveal those of the Divine wrath (*Threefold Life*, iv. 90),—so also does man, with whom when he is born again the revelation of God is conscious and therefore a life (*Ibid.*, iv. 58, 89). It is however not easy to attain to this point. Towards that end we cannot indeed do much, but we must give up a great deal : our selfness namely and our own will, through which we do not *come*, but are *already* brought into Hell (*Suprasens. Life*, xxxvi. 40). Hell, even the hell through which Christ passed, is the anger of God (*Regen.*, iii. 12), and he who hardens himself, stands in God's anger ; accordingly God hardens him not according to His Divine will, therefore not what is properly called God, but God's wrath or man's own will hardens him. Naturally the Devil tries every possible means to retain man in this Hell. If he cannot soothe him with vanity, then he tries to terrify him by his unworthiness and the catalogue of his sins, as though he were beyond hope (*True Repen.*, xxxvi.). In such case one ought not to dispute much with him, but throw oneself into the ever open arms of God (*Threefold Life*, ix. 29, 30). Even in these arms, it is true, a man will still be in hell, if he still desires to be or do something himself. This desire must die in me. Only in my nothingness, when my egoism is slain, is Christ born in me and lives in me (*Sign. rer.*, x. 50). The external means of grace alone do not effect it, neither the reading of the scriptures, nor attendance at church, nor the absolution which is proclaimed to us. The great weight which she attaches to the external, is the main reason why Böhme is always calling the Roman Catholic Church Babylon. But every view also, which exalts the letter and history above everything, is so called, as well as the Romish Church. To the saint, not only the Bible, but every creature preaches ; his church is not the house of stone, but that which he brings with him into the community ; forgiveness of sins is imparted to him not by a man, but by God Himself ; his Holy Supper consists in the enjoyment by his inner man of the true, and therefore not the sensuous, body of Christ ; to him the merit of Christ is not merely imputed, but Christ living in him, it is really his own (*Regen.*, vi. 2, 8, 14, 16 ; i. 4).—In spite of these assertions Böhme often controverts Schwenkfeld, who had taught the very same doctrine (*v. supra*, § 233, 2) ; but this is caused by the latter's terminology, which had hindered him from calling the glorified Christ a creature.—He who has ceased to live in

himself is already in heaven ; only his external man lives in this world, is bridegroom and citizen and subjected to authority. The sins also which he who is born again commits are only the sins of the outer man, they no longer harm the inner man. Indeed in them is clearly illustrated how all things without exception work for the best for the children of God : memory of the sins which were forgiven us can only increase the longing for God's grace. Sin therefore, is like the " firewood " in the stove, which by being burnt increases comfort. As all things work together for the good of him who is born again, even his sins, because he devotes everything, even them, to God's will, so on the other hand, for him who persists in his own will, everything contributes to his sorrow, even the fact that God does not give him up. By that very fact he who is not born again stands in the wrath of God, or damnation. Not as if God had desired or did desire his damnation, for God was only the merciful God, but the wrath of God desired it, *i.e.*, man's own will, by which he stands in the wrath of God. It therefore remains immovably fixed : God wills that all should be helped, and it is not God's choice that any should be hardened, but it is brought about by remaining in the Divine wrath, *i.e.*, the will of death and the Devil (*Myst. magn.*, x. 17, 38).

6. The richness of insight, which will hardly be denied to Böhme, by any one who seeks sympathetically to appreciate him, explains the high regard paid him by philosophers like Baader, Schelling and Hegel. Again, the pious, mild disposition of the man, opposed to all contentiousness, has attracted religious minds in all ages. The confusion of his exposition, derived partly from his alchemistic studies, and increased by his perpetual war with language, has indeed been the cause of much harm. This perhaps was the reason why he was very soon made the head of a sect, a position which he himself wished to be spared. This was brought about in particular by Gichtel (b. 1638, d. 1710), who was his apostle in Germany, as were Pordage, Brumley and Jane Leade in England. In France, Poiret in the seventeenth century borrowed largely from him, St. Martin (b. 1743, d. 1803) still more in the eighteenth, who for the rest is still to his countrymen the *philosophe inconnu*.

## SECOND DIVISION.

**Philosophy as Secular Wisdom.**

## THE COSMOSOPHISTS.

## § 235.

A CORRESPONDING correlative to the undertaking of the Theosophists, to transform dogma back into gospel, *i.e.* to develop the truth in such a manner as *e.g.* the apostles did, before secular wisdom had mixed itself up with it, on the ground solely of revelation received from God, is formed by the attempt to philosophise as if a divine wisdom inspired by Christianity had never existed. The pre-Christian secular philosophers had done this; to philosophise in their spirit is accordingly the problem of the age, and in contrast with those who do so, any one who seeks to hold fast by the scholastic standpoint, will seem behind the times and an unphilosophical head. The protection of the Roman Catholic Church cannot alter the fact: the time is past when her defence was the highest problem and churchliness therefore the measure of worth for a philosophy. A middle course between the two, as it were, is taken by those, who indeed respond to the need of philosophising in the spirit of antiquity, but so misunderstand it as to think that to do so is to conjure up the spirits of the ancient philosophers. What in other times would have been mere folly, here becomes an excusable misunderstanding, and what otherwise would reveal a misinterpretation of the age, shows here that its call did not pass unheard. Accordingly these (even if only mis-) interpreters of their age are not without influence on later philosophy; and those who permit the philosophers of antiquity to philosophise for them, if they do not deserve such detailed representation as those who themselves philosophise in the manner of secular philosophers, yet deserve mention as their forerunners.

## A.—REAWAKENING OF THE SYSTEMS OF ANTIQUITY.

## § 236.

However much the so-called Renaissance is distinguished from all other mediæval phenomena, it has nevertheless a purely mediæval character, something as the period of the Roman Empire belongs to antiquity in spite of its contrast to

the earlier forms of the latter. What makes it a feature, and a very characteristic one, in the physiognomy of the Middle Ages, is the individualism, which has hardly ever been so prevalent as just when the object of general enthusiasm was that antiquity which invariably sunk the individual either in the nation or the state. On that very account, it is not only the descent from the Romans, or the circumstance that after the fall of Constantinople Greek scholars with Greek books fled to Italy, but much more is it the political disruption of Italy, which assigns to the Italian the most important rôle in the great drama of the Renaissance. To its other forms there is joined the re-awakening of the ancient schools of philosophy, likewise at first in Italy, and from thence spreading itself out into other lands. In spite of hatred of the scholastic philosophy, in spite of the effort to allow only the ancients themselves to be heard, which made many of them mere translators and exegetes, the writings which serve this end nevertheless breathe the spirit of the Middle Ages, though it be only the spirit of that age when it was already departing. Especially does this appear in the fact that their authors not only for the most part belong to the clergy by profession, but with few exceptions are men of churchly piety of disposition, —Pagan in head, but Roman Catholic in heart, to vary an expression used later. The mingling of perfectly heterogeneous elements which is peculiar to the Renaissance in general, is demonstrable also in its philosophy. Though not in the same order in which they arose originally, all the systems of antiquity come again to life pretty nearly complete. That this should first of all happen with the systems with which the Church Fathers and the Schoolmen had alloyed the faith, in order to arrive first at dogma and then at a science of belief, and further, that this particular attempt at revival should excel all others in significance, is very natural. The former for reasons given above (§ 228). The latter because in Platonism and Aristotelianism all earlier Greek systems are contained as moments, all later systems as germs.

### § 237.

#### REVIVAL OF PLATONISM.

1. Like the earlier Alexandrine Neo-Platonists, the Florentine Neo-Platonists also, in spite of the many Aris-

totelian and Stoical elements which it contained, regarded their doctrine as pure Platonism and called their academy Platonic. The first opportunity for its foundation was given by the Greek Georgius Gemistus (which surname was subsequently replaced by that of PLETHO). Born in Constantinople in 1355 (he died almost a centenarian in 1450), subsequently holding a high judicial position in the Peloponnesus, he was taken to Italy by the Emperor John Palæologus in 1438 to work for the union of the Greek and Roman Churches. That he did exactly the opposite, need not surprise us in a dreamer of political and religious reform in an ancient pagan sense, who saw in the desired union a strengthening of Christianity. On the contrary, as formerly at home, so now in Ferrara and Florence he spread his doctrines, which had their origin in enthusiasm for Attic philosophy, in trusted circles, and originated a society of Platonists under the special patronage of Cosimo dei Medici. For this society was written his treatise on the difference between Platonism and Aristotelianism, which involved him in a controversy with Georgius Scholarius (Gennadius), in consequence of which his opponent had the only complete copy of Pletho's chief work burned. The loss of the latter, his *Nóμοι*, is however not irreparable. Not only have important fragments of it been preserved (re-edited by Alexandre, and published by Didot, Paris, 1860), but with the help of other writings which have been preserved, and the table of contents which was not burned with the rest of the book, it is possible to reconstruct Pletho's entire view of the universe:—his doctrine of the All by means of the fragments of the *Nóμοι* which have been preserved, his system of ethics by means of the treatise *περὶ ἀρετῆς*, his political doctrine by means of the *Reminiscences* of the Peloponnesus, etc. His system is thoroughly pagan, hostile to Christianity, and on that account seems also to be prejudiced against Aristotelianism so far as it had served as a support to the Church. This prejudice against Aristotle is further propagated by Pletho's disciple Bessarion (1395–1472), whose paganism, however, does not go nearly so far as his master's, and in whom therefore there appears no hatred, but a marked indifference towards Christian dogmas. Against the Aristotelian George of Trapezond he takes Platonism under his zealous protection.

Cf. Gass : *Gennadius und Pletho*. Bresl., 1844. Fritz Schultze : *Geschichte der Philosophie der Renaissance*. I<sup>r</sup> Bd. Jena, 1847.



2. The society founded by Pletho was maintained and became more and more an established institution. Lectures in Platonic philosophy were regularly held in it, indeed MARSILIO FICINO (1433-1499) was even educated as a teacher of the Platonic philosophy. That this education was succeeded by brilliant results, is proved by his perpetually reprinted Latin translations of Plato and Plotinus, which he accompanied with exhaustive commentaries. To these must be added his translations of individual works of Porphyry, (Pseudo-) Jamblichus, Proclus, Dionysius the Areopagite, Hermes Trismegistus, Alcinous, Xenocrates, Speusippus. That, however, the works which he translated did not contain opinions foreign to or unshared by himself may be inferred from his treatise *De voluptate* written in his 24th year, in which he expresses his conviction of the agreement of Plato and Aristotle and of the truth of their doctrine, just as he had done with Plotinus and Proclus. Throughout his whole life he sticks to the maxim: *Nolim Marsilianam doctrinam opponere Platonicae*. Becoming a priest in his forty-second year, he threw himself with zeal into theology, as is proved by his treatise *De religione Christiana*, his commentary on Romans, and his many sermons. At the same time he does not cease to be a Platonist, and his *Theologia Platonica* in 18 Books, in which he specially treats of immortality, shows that he regards Platonism as in accord with the doctrines of the Church. In his appeals to Origen, Clement, and Augustine, he forgets the alteration of the times; and that he personally experienced, as alluded to above (§ 133), how polemics against Averroës and other Aristotelians in order to promote Platonism, now appears suspicious to the Church, seems to be implied in the fact that he closes his *Platonic Theology* with the formula which was often subsequently to reappear: *In omnibus quæ aut hic aut alibi a me tractantur, tantum assertum esse volo quantum ab ecclesia comprobatur*. The collection of his works, made by Adam Henric-Petri at Basel in 1576 in two volumes, folio, contains, with the exception of the translations of Plato and Plotinus, everything which he wrote, among the rest some medical and astrological treatises.

3. The letters of Ficino (12 Books) show how large was the circle of those whom he calls Platonists and "*con philosophi*." They show also that among them he regarded none so highly

as JOHN PICO, Prince of Mirandola and Concordia (b. 1463, d. 1494), of German descent and thirty years his junior, to whom in recent times more regard has again been paid, because it has been found that to him the Swiss reformer Zwingli owed a great deal. But the very qualities which have given him value in the eyes of modern Protestants, explain the mistrust of the Church, which forbade the grand disputation, to which this *ingenium præcox*, who firmly held that Platonism, which, however, with the Neo-Platonists, he regarded as compatible with Aristotelianism, was especially fitted to lead back thinkers from Averroism and other damnable errors to Christianity, had summoned the scholars of the whole world, inviting them to come to Rome at his expense. Of the nine hundred theses which he had put together for this purpose, four hundred are borrowed from the most important Schoolmen, Arabians, Neo-Platonists, Cabbalists; the rest are his own, and betray a tendency to represent antagonists as coinciding with his own views. The endeavour to do so is intelligible in one who deduces all wisdom whether of Jews or Greeks from one original revelation of God to man, and who regards religion, *i.e.*, the life of God in men, which only takes place perfectly in Christ, as a cosmical principle, inasmuch as by it the whole world is brought back to the One Being and the One Good. The works of John Pico, among which the *Apology* for his theses and the speech, often verbally agreeing with it, *On the Dignity of Man*, contain his general standpoint, the twelve books against Astrology containing his natural philosophy, were first printed in Venice in 1498, afterwards repeatedly, and finally, along with those of his nephew John Francis Pico, they were printed at Basel by Henric-Petri in two vols. folio, 1572, and again in 1601. According to them, movement, light and heat are the sole influences of the heavens and the constellations. All astrological notions, which were chiefly handed down from the Egyptians and Chaldees, have their root partly in a too high estimation of mathematics. The sum of his wisdom is contained in his aphorism: *Philosophia quærit, Theologia invenit, Religio possidet.*

Cf. Dreydorff: *Das System des Joh. Pico.* Marb., 1858.

4. Ficino and Pico awakened the man by whom revived Platonism is represented in Germany. JOHANN REUCHLIN,

born in 1455 at Pforzheim, educated at Orleans and Paris, became known during his professorship of classical literature at Basel, as a learned and enthusiastic humanist. Subsequently he became professor in Ingolstadt, then in Tübingen, and died on the 30th July, 1522. In the year 1487 he first made the personal acquaintance of Ficino at Florence, and later that of Pico. As both make hardly any distinction between the Platonic and the Pythagorean philosophy, it did not at all disturb their mutual understanding, when Reuchlin especially exalted the Pythagorean element. Just as little discord arose, when Reuchlin, with his interest in Hebrew studies, who might have boasted of having restored the knowledge of Hebrew to the Church, mingled cabbalistic notions with Platonism. Pico himself, however, had already done this before him. The two treatises : *Capnion* s. *De verbo mirifico* (Basel, 1494. Tübingen, 1514, fol.), in which a Pagan, a Jew and a Christian (*Capnion* is Reuchlin) converse, each taking the chief part in one of the three books, and the *De arte cabbalistica Libb. iii.* (Hagenau, 1517, fol.), are interdependent, either making references to the other.

5. The same elements that are mingled in Reuchlin are also mingled in the Venetian ZORZI (Franciscus Georgius Venetus, born 1460, died 1540), and in CORNELIUS AGRIPPA VON NETTESHEIM of Cologne (b. 1487, d. 1535). The work of the former : *De harmonia mundi Cantica iii.* Venice, 1525, fol., is not so fantastic as the youthful treatise of the latter : *De occulta philosophia libri tres*, which he first published in 1510, and which partly, at least, is rectified by the *De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum*, which appeared in 1531. Agrippa's thoroughly adventurous doings brought him a host of vexations, partly deserved. His works, which besides the two named above, include commendations of the Art of Lully (*v. supra*, § 206), appeared in two octavo vols. : *Henr. Corn. ab Nettesheim Opera Omnia Lugd. Batav. per Bernigos fratres* (the title-page in some copies bears the year 1600, in others no date at all). Among French representatives of this tendency of thought, there are usually mentioned JAQUES FABRI or Lefèvre of Etaples (Faber Stapulensis, b. 1455, d. 1537), praised by Reuchlin for his services as regards Aristotle, and his disciple, CHARLES BOUILLÉ (Bovillus) whose works appeared in Paris in 1510. Both, like Reuchlin, are admirers of Nicolas of Cusa. The same holds

of another disciple of Faber's and friend of Bouillé, the Pole, JODOCUS CLICHTOVIVS, who was a teacher at the Sorbonne in the beginning of the sixteenth century, and also made a name for himself by his zeal for the Art of Lully, as also in controversy with Luther.

### § 238.

#### ARISTOTELIANS.

1. In Padua, which was to become for Aristotelianism what Florence was for Platonism, the attempt had been made by many to hold fast by pre-Occamist Aristotelianism, against the growing power of Nominalism and its consequences. In availing themselves of the help of Averroës to that end, they had already been anticipated by others. The Carmelite monk John of Baconthorp (d. 1346) in England, John Jandunus, who though born in France (in Jandun) was especially admired in Italy, Fra Urbano of Bologna, and the Venetian Paulus, were Averroists, before their doctrine was enthroned at Padua by Gaëtano di Tiena (1387-1467). After him, they were taught by the Theatine monk Nicolotti Vernias (1471-99); finally the same path was followed by ALEXANDER ACHILLINUS, who taught medicine and philosophy first at Padua, afterwards in his native city Bologna, where he died in 1512. He and others inspired by him went the length of recognising the doctrine of the unity of the human spirit as Aristotelian, and now by a process of pedantry represented Averroës as a defender of the immortality of men (of individuals, not of the race). These Averroists, some of whom went much further than Achillini (who always distinguished between what Aristotle teaches and what is Christian and true), are to be thought of when we hear it said by Petrarch that philosopher and un-Christian are synonymous terms. This Averroist-scholastic conception of Aristotle continued to flourish even after LEONICUS THOMAS (b. 1456) had held his epoch-making lectures on Aristotle in Padua, and proved by them, that the latter ought to be studied in the original, and by means of Greek, not Arabian, commentators. The study especially of Alexander of Aphrodisia was the cause of the rise of the Alexandrists in opposition to the hitherto almost all-powerful Averroists. They are better contrasted as Arabists and Hellenists. AUGUSTINUS NIPHUS

indeed is no ordinary Averroist (b. 1472; calls himself *Suessanus*, though Suessa was not his birthplace, but his adopted home), who taught in Pisa, Bologna, Rome, Salerno and Padua till about 1550, and won such a reputation as physician, astrologer and philosopher that Pope Leo X. allowed him to bear the name and arms of the Medici. It may be inferred from his works, the full list of which along with the place of publication is attached by Gabriel Naudæus to the Paris edition of *Augst. Niphi Opuscula moralia et politica*, 2 vols., 4to., 1654, that he is not unjustly counted as an Averroist. More than by the fact that in his own writings he comments on Averroës and defends him against Pomponatius, this conclusion is justified by his interpreting Aristotle exactly in the way which had become customary since the Arabians, under the influence of Neo-Platonism and especially Averroës, had become the teachers of philosophy. On the other hand ANDREAS CÆSALPINUS, famous as a naturalist, and a worker of merit in the physiology of animals and plants (b. Arezzo, 1519, d. in Pisa, 1603), leans more to the Alexandrists, or rather seeks to mediate between them and the Averroists, by trying to explain Aristotle by himself. Both his *Quæstiones peripateticæ* (published along with the chief work of Telesius (v. § 243) by Eusthat. Vigno in the *Tract. philos. Atrebat.* 1588, also at Venice 1593, as also elsewhere), and his *Dæmonum investigatio* develop his lively views of nature often bordering on pantheism. MARCO ANTONIO ZIMARA born in Neapolitan territory, who taught for some years in Padua, is a pure Averroist; that he is not slavishly so is proved by his treatises referred to in § 187. The Paduan JACOB ZABARELLA also (b. 1533, d. 1589), is at least in that department of philosophy in which he won greatest fame, viz., logic, a pure Averroist. When he strays into physics, and comes to results which are less in conflict with the doctrine of the Church, he claims to speak more in Aristotle's own sense, so that for him, as for Albert and Thomas, it is undoubted that Aristotle warrants the doctrine of the Church; he is only fundamentally distinguished from the scholastic Peripatetics by his knowledge of Greek and his more tasteful presentation of his subject. His works were published in five parts by Marschall at Leyden, 1587, fol., of which the first four contain his writings on logic, the fifth the thirty books *De rebus naturalibus*. The former also appeared

at Frankfort in 1608, the latter at Frankfort, 1607. Just as he was by some counted as an Averroist, by others as an Alexandrist, so was it with his contemporaneous opponent FRANCESCO PICCOLOMINI (1520-1604), and his successor, who also revered him, CESARE CREMONINI (1552-1614). The latter may be regarded as the last Aristotelian in Italy. For the rest he himself proved how dubious he thought the tenets of Aristotelianism, when he did not venture to look through a telescope because it might overturn his physical theories.

2. Pietro Pomponazzi, called Peretto, better known as PETRUS POMPONATIUS, did not, like the last-named, take up a middle position, but that of a most decided Alexandrist. He was born in Mantua on the 16th September, 1462, studied medicine and philosophy in Padua, taught there, afterwards in Ferrara, and finally in Bologna, where he died on the 18th May, 1524. First of all in his most famous treatise: *Tractatus de immortalitate animæ*, which was first printed at Bologna in 1516, afterwards repeatedly and often without mention of the place of publication, because at its first appearance it was burnt by order of the Doge, and which at once gained him the enmity of several Augustinians and Dominicans, then in his *Apologia* directed against the attacks of Contarini, finally in the *Defensorium* written against Niphus, he demonstrates that the view of the Averroists of the one immortal *intellectus* of all men is incompatible with Aristotle's doctrine, according to which the soul is the form of an organic body, and therefore that according to Aristotle neither man individually nor mankind can be immortal. He further shows that this was not the only point in which Aristotle differed from the Christian doctrine, and could not be, as every article of the faith stands or falls with every other. Just as little as with the Church does he in general agree with Plato. On this account it is not advisable to impart the *arcana* of philosophy to the weak, for they may easily fall into error. As regards himself he thinks quite differently from Aristotle, for to him, not the latter, but the Church, is the authority. It may be found singular that this book became obnoxious to the Church, and that in the controversies with the Averroists connected with it, the Church declared against Pomponatius, in spite of his influential friends at Rome. But it must be considered that he was the innovator, that the admirers of Averroës had tradition on their side. As in this book with

reference to Aristotle, so in the *De fato, libero arbitrio et prædestinatione* it is shown with regard to the Stoics, that reason and philosophy teach a quite other doctrine from that of the Church, but always with the purpose of closing with a declaration of submission to the latter. The treatise *De naturalium effectuum causis s. de incantationibus*, written in 1520 (published by Henric-Petri, Basel, 1556-8) had a local occasion. He seeks in it to trace back to natural laws (for the most part, it is true, astrological), what is regarded by superstition as the work of fairies. A small treatise *De nutritione* written later seeks to show that all reasonable grounds argue the material nature of the soul, which on that account cannot be immortal *per se* but only *per accidens*. The works of Pomponatius seem to exist in a collected edition, Basil., 1567-8. It is to me unknown.

Cf. Francesco Fiorentino: *Pietro Pomponazzi, studj storici su la scuola Bolognese*. Firenze, 1868.

## § 239.

### REVIVERS OF OTHER SYSTEMS.

1. Much less philosophically gifted and having therefore but little influence in philosophy, or at least no permanent influence, whatever their importance in other fields, are those who made the attempt to bring back to life the systems of the period of decadence of Greek philosophy (*v.* §§ 92-115). Thus Joost Lips (JUSTUS LIPSIUS, b. 1547, d. 1606), whose works appeared in 1585 in eight, in 1637 in four, folio volumes, won by the praises of Stoicism contained in them the reputation not of a philosopher, but only that of a philologist and critic. That a like fate should have befallen the colourless Caspar Schoppe (SCIOPPIUS, b. 1562, in the Palatinate) with his *Elementa philosophiæ Stoicæ* is intelligible. Indeed the much more important Pierre Gassend (PETRUS GASSENDI, b. 1592, d. 1655), who taught even at a time when Descartes had already appeared on the scene, fared much the same when he opposed the mediæval Aristotelianism in his *Life of Epicurus* (1647) and his *Syntagma philosophiæ Epicuri* (1649). He gained influence as a physicist only, and by Gassendists, who for a long period were cited in opposition to the Cartesians, are to be understood physicists who contest the theory of vortices by atomic theories. The collected

works of Gassendi (Lyons, 1658, in six, Florence, 1728, in six, volumes folio) contain, besides the above two treatises, the posthumous *Syntagma philosophicum* in which he treats of philosophy as Logic, Physics and Ethics. The later sensationalists in England and France have borrowed much from him. Those, however, who on that account have reckoned him among modern philosophers, and sought to set him alongside of Bayle and Locke, have hardly remembered that his atomistic physics did not prevent him from being a zealous priest with a leaning to asceticism. Almost contemporary with Gassendi's attempt is another. CHRYSOSTOMUS MAGNENUS, native of Burgundy and Professor of Medicine at Pavia, published his *Democritus redivivus* in 1646, in which he identifies air with the void, but reduces the three other elements to atoms of various forms. His other writings, partly referred to by himself, partly by Morhof, are unknown to me.

2. The post-Aristotelian systems having found their chief representatives in the Roman world, and the philosophers of Rome, because of their more or less syncretistic character having found their proper head in Cicero, it is comprehensible that he, and with him, rhetorical philosophy should be highly esteemed. Consciously or unconsciously he is made the pattern of those philosophers who are suitably designated as Ciceronians, a name which first occurs in this period. The Roman, LAURENTIUS VALLA (b. 1407, died 1459), and the German, RUDOLPH AGRICOLA (b. 1442, d. 1485), had already struck this note, only that Quintilian was as much to them as Cicero. On the other hand, the Spaniard LUDOVICUS VIVES (b. 1492, d. 1540), whose works appeared at Valencia in 1782, and still more MARIUS NIZOLIUS of Modena (b. 1498, d. 1575), both in his *Thesaurus Ciceronianus* and in his treatise against the false philosophers (also entitled *Anti-barbarus*) which Leibnitz republished at Frankfort in 1670 (*Marii Nizolii contra Pseudophilosophos libri iv.*), make no secret of their conviction that they owe more to Cicero than to the Socratic Plato and Aristotle, because the latter separate philosophy from rhetoric.

3. To these rhetorizing philosophers we must now add Pierre de la Ramée (PETRUS RAMUS), a native of Picardy. Born in 1517 in the neighbourhood of Soissons, he succeeded in completing his studies at Paris in the face of the greatest



difficulties, so that in his 21st year he dared to undertake the disputation which made him famous, and in which he triumphantly defended the thesis that all that Aristotle teaches is false. He especially attacked the Logic of Aristotle, and in the written form as well (*Aristotelicæ animadversiones*), and he sought to substitute for it a better (*Dialecticæ partitiones*, subsequently republished as *Institutiones dialecticæ*). The most peculiar feature of the work is the amalgamation of Logic, which on that account he calls the *ars disserendi*, with Rhetoric. From exact observation of the manner in which Cicero and other orators convince their hearers, one may learn the rules of Logic better than from the Organon. Several things which Ramus first introduced into logic, have remained permanent possessions of the logical hand-books. Such is the distinction between natural logic and the logic of art. Such also is the order of treatment universally taken in Logic. That is to say, the subject which forms the first part with Ramus (*de inventione*), the doctrine of the notion and definition, universally forms the beginning of a logical treatise at the present time. The second part, *de judicio* (hence *Pars secunda Petri* as jocular designation for *judicium*, i.e., the faculty of judgment) contains the doctrine of the judgment, the syllogism, and method. That Ramus only lays down three syllogistic figures, must be regarded as favourably distinguishing his logic from that of the Schoolmen; in the fact that subsequently, like Laurentius Valla before him, he drops the third, may be recognised a presage of the truth that without amplification it has not full demonstrative power. For the rest he deduces the syllogistic figures, not like Aristotle (*v. § 86, 2*) from the different comprehensions of the *terminus medius*, but (like most moderns following his example) from the place it holds in the premisses. At first the writings of Ramus were condemned and he was forbidden to lecture in logic, so that he had to confine himself to lectures on mathematics and such subjects, in which the rhetorical masterpieces of Cicero were commented on. After the death of Francis I., however, he again appeared at the Collège de Presles as teacher of Dialectic. He now widens the area of his attack on Aristotle so as to include the Physics and Metaphysics, to which he opposed works with similar titles. Hostile attempts, which since his conversion to Calvinism had become much more vehement, compelled him to undertake a foreign

journey (in Germany, Italy, Switzerland), which became a long triumphal progress. His chief opponent in Paris, the theologian Charpentier, bribed the assassins who, after his return to Paris, murdered Ramus on St. Bartholomew's eve. The exact list of the fifty treatises printed, some of them in many editions during his life, and the nine which were printed after his death, as well as of those treatises whose titles are known but which were never published, is to be found in Waddington-Kastus' monograph mentioned below. There is as yet no collected edition of the writings of Ramus. His logical innovations found great favour for some time, and there actually arose a school of Ramists in opposition to the Aristotelians. Reasons connected with differences of confessions of faith probably contributed to the bringing about of the fact that their number was even greater in Germany than in France. The fact that Arminius had attended Ramus in Geneva, was decisive for the influence of the latter among the Arminians of Holland. His close relations with Sturm in Strasburg were a recommendation to all men of humanistic culture. Waddington-Kastus mentions, p. 129 ff., a series of names which shows how highly Ramus was honoured. Between the Ramists and the Anti-Ramists, into which logicians were for a long period divided, there stood a few semi-Ramists, with whom Goclenius among others was reckoned.

Cf. Waddington-Kastus : *de Petri Rami vita, Scriptis, philosophia*. Paris, 1848.

4. Far less stir than was made by Ramus, was made by his thirty years' younger contemporary, whose hatred against Aristotle drew decided nourishment from the study of Ramus, but who preferred to be called the unconditional dependent of no philosopher, and therefore not of Ramus : NICOLAUS TAURELLUS (probably his family name was Oechslein), born at Mömpelgard in 1547. The study of theology to which he at first devoted himself at Tübingen, he exchanged for that of medicine, and after he had become doctor of medicine at Basel in 1570, he there taught first medicine, and afterwards ethics. Here he now ventured to publish his letter of renunciation to the peripatetic philosophy : *Philosophia triumphus*, etc., Basil., 1573, which drew down upon him both from Catholic and Protestant divines—the latter had long since returned to mere scholasticism—the reproach of godlessness.

The hundred and sixty-six theses which are prefaced to the treatise proper, as well as the prefaces to the particular parts, already contain all that the subsequent literary activity of Taurellus sought to accomplish. Among the many errors, enumerated as such, which have been naturalized under the authority of Aristotle, he makes special complaint of the doctrine that the greatest happiness consists in knowledge. Much rather as the happiness of God consists in His producing, creating, and willing Himself, whence He is also more than mere *mens*, so human happiness consists entirely in the loving and willing of God. The treatise itself is divided into three tractates, of which the first treats of the faculties of the human spirit, the second criticizes the Aristotelian principles of physics, the third makes an attempt to establish a true philosophy and one agreeing with theology, not supported by the authority of Aristotle but on reason. This opposition of Aristotle and reason embittered the philosophic world. The theological world was not less angry with him, because he did not so extend the results of the fall as to include the loss by reason of the capacity of knowledge. Vexations of all sorts gave him a series of troubled years, till finally he received the professorship of physics and medicine in Altorf, a university in which at that period the peripatetic philosophy stood in high regard. Accordingly in his *Medicæ prædictionis methodus*, etc., Francof., 1581, he expresses the intention of limiting himself entirely to the sphere of his professorship, a promise to which he remained faithful when he published his *De vita et morte libellus*, etc., Noribergæ, 1586, and with which the publication of two small volumes of poems: *Carmina funebria* Norib., 1595, and *Emblemata physico-ethica* can but just be brought into agreement. However, he could not long resist the force which instigated him to renewed conflict with the arch-enemy. His *Synopsis Aristotelis Metaphysices*, etc. Hanov. 1596 (which I have not seen) was soon followed by vigorous attacks on Cæsalpinus (*v.* § 238, 2) who was universally celebrated, and specially in Altorf itself through the influence of Scherbius, in his *Alpes Cæsæ h. e. Andr. Cæsalpini Itali monstrosa et superba dogmata*, etc., Norimb., 1597, in which treatise the roughest truths were addressed to Aristotelianism coloured by pantheism. His later works: the *Κοσμολογία h. e. physicarum et metaphysicarum disquisitionum de mundo libri ii.*, Amberg

1603, and the *Oùpanologia h. e. physicarum et metaphysicarum disquisitionum de cælo, libri ii.*, Ibid. 1605, finally a treatise which Leibnitz highly prized: *De rerum æternitate, metaphysices universalis partes quatuor*, Marpurg., 1604, are quite as polemical, only that the object of their attack is Piccolomini and the Jesuit peripatetics of Coimbra as well as other Catholic clergy, whose assertions they strenuously criticize. The ever-repeated assertion, that Aristotle is not philosophy, the war against him, even in the sphere of logic, in which Taurellus claims the right of domination for the *recta ratio*, instead of Aristotelian subtleties, is the reason why he is here mentioned along with Ramus, while however his contemporaries have associated him now with one, now with others of those who went to school to the Roman eclectics, Cicero and Seneca. It must not, however, be concealed that the grounds on which Taurellus attacked the Peripatetics are in part quite other than a desire to promote the cause of the representatives of the Renaissance, so much so that it is often possible to doubt whether he ought not to be counted among the Natural Philosophers (*v.* § 240 ff.), or even the Mystics rather than among them. The reason, namely, why Taurellus will hear nothing of the Schoolmen, is that they combined a philosophy which is thoroughly pagan with a system of Dogma that is Christian; this pretension of praying to Christ with the heart, and to Aristotle with the head, is to him so self-contradictory as easily to explain how it was, that the Schoolmen finally arrived at the absurd idea of a twofold sense. In order to philosophize as Christians (*Christiane*), and especially to take a right estimate of the relation between philosophy and theology, it is necessary to hold fast to the principle that philosophy has the power of apprehending all that Adam before the fall, and humanity after the fall, were able to search out by discursive thought. On the other hand, all truth the certainty of which has only come to man as the result of the grace which appeared in Christ, belongs entirely to the sphere of theology. Accordingly much that is regarded as theological doctrine, is philosophical; *e.g.* the doctrine of the Trinity, for God would not exist if He did not eternally beget Himself; so also the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, for reason teaches us that the entire man and not merely a part of him is immortal, and as *he* (not merely the soul) sinned or did well, deserved punishment or reward.

On the contrary, it would be presumption to attempt to prove philosophically that Christ works miracles, etc. At the same time that does not involve a separation between philosophy and theology; rather the former affords the foundation for the latter. It is, that is to say, with it as with the law, which is a schoolmaster to bring us to Christ. Thus it is philosophy which brings man to the despondent view, that once fallen it is quite impossible for him to avoid punishment and condemnation, but by that very fact makes him inclined to appropriate to himself the satisfaction which has been given by the sinless one. Moreover it can be proved by philosophy that such a satisfaction is possible. Not indeed by a philosophy such as the Aristotelian, which, because it foolishly treats of the question of the beginning of the world, *i.e.*, of the pre-natural, within the science of nature, and besides leaves out of consideration the fundamental proposition of Christian philosophy that man is the final end of creation, reaches the error of regarding the world as eternal and indestructible. The true philosophy is to be deduced from the belief that the human race will one day come to an end, and that the world also must one day disappear as useless. Connected with the erroneous idea of the eternity of the world is the error of thinking that at creation God required a substance to work upon. The *materia prima* which He required is the *nihilum*, so that things are the product of God and nothing, and are therefore partly being and partly non-being.—That the reputation of Taurellus so soon disappeared, that his books soon became rarities, is hardly, and certainly not entirely, to be explained by the cunning tactics of his opponents. It is mainly to be attributed to the isolated position which was the lot of this enemy of all sectarianism, who not only desires that people should be rather Christians than Lutherans, but says that only the ignorant calls himself Calvinist or Lutheran instead of Christian. His isolation was the result of the fact that he neither strove after a classical Latin style, like the representatives of the Renaissance, nor wrote in his mother-tongue, like the Mystics and Theosophists; that he, although not less hostile to Scholasticism than the Theosophists and Cosmosophists of this period, yet seeks in a manner quite different from theirs, and really in the spirit of those he attacks, for a philosophy in the service of theology, a theology established by means of philosophy. This double standpoint

does not speak in favour of great scientific importance. Later times, which have left onesided prejudices behind them, may often unconsciously idealise and over-value such standpoints, which have no longer a living interest. Must not something of the kind have happened to Leibnitz, when he characterizes Taurellus as *ingeniosissimus* and *Germanorum Scaliger*?

Cf. F. X. Schmid (aus Schwarzenberg): *Nicolaus Taurellus, der erste deutsche Philosoph*. Erlangen (New ed.), 1864.

### § 240

Not distorted by the misinterpretation noted above (§ 235), the need of the age is perceived by those who undertake the task of transforming philosophy into a secular science which shall be as independent of the Church as at the time when there was no Church in existence. Naturally this aim is reached in such a manner that the bond hitherto existing between philosophy and the doctrine of the Church first slackens, then breaks, and finally is forgotten. In the first stage there is a friendly relationship to the faith of the Church, in the second hatred of it, in the third indifference to it. The secular philosophy goes through these three steps, both where the world of sense, and where the ethical world is its chief object. Physical and political science, which during the period of Scholasticism had been entirely repressed and had only begun to come forward again in its last period, again become what they had been in antiquity, the chief parts of philosophy, and in such a manner that the philosophers of this period are almost purely natural philosophers, or purely political philosophers, very seldom both, never both to the same degree. For the sake of a better general view, they may be grouped together, or contrasted with one another, according as the one or the other element predominates. Inasmuch as they both stand opposed to and in advance of the eulogists of the ancient secular philosophers hitherto considered, as actual secularists, intellectually akin to the ancient, it would be more strictly correct to add to the A above § 236, as B, the heading, "Actual Secular Philosophers," or some such title, and to place under it in two co-ordinated groups, "Natural Philosophers," and "Political Philosophers," as 1 and 2, or otherwise designated. However, it does not affect the matter itself, if we leave the more comprehensive title

to the part already treated of, and go on to the Natural Philosophers as a second, and the Political Philosophers as a third group.

### B.—NATURAL PHILOSOPHERS.

A. RIXNER and T. SIEBER: *Leben und Lehrmeinungen berühmter Physiker am Ende des 16. und Anfang des 17. Jahrhunderts.* 7 Hefte. Sulzbach 1819–1826.

#### § 241.

#### PARACELSUS.

1. The series is here worthily opened by Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombast von Hohenheim (probably surnamed PARACELSUS to honour him, if the name be not, as was already asserted by Jean Paul, and as modern researches have sought to prove it to be, a Latin translation of the name Höhener, which tradition only must have interchanged for the noble von Hohenheim)—a man who, born in the year 1493 at Maria Einsiedeln, closed his restless life at Salzburg on the 24th September, 1541, after writing many hundreds of longer and shorter essays, which without the intention of writing a book, were first of all dictated by him in German and afterwards translated into Latin by his disciples. Most are lost; those which could be found were published, along with those already printed, in ten parts with an appendix by the Electoral Councillor and Physician Johann Huser (Basel, Waldkirch, 1789, 4to). The same pieces appeared subsequently in a Latin translation in Frankfort, but much more correctly in the Geneva folio edition in 3 vols. (*sumptib. Jo. Antonii et Samuelis de Tournes*, 1658), which also contains the surgical writings, likewise published in German by Huser (Basel, 1591), that appeared also in folio from the press of Lazarus Zetzner's successors, Strasburg, 1618. (Huser's edition will be here cited except where the variation is especially noted.)

2. It is no accident, when the epoch-making physician, who opposed to the pathology of humours hitherto in use, the doctrine that every disease is an organism ("a man" *Paramirum*, *Wks.*, i. p. 77), which is related to the body, as the parasite is to the plant (*Philos. Wks.*, viii. p. 100 ff.), and shows

itself under a different form in each person according to sex and individuality (*Param., Wks.*, i. p. 196); who in therapeutics strove his utmost against the customary style of only using medicines used by the ancients and therefore only foreign medicines, but of employing these in all possible combinations,—it is no accident, when this innovating opponent of Galen and Avicenna, who hears with a certain satisfaction that his opponents compare him to Luther (*Paragranum*, Pref., *Wks.*, ii. 16), begins a new period in philosophy too, and makes attacks upon Aristotle, the ruler of the previous age (*Ibid.*, p. 329). That disease too has its course of life, and again, that of the means which work effectively on the human organism there are many more than was thought,—both lie much nearer than anything hitherto to the notions, that everything is permeated by one life and that this one life is concentrated in man as the culminating point of the universe, so that the *major mundus* is created for his sake (*De nat. rer.*, Strasb. 1584, *Lib. viii. Fol. 57*). Although the doctrine of the Macrocosm and Microcosm was of primitive antiquity, and had even been last emphasized by Raymond of Sabunde (*v.* § 222), who had not remained unknown to Paracelsus, yet it is only since and by means of the latter that it was made the central point of the whole of philosophy. He designates nature as the sphere of philosophy, and hence excludes from the latter all theology. Not as though the two were antagonistic, or as though theology were subordinated to philosophy, but the works of God are either works of nature or works of Christ; the former are comprehended by philosophy, the latter by theology (*Lib. meteor., Wks.*, viii. p. 201). Accordingly philosophy speaks as a pagan and was already a possession of the pagans; yet the philosopher may be a Christian, for father and son are compatible the one with the other (*Explanation of the whole of Astronomy*, *Wks.*, i. p. 443). Philosophy and theology are mutually exclusive, for the instrument of the former is the natural light, reason, and itself is a form of knowledge: theology on the other hand, is a form of faith, mediated by revelation, reading of the scriptures, and prayer. Faith surpasses the light of nature, but only because it cannot exist without natural wisdom, which however can exist without faith. The latter therefore is the greater (*Philos. sagax.*, *Wks.*, i. 162, 24). Philosophy has nature for its sole and single object, is only apprehended



("invisible," i.e. ideal) nature, as nature on the other hand is merely visible, actual philosophy (*Paragr., Wks., ii. p. 23*). Since philosophy is only the science of the world, but the world is partly the macrocosm which contains, partly the microcosm which is man, the philosophy of Paracelsus only contains what we are accustomed to call Cosmology and Anthropology, only that the two are never separated, and some things which concern man, as will shortly be seen, lie outside the sphere of philosophy.

3. As no human work can be rightly appreciated unless we know for what end it was undertaken, so also in the case of creation we must enquire after God's "intention." It is of a twofold nature: God desires that nothing may remain hidden, that everything may become visible and revealed; and secondly, that everything which He has founded and left incomplete should come to completeness (*Phil. sag., Wks., x. pp. 29, 45, 51*). Man carries out both purposes, by knowing things, and by carrying them towards their destiny by transforming them; on that account man is last in creation and is God's proper intention (*De vera infl. rer., Wks., ix. p. 134*), and the world is only to be known inasmuch as philosophy contemplates man as the world's final aim and fruit, and searches in him as the book from which nature's secrets may be read (*Lib. meteor., Wks., ix. p. 192; Azoth, Pref., Wks., x., Append.*). On the other hand, as the fruit can only be understood from the seed, so man can only be understood from that which preceded him, i.e. from the world (*Labyrinth. medic., Wks., ii. p. 240*). This circle cannot appear fallacious to Paracelsus, who lays down as a fundamental proposition that he only is a philosopher who knows one thing in another (*Paragr. alter., Wks., ii. p. 110*). Moses too relates that after all things had been created out of nothing, for the creation of man, an instrument (*Zeug*) was necessary. The latter, the "*limus terræ*," is an extract and a quintessence ("*fünftles Wesen*") of all that was created before man, and might just as well be called *limus mundi*, since all *creata* are contained in it, and therefore in man formed from it, and can accordingly come out of it. This holds not only of cold and fire, but also of the wolf nature and the adder natures, and this being so, men can with literal accuracy be called wolves, etc. (*Phil. sag., Wks., x. pp. 28, 63, 27, 35*). Since man is everything, therefore to him as the centre and point of all things nothing

is impenetrable. But besides the earth, the All comprehends the heavens also, *i.e.* the constellations or the fundamental sidereal or ethereal powers, which themselves invisible, have their "corpus" in the visible stars (*Expl. of the whole of Astron., Wks., x. p. 448*). Accordingly the *limus terræ* and man formed from it are of a double nature; first the visible, tangible, earthly, and secondly the invisible, intangible, heavenly, astral body. This latter is usually called *spiritus* by Paracelsus; any one who should translate this word by life-principle or life-spirit might found upon the usage of Paracelsus, who instead of body and spirit often says, *corpus* and *life* (*int. al., De pestilit., Wks., iii. p. 25*), or also that the *spiritus* is "the life and balsam of all corporal things," of which none is created without *spiritus* (*De nat. rer. fol. 11*). Not only do men consist of a body sprung from the elements, and the spirit descended from the stars, so that they may be called children of the marriage of those two (*Expl. of Astron., Wks., x. p. 407*), but all beings, even those without sense, live and are penetrated by the astral spirit (*Phil. sag., Wks., x. p. 191*); but all the rest are only fragments of that which man is in completeness. In accordance with a universal world-law, which Paracelsus calls the foundation of his whole philosophy (*De pestilit., Wks., iii. p. 97*), every creature yearns after that out of which it has been created, partly to maintain itself, for everything eats of its own mother and lives on her, partly to return to its original, for everything dies and is buried in its father (*Phil. sag., Wks., x. p. 34, 14*). Accordingly both the component parts of man attract to themselves that from which they sprung as the magnet attracts the iron; to hunger and thirst which induce the body to appropriate the elements and transform them into flesh and blood, there corresponds in the spirit imagination, by means of which it nourishes itself on the stars, gains sense and thoughts which are its food (*int. al., Phil. sag., Wks., x. p. 32. Explanation of the whole of Astron., Wks., x. p. 474*). Imagination, as the peculiar function of the spirit, is of the greatest importance in the formation of seed and fruit, in the generation and healing of diseases; it is the means of the *illuminatio naturalis*, makes the spirit capable of speculation, etc. (*De gener. hom., Wks., viii. p. 166; Phil. sag., Wks., x. p. 33, 58*). Hence as all natural impulses have their seat in the earthly body, so all arts and all natural wisdom have theirs in the sidereal body or life-spirit (*Ibid., p. 148*).

They are also similar to one another in that both pass away ; at death the body goes back to the elements, the spirit is absorbed by the stars ; the latter takes place later than the former, hence spirits can appear in the places to which they are bound by imagination, but they also die through the gradual disappearance of their thoughts, sense, and understanding (*int. al., De animab. post mort. appar., Wks., ix. p. 293*).

4. To these two component parts, which together make man an animal, there is now added the seat not of the light of nature, but of the eternal reason, the soul, which springs from God (*anima*). This is the living breath, which when God created Adam He caused to be added to the *limus terræ*, and at the generation of each individual He causes to be added to the seed, the extract of all the elemental parts, and which at death, being eternal, returns to the eternal. The soul, which is essentially distinct from the spirit, and which is related to its thoughts as a king to his council, has its seat in the heart, with which accordingly we ought to love God (*Phil. sag., Wks., x. pp. 263, 264*). It is so related to the spirit that the latter may be called its body, and itself the spirit's spirit (*De anim. hom., Wks., ii. p. 272 ff.*). Paracelsus moreover sometimes uses the word *spiritus* in such a wide sense as to include both the spirit (of life) and the soul. It is the result of a confusion between spirit and soul when any one shifts to the power of the elements or the stars the responsibility of an individual's being good or evil. Whether he be hot or cold depends on the former, whether he be smith or builder on the latter, but whether he be good or evil depends on the soul alone, which God has left free, and in the power of which He has left it to determine itself in one direction or another. As regards the reasons which have induced God thus to leave the soul to freedom, in which if it persists it is miserable, whilst bliss consists in entire submission to God, philosophy has nothing to say. Indeed, all that concerns that supernatural essence, the soul, is defiled, when considered by the light of nature (*Phil. sag., Wks., x. p. 148*). Through this triplicity of nature, man is partly like to, partly surpassed by, three other kinds of beings. He is nature, spirit, and angel, unites in himself the properties into which the beasts, angels, and elemental spirits (*Saganæ*) are divided. These latter namely, which are named after the elements to which they belong, Watermen (Nymphs, Undines), Earthmen

(Gnomes, Pygmies), Airmen (Sylphs, Sylvans, Lemurs), Firemen (Salamanders, Penates), have no souls and are therefore often called *Inanimata*. Only by marriage with human beings can they receive souls for themselves and their children (*De nymphis*, *Wks.*, ix. p. 46 ff. *et passim*). As the body has its food in the elements, the spirit in the stars, so the soul has its food in Christ, who speaks to her as the earth to her children; take, eat, this is myself (*Phil. sag.*, *Wks.*, x. p. 24). The means of partaking of this food is faith, which is so much more powerful and effects so much more than imagination, just because the soul is more than the spirit. It is on that account frequently contrasted as the sacramental with the elemental (*De nat. rer.*, fol. 57).

5. As man by his three component parts points to the elemental, the sidereal and the divine ("déal") world, the knowledge of these three worlds is the condition of complete knowledge of man. Accordingly, philosophy, astronomy and theology are given as the foundations on which the true science of medicine rests. But Paracelsus, besides that he was himself a physician, had the further reason for referring to medicine, that in the true physician he saw the ideal of a scientific man, so much so that he says that of all the arts and faculties, that of the physician was the dearest to God (*Paragr.*, *Wks.*, ii. p. 83). Very naturally so, for the man whose task it is to investigate the nature of the highest thing in the world and to further its well-being, may well look down on the rest. Besides the dignity of its object, medicine may also pride itself on something else: in it, namely, are united the two elements which according to Paracelsus belong to true science—speculation, which without experience gives but "vain phantasies," and *experimentum*, which nevertheless without science, as Hippocrates says, is *fallax* and results in nothing but "*experimentler*" (empirics), who deserve no preference to many an old woman and barber; but they combine to make a true *experientia* or a plain, demonstrative, and obvious philosophy (*int. al.*, *Paragr. alt.* and *Labyrinth. med.*, *Wks.*, ii. pp. 106, 113, 115, 216). Without philosophic, astronomical and theological knowledge the physician is not in a position to decide which diseases are of an earthly, which of a sidereal origin, and which are visitations of God. But as the *Theorica causæ* coincides with the *Theorica curæ* (*Labyrinth. medic.*, *Wks.*, ii. p. 224), he runs the risk of attacking elemental

diseases with sidereal remedies, or *vice versa*, or also of making attempts at natural healing where they are out of place (*Param., Wks.*, i. pp. 20-23).

6. To these demands made of the physician, are attached, as helps to their fulfilment, we might say, the representations of the three sciences mentioned. First, as regards *Philosophy*, that "mother of a good physician" (*On the Birth of Man, Wks.*, i. p. 330), by it, astronomy being separated from it, is to be understood, the universal science of nature, which treats of all *creata* which existed before man (*Paragr., Wks.*, ii. p. 12). Paracelsus here goes back to the final basis of all being, which he finds in the "*fiat*" with which God brings to an end His solitary existence, and which may accordingly be called the *prima materia* (*Paramir., Wks.*, i. p. 75), or to the *mysterium magnum*, in which all things were contained, not essentially or qualitatively, but in the mode in which the image to be carved out of it is contained in the wood (*Philos. ad Athen., Wks.*, viii. p. 1, 3). Both names, however, are also attributed to the product of the *fiat*, in which it becomes materialized, the seed of all things. The name *yle* (*Philos., Wks.*, viii. p. 124), seldom used, and the perpetually recurring *yliaster* or *yliastron*, as a name for this first product of the divine creative power, will not surprise any one who thinks on the *hyle* and *hyleachim* of many Schoolmen (*v. supra*, § 200, 9). In these, as in a seed-vessel (*limbus*), all things to come are contained (*De generat. stultor., Wks.*, ix. p. 29). Since He who uttered the *fiat* is the Triune, also the formless primitive substance is subject to the universal world-law of triplicity (*Lib. meteor., Wks.*, viii. p. 184) : it contains three principles which Paracelsus usually calls Salt, Sulphur, and Mercury. That instead of these he also uses (*Labyr. med., Wks.*, ii. p. 205) balsamum, resine, and liquor, and his express declaration as well, prove, that by those terms we are not to understand the corporeal substances salt, sulphur, and quicksilver, but the primary powers (hence "*spirits*" also *materiæ primæ*), which are best reflected in our salt, etc. All corporeal beings contain these principles, as for instance what smokes in the wood is mercury, what burns sulphur, what remains in ashes is salt (*Param., Wks.*, i. p. 73 ff.), and in man, salt appears in the body, sulphur in the soul, mercury in the spirit (*De nat. rer.*, fol. 8). By sublimation, burning and analysis of these three, and by the fact that they combine in different relation-

ships, there arises the manifoldness of things, so that "all things are concealed in everything, one is their concealer, the bodily and visible vessel (*Lib. vexat., Wks., vi. p. 378*). As it is by cutting away the superfluous that the image grows out of the wood, so it is by the way of separation, *Separatio*, that the different beings arise out of the *Yliaster*. And indeed by such a separation there first arise the elements (*Phil. ad Athen., Wks., viii. p. 6*), which four parts of the *Yliaster* are often themselves again called the four (individual) *yliastri* (*Philos., Wks., viii. p. 60*). Paracelsus ceaselessly contests the peripatetic-scholastic theory, according to which the elements are *complexions* of the primitive qualities of heat and cold, etc. Partly because these qualities, as accidents, require a substratum, partly because each element has but one chief quality. Not because they are complexions, but because they are "mothers" of things, are they elements (*Ibid., p. 56*). Moreover, what held good of the three *primæ substantiæ* contained in them, holds good also of the elements: *Elementum aquæ* is not the water which we see, but the invisible mother of our water, who brings forth this visible, less wet, substance we see,—a soul, a spirit (*Philos. ad Athen., Wks. viii. p. 24 ff. ; Lib. meteor., ibid., p. 188*). In the first separation the elements *ignis* and *aër* combine in opposition to the other two, and so there arises there, the heavens, here the "globe" of the earth, like the yolk of the egg swimming in the white. In the former there are formed from the *elementum ignis* the life-giving mother of our (destroying) fire, the firmament and the stars, including the transparent heaven ("Chaos," *Philos., Wks., viii. p. 61, 66 ; Lib. met., ibid., p. 182*). In the latter again the wet separates itself from the dry, and sea and land arise. Within these four there now arise, out of the four elements by means of the *Vulcanus* indwelling in them, which is not a personal spirit, but a *virtus*, which is the power of nature subject to man, individual things, with the rise of which many *errata naturæ* slip in (*Lib. meteor., Wks., viii. p. 204 ; Phil. sag., Wks., x. p. 102*). (Consider here Aristotle's *nature*, working *dæmoniacally*, but failing of its end, *v. § 88, 1*). The products of the elements, which are not of like kind with their parents as are those of composite bodies, but "*divertalla*" (*Philos. ad Athen., Wks., viii. p. 24*), are divided into perceptible, or the above-mentioned elemental spirits and the different beasts, and imperceptible, such as

metals which come from water, plants which come from the earth, lightning which comes from the heavens, rain which comes from the air. The place of Vulcanus in the elements, is taken in each individual thing by the "ruler" or "archeus," *i.e.* its individual natural power, by which things maintain themselves, and especially in the expulsion of disease again establish themselves (*Lib. meteor., Wks., viii. p. 206*). The earth also has its archeus, who among other functions "measures the etnal or mineral fire in the mountains, like the alchemists" (*De nat. rer., Fol. 40.*) Man is distinguished from all other natural beings, by the fact that he does not belong to one element merely, but much rather seeing that he consists of them, all the elements belong to him, and so he does not live in but on the earth (*Ibid., p. 202*). Because he is the extract of all things, their "quintessence," he is therefore dependent on them, his spirit as well as his body dies away without nourishment from without (*Phil. sag., Wks., x. p. 28, 104, 105*); *Explan. of Astron., ibid. p. 405*). So likewise, he and his circumstances can only be known from the study of the elements and nature in general, and this is a fortunate thing for the sick, for otherwise the physician would have to learn their condition by experiment on the sick themselves, which would be the death of many (*Paragr. alter., Wks., ii. p. 117*).

7. The knowledge of water and earth only supplies the letters for a judgment on the earthly body of man. A judgment on his life proper is conditioned by knowledge of the stars, and accordingly *Astronomy*, the "higher part" of philosophy, along with the philosophy of the elements, is indispensable to the physician (*Phil. sag., Wks., x. p. 13*). The heavenly and the earthly world, as they consist of the same primal substances and as one Vulcan works in both, ought not to be separated as they usually are. The same thing which in heaven exists as a star, exists on earth, but as a vegetable, and in the water, but there as a metal (*Philos., Wks., viii. p. 122*). To him who clearly understands this and thereby possesses the "*ars signata*," who does not attribute the same name to different things, but such as express their individual nature, the heavens become a "*herbarium spirituale sidereum*," as he would have a *stella Artemisiæ*, *Melissæ*, etc. (*Labyr. medic., Wks., ii. p. 223*). Our present knowledge extends so far as to say that there must be far more metals than the seven, which are named on account of the number of the planets (*De miner.,*

*Wks.*, viii, p. 351). Naturally, what holds good of water and earth, must have its application to man, their quintessence : there is nothing in the heavens which is not in him. That which is there *Mars*, and in the earth, iron, is in man, gall (*Param.*, *Wks.*, i. p. 41). This point is important for the diagnosis of disease and the choice of a remedy. The two belong together, for where we have the cause of the disease, there we must seek the basis of cure. The aphorism *contraria contrariis* does not mean that cold is to be overcome by heat, but that sickness is to be overcome by health, the harmful effect of a principle by its beneficent effect (*Paragr.*, *Wks.*, ii. p. 58, 39). Here also if diseases were to be designated according to their nature, we would have to give up the old names, and speak of martial and mercurial diseases, for the stars are the *principia morborum* (*Philos.*, *Wks.*, viii. p. 123). Certainly in order to be able to do so, we must not isolate man, but regard him from the standpoint of the astronomer and astrologist, must recognise in the wind-storm the accelerated pulse of nature, in the feverish pulse of a sick man we must recognise an inner storm, in the origin of stone in the bladder the same process which gives rise to thunder, etc. (*Paragr.*, *Wks.*, ii. p. 29 ; *Paramir.*, *Wks.*, i. p. 186 ff.). As, on the one hand, this knowledge will place the physician in a position, not to treat sidereal illnesses, like *e.g.* the plague, in which just because it is such, imagination plays so important a part (*De occult. phil.*, *Wks.*, ix. p. 348), as if they were the common elemental sort, so on the other hand, it will free him from the proud folly of thinking that it is he who heals the sick. Only nature does so, and his task is to put away what hinders her from doing so, to protect her from hostile foes (*The great Art of Healing Wounds*, Zetzner's ed., p. 2). Another expression for the same assertion is, that it is the physician's duty to give opportunity to the *archeus*, *i.e.* the particular natural force, to exercise its healing influence. As this takes place by means of the remedy which is put into the stomach, the stomach is often designated as the special seat of the *archeus*.

8. Both the higher and the lower part of philosophy point to the basis of all things, hence Paracelsus calls the light of nature the beginning of *Theology* ; he who has a correct judgment in natural things, will not "lightly ponder" Christ and the Holy Scriptures (*De nymph.*, *Wks.*, ix. p. 72). Because he seriously believes that philosophy must rest on theology as



its corner-stone, and further, because he regards Scripture as the sole source of theology, he studied the latter with great zeal. (Morhof claims to have seen exegetical commentaries on Scripture in P.'s own hand.) But since he at the same time always contrasts theology with knowledge, there is no need of going into his theology further here. Reference must be made to one subject only, because it is closely inter-connected with his relation to the scholastic philosophy : his attitude to the Roman Catholic Church. When it is seen that he names Wicklif along with Albert and Lactantius among those who are predestined to doctrine (*Phil. sag.*, x. p. 95), that he entertains the highest admiration for Zwingli, that he derides the opponents of Luther, speaks disrespectfully of the Pope, frequently expresses himself against the mass, worship of saints, and pilgrimages, one may be tempted to count him quite as one of the innovators of his time. And yet it would be incorrect to do so, for against it there is his Mariolatry (*Lib. meteor.*, *Wks.*, viii. p. 213), his assurance that he would have the useless fools away from the Mass, not the saints, etc. His attitude might be compared with that of Erasmus, whom moreover he regarded the most highly of all the scholars of his time ; with more reason perhaps with those of the Mystics treated of above, who, without leaving the Church of Rome, neglected those points of her doctrine which were afterwards attacked by the Reformers.

9. If medicine were mere science and theory, it would rest upon the three sciences just characterized. But, now, Paracelsus lays the greatest weight on the fact, that it is an art and praxis (*Labyrinth. med.*, *Wks.*, ii. p. 208). He must therefore supply her with directions and a technique, as the fourth pillar on which she rests. This is accordingly afforded by Alchemy, by which is properly to be understood every art of bringing about transformations, so that the baker who makes bread out of corn, the wine-presser who makes wine out of grapes, is thereby an alchemist, as is the *archeus* who changes food into flesh and blood (*Paragr.*, *Wks.*, ii. p. 61 *et passim*). With these changes of things according to their character, there is associated the Alchemist in the narrower sense, *i.e.*, the Chemist, who refines, ennobles, and heals things, but just on that account is the opposite of a magician. The purest and most refined in everything is its quintessence or (since this word should only be used where an extract, like the *limus*

*terra*, contains everything from which it was extracted, without involving that anything is withdrawn from the residuum) to speak more exactly : its *arcanum*, its tincture or elixir (*Archidoxis, Wks.*, vi. p. 24 ff.). As in the latter the thing is contained with its force and quality without foreign admixture, it is naturally the chief task of medical alchemy to prepare quintessences, arcana or tinctures. They are drawn from metals, but also from things which have life, from plants, and the more living the thing is, the stronger. If it were possible to draw such an extract from man without his death, that would give the absolute cure. The "mummy" is an approximation to it, but as it is mostly got from the bodies of those who have died of disease, in the most favourable case from those who have been executed, and therefore always from the dead, it is not to be compared with the former (*int. al., De vita longa, Wks.*, vi. p. 181). As examples of such arcana after which we have to strive, Paracelsus cites *prima materia*, *lapis philosophorum*, *Mercurius vitæ*, and *tinctura*, for the attainment of which he gives the methods (*Archidoxis, Wks.*, vi. p. 42 ff.). Here, as in general with Paracelsus, it is hard to tell where self-deception ceases and charlatanry begins. He cannot be acquitted of either : on the contrary, neither here nor in the case of the famous recipe for the production of the homunculus (*De nat. rer., Wks.*, vi. p. 263), is it possible to think of an ironical jest. That in all his alchemistic works he demands that the stars and their constellations should be observed, that the sun's crop and fallow season, *i.e.*, summer and winter, should be distinguished, is a necessary consequence of the interdependence of all things which he asserts. Amid all the assertions which appear so fantastic he is never tired of warning his readers against fantasies, and of demanding that nature herself should be allowed to point out the way. But he not only regards it as such guidance, that an accidental *experimentum* teaches how an herb has once operated, but also when nature promises a certain definite effect by means of the form of a plant taken as a *signature* ; and finally, when from the fact that a beast can feed on, *i.e.* draw to itself, that which is poison to us, we draw the inference that this poison will draw away, *i.e.* to itself, our wounds, we follow not our own conceit but nature. He is entirely in earnest that our knowledge is only the self-revelation of nature, that our knowledge is but listening to her ; and that he heard a great

deal from her is proved by his fortunate cures, and by the fact that many of his fundamental principles have maintained themselves to this day.

10. He blamed many of his personal disciples for having left his school too soon. Praise is received by Joannes Oporinus, who was long his secretary and translated many of his works into Latin, also by Petrus Severinus, a Dane, who contributed much to the ordering of his system and making it accessible to the public, also by Doctors Ursinus and Pancratius, and by Master Raphael. Van Helmont is much indebted to him, but pursues his own line. He as well as the others only appropriated what was of practical value for medicine, and disregarded the philosophic basis.

### § 242.

#### CARDANUS.

1. HIERONYMUS CARDANUS, a prominent citizen of Milan, born outside the city in the year 1500, even in childhood addicted to hallucinations and visions, after a many-sided education diverging from the usual methods, and given him by his father, visited the Universities of Pavia and Padua from his nineteenth year onwards, and finally lectured in the latter on Euclid, but subsequently in dialectics and philosophy. Having taken the degree of Doctor of Medicine in 1525, he lived for six years as a practising physician in Sacco, then in Gallarate, at first struggling for the maintenance of his family, subsequently without that necessity. Finally, in 1534, his cherished project of living and teaching in his native town, was fulfilled. Before, however, he definitely entered upon his office, years passed, which he spent teaching in Pavia. Subsequently he declined many eligible calls, and remained, with the exception of journeys to which the world-famed physician was invited, faithful to his native city till the year 1559. Then he again lived for seven years in Pavia, from which the, in his opinion unjust, execution of his son drove him to Bologna. Here he was himself imprisoned, and after his liberation, which followed shortly, he went, in 1571, to Rome, where he died in 1576. Until the beginning of his thirtieth year he wrote nothing, but thereafter copiously. An exact list of his writings has been left by himself in several essays, *De libris propriis*, written for his autobiography, *De vita propria*, shortly before his death.

Of his philosophical works the best known are : *De subtilitate*, Libb. xxi., finished in 1552, of which he lived to see three editions, and which he revised for a fourth. Further : *De varietate rerum*, Libb. xvii., completed in 1556, which particularises much that was contained in a general form in his first treatise. He himself designates as his most difficult and important work the *Arcana æternitatis*, which, however, to judge by the fact that the editor of his collected works gives it from MS., was not printed in his lifetime. The collection of his works appeared under the title : *Hieronimi Cardani, Mediolanensis philosophi et medici celeberrimi, Opera omnia cura Caroli Sponii in decem tomos digesta*, Lugduni, sumptibus Jo. Ant. Huguetan et M. Ant. Ravaut, 1663. 10 vols., fol. It unhappily swarms with misprints, which distort, and often quite destroy, the sense. The first three and the tenth volumes contain the philosophical works, the fourth the mathematical, the others his medical writings.

2. The agreement which exists between Cardanus and Paracelsus must not lead to the supposition that the former borrows from the latter. Cardanus seems to have no information of what was taught by Paracelsus. The similarity of their results is explained by the age in which both of them lived, by their like profession, and partly also, by the affinity of their characters : their differences again, by the differences of their nationalities and the course of their studies. To Paracelsus observation is always first, and so likewise praxis, to which theory should but attach itself, and therefore he first learns, even though it be through barbers and old women, what is remedial, and only afterwards investigates the question why it cures. Accordingly to him the institutions, as well as the individual men of theory, are a source of vexation ; he speaks contemptuously of Galen, in the same way as he does of universities. Quite otherwise is it with Cardanus ; a passionate university teacher, he desires above all things rational treatment, and goes to school to Avicenna and Galen with ever new admiration. He prides himself, not only like Paracelsus, on his fortunate results, but also on the fact that he is not a raw empiricist ; as the former educated himself to be a physician by journeys, so the latter in libraries. Connected with this is the fact that Paracelsus excels all his contemporaries just in that science subsidiary to medicine, which (and especially at that time) entirely consists of isolated or

self-made observations, chemistry, while Cardanus so distinguished himself as a mathematician, that a grateful world named the well-known formula after him, although in its present form it is not descended from him. If all this makes Cardanus, who has been so often decried as fantastic, appear in contrast to Paracelsus, as a calm rationalist, the same impression is made by their relation to religion. Agreed on the point that philosophic and theologic treatment are to be held asunder, their seriousness in this separation is of very different degrees. Paracelsus, who by his mystical subjectivism puts himself at a great distance from the Roman Church, and often verges very nearly on the Lutheran formula *sola fide*, can never quite abstract from religion, because it appears to him a thing of the heart and disposition, and therefore not only his theology, but his philosophy has a mystical character. With Cardanus it is quite otherwise. He is so much attached to Roman Catholicism, that one of his grounds for declining the brilliant call to Denmark is the ruling cultus of the country. Without subjection to authority, no religion or Church is to him conceivable. Far rather have none, he says, than one which is not revered (*Polit., Wks.*, x. pp. 66, 67). As, now, philosophy has to do entirely with knowledge, with theory, it can never be the cause of attacks upon the Church which is a practical institution, and for it he demands the greatest freedom. Only for those who know. The layman, *i.e.*, the private person who, versed in the practical life, can naturally make no claim to this privilege, should be terrified from every violation of ecclesiastical authority by the strictest penalties, and in order that the limits between him and the man of knowledge may never be destroyed, it ought to be forbidden to discuss scientific questions in the vernacular (*De arcan. æt., Wks.*, x. p. 35). The populace should be forbidden to quarrel over religious questions, and should be kept at a distance from all knowledge, *nam ex his tumultus oriuntur* (*Polit., Wks.*, x. p. 66). This scientific aristocratism also forms a contrast to the plebeianism, carried to parade, of Paracelsus.

3. Like Paracelsus, Cardanus holds fast by the principle that all that exists is an interdependent whole, in which everything is united by sympathy and antipathy, *i.e.* attraction of the like and repulsion of the unlike, but without visible cause (*De uno, Wks.*, i. p. 278; *De subtil., Wks.*, iii. pp. 557, 632). This ground of unity, which is more intimate than that of an

individual man, is the soul of the All, dwelling not in any one place, but everywhere, or, nowhere, and it would be folly for Aristotle to deny the existence of such and only admit its analogy, a nature, in the All (*int. al., De nat., Wks., ii. p. 285 ff.*). The vehicle, or phenomenal form, of the *anima mundi* is warmth, which on that account is often called the soul of the All (*De subtil., Wks., iii. p. 388*). It is also identified with light, as light and warmth are the same (*Ibid., p. 418*). Opposed to this active and heavenly principle stands matter, as the passive principle, the *hyle* or the elements, whose fundamental quality is moisture (*Ibid., pp. 359, 375*). The peripatetic deduction Cardanus rejects, partly on the ground that qualities require a substratum, partly on the ground that coldness and dryness are mere privations, negations (*int. al., Ibid., p. 374*). By the conjunction of the active (*anima, calor, forma, etc.*) and the passive (*hyle, humidum, materia, etc.*), things originate. He who says instead, that everything originates because such is God's pleasure, dishonours God by making Him act without reason, and concern Himself about the least things (*Ibid., pp. 388, 404; De rer. var., Wks., ii. p. 33*). Within the humid there are now distinguished the three elements, earth, water, and air; the fact that fire requires feeding, alone proves that it cannot be an element. As contrasted with warmth, the elements naturally are infinitely cold; on the other hand, as the soul is the instrument of all mingling, the *mista* are more or less warm or inspired with soul. Nothing is absolutely without life (*De subtil., Wks., iii. pp. 374, 375, 439*). This already holds good of the most imperfect mixtures, the minerals (*Metallica*) and metals (*Ibid., Lib. v. and vi.*), still more of the plants (*Lib. vii.*) which already exhibit love and hate, still more of the less perfect animals arising from putrefaction, and of the more perfect originating in generation (*Lib. ix. and x.*), most of all of man (*Lib. xi. to xviii.*). The latter may just as little be reckoned among the beasts, as a beast among the plants. But there is added to that, secondly, that the soul of man is distinguished by its understanding (*ingenium*), which so far excels the beasts that he is able to outwit them all, and on that account he can be designated as the *animal fallax* (*int. al., Polit., Wks., x. p. 57*). Only in its lowest class, the *genus belluinum*, does the human race consist of such *qui decipiuntur*; in the higher, the *genus humanum*, it consists of such as can betray but cannot be betrayed. In the mean betwixt the two

stand those who *decipiunt et decipiuntur* (*De subtil.*, *Wks.*, iii. pp. 550–553). Neither in body nor soul for that matter is there anything lacking to man which plants or beasts possess; the courage of the lion, the swiftness of the hare are his also, in short he is not *a* beast, but all beasts. But finally, he is still more, inasmuch as to body and soul the immortal *mens* is added as a third principle, which is united with the living body (*beseelten Leibe*) by its vehicle, the spiritus (*De rer. variet.*, *Wks.*, iii. p. 156). It is only by means of the latter that the *mens* is able to rule the body, as the corporeal can only be set in motion by the corporeal (*Ibid.*, p. 330). Of such *mentes* God has created a certain and eternally fixed number, and hence Cardanus combines his doctrine of immortality with one of metempsychosis, which on the one hand suits very well with the periodic recurrence of all things, but on the other hand with the justice of God, inasmuch as now no one is a mere successor and heir of predecessors, but each is also the converse (*int. al.*, *Paralip.*, *Lib.* ii., *Wks.*, x. p. 445). These three principles being united in man, and indeed so closely, that he frequently regards himself as only one of them, and ascribes to the whole what only belongs to a part, man by his body and soul is like to heaven and the elements, but by his *mens* he is like to God, rules over the beast in himself, to which he is only subject when he allows himself to be won over by its entreaties (*De subtil.*, *Wks.*, iii. p. 557; *Lib. Paralip.*, 13; *Wks.*, x. p. 541). As the function of the *mens* is knowledge, which makes man immortal, there stands above the above-mentioned classes of men the *genus divinum*, which consists of such as *nec decipiunt nec decipiuntur* (*De subt.*, *Wks.*, iii. pp. 539, 550). The latter, the divinely inflamed, who are refreshed by faith exactly as the tired spirits of the body are refreshed by sleep, are however very rare (*De rer. var.*, *Wks.*, iii. p. 159 ff.). Their knowledge, *sapientia*, is essentially different from that of the rest of mankind, *peritia*. It was on account of the latter, which has for its organ, *ratio*, which is never quite free from matter, that the famous Schoolmen Vincent of Beauvais, Scotus, Occam and others were praised, although they nevertheless were very far from true wisdom. It is indeed more ridiculous when, as by Raymond Lully, the pretence is made to teach all sciences without knowing them (*Paralip.*, *Wks.*, x. pp. 542, 562, 588). Agrippa of Nettesheim is censured as severely as Lully (*De subt.*, *Wks.*, iii. p. 629). Besides ab-

sorption in God, Cardanus attributes true wisdom to mathematical knowledge, especially that which refers to the nature of numbers; and the amalgamation of theology with the doctrine of numbers was certainly one of the grounds on which he set Nicolas of Cusa so far above all his contemporaries, and indeed above all men, although he admits that his squaring of the circle was an error refuted by Regiomontanus (*Exæret. math., Wks., iv. pp. 406-462; De subt., Wks., iii. p. 602*). Next to him he especially praises Jo. Suisset (Mathematician). The recurrence of certain numbers in the movements of the stars, is made a proof that God Himself has subjected His works to the law of numbers. With all his contemporaries, Cardanus supposes the existence of other spiritual beings besides man. The air is assigned to the demons as their dwelling-place, and to the pure intelligences (*primæ substantiæ*), the immortal stars of which they are the souls (*De subt., pp. 655, 661*). But here also he shows his clear understanding, inasmuch as he will have nothing to say of an activity of the demons which is not bound to the laws of nature (*De rer. var., Wks., iii. p. 332*), and takes the freedom of the will also against the power of the stars under his protection.

4. Although man is not, like the beasts, a mere member of a series, but a complete unity in himself, yet he does not satisfy himself, but like the beasts which live in herds, he is, by his helplessness in particular, obliged to live in society, in which he attains the happiest existence, though also the most miserable, when society is badly constituted (*Polit., Wks., x. p. 50*). Cardanus treats of this society, the State, in his *Politics*, which unfortunately remains fragmentary. He speaks with contempt of Plato's works, somewhat carelessly of Aristotle's, and regrets that, in order to learn the art of ruling, that sister of the highest wisdom (*De arcan. æt., Wks., x. p. 120*), instead of studying these two philosophers, men have not more accurately studied the two Republics which afford us patterns: ancient Rome and modern Venice, which is only hindered by avarice from ruling half the world (*Ibid., p. 29; Polit., p. 52*). As a chief fault in all investigations, Cardanus complains that the difference between peoples, as well as in one and the same people the difference between its ages at different times, and the difference between healthy and unhealthy ages, remains unnoticed (*Polit., p. 53*). Man, furnished with all the tendencies of the beast, but at the same time with



cunning (*fallacia*) and understanding (*ingenium*), can only live in very small communities without laws; in larger societies they are indispensable. (The investigation which he announces on the question when and where the first laws originated, is wanting in the fragment of the politics.) Laws are obligatory only when they agree with religion and philosophy, both of which are wanting in the Lombard and Salic laws. Tyrannical laws may be broken, tyrants murdered, just as sicknesses, although they may be permitted or ordained by God, are driven out. In spite of all the disadvantages which marriage brings along with it, both where divorce is possible, and where it is not, marriage is necessary for the State. Therefore every man must marry on pain of penalty, and the sacredness of marriage must be guarded by the strictest laws. Still more important for the State is religion, the importance of which Machiavelli, whom in general Cardanus frequently censures, is shown to have entirely ignored (*v. int. al., De arcan. æt., Wks., x. p. 29*). The army, religion, and science are designated as the most important branches of the State; at the same time however, religion is only treated as supporting the State. As the State is only strong as unity, spiritual and worldly power may not be separated; the State must watch, that the dogmas of God and individual responsibility, which make citizens faithful and soldiers brave, remain unshaken, and that ecclesiastical proceedings are solemnly and earnestly carried out. Draconic stringency is a mark of excellency in the State, the elementary basis of which Cardanus projects in his Fragment and elsewhere. The question whether traitors should be condemned to vivisection when required by science, is not unconditionally negatived by him. He always remained faithful to his motto: *Veritas omnibus anteponenda neque impium duxerim propter illam adversari legibus*, especially where the question is one of the science, which, along with mathematics and the art of ruling, and often above these he regards as the highest, the science of medicine (*De subt., Wks., iii. p. 633*).

### § 243.

#### TELESIUS.

I. BERNHARDINUS TELESIUS, born in 1508 at Consenza in the Neapolitan territory, instructed at first by his uncle, after-

wards educated at Rome, and from 1528 at Padua, in philosophy and mathematics, betook himself, after he had become Doctor in 1538, to Rome, where he threw himself entirely into the study of natural science, which made him more and more an opponent of Aristotle. Domestic affairs interrupted the latter occupation, to which years afterwards he returned with redoubled zeal, and the fruits of which he laid before the world in 1565 in his treatise *De natura rerum juxta propria principia*, first in two, afterwards, shortly before his death, in nine books, of which the first four composed the earlier work, the other five being subsequently added. Soon after the first appearance of this treatise he was called to Naples, where partly as a teacher, partly as founder and head of a learned society (the Consentine society) he remained active up to his eightieth year. In 1588 he died at his native place. Besides the works above-mentioned, the second and unaltered edition of which appeared at Naples in 1570, 4to, and that which appeared in nine books at Naples, 1586, apud Horatium Salvianum, Fol., there was published after his death by his friend, Ant. Persius, *Varii de naturalibus rebus libelli*, Venet. ap. Fel. Valgresium, 1590, Fol., which contains his treatise against Galen on the soul, on account of which his works were subsequently placed on the *Index Expurgatorius*. It contains besides, treatises on comets, atmospheric phenomena, rainbows, the sea, breath, colours and sleep.

2. Although Telesius never mentions Cardanus, and it cannot therefore be proved by his own statement, that he was inspired by the latter, his doctrine may however be designated as an advance on that of Cardanus. Like the latter, he also declares that he will only trust himself to observations, only follow nature which always remains consistent with herself (*De rer. nat., Lib. i., proœm.*), in order to recount how she works, and then to demonstrate how all phenomena can be most simply explained. It is only in the last edition of his works that he adds, that he retracts everything contradictory of Catholic doctrine, because in face of it both *sensus et ratio* must retire. By means of this declaration, which was doubtlessly meant in all good faith, he settled accounts with theology, although beyond this he hardly mentions theological views. Accordingly, if philosophy appears with him as pure secular learning, no longer religious and mystical as it is with Paracelsus, he also distinguishes him-

self from Cardanus in making much less use of books than of his own observations, or if he does use the former he works from them with much more discretion. Hence we have not to do with anything like so many fantasies as in the former case; instead of mysterious sympathies and antipathies, we have here a few natural forces bound by unalterable laws. Telesius regards such a method of treatment as more honourable to God, than like the Peripatetics, as it were competing with God, to seek to construct a self-excogitated world instead of that which God had created. If God is almighty, He can give to certain principles created by Himself the power to do the rest without His future interference. It is only these principles which he established, and not the controversy with the Aristotelians which runs through the whole work, to which the historian has to pay regard.

3. The first fact which strikes every one, and which is recognised by Holy Scripture as given along with creation, is the opposition of heaven with its heat-radiating constellations, and the earth surrounded by it, which, as any one may observe, after sunset radiates cold. A further fact is that when moved by the sun the earth brings forth all sorts of beings. When the Peripatetics attempt to explain everything by the double opposition of cold and warm, dry and humid, which they deduce from motion, they first posit that which is to be deduced, secondly they needlessly heap up presuppositions, and thirdly they cannot explain the facts. All these errors are avoided when, as the earliest created (properly sole active) principles of things, the following three are taken: the passive corporeal mass quite without qualities, and the two active principles of cold and warmth working upon it, which, because they seek to maintain themselves, but hate one another, and are incorporeal, may be called spirits (*spiritus*). Warmth is the principle of movement and not its consequence; by it everything is loosened, attenuated and so spread out. For phenomenal form it has light, which universally accompanies warmth and almost indeed coincides with it. Opposed to it is cold, the principle of stiffness and motionlessness, which being one with darkness or the black, goes forth in it to contract and thicken all things. By the wise arrangement that the coldest part of the mass is set in the middle point, the warmest laid round about it, and now since warmth moves, *moves* round about it, this advantage is gained,

that in the war of the two principles neither of the two is ever destroyed, taken as a whole indeed is never lessened. In the all-embracing, the heavens, light and warmth are mostly concentrated in the sun, in a less degree in the other stars. They are all of a fiery nature, and hence extraordinarily attenuated, and serve for the purpose of bringing water, the sweat of the earth, from the earth, by melting, as on the other hand, air is the fire of heaven thickened or cooled. The objection, that warmth often, *e.g.*, in drying, causes thickening, is simply and triumphantly controverted, and it is then shown how manifold must be the forms of the phenomena of warming and cooling, if the structure of bodies be not similar, etc. As warmth and light (white), cold and darkness (blackness) coincide, in the treatment of the middle products reference is always made to the colours, on which Telesius wrote a special tractate.

4. What has so far been explained is all contained in the first edition, therefore in the third of the first four books. With the *fifth* Telesius makes the transition to plants and animals. A whole which is composed of parts of quite different kinds, can only be held together by a spirit, whose instrument therefore the body is. But when the Peripatetics make it (the spirit) an immaterial form, they involve themselves in difficulties, which are avoided, when it is regarded as a very fine substance, the nature of which consists in warmth, which is therefore the principle of movement, and which in men and animals has its seat in the blood and nerves, and especially therefore in the brain, in the ventricle of which the entirety (*universitas*) of this fine spiritus is found, and whither it from time to time entirely withdraws itself. It originates with generation, the theory of which is treated in the *sixth* book, sets to work in the senses of which the *seventh* book treats, in which it is also shown how a multitude of phenomena in the living organism can be explained by contraction and expansion (*e.g.* the blood vessels). (Which is the lender and which the borrower is hard to decide in the almost verbal agreement of the description of the movement of the blood by Telesius and Cæsalpinus. Both verge very closely on Harvey's epoch-making discovery). The other functions of the spirit, connected with observation, are in the *eighth* book always traced back to the latter; even geometry requires experience; there is no pure understanding which is

independent of observation, etc. Thought and judgment as activities of the observing substance are attributes of the beast also. But as the spirit of man is more fiery and fine than that of the beast, so one human spirit is superior in fire and fineness to another—a matter which depends on climate, manner of life, food, etc. This holds good of the theoretical as well as of the practical, since all will is a consequence of thought, as one only wills what one recognises as good. The *ninth* book, which treats of the virtues and vices, sets forth self-preservation, in perpetual controversy with Aristotle, as the highest good and aim of all action, and seeks to show that the chief virtues, (*sapientia, solertia, fortitudo, benignitas*) are only manifestations of the tendency to self-preservation, and are only distinguished from one another in that different sides of the self (its knowledge, its needs, its given resistance, its intercourse with others) are always coming into play.

5. Telesius, just like Paracelsus and Cardanus, sees in man something that goes beyond the most perfect animal. This he becomes, inasmuch as the God-created, immortal soul is added to the living body. The former is really an immaterial form; not of the body alone, however, but of the body and of the spirit, so that both are its instrument. To it belong likeness to God and the knowledge of God. Whether there be anything more is hard to decide, as Telesius but seldom speaks of this "*forma superaddita*," and *imaginatio, memoria, ratiocinatio*, even the virtues, are ascribed to the *spiritus*, and not absolutely denied to the animals. Perhaps it was the life of faith which he regarded as the life of the immortal soul.

### § 244.

#### PATRITIUS.

I. FRANCESCO PATRIZZI, born at Clissa in Dalmatia in 1529, and well instructed in his early years, was as early as his ninth year drawn into circumstances, of which he subsequently complains, that they were only of advantage to others, not to himself, or at least to his scientific education. As early as 1546, when as the companion of Zacharias Macenigo in Venice, and subsequently in Padua, he attended lectures on Aristotle, his course of study proper begins. During this

time, the first book of his *Discussiones Peripateticæ* was already written, at least in part; it contains investigations on the life and writings of Aristotle. He also wrote a *Rhetoric* during this period, which however only appeared subsequently (*Venet.*, 1562, 4). A journey to Spain, to which he sacrificed the books which he had collected with early awakened zeal, interrupted his studies for some time. On his return he completed the first part of his *Disc. Perip.*, but did not publish it till 1571. Tossed hither and thither, he finally received a professorship of the Platonic philosophy in Ferrara, which he occupied from 1576 to 1590. During this period he completed the three remaining books of his *Disc. Perip.*, in which much more than in the first part he expresses the hatred of Aristotle which he had drunk in at Padua, the seat of Averroistic Aristotelianism, and had afterwards nourished by intercourse with the Neo-Platonists and many moderns, e.g. Telesius. The work first appeared at Basel (*ad Pernæum Lecythum*, 1581, Fol.). Soon thereafter he published a Latin translation of the commentary of Jo. Philoponus on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and simultaneously a treatise in Italian on the art of war of the ancients. The *Poetics* also, which appeared in 1586, and in which he controverts T. Tasso, is written in Italian, as also an attempt to revolutionise the method of geometry. Finally his *Nova de universis philosophia* was completed at this time, of which the first edition seems to have appeared at Rome in 1591. The edition used here, the preface of which is dated *Ferrariæ Augusti die V anno MDXCI*, shows on its title-page the name of the firm: *Venet. excud. Robertus Meietus* 1593 (Fol.); on the other hand, on the title-pages of the separate parts we read: *Ferrariæ extypographia Benedicti Mammorelli*. It contains besides, the oracular sayings of Zoroaster in Greek and Latin, and the collected writings of Hermes Trismegistus (the Asclepius in the translation of the [pseudo-] Apuleius), the *Mystica Ægyptiorum*—(i.e. the so-called *Theologia Aristotelis*, v. § 182)—and a treatise on the order of the Platonic Dialogues. As it would seem, a long-cherished wish of Patritius was fulfilled by his call to Rome. Here he wrote his *Paralleli militari*, a work which has been much plagiarized by later writers, but which was not published till after his death, which took place 6th February, 1593.

## 2. The earnest petition made by Patritius to Gregory XIV.

that he should see to it, that instead of Aristotle, that enemy of the faith, who had only been smuggled into the schools four centuries before by the Schoolmen, the Platonists already appreciated by the Church Fathers should be read, might tempt us to rank him along with Marsilio and Pico. The work, however, which, although it had much less influence than his critical writings, was always regarded by himself as his chief work, the *Nova Philosophia*, proves that he was a man who not only tried to follow in imitation of the ancients, but also like them to philosophise independently. Because the object of philosophy is the All, and investigation shows that the All is the reflected splendour of a primitive light, that it is based in an individual and ruled by him, animated, and a system complete in itself, this man of the Greek spirit gives to the four parts, in which these four points are examined, the titles : *Panaugia*, *Panarchia*, *Pampsychia*, *Pancosmia*.

3. In the ten books of the First Part (*Fol.* 1-23), to which he gives the name *Panaugia* (borrowed from Philo), which he himself translates *omnilucentia*, he develops his theory of light. Like Telesius, he also contrasts darkness with it, not as its absence but as *contrarium positivum non privativum*, and therefore to the lessening series of emanations *lux*, *radii*, *lumen*, *splendor*, *nitor*, he opposes as correlatives *corpus opacum*, *tenebræ*, *obscuratio*, *umbra*, *umbratio*. After defining light as a mean between matter and form, as substantial form, he goes on, after treating of the earthly (hylic) light, to the etherial, and defines the heavens, with Telesius, as warm or fiery and therefore shining, and in like manner the sun and the stars as concentrations of this heavenly fire. Their light spreads itself beyond the limits of the world and fills the infinite world surrounding space, the Empyrean, in which no things exist, though spirits do. After this, the heavenly light, he treats of the incorporeal light, and the modes of its manifestations in the souls of plants, beast, and men, and closes with a treatment of the father of all light, both corporeal and incorporeal, so that with constant reminiscences of the Christian, Hellenistic and Neo-Platonic wisdom, the triune original light is made the source of all light. The question whether this father of all light is also the origin and principle of all other things, is the subject of investigation in the twenty-two books of the *Panarchia*, which form the Second Part (*Fol.* 1-48). Here it is shown in the first place, that the highest principle is to

be conceived as All-One (*Unomnia*), that from it there proceeds, secondly, that in which everything is no longer to be thought as *indiscrete*, so that it is related as unity to the first as the One; that, finally, both again become one by love, in which Zoroastrians, Platonists and Christians agree. The highest principle is hence not to be regarded with the Aristotelians, as self-thinking and only self-thinking *mens*, but as something higher, from which only the *mens*, indeed a double principle, the first (*opifex*) and second, proceeds. Instead of *mens prima* he frequently says, coinciding verbally with Proclus : *vita*. To the graded series of the highest, life, spirit, corresponds the series of their functions which are often designated as *sapientia*, *intellectio* and *intellectus*. It is self-evident that they should correspond to the churchly conceptions of Father, Son, and Spirit. (It occasionally happens, however, that the number three is replaced by four, and *unitas*, *essentia*, *vita* and *intellectus* are named as the chief principles.) From the last principle, spirit or the *mens secunda*, there further proceed : the intelligences, in the hierarchy of which the three orders correspond to the three principles, under these the souls, then the natures, then the qualities, the forms, and finally bodies. At the same time the fundamental doctrine of all theories of emanation is constantly emphasised (*v. supra*, § 128, 2), that every act of production leads to a lower not a higher form of existence.

4. The Third Part, the *Pampsychia*, in five books (*Fol.* 49–59), defines the idea of the soul (*animus*, the word *anima* being reserved for the human soul) as the mean between the corporeal or passive, and the active and therefore incorporeal. Without such a mean the latter could not work on one another. The idea of a world-soul is defended, and it is denied that an absolutely unreasonable soul exists. Least of all may animal souls be so regarded. The Fourth Part of his system, the *Pancosmia*, in thirty-two books (*Fol.* 61–153), is treated by Patritius at greatest length and contains the doctrine of individual things. Space, the first element of all things, must be called the condition of all material existence. To it is added light which fills it, and warmth which always accompanies light. Finally, the fourth element is the fluid (*fluor*, *fluidum*), which some have also called the humid, others water. All four together give the one body, the outer region of which spreading out into the infinite is called the fiery heaven, to



which at the centre is added the heavens, followed by the regions of the æther and the air, so that these words merely designate local differences in one continuous substance. The stars, concentrations of light and warmth, are eternal flames, which are nourished as the *fluor*, and themselves shine, although the added light of the sun increases their power of illumination. As the sun is to be separated from the other stars, and is especially not to be reckoned among the planets, neither on the other hand is the moon, that earthly and at least partly dark body. Patritius, by denying the hitherto firmly maintained multiplicity of the heavens, simplifies the structure of the universe, and also the courses of the heavenly bodies, by attributing motion to the earth. The fact that he does not entirely follow Copernicus brings its own punishment, for, in order to remain in accord with phenomena he has to refer much to movements of the planets of an entirely arbitrary kind. The stars impart that of which they consist; hence an influence of the stars on the earth is quite necessary. Perhaps, however, the sun and moon are the mediators, so that the former causes the light and warmth, the latter the fluidity and humidity of the other stars to be added to what the earth itself has. As regards the earth itself, Patritius writes in a controversial manner, which rather reminds us of Cardanus whom he does not mention, than of Telesius whom he frequently praises. Fire is to be entirely excluded, and with the three other remaining elements it is never to be forgotten that they are composed of the four above-mentioned elements proper (*primaria*). Into the nature of particular bodies Patritius goes no further. It is enough for him to have given the integrating chief parts of the world-whole.

### § 245.

Honourably as it was meant when Cardanus, Telesius and Patritius declared their dependence on the Roman Catholic Church and their subjection to its authority, yet it did not secure them from ecclesiastical censures. The Church here saw more clearly than they; persistent polemic against the man who had once been regarded as the support of the received theology could at most be forgiven to one who (*e.g.* like Raymond, § 222) proved that the most essential dogmas could be as well as, or more easily, deduced from the new

principles as from Aristotle, but certainly not to such as hardly mentioned these chief dogmas. Such a position is too undecided ; it is ambiguous, as it must be with laymen, so closely held in bondage by the world that the most important of them (Telesius) would not even allow himself to be induced by the offer of a bishopric, to renounce marriage and family life. On the other hand, the task of bringing clearness and decision into this relationship, is urgently laid on those who belong to the standing army of the self-defending Church. That task is accordingly undertaken by two monks of the same order which in the flourishing period of Scholasticism had held the chief word in philosophy, but in this period, on the other hand, was almost turned dumb. The problem was solved by the two Dominicans, Campanella and Bruno, so near one another in country, character and fortune, but in quite opposite ways. The former is induced by the newly-found principles of Telesius, to defend the dogmas and the government of the Church against all innovators, and therefore of all the world-powers to place that highest which was mostly regarded as the treasure of the Church, but finally so to rouse himself in behalf of the temporal dominion of the papacy, that he shows a decided preference for the monastic order which, since its origin, looked upon it as its task to defend the papacy against its foes. The second, on the contrary, is led by enthusiasm for the new views of nature, first to break the chains of the order; then to extend the war against Aristotle to the Church herself, and further enthusiastically to praise persons and places most hated at Rome, the English Queen and Wittenberg; finally, to feel for the Jesuits nothing but hatred, and to expiate that hatred with his life.

## § 246.

## CAMPANELLA.

I. THOMAS (originally Giovan Domenico) CAMPANELLA, born on September 5th, 1568, at Stylo in Calabria, and entered in the Dominican order as early as his fifteenth year, occupied partly with poetry, partly with mediæval Logic and Physics, was perplexed with Aristotle, the master in both, when the writings of Telesius drew his attention to the contradiction between his doctrine and that which may be read in the divinely written code of nature. He seized enthusiastically on the new

doctrine, celebrated its founder in a poem, defended it against the *pugnaculum* of Antonius Marta, and sought to demonstrate its truth and its agreement with the doctrines of the primitive Church in his treatises *De sensu rerum* and *De investigatione rerum*. During a six years' residence in Rome, Florence, Venice, and Padua, his unusual learning and ready oratorical faculty universally called forth admiration, but also mistrust, mingled with envy. To the latter he owes it, that a metaphysic which he had begun, the beginning of a physiology planned in nineteen books, a compendium of the same, a rhetoric, a treatise *De monarchia*, another *De regimine ecclesiæ*, slipped through his hands and disappeared, and years afterwards were found again in the possession of the Roman Inquisition. Returning in 1598 to Naples, and then to Stylo, occupied with works of natural science, ethics and poetry, he was imprisoned under the pretence of having conspired with the Turks against the Spanish rule. That this particular pretext was used against a man who, when Clement VIII. was already Pope, and Philip II. of Spain still reigned, wrote his treatise *De monarchia hispanica* (the conclusion was, indeed, written after ten years' imprisonment), is a remarkable mockery of the truth. He was a prisoner for some twenty-seven years, in fifty different prisons, was seven times tortured, and treated very severely, even cruelly (for he was even denied books); subsequently he was better treated. In prison he wrote much; at first from lack of books, only Italian poems. The latter were published under the title *Squilla septimontana*, by Tobias Adami, a German who accompanied the Saxon nobleman von Bunau as instructor, and came to know Campanella in prison. The same person published the above-mentioned *Compendium Physiologiæ* under the name of *Prodromus totius philosophiæ Campanellæ* (Padua, 1611; then 1617 Frankf. Tampach). Similarly, he caused to be printed the treatise *De sensu rerum*, further, in 1618, the *Medicinalia*, finally, in 1623, the *Philosophia realis*. Campanella, who, since he had been allowed books, in the quiet of the prison and with the help of his powerful memory had become one of the most learned of men, had written these and very many other books, and according to his method had entrusted them to Adami. Towards others he was just as trustful, to his cost, for two new redactions of the *Metaphysica* which he had formerly begun were purloined from him, and it was only in its fourth form that this *Biblia*

*philosophorum*, as he proudly calls it, appeared at Paris in the year of his death. A theology after his own principles, in twenty-nine books, a book against the atheists, his *Philosophia rationalis*, several mathematical writings, as well as his works on Christian Monarchy, were all written in prison. At last, on the 15th May, 1626, the hour of freedom struck, and he went to Rome. A Defence, and his treatise *De gentilismo in philosophia non retinendo*, which is directed against Aristotle, originated here, but he was immediately threatened with new persecutions, from which he withdrew himself by flight to Paris. Here he made friends with persons of high position, but especially with scholars, amongst others with the learned librarian Naudæus, to whom his *De libris propriis et recta ratione studendi syntagma*, is dedicated (printed at Paris, 1643). Here he began a collected edition of all his writings. It was intended to comprise ten volumes, viz., in the first, the *Philosophia rationalis*; in second, the *Philosophia realis*; in the third, *Philosophia practica*; in the fourth, *Philosophia universalis s. Metaphysica*, in the fifth, *Theologica pro cunctis nationibus*; in the sixth, *Theologica practica*; in the seventh, *Praxis politica*; in the eighth, *Arcana astronomiæ*; in the ninth, *Poëmata*; in the tenth, *Miscellanea opuscula*. With Campanella's death, which took place on 21st May, 1639, the undertaking came to an end. At least Morhof himself throws doubt upon the correctness of a notice cited by him of the ten volumes. (I myself am acquainted with: the *First Part* of the collected edition, so designated on the title page, which contains the *philosophia rationalis*, i.e., the Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Poetics, and Historiography, and appeared at Paris in 1638, *apud To. du Bray*, and also with the *Fourth Part*, likewise designated on the title-page as *Operum meorum pars quarta*, but in folio and published by the Italian Phil. Burally in 1638. It contains the *Metaphysica* or *Philosophia universalis*. According to Rixner, the *second volume* of this collected edition was published by yet another publisher, Dim. Housaie, 1637, Fol., according to which statement the second volume would have appeared a year before the first. The *Philosophia realis*, which it was to have contained, I know only in the quarto edition of Tob. Adami, which was published by Tampach at Frankfort in 1623; the *Medicinalia*, intended for the third volume, only in the quarto edition of 1635,

Lyons, Caffin et Plaiquard ; the *Astrologica*, intended for the same volume, in the Frankfort quarto edition of 1630 ; the treatises *Atheismus triumphatus*, *De non retinendo gent.* and *De prædestinatione*, which the sixth volume was to have contained, in Du Bray's quarto edition, Paris, 1636 ; the *Monarchia hispanica*, intended for the seventh volume, in a 16mo edition, Hardervici, 1640, and in Italian in *Opere di Tommaso Campanella*. Torino, Cugin, Pomba e Comp. 1854, *Voll. 2* ; finally, the *Poesie filosofiche*, which were meant for the ninth volume, in Otelli's edition, Lugano, 1834.)

2. Campanella's judgment of his predecessors is most unfavourable in the case of Cardanus, who is hardly mentioned except to be controverted and reproached with a leaning to fantastic superstition. He attaches much more importance to Paracelsus, but still only as a chemist : his verdict on the Paracelsists, *in operationibus acuti, in judicio fere obtusi* (*Met.* ii., p. 194), he probably extends to their master also. He urgently advises the study of Patritius, and moreover after that of Aristotle has preceded it, for by this contrast truth becomes the better recognised (*De libr. propr.*, p. 46). But it was Telesius above all, whom up to his latest years he praised as the first philosopher. He was bound to do so, for to such an extent has he appropriated the physics of the latter, that he himself can say, that he has only shown that it does not contradict the doctrines of the Fathers (*Monarch. hispan.*, xxvii. p. 265 *et passim*). Yet he is no mere disciple repeating the doctrines of his master, but goes beyond Telesius in two ways : first, by demonstrating the reasons of his pre-suppositions and seeking by that means to give a surer foundation to his physics ; secondly, by thus giving it a completeness which with Telesius was only hinted at. The former takes place with regard to the Metaphysics, the latter with regard to the Politics. The relation of both to physics is expressly treated of by himself, in the work which was intended to treat comprehensively (*per encyclopædiam*) of the principles and fundamentals of all science, his *Metaphysica* or *philosophia universalis* (so, *int. al.*, ii. p. 4). The idea, which since Maximus Confessor (*v.* § 146) had been almost forgotten, that God had recorded His revelation in two books, the world and the Bible, had been frequently repeated, especially by the natural philosophers of this period, since Raymond of Sabunde had recalled it to their minds (§ 222, 3). Campanella, too, makes God,

who alone is truth, speak to us by bringing forth works by the dictation of words, and so makes the world arise as *codex vivus*, and the Holy Scriptures as *codex scriptus*. What the latter contains we appropriate by faith, what the former, by observation (*sensus*), both our own and that of others (p. 1 ff.). By the scientific elaboration of what is attested by faith there arises the divine science, theology, by that of observation there arises human science, which, as man is so small compared with God, may be called Micrology, and stands to the former in the relation of handmaid (V. p. 346). As their sources are different, so also is their confirmation; for theologians the attestation is by prophecies and miracles; reason and philosophy do not serve as means of proof, but at best as witnesses. It is otherwise with philosophy. Its source is in documents founded on observation (*historiæ*), its grounds of demonstration, reason and experience. It is therefore a logical fallacy, when the physicist appeals to sayings of the Bible, or the theologian to physical laws (*Phil. rat.*, ii. p. 425). The theology of Campanella is in essentials that of Thomas Aquinas. In the doctrine of freedom only does he approach the Scotists, to which his anger at Luther and Calvin, whose doctrine of election he is never tired of likening to Mohammedanism, may also have contributed. As regards philosophy, however, it is divided (if we abstract from the instrumental sciences which are not concerned with the object of knowledge, but with its method, such as logic and mathematics, which are therefore only auxiliary sciences) into *Philosophia naturalis* and *Phil. moralis*, or as it might better be called, *legalis*, as the legislature, the direction of the State is its chief subject (*Phil. univ.*, V. p. 347). The two together give what Campanella calls *Scientia* (or *Philosophia*) *realis*, in opposition to *Scientia rationalis* or *instrumentalis*.

3. The gulf between theology and philosophy is greatly lessened by the fact that Campanella supposes a middle science, which, as is involved in the nature of the case, gradually attains the position of being the superior or the foundation of both: this is metaphysics, which in his view is related to all the sciences, as poetics is to poems, and which, itself without pre-suppositions, supplies the foundation for the presuppositions of all other sciences, and by the building up of which he considers himself in a position to say: *omnes scientias restauravi*

(*Epist. dedicat. Phil. univ.*). If we understand by principles grounds of being, then not only the principles form the content of metaphysic, but also the *pro-principia* (original grounds) of all things, since there must here be considered not only that whereby everything is, but that also whereby it has its essence (*essentiatur. Phil. univ.*, i. p. 78, ii. p. 93). In order to reach this, Campanella, like Augustine before (*v.* § 144, 2) and Descartes after him, starts from that which the most extreme scepticism cannot deny, the existence of the individual self. As each man finds himself as a being, yet limited and finite, but as limit and finitude are negations, the pre-conditions or *principia* of my or any other being are *Ens* and *Non-ens* or *Nihil* (i. p. 78). That the *Ens*, which excludes all *Non-ens* and is therefore infinite, exists, is proved by the very fact that I think it: so unimportant a part of the world as I am, cannot however possibly invent anything greater than the world (p. 83). If I now reflect further, not only on the fact that I am, but also on what I am, I find that my essence consists in *posse*, *cognoscere*, and *velle*; all three are limited, *i.e.*, infected, with non-being. Since, therefore, the ground must at least contain what is contained by that which is grounded in it, inasmuch as no one can give more than he has, I must posit in the *Ens* and *Non-ens* in an eminent sense, what is limitedly contained in my *can*, *know*, and *will*. Hence there result as *pro-principia* or *primalitates* of the *Ens*: *potentia*, *sapientia*, *amor*, of the *Non-ens*: *impotentia*, *insipientia*, *disamor* or *odium* (p. 78), which latter only designate limits, hence nothing positive. Campanella could have so much the less scruple in comparing the *Ens* with the divine essence, the three *Primalitates* with the three persons of the Godhead, as since Abelard (*v.* § 161, 4) and Hugo (*v.* § 165, 3), the later theologians had been accustomed, in treating of *relationes* and *appropriata* in God, to group them in this very manner.

4. When this essence, which as infinite has nothing over against it, but comprehends everything (viii. p. 155), everything indeed (vii. p. 130) only in an eminent sense, and is therefore above all things, no longer remains in the position of merely producing into itself, but,—what can only be explained by superfluity of love (viii. p. 173), seeks also to bring forth something beyond itself (and it is a logical contradiction that an infinite should stand over against it) the finite arises, in

which is the being of God, but also under limits, in that it has God or Being in itself not entirely but only partially. It may be said, that what of being there is in such a participation is given it of God, what of non-being is permitted it of God, as a remainder of the non-being out of which God called it into being (vii. p. 138). The nearer such a product stands to God, the less powerful in it is non-being. Therefore the eternal original image of the world, the *mundus archetypus*, stands at the head of existence, comprehends the infinitely many worlds which God could have created (ix. p. 243). The whole thirteenth book is devoted to this original type-world, *i.e.*, to ideas. As in the radiation of light the spheres of light, which are more distant from the middle point, become ever darker and darker, so here in the case of the divine productions, the influence of the *Non-ens* makes itself more and more felt. In the maintenance of things by the power of God or necessity (*necessitas*), by His wisdom or destination (*fatum*), finally by His love or ordinance (*harmonia*), *contingentia*, *casus* and *fortuna* are more and more mingled as the three correlates to the former influences of non-being (vi. *proœm.*), which because they are nothing real, are not willed by the *ens*, but suffered. Why? That question cannot be answered; at the best we can say to what end, *i.e.*, what object God had in such permission (vii. p. 138). Going downward from the *mundus archetypus*, the next participation in it, and therefore a still weaker circle of light, is formed by the world of spirits (*mundus mentalis*, also called *angelicus* and *metaphysicus*) in which the eternal ideas of God, because determined by the *nihilum*, give only *æviternal* intelligences. Amongst these are found first the well-known nine orders of angels. The lowest of the *dominationes* is the world-soul. But secondly, there belong here the immortal human souls, the *mentes*. They are all treated of at length in the twelfth book of the *Phil. univ.* By a further descent Campanella reaches the *mundus sempiternus* or *mathematicus*, by which is to be understood space as the possibility of all bodily form, with which mathematics is concerned. Penetrated by the (spirit) world above it, it participates in it, as again it is participated in by the *mundus temporalis* or *corporalis*. But even this latter world does not appear the lowest to Campanella; he also distinguishes from it that which does not require for its existence space and time



(*tempus*) but has a definite place and also a definite point of time (*tempestas*). *Mundus situialis* is the name which he usually employs for this world; it will best correspond to it perhaps if we say the world of now. The relation of these worlds to one another, and likewise the influence of the three *primalitates* on them, Campanella has endeavoured to represent in graphic schemes, which show that in spite of multifarious polemic against Raymond Lully, he has allowed himself to be influenced by the latter's attempts.

5. If we now consider the lowest world, the world of now, since everything is an image, though an unpurified image, of the original essence, the original triplicity is present in each individual thing. If anything *could* not be, did not feel, *i.e.*, know, its being, finally did not will it, it would not come into existence and would not maintain itself in existence, and therefore would not exist. Therefore there is nothing which is without soul. (To the working out of this thought and the proof that it is not antagonistic to the Christian faith, the treatise *De sensu rerum* is dedicated.) This holds already of space, that imperishable and almost divine (ii. p. 279), all-permeating condition of all things; for the phenomena which are referred to the *horror vacui* shows that it tends to fill itself and therefore feels (vi. p. 41). So also it holds of the two active principles by the working of which on matter all things arise, the warmth concentrated in the sun and visible in the light, and the cold, which radiates from the earth as its seat: they strive to maintain themselves and annihilate their opposites, they therefore love and hate, *i.e.*, they feel (vi. p. 40). Not less is it true of the entirely passive matter, which by its persistence, by its accelerated fall, and the like, proves that it is not a dead thing. It does not follow that space, warmth, matter are animals; plants too are not animals, and who that sees them enlivened after rain will doubt that they live and feel (p. 44)? (At the most they might be called immoveable animals, which have roots for mouths [*Phil. real.*, p. 59]). The fact that everything feels, makes intelligible the sympathy between likes, antipathy between unlikes, which is universally seen, and would otherwise be inexplicable. Quite in the same manner as with Telesius, there arises here also by the seeking to one another of likes and the hate of the opposed, the opposition of the cold earth in the centre and the heavens surrounding it on all sides, in which the accumu-

lation of illuminating warmth gives rise to the sun, the most powerful source of heat, and to the fixed stars and planets, less powerful, partly on account of their distance, partly on account of their nature. It is an important point of difference from Telesius, that Campanella is induced by Galileo's investigations to regard the planets as bodies, like the earth, (*systemata*) that circle round the sun, which to him remains a mere fire. He also seeks in a treatise to exhibit the doctrine of the motion of the earth as not dangerous to the faith. At the same time, it in a way lightens his heart when the Church declares against Galileo; he sees in it a confirmation of his own view, according to which the planets move round the sun as their *centrum amoris*, but the latter, because it would conflict with the fiery nature, does not stand still, but moves round the earth as its *centrum odii*, along with the planets, which have thus two centres. This existence endowed with soul, which attests itself by love and hate, is still more visible in beings which proceed from these principles and are formed by their combination and are so far mixed beings. So in animals, in which a free and warm spirit (*spiritus*) is bound up with a cold and heavy mass of body by the warmth of the blood. Their instinct is nothing but knowledge mixed with non-knowledge (vi. p. 45), their tendency to self-preservation, love for their own being. The same thing holds naturally of man, that *omnium mundorum epilogus* (ix. p. 249), who exhibits a union of the most perfect animal with the spirit (*animus, mens*) which goes immediately forth from God, by which the body and the spirit of life is ruled (*Philos. real.*, pp. 102, 164). The attack on the Aristotelian anthropology, the investigation on corporeality and the seat of the *spiritus*, etc., exhibit an almost verbal coincidence with Telesius, and may be passed over. Peculiar to him is his manner of linking the doctrine of man to the fundamental science, and the manner in which it forms the basis of his practical philosophy. It hence becomes to him to some extent a bridge from metaphysics to ethics and politics. Since *can*, *know* and *will*, make up the essence of man, naturally none of them goes beyond its essence, and as I do not properly feel things, but my own excitation by them, I also desire not food, but my satisfaction, I love, not my married wife, but my being wed, etc. The love therefore of no being goes beyond itself; each loves for its own sake,

seeks after the maintenance and food only of itself (ii. p. 173, vi. p. 77, and other passages). Only one single exception must here be laid down. Love to God is not merely an accident of self-love, but in it man forgets himself, so that we may say, it precedes self-love, and man seeks for self-preservation only as a participation in God (ii. p. 274). Love to God is with man, what in all other beings is the tendency to return to his origin, a tendency which universally shows itself along with the tendency to self-preservation (*int. al.*, ii. p. 217, xv. p. 204).

6. That in his practical philosophy Campanella appears much more independent of Telesius than in his physics, is partly explained by the fact that from the very beginning his attention was much more directed to the world of men than the sub-human world, partly by the fact that the historical documents which to him were the very basis of philosophic knowledge, were, so far as regards the *Physiologica*, much harder to get in prison than those relating to man. Psychological experiences can be attained even in prison, ethnological knowledge must be gained from books even by the unimprisoned. Agreed with Telesius, that the furthering of one's own existence is the highest aim of action, Campanella defines virtue (*virtus*) as the rule for the attainment of that end (*Realis. philos.*, ii. p. 223). But he differs from Telesius not only in his classification of the virtues, but also in introducing the control of impulse as the standard of worth (*Ibid.*, p. 225), by which he rather turns round from the idea of virtue to that of duty. Hand in hand with this difference goes the other, that, more than Telesius, he regards man as born not only for himself, but for a greater whole, the State (*Ibid.*, p. 227). Like man, so also his amplification, the State, is an image of God, and hence he may partly be treated from the point of view which descends to him from the highest being and then looks upon him in comparison with the latter, partly from that which sees how the individual man arrives at that amplification. The former (metaphysical) method of treatment is that of Campanella's youthful treatise, *Civitas solis*, a counterpart, as he himself says, surpassing the original, the Platonic *Republic*, in which a much-travelled Genoese tells his guest of a State, at the head of which, designated by the name *Sun*, one Metaphysicus stands as ruler, who is assisted by three representatives : *Potentia*, *Sapientia* and *Amor*,

under whose supervision marriages are concluded, justice administered, trade conducted, etc. In his remaining works Campanella is concerned with the opposite (empirical) way, from beneath upwards. With Aristotle (*v.* § 89, 2) he makes the household first, and from the household arises the community, from communities the *civitas*. He then, however, goes further: *Civitates* combine in a *Provincia*, provinces in a *Regnum*, kingdoms in an *Imperium*, empires in a *Monarchia*, by which he understands a universal kingdom, which, as is shown by the example of Rome, can exist in the form of a republic, although the monarchical form is more suitable to it. But above it also there stands a higher power, for while the *Monarchia* can only rule a part or a couple of parts of the world, and in these only bodies, the papacy is bound by none of these limits, and is therefore the true universal dominion. Three points are here of special interest. *First*, how far does the power go which Campanella attributes to the State in relation to the individual? With all the abuses, which may have been perpetrated in the interests of tyrants under the formula, that everything must be subordinated to the "*ratio status*," he yet holds it to be true. The good of the State is really the highest political problem (*Real. philos.*, p. 378). This good is dependent on three things: on God, on political sagacity (*prudentia*), by which indeed is meant something quite different from Machiavelli's *astutia*, and on favourable chance (*occasio*). And again, there are three means by which this good is furthered: persuasion (*lingua*), force (*militia*) and money. In all cases the three must combine; the ass laden with gold must have soldiers behind it, who make use of the time, whilst the hired men count their money. (*Ibid.*, pp. 387, 386; *De mon. hisp.*, xxiv. p. 219). The laws, as the rules according to which the well-being of the State is furthered, are therefore for the whole what the virtues are for the individual; and the art of legislation and ruling therefore demands the highest and indeed an almost divine wisdom (*Realis. philos.*, ii. p. 224, iii. p. 381). It will never be exercised by one who does not know how to rule himself and his house, both of which are only learned by obedience toward God. Without these the ruler, who ought to be a shepherd to his subjects, becomes their chain (*Ibid.*, iii. p. 337). His own obedience to God, still more, regard to the well-being of the State, will suffice to induce the law-giving ruler to oppose

the origin and spread of heresy. Since religion is related to the State, as the higher spirit (*mens*) in man to himself (*Ibid.*, p. 387), there must only be one recognised religion in the State. Should the differing religion contain doctrines which make any State impossible, as Calvinism does, which teaches that no one is responsible for his deeds, it is doubly necessary that it should be suppressed. As the most real means to that end, Campanella recommends that the source of theological subtleties should be stopped up, by turning interest in the schools from the study of Greek and Hebrew, from which the heresies (really grammatical) arose first in Germany and then in France, to mathematics and natural science. Campanella exhibits much greater peculiarities in the *second* point here to be noticed, his commendation, namely, of universal monarchy. That it is desirable, is with him an established principle; hence the sole subject of his investigation is as to how and to whom it is possible. Germany and France, which might formerly have been able to found it, are no longer able to do so, but Spain might. It was indeed to commit a great error, to allow Luther free power, and to lose the German Imperial Crown; but with due diplomacy, by taking advantage of the disintegration of Germany caused by Luther, which if it were united would be more powerful than the Grand Turk, it would be possible to regain what was lost. The marriage of rulers and distinguished persons with foreign wives, by which the differences between nations are more and more wiped out; weakening of the vassals by exciting them to jealousy among themselves, and by rendering the most distinguished among them harmless by appointing them to high posts in foreign lands; just administration of the laws and taxes, so that confidence may spread, that the poor and lower classes will be favoured; care for schools, and above all friendship with the Church,—such are the counsels given by Campanella in his treatise *De mon. his.*, not only in general terms, but with constant reference to the condition of the world with which Campanella shows very intimate acquaintance. He says several times, that in order to obtain more exact information, especially on the point of the method of winning over the Protestants of Germany, he would require a personal conversation with King Philip II. After his release, important politicians of the most different nationalities, willingly held political conversations

with him. If, on the one hand, in these doctrines many points of contact with Dante (*v.* § 208, 8) can be pointed out, on the other hand Campanella comes into decided and conscious conflict with him on the *third* point to be mentioned, in his view of the papacy. The temporal power of the latter is with him one of the most essential points. All history proves that high-priests without secular power become mere chaplains of secular princes, and that on the other hand, where true religion wields the sword along with the word, it is irresistible. Both the swords of which Christ says that they suffice, are entrusted to the Church. As therefore the dignity of the Pope is not comprehended by those who place councils over him, the flock over the shepherd, just as little is it understood by those who deny him the power to chastise rebellious princes. Here, too, history proves that apparently victorious councils and princes finally became subject to the Pope. The princes gathered round the Pope as a senate—that is Campanella's ideal. It is therefore intelligible, that against no politician does he show such rage as against Machiavelli (*v. infra*, § 253). The so vigorously worked out (pagan) deification of the principle of nationality of the Florentine stands in too glaring contrast to the (catholic) universalism of the Calabrian, who ever insists upon the mingling of races, and the hatred towards the papacy of the former is too strikingly opposed to the enthusiasm for it of the latter, for us to wonder that the latter concerned himself for years with the plan of writing a special work against the former. He did not do so, but in his political writings he not only actually declaims against Machiavelli's aim as diabolical, but also against the means which he advised as infernal. Although in doing so he perpetually insists that men should not be without conscience in the choice of policy, the reader, however, like himself, will scarcely forget, that he often gives counsels himself which only too well remind us of the practices with which (rightly or unrightly does not here matter) the order of Jesus, which he so highly regards, is frequently reproached.

## § 247.

## BRUNO.

Steffens: *Nachgelassene Schriften*. Berlin, 1846. p. 43-76. Chr. Bartholmæss: *Jordano Bruno*, Tom. i. et ii. Paris, 1846-47. F. J. Clemens: *Giordano Bruno und Nicolaus von Cusa, eine philosophische Abhandlung*. Bonn, 1847. v. § 224. Berti: *Vita di Giordano Bruno da Nola*. 1868.

I. GIORDANO BRUNO, according to his recently published Evidence given on his examination at Venice, which however does not appear to be quite exact in regard to chronology, was born in 1548 at Nola near Naples, of a good family; he entered very young into the Dominican order, on which occasion he exchanged his name of Philip for that of Brother Giordano. His enthusiasm for nature, which in its glowing sensuousness announced itself to him as his mistress, necessarily brought him into conflict with a calling, which in the name of grace demanded a perpetual war against nature. How soon he became conscious of internal discord, whether it was preceded during a considerable period by enthusiastic piety, and whether his youthful treatise dedicated to Pope Pius V., *Dell' Arca Noë*, had its spirit as well as title in common with the treatise of Hugo (§ 165, 4), cannot be decided. Occupation with poetry, partly frivolous, and the enthusiasm with which he was filled by the discoveries of Copernicus, as well as the doctrines of Telesius and kindred spirits, were unsuited to reconcile him to the cowl of his order. His growing antipathy, moreover, fills him with ever greater hatred against what passed for science in his order, scholastic Aristotelianism; and the writings of men of such ecclesiastical sympathies as Raymond Lully (§ 206) and Nicolas of Cusa (§ 224) are zealously studied by him only for the sake of creating new weapons against Aristotle and ecclesiastical theology. During such inner struggles and also outer conflicts with his superiors, in consequence of which he was twice put to the question, one or other of the passionate treatises which he subsequently printed was in all probability written or at least projected. Finally, after keeping himself hidden in various places in Italy, he withdrew by flight from the oppression which had become unbearable, exchanged the gown of his order for cap and sword, and began a life, which thereby became so unquiet and restless, that he nowhere found hearers, at least for

a long time, who were susceptible to his teaching, and nowhere printers ready to make his doctrines accessible to after generations. There was the greatest lack of both at Geneva whither he at first betook himself, but from which the religious strictures verging on rigour, which Beza's all-determining influence there maintained, soon drove him away. Then he seems to have stayed some time in Lyons and Toulouse, to have acted at the latter as teacher of astronomy, indeed, according to his Evidence on examination, as Professor of Philosophy. Thence he went to Paris, where he would have obtained a full professorship, had he been willing to bind himself to attend mass. His lectures treated only of the Art of Lully. Things printed in Paris also, with the exception of the *Candelajo*, an Italian comedy deriding avarice, superstition, and pedantry, relate only to the *ars magna*. They are : *Cantus Circeus*, *Compendiosa architectura artis Lullii*, and *De umbris idearum*. He soon saw that he could not publicly lecture here on the real inner principles of his doctrines. Nor did he find a printer for them, at least none who would venture such matters in France. He indeed owes it to the favour of King Henry III. and other exalted patrons, that when he went to England, he was received into the house of the French ambassador Michel de Castelnau, Seigneur de Mauvissier. Along with the latter, Sir Philip Sidney was his patron. Queen Elizabeth herself seems to have wished him well. When, therefore, his lectures at Oxford on immortality, and the Copernican system, were shortly prohibited, he preferred to live in London in the circle of his personal friends. At the same time, this afforded him an opportunity, through the learned printer Vautrollier, who had crossed over from France along with him, of at last laying before the world the real *arcana* of his doctrine. This he did in the Italian treatises : *La cena della cenere*, *Della causa principio ed uno*, *Del infinito universo e mondi*, *Spaccio della bestia trionfante*, *Cabala del cavallo Pegaso*, *Degli eroici furori*. The *Explicatio triginta sigillorum*, with the appendix *Sigillus sigillorum*, was published simultaneously in London, but, again, rather relates to the method of his teaching than to his doctrine itself. It must be regarded as characteristic that the treatises which most breathe hatred of the ecclesiastical philosophy, are composed in the vulgar tongue. Whether it was that his patrons now left England, or there were other causes, at all events Bruno again appears



at Paris in 1586, but only as a passing traveller, who presides over a three days' disputation, in which a young Frenchman Hennequin, defends Bruno's *Articuli de natura et mundo*, which were set up against the Aristotelian Physics. At the same time, the *Figuratio Aristotelici auditus physici* was also printed. He now tries Germany. Repulsed at Marburg, he betakes himself to Wittenberg. In spite of the tolerance which he found here, and which he recognises with praise, he gave to the light in lectures and treatises during the two years which he passed in this place, only exoteric matters, relating to rhetoric and the Art of Lully. The *Acrotismus*, which contains his Paris theses and their defence, and the *De lampade combinationa Lulliana*, *De progressu et lampade logicorum*, and *Oratio valedictoria*, were printed in Wittenberg previous to 1588, while the *Artificium perorandi*, which was not published till 1612, was dictated in 1587. Perhaps he thought to move more freely in Prague, whither he betook himself in 1588. He was deceived: only *De specierum scutinio* and *Articuli centum sex adversus Mathematicos hujus temporis* could there be printed. Better prospects opened up for him when Duke Julius of Brunswick invited him to Helmstädt. But he had scarcely arrived, when, on the death of his patron, he had to give an *Oratio consolatoria*, came also into conflict with the preacher Boëthius, who publicly excommunicated him, and although he nevertheless remained a year at Helmstädt, all this made his stay painful. In the year 1591 he is found in Frankfort, where besides *De imaginum signorum et idearum compositione*, the three Latin didactic poems: *De triplici minimo et mensura*, *De monade numero et figura*, *De immenso et innumerabilibus* s. *De universo et mundis*, along with remarks, were printed, which with the two pieces in Italian: *Della causa* and *Del' infinito*, are the most important for the knowledge of his teaching. During the printing of these, as we are informed by his publisher, Sir Philip Sidney's friend Wechel, the printer in Frankfort, Bruno left Frankfort and Germany, and seems in his flight to have touched at Zürich, and there to have dictated the *Summa terminorum metaphysicorum*, which first appeared at Zürich in 1595, subsequently in an enlarged form at Marburg in 1612. Mocenigo, who by invitation had induced him to make his journey to Italy, became, through morbid self-love, as it appears, informer against him with the Inquisition. Even although the Venetians would

not deliver him up to Rome on the first demand of the Grand Inquisitor, they kept him imprisoned, and soon yielded to the repeated threat. Brought to Rome in 1593, he withstood for nearly seven years the offer of retractation, and suffered death by fire on the 17th February, 1600, as a "heretic and heresiarch," uttering the lofty words: "Your judgment makes yourselves to tremble more than me." Bruno's writings, being printed in few numbers, had become very scarce, when those that were in Italian were published by Ad. Wagner: *Opere di Giordano Bruno*, vol. i. et ii., Lips. 1830. The edition: *Jordani Bruni Nolani scripta quæ Latine confecit omnia* ed. A. F. Gfrörer, Stutt., Lond. et Paris, 1834, was intended to supplement this; but the publication unfortunately came to a stand-still, so that in it not only the two academic orations, but also the three most important writings, the didactic poems published at Frankfort, are wanting. Moreover there is no attempt to follow the chronological order. Besides these works, there are several quoted by Bruno himself. Among others, a certain *Liber triginta statuarum*, of which some years ago Tross, the bookselling firm in Paris, announced that they possessed a MS., written in Padua in 1591. The same firm also announced several autograph treatises of Bruno which have hitherto remained unprinted.

2. If any one cared to gather together, as foreign matter, all the sentences which Bruno has borrowed from earlier authors, the result would be a rich store. He himself often speaks of these borrowings, as if he were a pure eclectic (cf. *int. al.*, *Della causa*, p. 258; *De umbre*, *id.*, p. 299). But he shows himself different from the syncretists, inasmuch as he distinguishes and weighs most exactly the worth of his authorities. Among the ancients he especially exalts Pythagoras: he complains of Plato, that in order to make himself original he often corrupted the doctrines of Pythagoras. Aristotle and the Peripatetics are often quoted, but rarely except to confute them. As against them, he indeed calls himself a Platonist. He often takes the Stoics under his protection, still more the Epicureans; scarcely any one so often serves him as an authority as Lucretius, who like himself deified nature. He refers both to orientalising Hellenists and to Hellenising orientals. On Albert and Thomas he expresses himself more coolly—cooler still on Duns. The fact that on one occasion he places the first of these three far

above Aristotle, is, in the first place, no great praise in his mouth ; moreover secondly, it was said when it was a question of praising Germany. He speaks with great recognition of Raymond Lully, but only on account of his method, which he regarded as a really divine invention. But his reverence for Nicolas of Cusa is unmeasured (§ 244) ; he leans so much on him, that he might almost be called his disciple. Even the ideas on account of which he has such a high regard for Copernicus, the infinitude of space and the motion of the earth, he looks upon not as his discoveries but as those of the Cusan. Along with these, Telesius is always mentioned with praise, and not only in controversy with the Peripatetics but in many of his physical statements also, Bruno attaches himself to him. That the first alone is not enough to ennoble, he shows in his rejectory verdicts on P. Ramus (*v. supra*, § 239) and Patritius (*v. § 244*). Paracelsus (*cf. § 241*) he considers a most gifted physician, but as little of a philosopher as Copernicus. He speaks with decided want of respect of the "grammarians," who would substitute philology for philosophy, and who cry out against every one who, because he has new thoughts, uses new words. In this connection he makes plain allusion to Nizolius and other Ciceronians, and reproaches them with lack of independence.

3. Such a demand upon others is a proof that Bruno regards himself as an original thinker, with which also his certainty of better recognition from posterity than from his contemporaries agrees. And in this he is justified in spite of all his borrowings, for all doctrines, be they borrowed from whom they may, receive in his mouth an entirely new and hitherto unheard-of relation to the Romish Church and all Christendom. His original act is that he has broken with both. With the purely formal investigations, which form the content of his Paris writings, this could not become so apparent. Hence even if prudence had not guided him in Paris, as later in Wittenberg, yet the choice of his subject would have made reticence a duty. In his treatment of the Art of Lully, incidental remarks at most could find a place, as when he says that it was mere foolishness when Lully by his great discovery thought himself able to prove : *quæ contra omne ratiocinium, philosophiam, aliam fidem et credulitatem, solis Christicolis sunt revelata*. In the Paris as well as the Wittenberg writings, Bruno proceeds as if he knew only that

form of the Lullian Art which it had latterly received in the *Ars compendiosa*, *Tabula generalis* and its *Brevis practica*, where, that is to say, the former sixteen prædicates of figure A are reduced to nine, and the many rings of the *Figura universalis* to four (*v. sup.*, § 206, 4, 10, 11); but he sets Lully's representations before his readers in such a way that, *e.g.*, he never once explains what Lully means by the letter T, on account of which his ternions acquire the appearance of quaternions. (So in the Paris treatises; those from Wittenberg give this explanation and are therefore more intelligible.) The Paris writings on the whole, rather exalt the mnemonic use of the great Art, the Wittenberg its topical use for speaking and disputing. The two treatises on the Shadows of Ideas and on the Logic-hunt (*i.e.* for truth) take up a somewhat freer position towards Lully, but they also relate rather to the method than the object of knowledge, and must therefore like all the Latin treatises with exception of the Frankfort three, be reckoned among the exoteric writings, which do not develop the peculiar secrets of his teaching, but for that reason also do not betray his position towards the Church. That he did not dare do this where he desired to work in a University, Toulouse, Paris and Oxford had shown him, nor did he subsequently forget it in Wittenberg and Helmstadt. Only among educated men of the world, or when he addressed an advanced posterity, could he give way to the force of his deepest convictions. These works, in which he speaks not the language sanctioned by the Church, but the profane speech which was his mother-tongue, and at the same time that of educated courts, are written for both. His break with the ecclesiastical view is impressed on none of his Italian works so glaringly as on the *Spaccio*: it is as if the author, in a circle of scientifically educated patrons, under the protection of a queen excommunicated by the Pope, felt himself at last free from the oppression, under which he had languished in Italy, Geneva, Toulouse, Paris, and Oxford, and now let forth all his hatred and wrath. The *Bestia trionfante*, indeed, which he here prepared, is not, as many have concluded from the title, the Pope or the papacy; rather in this treatise Bruno explains the fundamental ideas of his moral philosophy, by relating how Jupiter took counsel with the gods as to the new names which were to be given to the stars, in place of the old mythological ones, in order that, inasmuch as for these names purely ethical conceptions (truth, cunning

legality, etc.), were to be taken, and on the other hand, the former monsters in the heavens were to be banished as symbols of vices, men would come to reverence the former instead of the latter, which had hitherto been triumphant. But in the working out of this theme, above all in the utterances of *Momus* (conscience personified), there is expressed such scorn of the Christian dogmas, that it cannot be regarded as accidental, when the same individual who here on the subject of the centaurs scoffs at the union of two natures, and who had previously written against transubstantiation and had refused to attend mass, afterwards at his death turned away unwillingly from the crucifix. To him, who only ranks Jesus with Pythagoras, and to whom the "Galileans" were just the same as the disciples of other wise men, the dogma of the God-man was a stone of stumbling. But if (*v.* § 117) the dogma of the God-man was Christianity *in nuce*, then this determines Bruno's attitude towards Christianity. We may not call him an atheist, we may not call him irreligious: his *Eroici furori* exhibit a religious enthusiasm which verges on God-intoxication, and gives him a right to the name he willingly used, *Philotheus*. But his religiosity has no Christian colouring, his enthusiasm is much rather to be compared with that which meets us in the hymn of Cleanthes (§ 97, 3) than with that of a Bonaventura, and this he himself knows very well. Accordingly, in introducing the names of the gods of mythology, he is much more in earnest than Dante, and further, accordingly, his attacks on the *Cucullati* are always designed against the Romish Church; but it does not follow that the Lutheran or Calvinistic confession was more satisfactory to him: against justification by faith alone he scoffs quite as bitterly. He even attempts, and he is the first to do so, to place himself outside of Christianity altogether and thereby confirms the word of Him who said: "he who is not for Me is against Me." Broken love is hate. He himself knows that his doctrine is pagan, for that reason he calls it ancient and primitive (*Cena*, p. 127).

4. With this renunciation of Christianity, however, the doctrine, of which Bruno always confesses himself to be the disciple, when he not only announces the *coincidentia oppositorum* as his principle, but adopts its chief consequences,—the doctrine, namely, of Nicolas of Cusa, must undergo very essential modifications. With the latter, the doctrine of the God-man had been the centre of his speculations, inasmuch

as in the God-man the infinite was one with the finite, and therefore also the monism or totality which the doctrine of the infinite had exhibited, balanced the pluralism or individualism in the doctrine of the finite; and again, inasmuch as the Church was only the God-man extended to an organism, the churchly character of his doctrine followed of itself. It is not only the latter traits which the now de-christianised doctrine loses in the Nolan, but also monism and pluralism are now separated, and, so far as this happens, approach the two extremes which Nicolas had so happily avoided—Pantheism and Atomism. Bruno nowhere verges so nearly on Pantheism as in the two Italian treatises, which appeared contemporaneously with the *Spaccio*,—the treatise *Della causa*, from which for that very reason F. H. Jacobi could make extracts to show its relationship to Spinoza, and the *Del Infinito*. What the Cusan had said of God, is predicated (or nearly so) in these two writings, of the world-soul, which Nicolas had denied, and thus the universe, endowed with a soul, is almost set in the place of God. In doing this, Bruno is so conscious of his approximation to the Pantheism of the Stoics, that he willingly cites their all-permeating Zeus in confirmation of his doctrine. The universal intelligence, which is determined not as cause (drawing from the outside), but as the principle of all things driving from within, is expressly regarded as the highest faculty of the world-soul. It is quite identical with his power-of-being, *i.e.*, matter, so that matter is not to be regarded with the Peripatetics as a *prope nihil*, but rather with David of Dinant (§ 192) as something divine: as the infinite ether which bears all things in its bosom and sends them forth from itself. This ether or *universum*, endowed with soul, filling infinite space, is, because it comprehends all things, the greatest of all; because it is present in all, it is the smallest of all and unites all other contrasts as it does these; because it is infinitely swift, it rests; because it is everywhere the centre, it is everywhere (or also nowhere) the periphery, etc. In this infinite universum the planets and comets move, by their own inner soul-force and not by a *primus motor* imagined by the Peripatetics, round their suns, and so form an infinite multitude of worlds, between which only those suppose metacosms to exist who dream of cuplike heavens. The universum or All must not be confused with the world, or even with the complex of all things. The world is only a solar system. Things, again, are only

changing transitory modes or circumstances (*circonstanzie*) of the All, which ever give place to new modes, while the universum, as it is already all it can be, always remains the same. Therefore the world-soul, as this one and self-same, is in the plant and the beast not only at the same time but in exactly the same mode; the difference in the souls of plants and beasts, comes only from the limited plant and beast nature, added to the former. While the infinite universum is eternally what it has the power to be, everything in finite, individual existence realizes in itself what it has the power to be, only successively; all things, therefore, the corporeal or extended as well as the intellectual, for in their substance they are not different, gradually pass through the possibilities that belong to them, the beast souls rise to human souls, etc. The individual beings which are perceived by observation, are hence, not as they are mirrored by perception, substances, but accidents, and are recognised as such by reason. Reason, that is to say, is caused by the senses to rise to that which unites in itself all contrasts, and to which the things perceived are accidents. Bruno is quite conscious that this unity does not coincide with the God of the theologians, hence he separates philosophy from theology, limits the former entirely to the consideration of nature, and asserts that the true philosopher and the believing theologian have nothing in common (*Della causa*, p. 275). Nicolas, who would never have conceded this, has to thank him for the reproach, that his priest's robes had too much narrowed him.

5. If the two London treatises had showed how near Bruno succeeded in bringing the doctrine of the Cusan to Stoical nature-panteism, the three Frankfort didactic poems, on the other hand, show how much that is akin to Democritus and Lucretius may be drawn from that doctrine. It happens, however, with far less one-sided logical sequence than in the case of the opposite tendency. Whether in the seven years between the publication of the *Della causa* and of the *De triplici minimo*, the experience that in an exclusively theological university, diversity of belief was quietly tolerated, had modified his asperity against theology; whether he actually from inward necessity adopted the Reformed confession at Helmstädt, as has been inferred by some from an expression in the *Oratio consolatoria* and the fact of his excommunication; or whether his earlier indignation may have given way to quiet indifference which might almost be concluded from the fact that (*De*

*immenso*, *Lib. iii. p. 332*), he only sees stupidity unworthy of an answer, in the attacks upon physics by means of Scripture texts,—it is enough that the fact is not to be denied, that in his later writings, Bruno does not express himself so harshly on the subject of theology, and also that he again more nearly approaches the original teaching of Nicolas of Cusa. The three stages, *Deus*—(*efficiens ille, quocunque appelletur nomine, universalis*, he says, *De immenso*, i. 1, p. 151)—*Natura* and *Ratio* are placed together in the most manifold forms, as *Mens super omnia, omnibus insita, omnia pervadens*, or as *dictans, faciens, contemplan*s, finally as *Monas, Numerus* and *Numerus numerans*, so that the first bears the Ideas in itself, the second exhibits their *vestigia*, the third comprehends their *umbrae*, and that *Totum, Omnia*, and *Singulum* correspond to this series; and it is the task of man to recognise the *omniformis Deus* from the *omniformis imago ejus*, etc. Even now, too, he will not have a separation of God and the universe; God is to be neither *supra* nor *extra omnia*, but *in omnibus præsentissimus* (*Ibid.*, viii. 10, p. 649), just as the *entitas* is in all *entibus*; but that the two are more distinguished than in the Italian writings, and that he can in good faith adopt the distinction of the Cusan between *implicatio* and *explicatio*, seems indubitable. Hand in hand with this retreat from Pantheism there goes the correlative that the tendency opposed to it comes so into the foreground, that, if the roots of Spinozism (*v. § 272*) were rightly seen in the *Della causa*, his treatises *De minimo* and *De monade* may perhaps with even greater correctness be called the sources out of which Leibnitz (*v. § 288*) created his Monadology. The fundamental proposition of Nicolas, that there is no endless progress in the sphere of the divisible, leads Bruno to the assertion, that the last ground is everywhere a *minimum*, which is related to things as unity is to number, as the atom to the body. Even the mathematical conceptions of line, surface, etc., form no exception. It is indeed true of those points, which are the limits of lines, that the line does not consist of them, but they originate in it. But a distinction must be made between *terminus qui nulla est pars* and *minimum quod prima est pars*. When the mathematician speaks of infinity, he in reality only says: as much as great, or: indefinitely great, and it would be better that instead of *infinitum* he should much rather say *indefinitum*. The point, not as *terminus*, but as



*prima pars*, is when it is moved, the line, and the latter, the *prima pars* of the surface, is when it is moved the surface. Therefore the point properly contains all dimensions, since they are its proofs, just as the seed contains the body, because the latter is only the extension of its own *minima pars*, the seed. If, as we must, we conceive of the *minima* as spherical, it may be shown by schematical representation, why in every quadrature the *minima* of the sides must be conceived of as denser, those of the diagonals rarer (Incommensurability), and similarly, that it is incorrect that an indefinite number of lines starting from the periphery touch the centre, etc. As mathematical difficulties can only be explained by mathematical *minima*, so a host of physical difficulties can only be explained by physical *minima*. Such are touch, the attraction of bodies, and the fact that there are no two things exactly alike. In general it must be steadfastly held that without a *minimum caloris*, *luminis*, etc., there can neither be question of increase nor of comparison, as the *minimum* universally serves as unit of measure. In like manner, finally, we must conceive in the third place of metaphysical *minima* (hence *de triplici minimo*). Those who conceive of the soul as an entelechy or harmony, cannot conceive of its immortality; but of course those can who conceive it as a really indivisible unity, which in death can at most withdraw and contract itself into itself, as at birth it passed into expansion. If the name *monas*, which is properly suitable for the *minimum* of number, be applied to all *minima*, then the monads are the germs (in modern terminology, the differentials) of all actuality; and the principle of all principles, the *Monas monadum* is then God, who because all things consist of Him is the *minimum*, because all things are in Him, is the *maximum*.

6. The sentence last quoted, taken like all the others on the *minima* from the treatise *De tripl. min.*, prepares the way for the transition from the explanation of the original unity to the system of relative unities. It forms the subject of the treatise *De monade*, to which there is immediately attached the treatise *De immenso*, which naturally exhibits much agreement with the Italian treatise *Del Infinito*. The development of the one through all the following numbers up to ten, as the number of perfection, to explain which, besides the commentary which accompanies the verses, graphic schemes are designed, has little interest. More interest, on the other hand, attaches to

his manner of expressing himself on development in general. There he especially emphasises, that the framing of the world is throughout not to be conceived as arbitrary, but as a necessary, and just for that reason, free act. Freedom and necessity are one, because both exclude violence. As it is incompatible with the nature of God that He should not frame a universe, so also is it that He should make a finite universe. The infinite All contains an endless multitude of worlds, which, each complete in its kind, in their totality exhibit the highest conceivable perfection. Taken absolutely, nothing is imperfect or evil; only in relation to others does it appear so, and what is an evil to the one is a good to the other. The more man raises himself to the contemplation of the whole, the more does the idea of evil disappear from him. Least of all will he regard death as such. The wise man does not fear death, there can even come occasions when he seeks it, or at least goes to meet it peacefully. (This was written immediately before Bruno entered upon his journey to Italy.)

### § 248.

1. Bruno is one of the many examples, which show that the breaking of the chains of slavery is not by itself enough to confer freedom. All his bitterness against the monk's cowl, all his yearning to belong entirely to the world, does not take from him that monkish nature, which, even in the circle of his friends, makes him a strange phenomenon, and isolates him; and all his hatred against scholasticism, does not prevent him from taking as his guides Lully, in whom the middle period, and the Cusan, in whom the final period of scholasticism culminated. Neither the residence in the cloister, which he at first chose from liking and afterwards could not endure, nor his after life at places where only the dominant confession had adherents, was suited to the attainment of the untrammelled and free position in relation to the Church, towards which the spirit of this period was tending. Quite another spirit is developed, where different confessions appear alongside of one another, and where experience has taught that unbending maintenance of these distinctions leads to hatred and unrest, while to abstract from them, gives zest to the charm of social life, because it widens the circle of vision. When this atmosphere is entered by those who from their birth stand outside the

Roman Catholic Church, and who by birth, education and career have turned away from the spiritual and towards the secular, then we have given the objective and subjective conditions for a way of looking at the world, which, just because every bond with the Church has ceased to exist, permits her to exist in her own sphere, and is angry, not with her, but only with scholasticism, that intermingling of the ecclesiastical and the secular.

2. How entirely the conditions of the formation of that spiritual atmosphere were supplied, exactly in the middle and southern provinces of France, is seen in a closer study of the type of those who help to form it, MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE (b. 1533, d. 1592), as he exhibits his character in the three books of his *Essays*, which were published in 1580 by himself, in enlarged form in 1593, and afterwards frequently, among others, by *Didot* in 1859. The son of an Englishman by birth, so versed in Latin before he knew his mother tongue that his subsequent teacher Muret was ashamed to speak Latin with him, early acquainted with Roman authors, while quite young a highly respected councillor of the Parliament of Bordeaux, where acquaintance connected him with very many, and friendship with one of the most important intellects of his time; finally, while still in full vigour, living as an independent landed nobleman, who always returned home from his journeys with delight, Montaigne moulded himself into a true ideal of highly cultivated practical wisdom. An extraordinarily fine knowledge of men, founded on self-observation, is his pursuit, and he sets down the fruits of this pursuit in his *Essays*, of which he therefore repeats that they were intended to portray nothing but himself; of course including the world, as it mirrored itself in his brain. Thoroughly cultured, but the foe of all pedantry, an honourable Catholic, but tolerant, and seeing only harm in all religious strife, captivated with the Stoical doctrine in Seneca, but disinclined to all extremes, and therefore devoted above all to Plutarch, whom he read in Amyot's translation, an admirer of man's high task, but conscious of his weaknesses, and taking enjoyment with zest from principle, there is developed in him that moderate scepticism, which in all ages is wont to be the peculiar characteristic of refined men of the world. With Montaigne, however, it is based upon the respect which he has for every individuality, and which, when he sees how differently each man judges, compels him

to concede that all, *i.e.*, that none, are right. Essays like the 25th of the First Book, on Education, the 8th in the Second Book, on the Love of Parents, or the 13th of the Third Book, on Experience—show in its most amiable form the *bon sens* of the cultivated cavalier. The longest of the essays, the 12th of the Second Book, the apology of Raymond of Sabunde, whose natural theology Montaigne at the wish of his father had translated, contains pretty completely what is said piecemeal in the rest, on the limits of knowledge and its relation to faith.

3. In spite of the fact that Montaigne often contrasts his "gossip and fantasies" to scientific philosophising, and would certainly have been very much astonished if any one had called him a philosopher by profession, the attempt was nevertheless made to bring his thoughts into systematic form by his friend, the distinguished pulpit orator PIERRE CHARRON (b. 1541, d. 1603). Not exactly to their advantage, for any one who goes from Montaigne's *Essays* to Charron's three books *De la Sagesse* (published first at Bordeaux in 1601, afterwards *i.a.* at Amsterdam, in 1662) will hardly find in the latter one single thought which is not more attractively handled in the former. In the First Book, self-knowledge is first extolled in five treatises (*La vraie science et le vrai étude de l'homme c'est l'homme*, he says), then the way to it is pointed out in the detailed development of the peculiarity of man, his difference from other beings, the differences of nature, calling, rank, etc. The Second Book, which treats of the general rules of wisdom, develops in twelve chapters the presuppositions of wisdom, places its essence in uprightness (*prud'homme, probité*), shows how it expresses itself in true piety, and how its fruit is quietness and indifference. Finally, in the Third Book, it is shown in forty-two chapters, how wisdom may be analysed into the four cardinal virtues. The scholastic dress, in which these thoughts here appear, is probably the reason why learned writers take more notice of this book than of its real source. Charron was vehemently attacked, and he was especially reproached with having contradicted what he had taught in earlier apologetic writings. Incorrectly so, for he is in earnest when he attaches to his depreciation of knowledge, exaltation of faith. His faith is only larger-hearted than that of his opponents. He would neither make the Protestants out to be barren of all truth, nor regard the Catholic doctrine as free from all human ingredients.

4. Finally, FRANCIS SANCHEZ, born in Portugal in 1562, educated like Montaigne at Bordeaux, was as early as his twenty-second year Professor of Medicine in Montpellier, and died as Professor of Medicine and Philosophy at Toulouse, in 1632. With the exception of his sceptical *Chef-d'œuvre* (*Quod nihil scitur*), which, if the ordinary accounts be correct, must have appeared as early as his nineteenth year, his writings were not published till after his death (Tolos. Tect., 1636, 4to). The internal contradiction into which he fell from the fact that he was bound by his office to comment on Aristotle, whom he despised, gives to scepticism in him more sharpness and bitterness than it had in Montaigne and Charon. Since there is real knowledge only of that which one has one's self created, it is properly possessed by God alone. Hence our wisdom is folly with God. Exactly as the ignorant refer everything that happens to God, the philosopher in the end comes to the same conclusion; only that he does not, like the ignorant, pass over the secondary causes, but passes upwards by them as far as they go. Of these secondary causes there are still very many to be sought out, and that is the subject of the true philosophy, whereas philosophy hitherto has only busied itself with words. Although for him, as a physician, the investigation of physical laws must have had more interest than for his predecessors, yet Sanchez showed, like the man of the world and the pastor of souls, interest in the atrocities of men; and their differences brought him, as they brought them, to more cautious judgment of others, and to shame of over self-exaltation. "The more I think, the more doubtful I become," he often says.

Cf. Gerkrath: *Franz Sanchez, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der philosophischen Bewegungen im Anfange der neuen Zeit*. Wien, 1860.

5. Through the influence of men like the three just named, France at this period becomes more and more of a great academy of practical wisdom, which spreads in wider and wider circles the feeling, that there is no use in philosophy—which as it had given to the universities their greatest glory, so now received payment of the debt of gratitude almost from the universities alone—that intercourse with men, but especially the visiting by travel of foreign countries, is the true high school, in which men unlearn the habit of holding universally valid what is valid for themselves, and so emanci-

pate themselves from prejudices ; that, finally, a worldly astuteness closely applied to given conditions, is the greater part, if not the whole, of true wisdom. For that very reason it was not incorrect, but it was inadequate, when these thinkers were called sceptics ; to do so was to forget the positive moment which distinguishes them from mere sceptics. Neither is their know-nothingness a mere negative condition, nor do they strive after the negative immovability, after which the sceptics of antiquity longed. The former is not the case, for when we see with what confidence a Sanchez promises new discoveries and inventions, we recognise that it is really only the knowledge which we possess as yet, that he estimates as of so little worth. The latter is not the case, for the eudæmonism of a Montaigne, his hope that ere long better men than those of to-day will live on earth, stand in conscious opposition to self-isolating ataraxy. To build on the ruins of past science, the bankruptcy of which they loudly proclaim, an edifice of pleasanter and more useful wisdom of life, is the task to which these men invite the world, and inasmuch as they send out their summons to the whole world and find believing hearers everywhere, they, as was formerly said (§ 62) of the Sophists, made a return to the wisdom of the schools impossible, drew a line through the previous development, and levelled the soil in which the germ of a new development might be laid.

6. According to what has been said, it would be a mistake to close the third period of the Middle Ages with Montaigne and those who were akin to him in spirit. For, to occupy a place such as was assigned (§ 144) to Augustine, and (§ 224) to Nicolas of Cusa, there is required more than the supplying of directions for pleasant wisdom of life. For it, there is first required that all this vague hesitation between mere mistrust of past science and mistrust of all science should cease, therefore that without any colouring of scepticism, past science should be broken with ; for it, there is required that it should be shown why the scholasticism which had certainly fallen into disrespect among men of the world deserves the same disrespect even from those who were scholastically educated ; further, it must be shown, why the drift of men's spirits towards nature, which causes a man like Montaigne to envy the time when there were no clothes, has a real justification ; finally, it must appear not only as a happy accident of the study of the natural sciences, that by its

means life becomes pleasanter and happier, but with conscious exclusion of all ideal ends and those which transcend the actual world, whether they be ecclesiastical or whether they be those of self-sufficient knowledge, those ends which determine our daily impulses must be represented as the proper end and aim of science. Therewith, instead of the merely intellectual and cultivated wisdom of life, a scientific secular wisdom will appear, which in this case better deserves the name than in all previous appearances, because it became so secular, that even the last link of relationship to the Church, hate and fear, ceases, and gives place to indifference. At the same time, it may be admitted that without French secular wisdom, this advance was impossible, as it was also admitted that without the work of the Sophists, Socratism and Platonism would not have been possible. That to which Montaigne and his French intellectual kinsmen formed the prelude, was completed by Bacon, a Protestant, and born in England, but nourished on their ideas.

### § 249.

#### BACON.

W. Rawley: *The Life of the Right Honourable Francis Bacon*, 1670. (To be found in almost all the Latin editions.) K. Fischer: *Franz Bacon von Verulam*. Leipz., 1856 (the second edition entirely altered: *Francis Bacon und seine Nachfolger*. Leipz., 1875). J. Spedding: *The Letters and Life of Francis Bacon*. [Complete in 7 vols. Lond., 1861-74.—Ed.]

I. FRANCIS BACON, the youngest son of Nicolas Bacon, Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of England, was born on the 22nd Jan., 1560 (if we follow the contemporary English usage of beginning the year with the 25th March; by our reckoning 1561), and was able to leave Cambridge after a completed curriculum of study, as early as 1575. A residence of two years in Paris, whither he accompanied the English ambassador, which was very important for his development, could not be prolonged, as his father died without securing to him by will the sums which had been laid up for his favourite son. Hence there remained nothing for him but to adopt the career of a practical lawyer, and so in 1580 he is seen beginning the legal curriculum at Gray's Inn, during the course of which he already attracted the attention of Queen Elizabeth. The entire want of means, doubly painful on account of his dis-

tinguished connections, the mass of debts, prospects, during twenty-three years always recurring and always melting away, of becoming a salaried instead of an unsalaried official,—all this might have impressed the habit of striving for money on even a stronger character, how much more on him with his desire for glitter and show. His legal practice was unimportant; so much the greater was his reputation as a member of Parliament (from 1584), and as an author, from the time when inspired by Montaigne he published his literary and moral *Essays* (1597), which (in innumerable editions) gradually increased in number from ten to fifty-eight: in the Latin editions they are entitled *sermones fideles*. The rigour with which Bacon has been censured for acting on the fall of his patron Essex as advocate of the complainant and afterwards laying before the public an account of the process justifying the Queen, appears unjust to any one who considers how Bacon exerted himself to bring the Earl to reason and the Queen to mercy, and at the same time, that in virtue of his office he was bound to perform whatever duty the Queen laid upon him. It was not till the accession of James, with whom he was closely united by mutual respect for scientific knowledge, that Bacon's position changed. By the favour of his king he was endowed with six offices and three titles in succession. When he had become Lord Keeper of the Seal, Lord Chancellor, Baron Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, the catastrophe overtook him. On the accusation of taking bribes, he confessed himself guilty, was deprived of all his offices, even for a few days imprisoned. "Never was a judgment juster," he says subsequently, "and yet England never had before me so honest a Lord Chancellor." All later offers of return to public life he refused, and died in rural retirement, busied only with science, on the 9th April, 1626. In this period of retirement falls the publication, though not indeed the composition, of most of his works. Before his fall, there appeared the *Cogitata et visa*, completed as early as 1607, which appeared in 1620 as the (twelve times re-written) *Novum Organon*, after it the *Advancement of Learning*, composed in 1603, published in 1605, much enlarged in 1623, as *De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum*. After his death there appeared the *Sylva sylvarum s. historia naturalis* (1664, Frankf., Schönwetter). Besides these, Gruter published a collection, which contains the *Cogitata et visa*, *Descriptio globi intellectualis*, *Thema cæli*, *De fluxu et refluxu maris*, *De*



*principiis et originibus s. Parmenidis et Telesii philosophia*, lastly a number of short essays under the general title *Impetus philosophici*. As in general Bacon was sooner recognised abroad than among his own people, the first collected edition of his works appeared in Latin at Frankfort-on-the-Main (1665, Schönwetter, Fol.). It was only later that the admiration amounting almost to deification began, from which there is now a reaction in England, at least with regard to his character. Of the English editions, the London edition of 1740 with the life by Mallet may be mentioned as the chief, that of Spedding (Ellis & Heath, Lond. 7 vols. 8vo, 1857-59) as the most modern, to which Spedding's biography and collection of letters referred to above is attached.

2. Even for the youthful Cambridge student it was already an established conviction that the condition of the entire circle of the sciences was a melancholy one, and that he himself was called to contribute to the bettering of it. How little he lost sight of this "*Instauratio Magna*" during his legal and political labours is proved, amongst other evidence, by the title which he prefixed to a youthful writing: *Temporis partus maximus*. The older he became, the more he perceived that an attempt at restoration must be preceded by a demonstration that present science was really so defective. This demonstration is given in the *Advancement of Learning*, which in its enlarged form as: *De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum* is for that very reason designated as the *First Part* of his great work. In order that there may be no gap in his proof, it is first of all necessary that the whole sphere of knowledge (*globus intellectualis*) should be exhibited in an encyclopædic survey, and then in the second place, that it should be shown in regard to each science, what it still leaves to be desired. Human science (so-called in contrast to divinely revealed theology), is best divided according to the three fundamental faculties of the human soul—memory, fancy, and reason, into history, poetry, and philosophy. *History* is divided into history proper and natural history. In the former, the *historia civilis*, are to be included Church History, the History of Literature, which as yet we have not at all, and lastly the History of Philosophy. The *historia naturalis* again, narrates the working of nature, both where she is free, and where she errs, and lastly, where she is compelled by force. Even with reference to the first our know-

ledge is very defective, but much more so with regard to the second and third, the *Monstra* and *Artefacta*. *Poetry* is divided by Bacon into narrative (*i.e. epic*), dramatic and parabolic (*i.e. didactic*); the last he ranks highest and quotes as examples of it the myths of Pan, Perseus, and Dionysus, which he attempts to explain. (He sets himself a similar task in the treatise dedicated to the University of Cambridge: *De sapientia veterum*, 1609.)

3. With the third book of the treatise *De dign. et augm. sc.*, Bacon passes on to *Philosophy*. It is divided according to subjects into the doctrines of God, of Nature, and of Man; but underlying all three as their common basis is the *philosophia prima*, which must not, like that which has hitherto been so called, be a mixture of theological, physical, and logical propositions, but must develop the properly transcendent conceptions and axioms, *i.e.* those which go beyond all particular spheres, and must demonstrate what is *ens* and what *non-ens*, what is possible, and what impossible, etc., and the reason why many axioms which were regarded as merely mathematical, have quite the same validity in politics. The three parts of philosophy mentioned he compares with optical phenomena: our knowledge of God is compared to the ray which is broken by entering into another medium, our knowledge of nature to the direct ray, our knowledge of ourselves to the reflected ray. Just for that reason *Natural Theology* must be content with controverting the arguments for Atheism. Because in current theology, the desire is rather to prove the truth of dogmas, we ought not in her case so much as in the other sciences to complain of lack, but rather of superfluity. The Pagan idea that the world is not the work, but the image of God, has betrayed us into the error of making inferences from the formation of the world as to the being of God, and to such a mingling of philosophy and faith that the former becomes fantastic and the latter heretical. In opposition to this intermingling, Bacon perpetually demands that to faith should be assigned the things of faith, and to knowledge, on the contrary, what belongs to knowledge, *i.e.*, what is discovered by observation and reason. Reason is not to intermeddle in the former sphere, faith not in the latter. He who finds in the doctrines of faith that which is contradictory of reason, will not on that account be alarmed. A greater contradiction than he finds to exist between the doctrines of Christianity

and reason is hardly conceivable—(so in the fragment *De scientia humana*, but especially in the posthumous *Paradoxa Christiana*)—a contradiction more or less, when once we have resolved to believe, makes no difference. It is the same as when one has agreed to take part in a game, and then naturally must submit to all, even of its most peculiar rules. As, on the one hand, those contradictions of reason do not disturb the scientific man, because they only occur in the sphere of faith, so conversely faith has nothing to fear from science: perhaps science at its first taste, but not science fully equipped can turn away from God. He, however, who surveys the whole of science knows that the sphere of faith is one quite separate from his own, obeying only its own laws, and will therefore never attack faith.—While theology here entirely disappears, the second part of philosophy, the *Philosophy of Nature* (natural philosophy) gains a proportionably great expansion. It is divided in the first place into speculative and operative, of which the first teaches the knowledge, the second the use, of the laws of nature. Each of these divisions is again subdivided into two parts, so that physics as their practical application, corresponds to mechanics, metaphysics on the other hand, to natural magic. By metaphysics, therefore, is to be understood throughout, not as hitherto the *philosophia prima*, but (only) the part of natural philosophy, which, while physics treats of material and moving causes, rather contemplates forms and ends. (Accordingly Bacon's world-famous saying, that Teleology is like a barren virgin, must be limited to Physics, and not extended to his Metaphysics. It may also be remembered that some of the Schoolmen had already made just such a division. *V. sup.*, § 200, 7.) Therewith goes hand in hand a second distinction, namely, that Physics has to do with concrete phenomena, Metaphysics, on the other hand, with the abstract and constant. This contrast suffers a limitation, inasmuch as within the sphere of Physics there must be distinguished a lower part, more closely akin to natural history, and a higher, more akin to Metaphysics; of which the former treats of concrete things or substances; the latter, on the other hand, treats of their natures or properties, *i.e.*, the more abstract part of them, such as the chief states (*schematismi*) of matter, and the chief forms of motion. Even Physics leaves much to be desired in its present form, as *e.g.* Astronomy is a mixture of mere de-

scription (*i.e.* history) and all sorts of mathematical hypotheses which all suit the phenomena equally well, instead of giving physical explanations, *i.e.*, such as follow from the essence of the heavenly bodies, and so becoming as it must a living Astronomy, to which a sound Astrology might be attached. And now as regards Metaphysics indeed! This is a perfect desideratum; for, as concerns the one part of its problem, final causes, that has indeed been an object of consideration, but under physics, by which the latter was corrupted. And again it has been thought that we already have in the efficient causes, which the physicist finds, also the forms which underlie them, and people have satisfied themselves with physical explanations, as if these were able to give metaphysical knowledge. In short, a Metaphysics, without which *e.g.* we can have no theory of Light, must now for the first time be created. Bacon treats Mathematics as an appendix to Physics, because it is only a subsidiary science; and in a manner which shows how much this was to him a closed domain.

4. The fourth book of the treatise *De dign. et augm. sc.* makes the transition to the last part of philosophy—the *Doctrine of Man*. The latter is, according as it treats of man out of or in society, the theory of the man or of the citizen. The former, the *philosophia humana*, contains partly the sciences which concern his body, partly those which concern his soul. But both must be preceded by the doctrine of the nature and the person of the whole man and the league (*fœdus*) between those two, all of which fits neither of the divisions. Medicine, and the doctrines of beauty, strength, and pleasure, (*Cosmetica, Athletica, Voluptuaria*) concern the body. To the latter are also reckoned the fine arts, with the exception of poetry. The theory of the soul must leave the reasonable, or human soul (the *spiraculum*), to the theologians, and limit itself to investigations on the animal soul, and conceive it not logically as *actus*, but physically as a body highly rarified by warmth, *i.e.*, just as it was conceived by Telesius. Its chief properties have been pretty accurately investigated; but one point is still much discussed,—the relation of spontaneous movements to sensation, as well as the distinction of the latter from mere perception, which belongs to the non-sensuous also. The quite immediate perceptions and modes of activity of the soul, *divinatio* and *fascinatio*, must be treated as additions to the activities of the soul. The proof of the

activities of the soul and their objects is investigated in the *Logic* (*Lib.* v. and vi.) and *Ethics* (*Lib.* vii.). The former treats of knowledge and the attitude towards truth, so that it gives instructions for perception, judgment, retention, and impartation, therefore contains all that relates to dialectics, mnemonics, grammar, and rhetoric, and necessarily, indeed, contained much more. Ethics, which treats of the spirit as will or as it proceeds towards the good, *i.e.*, the useful, is divided into the theory of the pattern or the good, and that of the leading or culture of the will (*Georgica animi*, so called because it stands to the high doctrine of the pattern as the Georgics stand to the *Æneid*). Not only the individual good, but also that which benefits the community, is considered by Ethics, because moral culture consists in a man's living not only for himself but for others also, a fact which the ancients ignored in their glorification of the speculative life. Bacon has not given a detailed representation of Ethics. Scattered remarks on its fundamental principles are to be found in his *Essays*. His treatment of self-love and the love of society, of motives and the passions, on the ruling of the latter, etc., exhibit the moderate sense, disinclined to all extremes, of the cultivated man of the world. All controversies occasioned by religion, the bond of peace, are to him an abomination. He calls them : A striking of one table of the law against the other, and because we are Christians to forget that we ought to be men. The second part of the *Doctrine of Man*, and the last of philosophy, is formed by the *Politics* (*philosophia civilis*), which is contained in the eighth book. Of its subjects, the Social, the Commercial, and the Civil Life, —it is not customary to treat of the two former at all, and of the latter only from the standpoint of philosophers who know nothing of the world, or from that of the jurist, both of whom, though for opposite grounds, are incapacitated for the work. The statesman must here speak the decisive word. In the presence of a king such as he whom he addresses, Bacon will content himself with hints, and gives numerous aphorisms, amongst which the most important are, that the State is not only an institution for the security of private rights, but that religion, morality, honourable relations with foreign countries, etc., concern the welfare of the citizens. Practical counsels as to the establishment and application of the laws are added. Since the content of theology as revealed lay quite outside

the sphere of philosophy, the investigations of the ninth book, in which he zealously declares himself against those who like Paracelsus and the Cabbalists learn philosophy from the Bible, or again seek to explain the Bible philosophically, refer only to the form in which the truths of faith are to be brought forward. Here he omits all that in later times has been called Apologetics, Irenics, and Biblical Theology. Finally he collects all his desiderata as a *novus orbis scientiarum*.

5. If this survey of the whole circle of knowledge has shown that its condition is not a brilliant one, the question arises, Why so? To Bacon, slavish dependence on the ancients is a chief reason. In almost verbal agreement with Bruno (*Cena delle Cen.*, p. 132), he says, that reverence for age must bring us to set our own time above all others, for it is older by thousands of years than that of the so-called ancients, and in its longer life is riper in experience and discoveries of all kinds. With Telesius, whom he designates as the greatest of modern philosophers, Bacon frequently refers to the three great discoveries of gunpowder, the magnetic-needle, and the printing press, by which the present has gained so great an advance upon the past. Since not only these and other discoveries, but all their useful applications, were unknown to the ancients, it is intelligible that the selfish view was firmly maintained among them, that philosophy only existed for the sake of the enjoyment of knowledge. Humanity, having become reasonable, does not think in so Epicurean a spirit, but sets up common utility, practical applicability, as the standard of philosophy. The furnishing of life with conveniences of all kinds is its aim (so *int. al.* in *Valerius Terminus*, p. 223, ed. Ellis). Besides, people have never once borrowed from the ancients the doctrines which most merited to be borrowed. Plato, but especially the envious Aristotle, who like the Turkish Emperor, only thought it possible to rule in safety when all pretenders to the throne were slain, favoured by chance, have come down to us almost alone, a proof that on the stream of time also, the light wares are carried on, the heavy sink to the bottom. If, instead of these two, of whom the first neglected physics on account of his preference for theology and politics, the second destroyed it for the sake of his zeal for logic, we had taken for teachers Democritus, Empedocles and other natural philosophers, who all explain

to us active causes, and nothing of a teleological nature, as these two things would have been in a better condition. For, since every practical application of common utility may be finally explained as control over nature, which, since man lost it by his fall, is only possible by the use and therefore by the knowledge of its laws, natural philosophy must be regarded as the chief part of philosophy, and above all things every effort must be directed to its application. But to this the influence of Aristotle did not contribute, inasmuch as by his means it almost became an established axiom, that the syllogism supplied the sole scientific method of procedure. It is true that in the Logic of Aristotle and the Schoolmen, induction is also brought forward along with the syllogism; but apart from the fact that to it is assigned a subordinate place, the induction intended by them is a quite subordinate one, even childish, consisting in the collection of individual instances, which at best may lead to an hypothesis, but never to knowledge. For the Schoolmen, who found out nothing new, and by their thinking at best only expounded the ancients, the syllogistic method, which only subsumes everything under the already known, which makes not discoveries but words, and for which little importance appears to attach to the *regnum hominis*, and much to the *munus professorium*, was quite sufficient. It is otherwise at the present day. Time, whose peculiarity it is daily to make new discoveries, needed a new logic, by means of which these discoveries might cease to be as hitherto the gifts of chance; and therefore the art of discovery occupies the first place.

6. The outlines of this new logic are furnished by the *Cogitata et visa* of the year 1607, in enlarged form by the *Novum Organon*, which therefore as the *Second Part* of his great work is added to the *Globus intellectualis* as the First (*v. supra*, sub. 2, 3, 4). After the exposition which has been given, it cannot occasion surprise, when the understanding of nature (*interpretatio naturæ*) is mentioned as the aim of the work. As in all interpretations, so also in this, the introduction of foreign matter is to be avoided; accordingly anticipations are above all things to be cast aside. To these the doubt—a word which elsewhere he does not use—refers with which, according to Bacon, a beginning must be made, and which for that very reason cannot be compared with that of the sceptics of antiquity. It is neither founded upon a mis-

trust of observation and reason, for Bacon trusts both, nor is it of so wide an application as was theirs; for instead of the Sceptics': Nothing is known, Bacon says: Hitherto very little is known, (cf. § 248, 6), nor does he finally content himself with acatalepsy (*v.* § 101, 1, 2.), but rather seeks a eucatalepsy. He is never tired of blaming those who because they have not known something, immediately by a *malitiosa circumscriptio*, deny reason the capacity of knowledge. Nor may the Baconian doubt be compared with the absolute doubt of Descartes (*v. infra*, § 267, 4), for the former only relates to erroneous opinions formed by anticipation, to what he calls *idola*, but does not at all go so far as to put the existence of the world of sense, or of God, in question. Of these *idola*, he distinguishes at first three kinds, subsequently four: those which dominate all men, because they appear to be fundamental to the race, may on that account be called *idola tribus*; the prejudices, again, which are grounded on the limits of one's own individuality, which Bacon often compares with Plato's cave (*v.* § 77, 8), he therefore calls *idola specus*; in the intercourse of men with one another a third kind of prejudices are developed, the *idola fori* (*palatii*); finally, he adds a fourth kind, the fictions, namely, and false theories which dominate us because they are the fashion, the *idola theatri*. As the second kind is innumerable, Bacon refrains from even mentioning by name the chief prejudices which it includes. It is otherwise with the rest: under the *idola tribus*, the tendencies to presuppose a general uniformity, and to explain things by final causes are censured; under the *idola fori*, it is subject of special censure that men regard words as more than counters which pass instead of things; a prejudice from which arises a host of errors, *e.g.*, all anti-nominalist propositions. The false theories of fashion, the *idola theatri*, have been most destructive of science. They may be traced back to the main forms of sophistical, empirical and superstitious theory, of which the first allowed itself to be enchained by words and universally current representations, the second by imperfect and not duly proved experiences, the third by the intermixture of theological views.

7. The purification of the spirit from the *idola* is only the negative part (the *pars destruens*) of that to which the new Organon is to lead up, and Bacon himself often compares it with the cleansing of the threshing-floor. To it there is



added as a positive complement the demonstration of the method of attaining true and socially useful knowledge. This forms the content of the second book, while the first specially relates to the *idola*. In the right method two steps may be distinguished; first of all the axioms must be derived from experience, then secondly, from the axioms discovered we must pass on to new experiences. Experience is therefore the starting point, *i.e.*, the only true method is induction. Only we must not be content, as is usual, with gathering together those instances (*instantiæ*) which tell in favour of anything, but with the same accuracy we must register the instances which favour the opposite (*instantiæ negativæ, exclusivæ*), and therefore to all cases in which light and warmth appear together, we must oppose those in which they are not united, exactly as in a legal process we hear witnesses for and against the alleged injury. Finally, moreover, all the cases must also be collected, in which, with increase or decrease of light, there is a corresponding increase or decrease of warmth, and similarly where there is not such a correspondence. However accurately these tables of instances may be constructed, it is clear that it is impossible to reach absolute completeness, and thus the question now arises, How in spite of that fact can the method of induction afford a certainty? Only on the principle, that single cases, even if very rare, have the preference before others which occur frequently. The exact opposite of these will be found in the very frequently occurring accidents or "sports" of nature, which are not worth notice. That prerogative, *i.e.* the qualitative preference, of certain instances, is treated very carefully by Bacon, and traced back to twenty-seven chief kinds, which according to his peculiar method are designated by names which, if curious, are yet to his mind the most pregnant. Among them appears the *instantia crucis* (finger-post), so called because, like the finger-post at the cross-ways, it indicates the solution of other problems. An intensification of this prerogative character is shown by the *instantiæ prædominantes* or *ostensivæ* (also called *eluscentiæ*), which reveal a law more clearly than all others. As such a classification is a product only of the reflective understanding, Bacon is justified when he opposes the empiricism which he describes to the ordinary empiricism, as *experientia literata*. But so likewise is it opposed to deduction from mere hypotheses. The true

empiricism, *i.e.*, philosophy, must not like the ant merely gather, nor like the spider merely draw its thread out of itself, but like the bee it must make its gatherings into honey. It must be regarded as a modification of earlier views, that when he adduces amongst the decisive instances those which acquire a special importance by parallelism and analogy with others, propositions are here censured which Bacon had previously referred to *philosophia prima* (*v. supra, sub. 3*), so that the latter seems to disappear. Among the analogies fruitful for natural science, not only the Aristotelian contrast between the upper and lower parts of plants, and those of man, is adduced, but also the analogy between reflecting light and seeing, between echoing and hearing.

8. The most complete possible enumeration of the most important instances now affords the material (therefore frequently called *sylva*). The latter is also named by him *historia*, so that, therefore, exactly as with the Italian natural philosophers, history becomes the basis of science. An *historia naturalis*, as complete as possible, was intended to be added, as a *Third Part* of his great work, to the encyclopædic Survey and the *Novum Organon*. He has only given fragments of it. The *Historia ventorum* and *h. vitæ et mortis* are detailed treatises, the *h. densi et rari*, *h. sympathiæ et antipathiæ rerum*, *h. sulphuris mercurii et salis*, are only tables of contents for similar treatises. He mentions more than forty such *historiæ* which must be written. His *Sylva sylvarum*, so-called because the collections of materials (*historiæ* or *sylvæ*) are here gathered into one collection, shows Bacon as an industrious compiler, who without once mentioning them by name, makes extracts, from the Problems of Aristotle, the Natural History of Pliny, Acosta's *Historia natural y moral de las Indias*, Porta's *Magia naturalis*, Cardanus' Treatises *De subit.* and *De variet.*, Scaliger's *Exercit. adv. Card.*, Sandys' *Travels*, as chief sources, besides other works. In general he works almost entirely from books. Lasson, Liebig and others have cast a cruel light on the poor appearance he makes in his own experiments, and what he relates as seen by himself shows how little he was able to distinguish between imagination and observation. In this collection of materials he intentionally avoids all appearance of systematic order—for the arrangement of a hundred experiences to a century would not be called such—and passes after enumerating a multitude of partly isolated

("solitary") partly combined ("consort") experiences relating to sound, to such as relate to the colours of metallic oxides, then to those relating to the prolongation of life, etc. But these materials only supply the matter, from which the bee was to make the honey; and yet, having learned to regard the *interpretatio* of the whole of nature as something transcending the power of an individual man, Bacon seeks to show only in an individual instance what he conceives this highest task of natural philosophy to be.

9. What Bacon assigns as the problem of the *Fourth Part* of his great work, is properly the work itself, the *interpretatio naturæ*, the necessity of which was established in the First, the method in the Second, and its point of departure in the Third Part. Here it is sought in the first place to fix the aim of this explanation of nature, a problem in such close connection with the problem of method, that its solution is attempted in the *Novum Organon*. This aim is repeatedly represented as the knowledge of the forms which underlie phenomena. Since, however, this has been above (*sub. 3*) designated as the problem of metaphysics, the problem now is: to establish the metaphysics which was there wanting. The path thereto leads through physics, which, linking itself on to Natural History, concerns itself in its higher part with the abstract natures or properties of bodies, such as heat, cold, density, etc. But the ascending induction must not content itself even with them, but must proceed to the seeking out of the forms of these qualities. With the word form, which Bacon borrows from the Schoolmen, he associates quite another meaning than theirs. To him form is the at first hidden, but not entirely incognisable, deeper basis of self-manifesting phenomena and properties. Hence, form for him coincides now with the true difference or essential property, now with the generative nature of things, now with the laws which underlie phenomena, so that the search for forms and that for final axioms become to him synonymous. Bacon very early alluded to the possibility that this final basis of physical properties might most especially consist in the different configurations of the smallest particles (the *schematismi*) of matter and the different motions. If he ever had the hope, that he himself should attain to the reduction of all the natural phenomena treated by physics to these underlying *naturæ naturantes*, he soon exchanged this proud

hope for the much more modest one of exhibiting this reduction in a single example. This example is warmth, which in its deepest basis, is for him nothing else than a shivering movement of the smallest material particles, so that, therefore, motion is the form of warmth. With regard to warmth, this is repeatedly and decidedly expressed. Indications occur in his works that other physical properties are similarly related; they at most, however, justify us in saying that he desired, not that he asserted, that all physical properties might be traced back to what is nowadays called molecular motion. On the other hand, another habit, which is to-day regarded as inseparable from such a tendency, the preference for applying mathematics to physics, is not to be found in Bacon at all. On the contrary, just as Aristotle on account of his teleological views (*vid.* § 88, 1) reproached the Pythagoreans, so Bacon reproaches the mathematicians with destroying physics, because the latter has to do with the qualitative. This disregard for mathematics is one of the reasons why he so little valued the immense discoveries of his age.

10. But even the discovery of the underlying forms is not the end. The latter rather consists in the dominion over nature based on such knowledge. The knowledge of the primitive forms puts us in a position to cause new, secondary qualities to appear. He who should know the basis of all the properties of gold, would be in a position to cause all its properties to appear together, and then he would have gold itself. The final aim of all knowledge is power over nature, and hence it properly aims at the production of *artefacta*. Here also a repertorium of what has been already invented is a condition of knowing what is to be invented. The last problem therefore divides itself into two, and Bacon can give as the *Fifth Part* of his great work a list of things already invented, and as *Sixth*, hints for new inventions. With regard to what he here supplies, he himself admits that it is extremely little. For us the most important point is the consistent practical point of view, which does not make him afraid even where it leads him to treat science like a vulgar handicraft and poetry prosaically. He still believes that he is doing the myths of antiquity great service, when he transforms them into often very frosty allegories of physical and moral theories. Social utility, the advancement of human convenience—this final aim of all human action and motive is

most surely reached by the knowledge of nature, for knowledge is power.

### § 250.

The actual and undeniable facts that when compared with the writings of the Italian natural philosophers those of Bacon breathe more of the modern spirit, and yet that he ignores the discoveries which have proved themselves to be most fruitful for subsequent times, and even their originators (Copernicus, Galileo, Gilbert, Harvey, and others), or at least is less able to appreciate them than the former,—that, further, in spite of his praise of natural science he has exerted on its development no influence worthy of the name —(facts which in recent times have led to such different verdicts on Bacon), can only be harmonised (but then easily harmonised) when we do not attribute to Bacon the position of the initiator of modern philosophy, but see in him the close of the philosophy of the Middle Ages. He has left behind him the standpoint from which natural science subjected itself to dogma and in which she contended against it. Therefore he stands higher and nearer to modern times. But this advance refers only to the relation of the doctrines of natural science to religion and the Church. But the doctrines themselves, even if stripped of their slave's or freedman's cloak, are fundamentally not very different from those which were the outgrowth of the lower standpoint. It is true he says, that previous science is not the true science; but he is unable to put a better in its place, and hence he constantly exhibits this contrast between the justifiable desire to stand in a quite different position from his predecessors, and the inability to expound a natural science which is specifically different from that of Telesius and Campanella. Like the bird which cannot yet fly, which with all its stretching of its wings raises itself at most only a little above the nest, and always falls back into it, so Bacon frets himself to emerge from the mediæval doctrines, amongst which he feels insecure, and again always falls back into them. The great step, by which modern research is distinguished from the ancient and mediæval—that in place of experience, which one undergoes, there is substituted experiment, in which a purpose is kept in view, he only hints at; whenever he tries to fix it in thought, it

disappears from him, or is grasped in a distorted form. The method of experiment, that everything particular in nature is intentionally put away, and only what is a condition of the law is left, he changes into a searching out of negative instances, as if to observe absence were equivalent to causing absence. And again, when in the theory of the prerogative of certain instances over others, he rightly points out that not everything which shows itself frequently or always is therefore a law found by experiment, yet he lacks the positive complement to this, that it is only when the discovered thing is rational, and therefore known *a priori*, that it can be regarded as a law—a want with which also his disregard for mathematics is connected. If he had been able to make more than a verbal distinction between experience and experiment, it could not have transpired, that, in the ascertainment of specific gravity his method should remain so rude, although he knew the process which had been hit upon long before by Archimedes, and shortly before his own time by Porta. The experience and therefore the induction, by which Bacon had chosen to be led, had already been taken as a guide by Telesius and Campanella; but the latter at best know only how to lie in wait for the secrets of nature; accordingly they are unable to confront her with questions to which she must answer, and with, Yes or No. Just as little can Bacon. Indeed his hatred of all anticipations makes him actually forbid experiment, as the experimenter must always anticipate the answer. The parallel between Bacon and A. von Humboldt, which in the study of Bacon's writings often obtrudes itself, and is often drawn, overlooks the circumstance that the latter not only noticed gaps in knowledge, but also filled them, and, further, was able to lay down definite problems by which they were filled, and for that reason, moreover, was able to place himself *en rapport* with every aspiring mind; while, by reason of his position, Bacon had no intercourse with the contemporary founders of modern natural science, and only sought the help of those who were already dead, *i.e.*, of books. His comparison of his own method of action with that of a judge who weighs the testimony for or against, is characteristic; he does not dare compare himself either with the eye-witness or the police spy. In short, the saying of Erasmus about Seneca (*v.* § 107, 3), holds good here: measured by the standard of the Middle Ages Bacon appears modern, by that of modern

times he appears mediæval. But to say this implies that his merit is no small one. He gathered together the fruits of mediæval natural philosophy; he gave it, in the second place, an entirely secular character by rejecting in the study of it all ideal ends, whether the honour of God or the satisfaction of the thirst of knowledge, and put in their place prosaic industrial aims. It would appear that a man of the world in both the good and bad sense of the word, was best fitted to carry this out. But certainly an English origin and the early breathing of the atmosphere described in an earlier section were essential moments in the development of this standpoint, which can, to be sure, boast that it is quite different from any hitherto, and yet stands to that of modern times almost in the same relation in which the saying of Protagoras, "Every man is the measure of all things," had stood to that of Socrates, "Man is the measure of all things" (*v.* § 64, 1).

#### C. (cf. § 240).—POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS.

H. Fr. W. Hinrichs: *Geschichte des Natur- und Völkerrechts, etc.* 1848-52  
3 Bde.

#### § 251.

While secular learning in the form of natural philosophy makes the macrocosm the exclusive subject of its treatment, with others, likewise turned away from the hitherto dominant divine learning, interest tends towards the microcosm. The investigation of the laws of that world whose component parts are not elements or constellations, but men, whose moving powers are not heat or cold, but passions and inclinations, now becomes the main object, and if in the former sphere the whole of philosophy was gradually subordinated to physics, a perfectly similar subordination here takes place with relation to the *jus naturæ et gentium*. The three different attitudes of secular philosophy to the Church and to the Christian religion have already been mentioned above (§ 240); the theory of Natural Law and the Science of Politics of this period, also pass through the ecclesiastical, anti-ecclesiastical, and non-ecclesiastical stages. The only distinction between the method of advance here and that in the case of the philosophy of nature is, that the break with the Church and hatred of her, enters earlier in this case. In the development of Political Philosophy,

the man who corresponds to Bruno (*v.* § 247) in the development of the philosophy of nature, stands almost as near the beginning of the period, as Bruno does to the end. A result of this is, that indifference towards the Church enters earlier upon the scene, and exhibits a greater number of intermediate stadia. When the political philosophers of ecclesiastical tone refer back to that break with the Church and discountenance it, their standpoint becomes reactionary; but where it is unknown to them, their ecclesiasticism is unbiassed and naïve, and even when living subsequently to the leader of the break with the Church, they must be treated of before him. This disregard of the historical order is rendered more possible, as the revolt against the Church had for its instrument a practical statesman, whose theory as such was not set forth, but has only subsequently been gathered from his practical counsels given with reference to local and temporal conditions.

## § 252.

### THE ECCLESIASTICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS.

C. von Kaltenborn : *die Vorläufer des Hugo Grotius*. Leipz., 1848.

1. It was involved in the nature of the case, considering the respect in which Thomas Aquinas was held in the Church of Rome, that those who persevered in the unaltered Romish doctrine, and who for that reason may be called the OLD-CATHOLIC political theorists, should not abandon the foundations which he had laid down (*v.* § 203, 8, 9). Especially so, when, as *e.g.* *Domenicus de Soto* (1494–1560), the author of the *Libri decem de justitia et lege* (printed, Venice, 1588, and elsewhere), they belonged to the order which Thomas had made illustrious. But we must not think of them as merely repeating his doctrines. By a more definite consideration of canonical law there is forced to the front with these successors of Thomas, much more than with himself, one and another determination of Roman law. Still more than among the theologians, who, like Thomas, held especially close to the Aristotelian basis, this naturally takes place with the Jurists, who in particular (like Cicero and other Roman writers) look upon the *jus naturæ* and the *jus gentium* as one, and now seek to bring its definitions into accord with canonical law. The



Jurists Franciscus Connanus, Didæus Covaruvius of Leyva (1517–1577), Albertus Bolognetus (1530–88), author of the treatise *De lege, jure et æquitate*, may here be mentioned as examples of a mode of treating the science of law, regarding which it is quite intelligible that it received the favour of the theologians.

2. The attitude which PROTESTANTS claim to occupy is indeed one of opposition to the Roman, but by no means to the Catholic Church. But considering the attitude which LUTHER took up as against canonical law, and considering the exclusive emphasis laid upon the scriptural principle, their investigations were bound to take a different form from those of the Roman Catholic theologians and canonists. Luther himself rather allowed the matter to rest with occasional expressions on the subjects of law and righteousness, the State and its power. The mystical trait in his character causes him frequently to treat these questions, as being concerned with the outer man, in such a manner, as to make it intelligible how Böhme with his disregard for the world (*v.* § 234) could borrow so much from him; and again his deep respect for authority as decreed by God causes him to use expressions which idolizers of the State have gladly quoted. This is always the lot of rich natures, which are not only one, but many-sided. The position of PHILIP MELANCHTHON is quite different from that of Luther (*v.* § 232, 3). His *Ethicæ doctrinæ elementa*, printed first in 1538, and often subsequently, were long, even in the part which refers to natural rights, of almost canonical authority for Protestants. The chief difference between him and the Roman Catholics consists mainly in the fact that he endeavours to identify the *jus naturale*, that foundation of all positive law, in particular with the Decalogue. This, however, does not hinder him from making use of the Aristotelian investigations of the nature of justice as well as the conceptual definitions of the *Corpus Juris*. The content of Melanchthon's doctrine naturally differs from the Roman Catholic, where the relation of Church and State comes into question. It is not indeed an absolute separation, such as Luther would perhaps for a long time have wished, which he demands; but still a strict separation of the spheres of both, and especially greater independence for the State.

3. In the identification of the *jus naturale* with the commands of the Decalogue, as well as in many other points, JOHANNES

OLDENDORP is an independent follower of Melanchthon. He died as *Professor Juris* at Marburg, in 1561; his collected works having appeared in two folio volumes at Bâle, in 1559. His *Juris naturalis gentium et civilis εισαγωγή* had already appeared at Cologne as early as 1539, and it is to be regarded as the first attempt to establish a system of natural law. The knowledge of the original *jus naturale*, for the extension of which to animals Ulpian is to be strongly censured, was obscured by the Fall and renewed again by means of the Decalogue. As the Greeks borrowed their wisdom from the Hebrews, and the authors of the Twelve Tables had learned from the Greeks, the agreement of Roman law with the Decalogue and natural law becomes intelligible.

4. The Dane NICOLAUS HEMMING (1518-1600), a personal pupil of Melanchthon's for many years, is especially worthy of mention, because in his treatise *De lege naturæ apodictica methodus*—(printed 1562, afterwards often. I know only the Wittenberg edition of 1564)—he claims for natural law a strict form according to the manner of the philosophic sciences, and a derivation from the principles of natural right. The natural law implanted in man by God, making itself heard in conscience, refers just as much to thought as to action. On the one side therefore, there arises a dialectic, on the other a moral philosophy. If it has been recognised as necessary in the case of the former to deduce everything methodically, it is illogical not to do so in the case of the latter. Accordingly a definition of the natural law for conduct must be established (similar to the law of thought in the other case) and the norms for all circumstances must be derived by analysis of all its content. According to the Aristotelian division, ethical, economical, and political life are distinguished, but the first is determined as *vita spiritualis* and set above the other two, as also in the Decalogue, that *epitome legis naturæ*, the first table refers to the *spiritualis*, while the commands which refer to the economic and political life, the household and the maintenance of peace, are found in the second. The obligatory character of all these determinations may moreover be deduced from reason, without appeal to revelation.

5. What Hemming had demanded, BENEDICT WINKLER (Professor of Jurisprudence at Leipsic, died as Syndic of Lübeck in 1648) seeks to give. His *Principiorum juris libri quinque* appeared at Leipsic in 1615, and is really a methodi-

cally thought-out book. Above all things he warns against any confusion of *lex* and *jus*, which are related as *constituens* and *constitutum*, or cause and effect. He treats first of the *lex naturæ*, but secondly of the *jus naturæ*. God is to him the primary and original ground of natural right or law, as of all things. Inasmuch, however, as law arises by means of human freedom and the will, God is only its final cause, and so long as God permits the existence of human freedom, the *causa proxima* of law, God himself cannot change it. In regard to law, however, a distinction must be made between the *jus naturæ prius*, the law, as it would be in an ideal state of man, where it has its basis in love, and the *jus naturæ posterius s. jus gentium*, i.e. the law which results from the nature of man at present, but which therefore also holds among all nations of the present time. The source of the latter is *prudentialia*, and it is related to the former as intercourse with non-friends is to intercourse with friends. To these two there is added as complement, the law defined by the *lex civilis*, which has therefore a positive character; while natural law as the result of the *ratio* which distinguishes man from the beasts, has a rational character. The third book of the work is devoted to the *jus naturæ prius*, the fourth to the *jus naturæ posterius*, the fifth to the *jus civile*, in which it is perpetually reasserted with emphasis that for the teacher of law the good of the individual is of subordinate, that of the State of the highest, interest. In the third as well as in the fourth book it is shown that the legal definitions derived from reason are to be found in the Decalogue, which on that account is also called the compendium (*index*) of natural law.

6. If the standpoint of the Jesuits is here distinguished from that of the old Romanists as NEO-CATHOLIC, this agrees with the task which this Order always recognised as its own—that of reaction against Protestantism. Every reactionary system is, when compared with the good old times, an innovation. But that Jesuitism by its peculiar emphasis of the doctrine of free will, actually introduced dogmatic innovations, and only secured itself from ecclesiastical censure by its accentuation of the papal power, might be admitted by the most orthodox Roman Catholic, provided of course that he did not himself belong to the Order. All three, however, the reaction against Protestantism, the doctrine of free will with

its tendency to Pelagianism, finally zeal for the defence of the papal power, jointly compose an essential moment in the Jesuitical view of law, especially that of the State. When the Protestant writers on natural law always emphasize the divine ordinance of the State; when they willingly put the subject as against the monarch in the relation in which the child stands to a father whom it does not even choose; when, finally, they firmly hold the indefeasible majesty of the head of the State,—the Jesuit writers on State law meet them with most decided opposition. In the interest of the Church they assert the human origin of the State by means of a primitive social contract, and it follows therefrom that where the prince shows himself unworthy of the power with which he is entrusted, the mandate which has been given him may be resumed. On the other hand, the head of the Church, whose origin is from above, cannot be deposed. These fundamental principles, which were publicly expressed by the second General of the Order, Laynez, as early as the Council of Trent, were afterwards more widely applied by Ferdinand Vasquez (1509–1566), Ludovicus Molina (1535–1600), more acutely by Bellarmine (1542–1621), the most harshly by Mariana (1537–1624). With Fr. Suarez (1548–1617) and Leonh. Less (1554–1623) they appear in a somewhat milder form, but not sufficiently so to enable us to assert (as does Werner in his treatise on Suarez [*v.* § 217]), that the theory of the social contract was foreign either to them or to the Jesuits in general. Moreover it is involved in the nature of the case, that the persons mentioned concerned themselves especially with canon law and State law, and on the other hand, neglected civil law and especially private rights. That Campanella could not be discontented with their doctrines (*v.* § 246, 5), is intelligible.

## § 253.

## ANTI-ECCLESIASTICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Leopold Ranke: *Machiavell; besonders über dessen politische Schriften, Anhang zu: Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1535.* 1. Bd. Leipz. u. Berlin, 1824. Gervinus: *Histor. Schriften.* Bd. 1. Frkf. 1833. Rob. v. Mohl: *die Machiavelli-Literatur in s. Gesch. u. Lit. der Staatsw.* Erlangen, 1858. Th. Mundt: *Nicolo*  
VOL. I. Y Y

*Machiavelli und das Princip der modernen Politik* (Dritte Ausgabe, Berlin, 1861). Von Gerbel: *Die Quintessenz von Machiavelli's Regierungskunst*. Dresden, 1865.

1. With all the difference between the treatment of natural law from the (old) Catholic, reforming, and anti-reforming (Neo-Catholic) standpoints, they are still agreed as to this, viz. that the two swords, whether they be borne by one individual or by two, must be used for the honour of Christ. Further, it is admitted in the end by the Protestants also, that the sword of the spiritual power takes precedence of the secular sword, and that the highest duty of the State is that of protecting the Church. Among Protestants, Winkler, although he glorifies human reason more than any one before him, is never tired of calling jurisprudence, *Theologia famula*, and the consistories and theological faculties find it quite in the regular order, when the prince demands of them whether he ought to undertake a war. If indeed the general fact that so much consideration is devoted to the State, is a proof that it enjoys much higher respect than in the period of scholasticism, yet so much of what is said in regard to it approximates so largely to earlier views, that it is quite intelligible when we find among the Jesuit teachers some who exerted themselves for the revival of the decaying scholasticism. And yet it was not possible to rest in the view that the Pope allotted the kingdoms. Exactly in cases in which Popes who took a powerful part in secular affairs wear the tiara, must it become clear to the bystanders, that their results are not reached by means of the Key of Peter, but by means of the sword and their allies, i.e. that they obey and not dictate the rules of statecraft. But to see this it was necessary to stand close to the machinery of the Roman Curia. It is intelligible, therefore, that in Italy the attempt could first be made, to see the salvation of the State not as heretofore in obedience to the Church, but in revolt against her, and instead of Christianity, which transcends nature and therefore also the nationalities, to make the national principle the determining standard.

2. NICOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, born at Florence on May 3rd, 1469, was already in his 29th year Secretary to the Government of his native city, and continued as such after the expulsion of the Medici. Diplomatic journeys to France and Germany frequently took him away from Florence for con-

siderable periods. The return of the Medici in 1512 deprived him of his post, brought him to the rack, to prison, and finally to the necessity of a life in the country at a distance from all state affairs, and in distressed circumstances. Here originated his *Discorsi* on Livy and his memorial *Del Principe*, the latter written with the expressed object of reconciling him with the Medici. It was only after the death of Lorenzo dei Medici (1519) that he stayed again for a considerable time in Florence; in intercourse with the circle which at that time gathered in the Rucellai gardens the *Discorsi* were finished, and his book on the art of war, as well as his Memoir on the reform of the Florentine government, intended for Leo X., was written. All that he gained from the party of the Medici was that the perjury of the Alamanni should not be visited upon him also, and that Cardinal Julius assigned him the task of writing the history of Florence, and subsequently (as Pope Clement VII.) of fortifying his native city. When in consequence of the occupation of Rome by the Imperial troops, the people again expelled the Medici, Machiavelli had to atone for the peace he had made with them. All activity in the State was taken from him and he died in discontent on the 22nd July, 1527. Of the collected editions of his works, that in quarto of the year 1550 (without place of publication) is the first.

3. It has been called an insoluble problem, that while Machiavelli's *Discorsi* throughout, but especially in his estimate of Cæsar, betray the enthusiast for the republic, he could write at the very same period his *Principe*, and in it impart the means whereby, with or without the observance of republican forms, a dominion of force may be founded and asserted. The solution of the problem is, that he is inspired by one sole desire, the desire of seeing Italy a united State like France or Spain, and if that were impossible, then at least a closely bound confederation,—that he regards it as the task of the politician, not to dream of the attainment of his desires, but to exhibit them as attainable, and that, himself born and bred to diplomacy, he has the courage to admit, what all diplomatists hitherto have only betrayed by their actions, that the end justifies the means. Although, of the five States of which Italy was then composed, Machiavelli admires Venice most, yet the Florentine cannot give up the wish that the unification of Italy should proceed from his own city. To

make Florence, first strong in herself, then the head of Italy, is the object after which he strives. If the Italian people of the present time were in as sound a condition as the Romans were after the expulsion of the kings and before Cæsar, or if they showed as much conscientiousness as the Germans, in whom, among other points, Machiavelli admires the fact (*Discors.*, I. c. 55), that in the free towns of Germany there is possible uncontrolled self-taxation (at the present time only surviving in Bremen) on the citizen's oath, a united Italy in the form of a republic would be possible. At present this is an impossibility, for of all peoples the Latin are the most corrupt, and amongst them, the Italians. Hence the only hope left is that in Florence one man (Lorenzo dei Medici) should possess himself of absolute power. By what means this may be brought about is explained in the *Principe*, and in the course of the explanation, Cæsar Borgia, on account of his ruthlessness in following out his aims, is frequently taken for a pattern. Once Florence has become a military monarchy, in the accomplishment of which it is to be recommended that republican forms, *e.g.* the easily guided universal suffrage, should be preserved, the means of approximation to the ultimate aim are given. For that end the development of the military power is the chief instrument, and in doing so the ancient Romans are especially to be taken as an example. The point in question is, namely, to substitute for the mercenary troops an army of citizens, but on the other hand, so to treat the citizen that when he has served his time in the army, he shall settle down into a quiet civilian. The obligation of all to serve as soldiers for some years seems to be the best means. Machiavelli admits that amid universal corruption the work cannot be done with clean hands. With the statesman the appearance of goodness is more than the reality. The ruler must guard absolutely against those crimes only, which, as experience teaches, universally embitter the minds of the people,—attacks upon private property and domestic honour. If he guards against these, if he never forgets that all men are wicked, and the most of them also stupid, and acts accordingly, he will maintain his position; otherwise not. The histories of Rome, Florence, Venice are especially drawn upon to furnish the weight of evidence for this demonstration.

4. As Machiavelli excuses everything which leads nearer to the goal of his desires, so on the other hand he is obliged

to reject everything that hinders its attainment. Accordingly he rejects above all things the Roman Catholic Church, which is the real obstacle to the unity of Italy (*Disc.*, I. c. 12). The only two ways in which the Church would not hinder this unity, would be: either that the secular power of the Pope should extend over the whole of Italy, or, that it should entirely cease. The latter means leads, as Dante's example shows, to a foreign protector. The former (which in opposition to Dante and Machiavelli, Campanella subsequently prefers) appears to Machiavelli as flat nonsense: thus he persists in an entirely negative attitude towards the Church. Away with her! His political theory is entirely anti-ecclesiastical. Accordingly he disputes the contention that the State is an institution which gives security for striving after the end of the Church, salvation, without disturbance; to him the State is its own end, and its sole problem is to maintain and increase itself. What Machiavelli's method of action shows, his theory also asserts: activity in the service of the State is man's highest task. Hence on the one side, his enthusiasm for the State of antiquity, and on the other side, his approximation to the modern conception of the State. He was really the first for whom, *il stato* designates not as heretofore the condition of a particular people, but the abstract State. Just as Giordano Bruno, on account of his hostile attitude to the Roman Catholic Church, was brought to turn his back, not indeed on all religion, but on Christianity, so it was with Machiavelli. His theory of the State is not irreligious; one needs only to read the 11th chapter in the first book of his *Discorsi*, the comparison of the merits of Romulus and Numa, to see that he is in earnest when he so often calls religion the foundation of the State. But he openly asserts without any timidity, that the religion of the Romans was better calculated to further the life of the State than Christianity, because the former taught manliness and love of country, the latter submission, and yearning for the other world. However, original Christianity may have been better than the present, in which things have gone so far that the nearer a district lies to the seat of the Pope, the less of religion is to be found in it. Christianity in its Roman Catholic form is to him the opposite of true religion, but he knows of no other. But Christianity being the peculiar upholder of all ideal interests, Machiavelli is accordingly brought



by his anti-ecclesiastical and anti-Christian tendency, to renounce all ideals in his political philosophy. He gives a theory of the State, which beyond the maintenance and the increase of the material power, in which the good of the State consists, knows nothing higher. Even the very love of freedom is grounded, according to him, on the fact that it affords more power and wealth (*Dis.*, II. 2).

### § 254.

#### THE NON-ECCLESIASTICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS, BODIN, GENTILIS, GROTIUS.

1. The slavish subjection of the State to the aims of the Church by the theologians, the not less fettered hatred of the Church by the statesman, are transcended by those theorists, who, in their investigations of the philosophy of law and politics, do not in any way attack the Church, but allow it to be left behind, and only claim that the State should not be hindered in its action. Still very moderate in this respect are the demands of two men, who speak of one another's work with respect, and whose agreement would probably have been still greater, if the one had not by birth and all his feelings belonged to Catholic France, and the other by free choice had not made himself an English subject and a member of the Church of England. Jean Bodin and Albericus Gentilis point out and pave the way for a third, whose fame so far surpasses theirs, that at the present day they are at best only mentioned as his predecessors. This latter, not always grateful, heir of both, Hugo Grotius, whom an important post in a republic, then that of an ambassador sent from one of the greatest to the greatest statesman of his time, led to many-sided, and his position within his own confession to emancipated, views of State life, makes such an advance as to explain if not to justify his designation as the Father of natural law.

2. JEAN BODIN (born in Angers 1530, died 1597), after residing first as a teacher of law in Toulouse, then as advocate in Paris, finally as a royal official in Laon, comes into consideration here on account of his *Six livres de la République* published in 1577, which he published in a revised Latin edition in 1586 (because the translation published in England

was too full of errors), which he also defended in an anonymously published tract in 1581. It is only in recent times that his *Colloquium heptaplomeres* has been published complete (Noack, 1857), in which a disputation between seven religious parties is made a plea for tolerance. In the very beginning of his work, Bodin declares against all utopian representations of the State, and demands a constant reference to history. He himself complies with this demand to the extent of supporting every assertion by historical quotations, which were very familiar to the author of the *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem*, published at Paris in 1566, and praised by Montaigne. For that purpose he specially makes use of the history of Rome, but also of those of France, Switzerland and Venice. With the same emphasis, however, he demands that the conception of law should be firmly adhered to, but especially that exact definitions of all points should be established. His aim in doing so is to secure the theory of law and the State both against the defence of the traditional as such, and against unclear reasoning. His definition of the State defines it as a community of families regulated by authority and reason. (So in the *First Book*, pp. 1-173, of the Latin translation.) The family, as the first constituent part of the State, is treated first. The father of the family, who as such is an unconditioned lord, loses in meeting with others a part of his freedom, on account of the repressive power which here shows itself, and thereby becomes a citizen, *i.e.* a subject freeman. He complains, as the chief lack of theories of the State heretofore, that the conception of majesty, *i.e.* of enduring power, not bound by laws, is nowhere rightly determined nor properly accentuated. In the monarchy, majesty is the attribute of the prince, whose power is therefore absolute. Conversely, as the power of the Emperor is limited, he is not a monarch, and the German empire is an aristocracy. All rights of majesty, the investigation of which is naturally of the greatest importance, are reduced to the one right of giving laws and receiving them from no one, from which the other rights, such as the power of pardon, are naturally derived. At the same time, the indivisibility of the rights of majesty is expressly asserted. In the *Second Book* (pp. 174-236), the theory is expounded, that according as majesty resides in one, many, or all, the State is a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy. The whole book is pervaded

by a polemic against Aristotle, against whom it is especially made a subject of reproach, that besides these three he adduces other mixed forms of government as sound, to which he, like many others, has been brought by the confusion between *status* and *gubernandi ratio*; a monarchical government may rule in a republican spirit, the difference between a king and a tyrant is not that the former is less independent, but that he subjects himself to the law of nature and of God: the tyrant does not.—The *Third Book* (pp. 237–365) treats of the different offices in the State, and first of all of the senate (an advising body only), then of those who are temporarily entrusted with a commission, finally of the permanent officers of government. The latter are repeatedly denied the right of questioning the justice of the laws; they are permitted to make representations. Only in cases of quite indubitable contradiction of the law of God is disobedience to the decree of the ruler permitted; but Bodin warns for that reason against taking subjective opinions for conviction. Unions of rank and corporations are necessary for the State, although, especially where secret assemblies are allowed, they may become dangerous. The ranking of the different orders of the State leads Bodin to the consideration of slavery, the disappearance of which he regards as desirable without declaring it to be absolutely unreasonable in itself. In the *Fourth Book* (pp. 365–490) the alteration of the forms of State and their decadence are treated. The latter is most surely delayed by prudence and slowness in the alteration of the laws. The replies given to the questions, whether State officers should be appointed for life, for a year, or on recall, whether the monarch should appear in all cases in person, how he and how private persons should conduct themselves in the formation of factions, universally show the man of affairs with a mind sharpened by experience, who, the less he hopes that virtue will everywhere sit upon the throne, seeks so much the more for means to secure it under all conditions. His utterances on the subject of religious sects are interesting. It is a decided error that the State can exist without religion; hence it cannot suffer atheism, just as little magic, which is utter godlessness, and against which Bodin has proved himself very strenuous both theoretically (*Démonomanie des sorciers*, Paris, 1578) and practically. With the difference of religions it is otherwise; here the State is to be so much

the less exclusive, as it can advantageously be. It is to be desired that the State should be divided not by two confessions only, but a greater number should render it possible to hold them all in check by pitting them against one another. The *Fifth Book* (pp. 491-620) treats of a subject which all writers hitherto had neglected, the natural differences of nations, from which there necessarily arise different forms of the State and of laws. It is not only that it is a natural law, that the southern peoples concede the highest place to religion, the northern to power, the middle races to cunning and justice, but within the same climate it is a law of nature that mountaineers should love freedom, etc. Regard must be had to this difference in considering the question whether a State should always be under arms. What may be right with reference to a republic might be false of a monarchy; what necessary for a small mountain land, useless for a larger country on the plain. Considerations on treaties and their guarantees close the book.—The *Sixth Book* (pp. 621-779) begins with politico-economical investigations, in the course of which Bodin shows his intimate acquaintance with the principles of coinage, as he had previously done in a treatise devoted to the subject (*Discours sur le rehaussement et la diminution de la monnaie*). He then passes on to a comparison of the different forms of government, and defines hereditary monarchy as the best, even in degeneracy, for the tyranny of one is much to be preferred to the tyranny of many. The closing chapter commends the monarchical State as the manifestation of true justice, the mathematical formula of which lies beyond the one-sided forms of arithmetical and geometrical relations, and which he designates as the harmonious relation. He reproaches Plato and Aristotle, with not having understood its meaning, and therefore with not having recognised how far above aristocracy, monarchy stands, the most beautiful image of the harmonious All, ruled by One.

3. ALBERICUS GENTILIS, born in 1551 in the March of Ancona, left his native country, perhaps on religious grounds, and came to England, where as Regius Professor in the University of Oxford (according to Bayle) he died on 19th June, 1608. His first treatise was probably the *De legationibus*, as to which he says in the year 1600, that it was written many years ago. (Von Kaltenborn refers to an edition of 1585; I know only of the Hanau ed., 1594. With regard also to his most im-

portant treatise, *De jure belli libri tres*, I am not acquainted with the ed. of 1588, cited by v. Kaltenborn, but only with the Hanau ed., 1612. Although Gentilis in his treatise *De nuptiis* Hanov., 1601, cites the above chief work, the title-page of the ed. of 1612 bears however the words: *nunc primum editi*. He also cites as his own writings: *De maleficiis*, *Disputatio a prim. libr. Machab.*, *De armis Romanis*, *De legitimis temporibus*, *De conditionibus*, none of which I have ever been able to see.) Gentilis distinguishes emphatically between the jurist, and him who promotes the Science of Law (*De nupt.*, I.), and therefore censures those who merely abstract their definition of law from history and dominant custom, instead of deriving it from higher principles. He declares himself against the mere followers of routine and practice as well as against the canonists and theologians, who do not suitably discriminate between what belongs to human and what to Divine law. Accordingly we no longer find him as we do Melanchthon, or even Winkler, regarding the Decalogue as an index to natural law, but he distinguishes: the first table of the law (*i.e.* the first five commandments, according to the Reformed division, not the Lutheran) is to be handed over to theology, on the other hand the second table, the principle of the composition of which is contained in the *non concupisces*, is the subject of investigation for jurisprudence much more than for theology. At the same time there are individual points where jurisprudence decides in ecclesiastical matters, *e.g.* on the crimes of the clergy, some points of marriage law, etc. On the whole, however, one must here be subject to the Church of the land (*De nupt.*, I. 88). Jurisprudence has to fashion its peculiar doctrines neither from history nor from ecclesiastical authority, but from natural law. The latter is founded partly on universal laws of nature, extending beyond the world of humanity, as *e.g.* the right of occupying the ownerless is only the outcome of the law that nature abhors a vacuum (*De jur. belli*, p. 131). But the definitions of natural law are preferably to be fashioned from the nature of man. Now the latter does not demand strife between individuals (*Ibid.*, p. 87), but much rather are we all members of a great body, and therefore meant for society (p. 107). But it is only in society that rights exist, as indeed, too, the *jus divinum* or *religio* entirely concerns association with God. As there exists no true society between man and beasts, so

also rights only exist amongst men (p. 101), hence the Roman distinction between *jus naturæ* and *jus gentium* cannot be maintained. From our destination for society there follows that the proper ethical condition is that of peace, and war is only permitted for the prevention or hindrance of the disturbance of the peace (p. 13). So also slavery, which is properly opposed to nature, is not injustice in the case of those who act against nature (p. 43). The open violation of natural right by cannibals, justifies all nations in beginning war against them (p. 191.) So likewise against such idolatry as demands human sacrifice; but otherwise religious wars may not be waged, and tolerance on the part of the State, as demanded by Bodin, is the most correct attitude (p. 71). Only with declared atheists is it another matter; they are to be regarded the same as the beasts (p. 203). As the beginning of a war does not make an end of all rights, so also during a war rights still exist, and even new rights are formed: a war without declaration, with dishonourable weapons, etc., is against the *jus gentium* and the *jus naturæ*. It is also to be regarded as a violation of it, to attempt to close up the sea, which, according to natural law stands open to all (pp. 209, 228, 148).

4. HUGO DE GROOT (better known under the Latin name of GROTIUS), was born at Delft, April 10th, 1583, and equally famed as a jurist and theologian. While Fiscal General at Rotterdam he wrote his *Mare liberum* (Lugd. Bat., 1609), in which he proved from both natural and international law, that no one had the right of forbidding the Netherlands to trade with the East Indies. As *Rathspensionarius* in Rotterdam he was intimate with Oldenbarnevelde, then in 1619 he lost his office, and from that time lived mainly in Paris, at first in a private capacity, later as the Swedish Ambassador, having been nominated to that office by Oxenstierna. Before receiving this appointment, his world-famous work *De jure belli et pacis libri tres* was published, with a dedication to Louis XIII., in 1625. The authorship also of his theological works, the *Annotationes in V.T., in N.T.*, as also of his apologetical treatise *De veritate religionis christianæ* falls in the period of his residence in Paris. On the 28th August, 1645, he died at Rostock, on a journey. His chief work was often printed subsequently. The representation which here follows is founded on the edition *Amstelod. apud Janssenio Waesbergios, 1712.*

5. In the *Prolegomena*, which also includes a critical survey of previous performances in jurisprudence, Grotius praises Gentilis (p. 38) and Bodin (p. 35), but in the further progress of the work, quotes only the latter, although he might well have borrowed much from the former. What he blames in them, as well as in all previous political theorists, is that none of them suitably treats the law which binds nations among one another, and which is based on the nature of man (p. 1), much less, then, expounds it scientifically (p. 30). This noblest part of jurisprudence (p. 32) he desires here to work out, in such a manner as to seek to refer it to certain principles, which no one without doing violence to himself can doubt (p. 39), and further to establish exact definitions and strict logical divisions. The latter, in particular, is necessary in order to the avoidance of the usual error of the confusion of perfectly different things. The first point is that the Science of Law should not be confused, as it is by Bodin, with Politics, the statecraft which only pursues utilitarian ends (p. 57); further, that natural and therefore necessary law should not be compared with the law of a particular nation, nor with what is merely the arbitrary convention of nations (p. 40-41). To this end investigation must especially be made into the proper source of all right. Like everything else, right also has its first foundation in the will of God, and so far every right is *Divinum* and *voluntarium*. At the same time, a distinction is to be made between what God expressly utters as His will in the Bible, and what is the outcome of divinely-willed human nature. Of what God wills in the first manner it may be said: because He wills it, therefore it is good; but of what God wills in the second manner, mediately: because it is good, therefore He willed it (Lib. I. 1, 15). Correlatively, God can alter the first, but the second just as little as that twice two are four (*Ibid.*, 20). To the latter, therefore, must be ascribed a validity independent of God, so that it would be valid even if no God existed (*Prol.*, p. 71). For the sake of greater definiteness, by *jus divinum* shall be understood only the contents of that which was or still is law, because God has expressly prescribed it, the former in the Old, the latter in the New Testament, and to it is to be opposed human law (*jus humanum*), with which alone the present investigation has to do. Casual quotations from the Bible can never prove that anything is a natural

law; but, however, it can prove that it is not against natural law, as the two wills of God cannot contradict one another (I. 1, 17). As regards human law in its turn, it is according to its different subjects, personal law or national law (so that therefore by *jus gentium* Grotius understands only international law). With both, however, we must again distinguish that the source of law is either the nature of men and nations, or their pleasure, so that four kinds of distinctions are to be made: *jus naturæ* and *jus civile*; *jus gentium naturale* (*internum, necessarium*) and *jus gentium voluntarium*, which latter therefore would be the *jus civile populorum* (*Prol.*, pp. 40-41; *Lib. III.*, 2, 7). By the neglect of these distinctions, which Grotius is never tired of censuring, it has come about that the pure positive definitions of Roman law have been regarded as natural laws, mere usages of civilized peoples as the rules of the law of nations. For the same reason it has also come about, that reference to utility, which is nevertheless the source of the *jus voluntarium*, has been made the principle of the theory of natural right (*Prol.*, p. 16). As the *jus divinum* is related to the *jus humanum*, so exactly are the *jus civile* and *jus gentium voluntarium* related to natural (individual and national) law: they contain further qualifications for the latter, therefore more than it, and are stricter than it. Accordingly, just as regard to the Divine law would be at least a negative corrective for the treatment of the human, so likewise regard to the *jus voluntarium* may be fruitful for the *jus naturæ*. This holds especially of national law: where certain definitions of national law are to be found among all, or at least all the noblest peoples, one may be pretty certain that they are not contrary to the natural law of the nations (p. 40).

6. By natural right or law is therefore to be understood, the law which is not arbitrarily established by God or men, but which follows necessarily from the nature of man. Only of man, for the definition of the *jus naturæ* received by the Roman jurists is too wide (*Lib. I.*, 1, 11; *Prol.*, p. 8). By his proper nature, however, that nature which distinguishes him from the beasts, man who for that reason has the faculty of speech, is destined for society, *i.e.* for quiet, rationally ordered society (therefore to be distinguished from a herd) (*Prol.*, p. 5). Everything therefore which is at strife with such an ordered society of rational beings is unlawful (*in-*



*justum*), but that which is not unlawful, is called law (*jus*). In this connection it is to be remarked, that this word is used, both to designate the moral condition of the person, and the legal regulations, which secure that condition (*Lib. I., 1, 3, 4, 9*). Whether anything is according to natural law, can be established *a priori*, and *a posteriori*. The former takes place when it is shown that the universal validity of the subject of proof follows from human nature as destined for society, the latter, on the other hand, when from its universal validity we may conclude that it lies in the nature of man. The second method of procedure is indeed more popular, but the first more scientific (*Ibid.*, p. 12).

7. In this solidarity of law and society, it is natural that Grotius, where he discusses the origin of law (and he concerns himself with this problem in the beginning of the first book), should begin his treatment at the point at which society has not yet come into existence. The condition of the entirely isolated individual man he calls the condition of nature. In the latter each one has a like right to everything, in so far as everything belongs not to all but to none, a condition which when it has once ceased only recurs in cases of the most extreme misery, and, approximately, in war. To this condition occupation makes an end, by which the ownerless is changed into possession and property, a transformation which that which cannot be occupied, as the air and sea, escapes (cf. II. 2, 6 ff.). When that which is thus appropriated is attacked, war arises with defence by force, in which the attacked is justified, both in asserting his own, and in regaining it, and finally in punishing the aggressor. That in return for evil inflicted a man should suffer evil, is a natural law, and therefore in the condition of nature any one may not only guard against, but punish the aggressor. This is altered, when by the voluntary combination of men, those artificial bodies arise, in which unity is as it were the soul (II. 9, 3), and of which the most complete is the State in which for that very reason the superiority of the whole over the parts is greatest (II. 5, 23). Even if, just because it is a voluntary combination, the individuals are not so dependent as the limbs of a body (II. 5, 8 and 6, 4), yet in the State the rights of the individual suffer a very essential modification, inasmuch as the State now acquires the highest power. This does not mean that the people, *i.e.* all of them, have this power, for both equality and

inequality are compatible with the conception of society, and it is very possible indeed, that a people should come to the determination to subject themselves to an individual as head, who then alone possesses the right of rule, the *imperium* (I. 1, 3; 3, 7). In this case the highest power may be conferred temporarily or permanently; hence dictatorship and kingship are distinguished not by the greater power, but by the greater dignity (*majestas*) of the king (I. 3, 11.). Kingship itself, however, may vary, according as the *imperium* is looked upon as a mere property, of which the holder may divest himself (*regnum patrimoniale*), or according as the latter is looked upon as the mere usufructer and trustee (which is now mostly the case); further the power of the king may be more or less limited, it may be quite undivided or divided (*Ibid.*, 14, 16, 17). Which of these relationships may exist, and the extent to which according to it the subjects are justified as against the monarch, depends on the original treaty of subjection, which binds successors, because the nation, even though it now consists of different individuals, has yet remained the same (like a waterfall or a stream), and it must be presumed would have the same will now as then, a supposition which, for the rest, is confirmed by the tacit consent of the people (II. 7, 29). So, in like manner, new circumstances can only be rightly judged when we ask ourselves: How would those who concluded the original treaty have willed in this case? The answer to that question will tell what is right to-day. Exactly in this way, in civil law the right of intestate succession is founded upon the hypothesis that the father, if he had made a will, would have made the son his heir (*Ibid.*, 10, 11). According to this principle, it may not properly be said in the case of an hereditary monarchy, that the *imperium* is transferred, but that it remains in the family originally chosen (I. 3, 10). When the family dies out, the *imperium* returns to the nation, *i.e.* the condition of nature, which obtained before the State contract, re-enters (II. 9, 8).

8. As the State, exactly like the individual, is subject to Law, there arise a number of legal relationships between states, which form in fact the *jus gentium*. The State, like the individual, can, when its rights are violated, take to war, and thus four kinds of war must be distinguished: war of the individual against the individual, of State against State, of the State against an individual and moreover against its own or

foreign subjects, finally of the subject against the State. The three first may be lawful or unlawful, the last can never be lawful (I. 4, 1). To the investigation of what cases justify the one or the other of these wars, in which the guiding point of view is, that the normal condition is that of peace, the disturbance of which gives occasion for war and the restoration of which is the aim of war, by far the greater part of the work is devoted, and from that it has received its name. But the treatment of all sorts of legal relationships is interwoven. Further, moreover, inasmuch as the *jus externum* is very often contrasted with the *jus internum*, and everything is assigned to the latter which is connected with equity, the feeling of honour, and especially the conscience, morality, though not exhaustively treated, is at least marked off in its relation to the theory of law. As has been said, however, the treatment of war is the chief object. As public (State) war has exactly the same legal justification as private (individual) war, the case in which the State uses force, not to ward off an attack, but to punish an attack which has been made, is treated in great detail. As regards the punishment of individuals, in the first place, in the state of nature the evil-doer might suffer punishment at the hands of any one. In the State, the individual loses the right of punishment, and it is properly transferred to the holder of power in the State. The aim of punishment is always the improvement, partly of the punished, partly of the rest of the nation (by deterring them). To those who would regard punishment as retribution, and in doing so appeal to the Divine laws of punishment, Grotius answers: God's justification, in punishing even him who will not improve or has not improved, lies, like the visitation upon children, which man would not dare to decree, in the fact that He is the Almighty who disposes of and rules us according to His pleasure. Men may punish only, as Seneca rightly says, *non quia peccatum est sed ne peccetur*. As regards in the second place relationship to other States, the question is thrown out, whether one State may overrun another in war merely to punish it? Only open violation of the law of God and of nature would seem to give it a right to do so. Hence the State may suppress declared enemies of the "true religion, which is common to all ages,"—as the content of which he mentions the being of God and responsibility for our actions, when they are its own subjects, and when they are not, may

make war upon them. But let those who would extend this to all who are not Christians, consider how many quite unessential doctrines have attached themselves to primitive Christianity, which one dare not force upon any one. In closing it may further be added to this survey, that the work of Grotius discusses in the *First Book* in four chapters, the origin of law, the notion of war, the distinction between private and public war, finally the relation of ruler and subject; in the *Second Book*, which is the most detailed, in twenty-six chapters, the different ways in which war arises; but besides also property, the law of treaties, the law of punishment are treated; finally in the *Third Book* in twenty-five chapters he investigates the question, what is to be observed according to natural law during war, where he treats of the conclusion of peace and agreement, and comes to the result that truth and honesty are the best policy.

### § 255

However great the advance is which Bodin, Gentilis, and especially Grotius, may have made, when they are compared *e.g.* with the Jesuitic political philosophers, or even with Protestants of ecclesiastical sentiment, yet there appears in them a peculiar half-heartedness, which is absent in the latter. Gentilis, who only attained emancipation from the Decalogue to the extent of ignoring the first table and only retaining the second as a normal standard, shows this half-heartedness in its most striking form. But Grotius labours under it scarcely less and is led by it into the most curious contradictions. He proposed to himself to abstract entirely from the revealed word of God, even indeed from God Himself, and to treat of man *in puris naturalibus*, as the earlier expression went. And this natural man, being without any perception of the word of God, is depicted by him, as though he felt the Divine command of Christian brotherly love; for the yearning after peaceful and reasonable society is nothing else. Of the actual man Grotius admits, that his natural tendency leads him quite elsewhere, for the whole *jus voluntarium* tends for him to nothing else than utilities. But in that condition which precedes the formation of States, he must have forgotten his utilities and have aspired only after peaceful society. Can this be called anything else than introducing

under other names, the Biblical doctrine of Paradise and the Fall? His intention is, further, to abstract in his natural law from all history, to treat man as though he were not the child of a special people, therefore in his complete isolation, and yet in regarding the later generations as bound by the original contract, he cannot but think of the nation as a continuous entity (a stream), in which the individual drops receive their positions from the whole. Is this anything else, than in spite of the derivation of the State from the arbitrary choice of the individuals, to place its existence prior to them? He is in the same position here as he is in the case of intestate succession, which he grounds upon the hypothesis that had there been a will the disposition would have gone as was *æquissimum et honestissimum*; but he does not consider that he thereby presupposes an *æquum et honestum* independent of all testamentary dispositions, and that his assertion that in succession to the throne the sovereignty is not transferred at all, but remains in the family, is equally applicable to the property inherited without a will. The very thing that Grotius had denied is always pushing itself to the front with him, and the assertion that injustice (illegality) can only arise in society, is neutralised by the fact, that man by nature, and therefore before the original contract, has rights. All these instances of a want of thorough-going principle will disappear, when in the supposed condition which precedes the State, man is taken to be what he still is to-day, because human nature is one and the same, *i.e.* was then what it is now; and when it is shown, that even the men of the present day, seeking only for utilities, would form a State when they first met one another. With this elimination of a paradisaic nature, theology is for the first time really thrown overboard, but at the same time also every trace of the scholastic treatment of natural law will have disappeared. Instead of what is at least a half theological political philosophy there now appears a physical or naturalistic theory, which, because it entirely ignores history, constructs the State entirely *a priori*.

### § 256.

#### THE NATURALISTIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

- I. THOMAS HOBBS, born at Malmesbury in Wiltshire, on

April 5, 1588, thoroughly instructed at school, was introduced to the scholastic philosophy at Oxford, and thence assimilated certain nominalist principles, which in spite of his opposition to scholasticism remained unshaken. Having journeyed to France and Italy as the companion of a young nobleman in 1610, he became acquainted with the most important men in those countries, and they still further estranged him from the scholastic philosophy. After his return, being especially occupied with the ancients, he became associated with Lord Bacon (only indeed after the latter's fall), to whom he appears to have rendered assistance in the translation of his works into Latin, but from whom he seems to have received in return much scientific inspiration. It is perhaps not an accident, that it was only after Bacon's death, during a second residence abroad, that Hobbes began to concern himself with mathematics, which brought him during a third visit to Paris (1631) into intimate friendship with Gassendi and Mersenne, as well as into contact with Descartes. On his return, the revolution which was already in preparation instigated him to embody his thoughts on the State, in the two English treatises, *On Human Nature* and *De corpore politico*, which, only imparted to a small circle, show us that from that time he experienced no modification whatever in his views. Discontented with the progress of affairs he went back to Paris, and in 1642 caused his treatise *De cive* to be published in a few copies. It was published in an enlarged form by Elzevir at Amsterdam in 1647. It was followed by the *Leviathan* in 1651 (Latin, 1670), after the publication of which, fearing the hatred of the Catholics, he returned to England. Here appeared the *De corpore*, 1655, and the *De homine*, 1658. He himself prepared the first collection of his works in the Latin language. It was published by Blaeu at Amsterdam, 1668. The eight treatises contained in it were printed in a series without recognisable principle. It was only after they were printed that Hobbes expressed the wish that they should have appeared in three parts, of which the first should have contained the *De corpore*, *De homine*, and *De cive*, the second the geometrical and physical essays, and the third the *Leviathan*. As, fortunately, each of the treatises had been paged separately, the publisher could fulfil the wish by an instruction to the book-binder. He afterwards wrote an autobiography as well as a translation of Homer, both in Latin verse. Shortly before

his death his *Behemoth*, a dialogue on the English Revolution, composed earlier, appeared against his will, as Charles II. had not desired its publication. He died on Dec. 4, 1679. Two years thereafter there appeared an anonymous biography (*Carolopoli apud Eleutherium Anglicum*, 1681), the author of which was Hobbes himself according to some, according to others, Aubry, and which was translated according to some by Ralph Bathurst, according to others by Richard Blackbourn. A collected English edition appeared in London, 1750, Fo. In recent times an edition has been prepared by Molesworth (London, 1839-45, 16 vols., of which eleven contain the English and five the Latin works).

2. Hobbes first of all places himself in antagonism to scholasticism, at which he is never tired of girding (*De corp.*, at the close, *Leviathan*, c. 8), by his definition of philosophy, according to which it contains cognitions inferred by mere reason partly from the causes forwards and partly from the effects backwards (*De corp.*, c. 1). For since theology is not sprung from reason, but from supernatural revelation, it is at once excluded from philosophy. The intermingling of the two, of faith and reason, is a sin against both. He who proves faith by reason, is like the sick man who, instead of swallowing the healing pill, chews it to pieces and only gains a bitter taste in his mouth (*De cive*, 17, 4; *Leviath.*, 32). And, again, he who would quote the Bible against physicists or political theorists, forgets that it was not given for the purpose of teaching us of nature or the earthly state, but the way to that kingdom which is not of this world. What is unconnected with this end, Christ has allowed to be set aside (*Leviath.*, 8, 45). So far Hobbes is quite in agreement with Lord Bacon, as, for instance, the comparison with the pill and that with the game (*v. supra*, § 249, 3) come quite to the same thing. His definition of philosophy, however, causes him in the *second place* to contrast it with empiricism; chiefly with that of Bacon, as Hobbes, the admirer of geometry, is not content with its contemner's estimate of induction, but expressly vindicates the philosophic method which is exactly opposed to induction. The whole sixth chapter of the treatise *De corpore* treats of the difference of the *methodus resolutiva* or *analytica* and *compositiva* or *synthetica*, and asserts with emphasis, that both must be followed. Then, however, he sets philosophy in general in contrast to all empiricism. In doing so he antici-

pates much which ought properly to be handled in the second part of his system: the primary origin of all knowledge consists in the impression of things on our organs of sense, which like all actions of impression, can be nothing else than movements. The effect of the object (not its image, for blue, sweet-smelling, etc., have not the smallest similarity to the movements in the object) mediated by the reaction of the organ, we call sensation (*sensio*) or perception (*conceptio*), as to which it must never be forgotten, that it lies entirely in us and is therefore *idea*, *phantasma*, *fancy*, in short something quite subjective (*int. al.*, *Human Nature*, c. 2; *Leviath.*, c. 1). Since all bodies react against impressions, some people are to a certain degree correct, in ascribing sensation to all things. Since by the object of a sensation we must understand its cause, we may indeed say: I see the sun, but not: I see the light; the motion, which imparts itself to my retina, is not seen. According to a universally valid law of nature the affection of the sense organ, when the impression has ceased, must continue, and this echo of the impression is called memory, thought, or imagination. It is so inseparable from the sensation, that it may be compared to a sixth sense accompanying the rest (*Human Nature*, c. 3); it is even the sensation itself, for *sentire se sensisse est memoria*, and without it no sensation would be possible, inasmuch as any one who only saw, and only saw one thing, in which he did not distinguish the seeing from (previous) hearing, the present colour from another (formerly seen), would really perceive nothing at all (*De corp.*, c. 25). The sum of what is found in our memory is called experience, which, the greater it is, is so much the more bound up with the expectation of what has been already experienced, *i.e.*, with foresight or prudence (*int. al.*, *Human Nature*, c. 4), which is not to be denied to the beast; but the beast does not on that account possess science or philosophy. Towards the latter, the invention of words is a great stride, *i.e.*, arbitrarily invented names or signs first for remembrance of things observed (*marks, notæ*), and secondly for imparting them (*signs, signa*), (*Human Nature*, c. 5; *De corp.*, c. 2). Since names designate the objects as they lie in memory, but since they are thus less plainly represented than when they are contemplated, they become signs for many like objects, and acquire the character of universality, which accordingly things never, but words always have (*Human Nature*, c. 5). If the union of



an idea with the proper word be called *understanding*, the latter is also the attribute of the beast, which, *e.g.*, understands a command (*Leviath.*, c. 2). On the other hand, man alone is able to combine the signs with one another or to separate them, a process which when the signs are numbers is called counting, but otherwise thinking, or reasoning. Reason is hence only the faculty of adding or subtracting, and children who do not yet speak, have none (*Leviath.*, c. 5). A combination of words which unites compatible terms, *i.e.*, when what follows from a word is affirmed of it, is a truth, its opposite an untruth or absurdity. Both predicates have only one sense for word combinations or propositions; to ascribe truth to things is to confound essential differences, as the Schoolmen confounded the essence of a king with its definition (*Leviath.*, c. 4). The possession of true propositions is *science*, of very many, *wisdom* (*sapientia*). Science, accordingly, has only to do with the consequences involved in the names of the designated things, and again with what follows from the true propositions, (*i.e.* the propositions which draw these consequences), and thus always with consequences (*Leviath.*, c. 9). Hence experience gives us information on individual facts, and protects us against error; science, on the other hand, gives us general truths, since words are generals, and secures us against absurdities. But since words and propositions are the work of man, we have real knowledge only of that which we have ourselves gone through, and this is the reason why Hobbes places Geometry above all the sciences, and indeed almost looks upon it as the only science (*De hom.*, c. 10; *De corp.*, c. 30).

3. The accurate determination of the meaning of words naturally appears here as the first problem. Their intelligibility is the proper light of the intellect, and intelligible definitions are the beginning of all reasoning (*Leviath.*, c. 5). The compendium of definitions of all those words, of which use is made in all sciences, forms Hobbes' *philosophia prima*. It is therefore not properly correct, when he treats of it in his treatise *De corpore* (c. 7-14), and in the schematic survey of all the sciences (*Leviath.*, c. 9) expressly ascribes it to natural philosophy. As without it the whole division of the system appears purely accidental, the fact ought to have been brought into greater prominence than it has been, that the first philosophy is the common foundation of all the sciences. Here the most

important chapters are the first three (*De corp.*, 7, 8, 9), which treat of space and time, substance and accident, cause and effect. Besides them, the division which treats of quantity deserves remark (c. 12). If, in order to develop the universe from principles, we think away for the moment everything objective, there yet remains with us the reminiscence of something which was objective to us, or existed outside of us; this *being-outside-of-us* we call space, by which therefore is to be understood an *imaginarium* or the mere *phantasma rei existentis quatenus existentis*. Quite in the same manner the reminiscence of movements previously perceived, leaves in us the *phantasma* of movement in so far as it is succession, *i.e.*, time, as to which Hobbes admits that Aristotle had already conceived it in the same manner (subjectively). A host of useless questions, which can never be decided, as for instance, about the infinity and eternity of the world, arose, he considers, only because space and time were regarded as inhering in things. Even if extension in space were determined as that without which objectivity would be impossible, it is hardly to be called a consequence of this, when it is further taught, that everything objective is extended, or a body, to which, because it is independent of us, we ascribe subsistence, and which we call *suppositum* or *subjectum* because it underlies the part of that (imaginary) space with which it coincides. The size or extent of a body, what has been called its real space, determines which part of (imaginary) space, or which place, it occupies. The two are distinguished as the perception and the memory picture of it. The movement or change of place, by means of which the body is never found in one single place, for that would be rest, brings it under the power of time, as size under that of space. This follows, as Hobbes himself says, from his definition of time. Movement is the explanation of everything which we call an accident of a thing, and of accidents, that by which we name a body, is called its essence. If, as customarily happens, we call this chief accident, the form, the substance or substratum receives the name of matter, which therefore only means the same thing as body. If we think of body, and abstract from all size, we get the thought of the *materia prima*, to which of course nothing in reality corresponds, but which is indispensable for thought (c. 8). Connected with this is the reduction of the notions of power and cause to that of mover, and of expression

and effect to that of moved, in which the greatest stress is laid on the fact, that only what is moved and capable of touching, can move, so that the scholastic idea of an unmoved mover, and the supposition of a distant effect, are equally nonsensical. Now, since all the accidents or qualities of things were their effects on our senses, it follows that the scientific treatment of their essences, *i.e.*, of their chief accidents, can only have their movements for object (c. 13), and philosophy is entirely concerned with the corporeal as the only kind of existence. To the objection that spirits nevertheless exist, he responds that incorporeal substances are four-cornered circles (*int. al.*, *Human Nature*, c. 11); to the further objection that yet God exists, he replies in turn, that God is not an object of knowledge and philosophy (*int. al.*, *Leviath.*, c. 3), apart from the fact, that men of great piety have ascribed corporeality to God (*Answ. to Bishop Bramh.*, p. 430). Philosophy therefore is the doctrine of bodies. But again, there are natural and artificial bodies, and as the State takes the highest place among the latter, philosophy is divided into *natural* and *civil* philosophy (Politics); the former treats *de corpore* the latter *de civitate* (*Leviath.*, c. 9, *Table*). The doctrine of man, who is the highest being in nature, and again the founder of the State, is now assigned to the second (*De corp.*, 1), now to the first part (*Leviathan*, c. 9, *Table*), both plainly because Hobbes does not get free from the idea of the Schoolmen, that division must be by dichotomy. If he had always held steadily to the principle which he explains in his first treatise, that philosophy in its three parts treats *de corpore*, *de homine* and *de civitate*, he would not have had the misfortune, in the tabular survey of all the sciences in the ninth chapter of the *Leviathan*, of inserting the arts of building and sailing between astronomy and meteorology, and separated from all that refers to other human *artefacta*. The *philosophia prima* is therefore followed by physics, anthropology and politics, as the three parts into which philosophy is divided.

4. In *Physics* he concerns himself by preference with the part which is more adapted for mathematics. Nine chapters of the treatise *De corpore* (c. 15–24) treat of the *rationes motuum et magnitudinum*, *i.e.* the laws of rectilinear and circular motion, constant and accelerated speed, reflection and refraction, in connection with which the notion of the *punctum* (the infinitely small) has an important part to play. The

distinction which he claims for this part, of strictly proving everything, is not his ambition in the part, which he himself calls *physica*, where he has to do with the qualitative, and which starts with the intention of explaining the phenomena of nature by assumed hypotheses (c. 25-30). He acknowledges that he is the grateful disciple of Copernicus and Kepler, with whom astronomy first began, of Galileo, since whom there has for the first time existed a general science of physics, but especially of Harvey, who was the first to make a science of living things possible. At the close of his *Physica* he declares his willingness to give up any one of his hypotheses, not indeed for the sake of the dreams of the Schoolmen of substantial forms and hidden qualities, but for the sake of simpler hypotheses than his own, and such as contradict as little as they do the principles of the *philosophia prima*. These principles demand that the centre of our planetary system, which sets the earth in motion, should itself be conceived as moving (in a small circle), and further that the movement of the planets should be explained not by a distant influence, but as mediated by the æther, existing between them and the sun, and in itself at rest. If at the same time we regard the land and the water hemispheres of the earth, we can deduce Kepler's assertion of the elliptical path of the earth, and the nutations of the earth's axis. Similarly we shall be able with Kepler to place the attractive power of the sun alongside of that of the magnet, without supposing an influence at a distance, and at the same time we shall be able to explain why the magnet always points to the North. In regard to this, it is only necessary to keep firmly in mind that its attractive power consists in the constant motion of its smallest particles, which, of course through a medium, imparts itself to the iron, and of which the direction is parallel to the axis of the earth. Not only in the case of beings without sensation, but also in the case of those so endowed, all phenomena are only differently complicated movements. Harvey proved that life consists in the circulation of the blood, death in its cessation. The heart, which serves as a force-pump in this process, is itself set in motion by certain small bodies breathed in with the air, which the organism retains, so that the air we breathe out no longer shows the same vivifying influence (*De hom.*, c. 1). Like life, so also sensation is a very complicated movement. Seeing, *e.g.*, with

which Hobbes concerns himself most, and to which he has devoted nine chapters (1-9) of his treatise *De homine*, takes place in such a manner, that the sun, or the flame, *i.e.*, the peculiar self-moving (burning) body, sets in motion the æther which surrounds it, and the unrest (*fermentatio*) into which it falls, sets the retina in motion, and the latter again by means of the fine matter (spirits) in the nerves, sets in motion the brain, from which the motion is transmitted to the heart, the proper seat of sensation, because from thence the reaction begins. Since this reaction proceeding from within outwards brings forth the sensation *blue*, etc., the latter may also arise without any external influence, in a dream, etc. It may be proved in a perfectly similar manner as regards hearing, tasting, etc. This all holds good of the beast not less than of man, hence in the tabular survey of the sciences, optics and music (*i.e.*, acoustics) are reckoned among the sciences which relate to *animals in general*. It is only the investigations with which the following chapter of the treatise *De homine* is occupied, that the survey above-mentioned reckons as relating to the science of man in particular.

5. With respect to *Anthropology*, the theoretical advantages of man over the beasts, *viz.* speech and science (*De hom.*, c. 10), have already been discussed under 2 above. Here therefore there only come under consideration the researches as to the practical circumstances of man, which are classified in the *De hom.*, c. 11, 15, and collected together in the tabular survey of the *Leviathan* under the name *Ethics*. As regards the relation of the theoretical and the practical, he distinctly subordinates the former to the latter. Although he often praises the blessing of knowledge, yet he always thinks a second time and rejects knowledge for the sake of knowledge; its aim is to be that of general utility. Even his pet science, geometry, must accept the position of being praised because it teaches how to build machines. Along with the reaction called forth by the influence of the objects, which engendered sensation, there goes another, which consists in the tendency to experience pleasure, to get rid of non-pleasure, *appetitus* and *fuga*. From its first stir, *i.e.*, the smallest and most inward motion (*conatus, endeavour*) it has a regular gradation up to its most vigorous state when it comes to the point of outbreak (*animi perturbatio*), a gradation which Hobbes describes pretty accurately, and in which both

these motions receive different names. The alternation of different desires is called reflection (*deliberatio*); what in this alternation is finally desired, is said to be willed. The will, which is not the potentiality (faculty) but the act of willing, is therefore the last movement preceding performance. Neither desire nor aversion can be called free; if only because it is the influence, first of the impressions, later of signs and words, and is therefore a passive state of being moved; but in the second place, because it is a logical error to ascribe the word, free, which has only a meaning in the case of subjects, *i.e.*, bodies, to an accident or a movement, such as desire or will is. Only in doing what is willed is one free, but one does not will to will (*int. al. Leviath.*, c. 21). The object of inclination is called good, of disinclination evil. Hence *bonum*, *jucundum*, *pulchrum*, *utile*, mean quite the same thing, *i.e.*, a relationship to a particular subject. To different people, different things are good or desirable. *Bonum simpliciter dici non potest*. But for each man there is a highest good, which is the maintenance of his own existence, and a highest evil, which is death. To seek the former, to protect and by emancipation from all limits to preserve it, and to avert the latter, is the highest law of nature. If now we imagine a number of men together, although the weakest and most stupid can take from the wisest and strongest his highest good, his life, yet they are nearly equal to one another in strength, intelligence, and experience. So likewise, in respect of the fact that each of them can do as he wills as well as the others, they are all equally free. The consequence of this similarity can only be mutual fear, mutual attempts at protection, in short war of all against all, of which the best expression is: *homo homini lupus* (*De cive*, I. 1, 3, 11, *Epist. dedic.*). Now it would be a self-contradiction, if man, to whom nature prescribed to protect himself, persevered in this condition; and since self-preservation is the first law of nature for individuals, so likewise it is nature's first law for a sum of individuals to seek security, *i.e.*, peace (II. 2); from which there springs the further consequence that that which is an indispensable condition of peace, is by that very fact laid down as a fundamental law of nature (I. 15, 1). Both in the treatise *De cive* (cap. 3) and in the *Leviathan* (c. 16) there are set up, in the former twenty, in the latter nineteen, of such fundamental laws, which follow as consequences of the above law of nature, inasmuch as if

treaties were not kept, if gratitude were not exercised, etc., the great final aim would not be reached. In closing, he gives the following as the simplest rule for finding out what to do : Let us always ask ourselves how we would wish that others should do to us. As security is incompatible with the natural freedom of all to do, each as he pleases, it only remains that each one should renounce this freedom on condition that the others do so also. This contract, therefore, is not, as has been said (*i.e.* by Aristotle and Grotius), a consequence of the social tendency or the love of one's fellows, but entirely of fear and care for one's own advantage (*De cive*, II. 4, I. 2). As such a contract would be mere absurdity without the security that others would be prevented by fear from violating it (V. 4), it is only possible, on condition that the power and freedom of all which has hitherto existed should be handed over to one (man or collection of men), under whom all now stand, and who has will and power instead of them (V. 8). By means of this act of subjection, through which government (*imperium, dominium*) takes the place of freedom, what has hitherto been a mere sum (*multitudo*) becomes a real unity, a person who has his will (V. 11). When this subjection is one set up by nature, and only founded upon force, we have patriarchal government, as it meets us in parental power, and in the government of slaves. When, on the other hand, it is self-determined and contracted (*institutiva*), we have a State (*civitas*), the combination in which the condition of nature in which man was free and therefore *homo homini lupus*, gives place to that of obligation, in which *homo homini Deus*. (*De cive, Epist. dedic.*)

6. The *Theory of the State* treats of production, which assumes the chief place ; for if man but reproduces the living being in his automata, in producing the State he but produces a giant-man, which we may compare with the : Let us make men ! (*Leviath., Introd.*) Just because the State is the work of man, there exists a demonstrative science of it, although it must be admitted, that before the treatise *De cive* was written, not even an attempt at such a science had been made. (*De hom.*, 10, 5 ; *De corp., Epist. dedic.*) The State is essentially different from the crowd, and it is a misfortune that the word people, which is synonymous with the former, is used by many to designate the crowd (*De cive*, 6, 1). As it is only by means of the *summum imperium* that the crowd becomes a people,

*i.e.*, a personality with a will, so the ruler is to be compared not with the head but with the soul of a body (*Ibid.*, 6, 19); indeed the sovereign is the people, and those who stand under him may not call themselves people, but subjects (12, 8). Inasmuch as in the primitive contract they have all deprived themselves of their power and will, they stand powerless over against the State; it is the Leviathan which swallows them all up, or to speak more respectfully, the mortal God, who like the immortal, rules according to his own good pleasure, and to whom we owe our peace and security (*Leviath.*, c. 17). It is only in and through the State that mine and thine exist, as in the state of nature each man regarded all things as his own and therefore none possessed anything as his own (*De cive*, 6, 5). Since attacks upon property are unlawful, freedom to protect oneself against them, on the other hand, lawful, it is only in the State that lawful and unlawful properly exist. In the state of nature might and right coincide. In the State, on the other hand, unright is what the sovereign forbids, right what he allows. Custom is a source of right only in so far as the sovereign has permitted that anything should become customary (*Leviath.*, c. 29). The laws of the State, since it is the establishment of peace and security, cannot be antagonistic to the fundamental law of nature, to seek peace and its consequences; on the other hand, they are opposed to the natural freedom of all, as limiting it. In general it is a great confusion to take the conceptions *lex* and *jus* as identical instead of contrasted. According as the sovereignty is exercised by means of a majority of votes, by a few, or by one, the State is a democracy, an aristocracy, or a monarchy. Those who desire to speak reproachfully say instead, ochlocracy, oligarchy, despotism. As the contract by which the State first came into existence was one in which the majority compelled the dissentient minority, so it may be said, that democracy preceded all forms of the State in time (*De cive*, 7, 1, 7). For the rest, to the question, Which is the best of these forms? it must be answered, that which actually exists (*Leviath.*, c. 42). Hobbes is never tired of expressing the opinion, that every attempt to change a form of government must end like the attempts at rejuvenescence of the daughters of Pelias. But whichever of these forms may be the existing one in any State, the sovereign has the unconditional right of command, the subject the unconditional duty of obedience, and this relation-



ship, since it was not the individual who concluded the contract with the State, can only cease when, as in the original contract, all individuals, the sovereign therefore included, declare their desire to return to the state of nature or war (*De cive*, 6, 20). War is a survival of the state of nature, even when the State conducts it against the aggressor for punishment. Its aim in doing so is to break down the opposition which it finds, and hence to improve the criminal, or at least others (*Leviath.*, c. 28). In general no distinction may be made between the natural law of men and of peoples. So-called national law is the right, the subject of which is not an individual, but a people, a moral personality (*De cive*, 14, 4, 5). As it is the State only, *i.e.* the sovereign, who gives rights to the subject, it is self-evident, that neither can the former do the latter injustice, nor conversely has the latter rights as against the former (*De cive*, 7, 14). But at the present time there are certain fundamental principles everywhere diffused, which are equally false and dangerous to the State, towards the eradication of which the State must do all in its power, but especially must take care that the schools and universities be not dominated in all things by the doctrine of Aristotle, whose *Politics* is the most dangerous, as his *Metaphysics* is the most absurd, of books (*Leviath.*, c. 46). The widespread error, that the individual possesses property which the sovereign dare not lay hands on, forgets that property only exists in the State, *i.e.* through the sovereign; the not less widely spread nonsense, that the sovereign is subject to laws, does not consider that only his will is law; of the third error, that power in the State must be divided, Bodin alone has seen, that this would destroy the State; a fourth, according to which the people or the people's representatives, are set up in opposition to the sovereign, as if he were not the sole representative of the people, in fact the people itself (*Leviath.*, c. 22), we owe especially to Aristotle, who in his preference for the republican form of State, asserts that only in it is the good of the ruled made the principle; in a monarchy, on the other hand, it is the good of the ruler. This is entirely false; in every form of State, the good of the people, *i.e.* of the State, is the supreme law (*De corp. pol.*, II. 8, 5). No error, however, is so dangerous as that which asserts that the subject may not act against his conscience, and therefore when the latter forbids him any-

thing, may not obey the command of his sovereign. As if the conscience must not much rather urge the maintenance of the primitive contract tending to peace (*De corp. polit.*, II. 6), and as if the ruler, solely and single, were not answerable for the consequences of his commands (*Leviath.*, c. 29 and 16). There is indeed one case in which one does not need to obey, but it is the only one; no one is bound to put himself to death, since self-preservation was the very aim of the formation of the State (*Leviath.*, c. 21).

7. As the politically dangerous doctrine of the right of private judgment has a stronghold through involving the question of *Religion*, Hobbes expresses himself at great length on religion, especially on the Christian religion, and the Church in the mediæval sense. In the *De cive*, chap. 15-17, and *Leviath.* c. 32-47, which are entirely devoted to this subject, it must always be remembered that the speaker is a member of the English national Church. Of the two ways in which God makes Himself perceptible to man, sound reason and revelation by His prophets, the former is sufficient to lead to the expression of reverence based (entirely) on the omnipotence of the Creator of the world, by external signs, words, and actions, under which latter, obedience to the commands of nature takes the first place (*Leviath.*, c. 31). In this cultus religion consists (*De hom.*, c. 14). The State shows that it is a person, by commanding the persons of which it consists to exercise their cult publicly and uniformly. The more experience teaches that nothing disturbs peace so much as difference on this point, so much the less may the State admit that, as it is expressed, it has claims only to the worldly and not to the spiritual sceptre. The spiritual power of the State, which results from sovereignty, and in virtue of which the sovereign prescribes the cult, must be, as people think, incompatible with a religion revealed by prophets, although, indeed, Christ never prophesied to kings, that by conversion to Christianity they would suffer loss in power or rights (*Leviath.*, c. 49). The very opposite must much rather be asserted. The history of the old Covenant shows a complete amalgamation of the spiritual and secular power in Moses, Joshua, and subsequently in the kings, while the prophets only attempted to restrict it in individual instances (*Leviath.*, c. 40). As regards Christ, however, our King, He became the latter only by His completed atonement, and therefore was

not so before His death ; moreover He Himself says, that the kingdom of which He is king, is not of this world ; it will only begin when he shall come to assume the kingly functions in that kingdom in which believers shall live for ever. Till then, He demands of us that we prepare ourselves for that kingdom, by obedience to the laws of the existing State (c. 41). So Christ. Just as God revealed Himself in Moses as *one* person, in Christ as a *second* person, He also revealed Himself in the Holy Ghost, *i.e.* the Apostles and their successors, as a *third* person. (*Persona* taken in its dramatic sense.) By the imposition of hands the office of Christ, to seek to win and prepare souls for the future kingdom, is by them ever further and further propagated. They are therefore teachers, witnesses (*Martyrs*) of that which they have seen, who because their office is to bring to belief, which suffers no compulsion, ought to have no power of compulsion, and therefore in general no power of force at all. Excommunication only excludes from the future kingdom. With the moment in which the sovereign of a State becomes a Christian, the hitherto persecuted community becomes a Church, by which therefore is to be understood a State composed of Christians, in which the subordination under the sovereign is quite the same as with the Jews and heathens. As Constantine was the first bishop of the Roman Empire, so likewise in every State composed of Christians, if it is a monarchy, it is the king alone who for that reason proclaims himself "by the grace of God," while the bishops standing under him, are so called "by the favour of his majesty." The king indeed does not baptize, etc., but only because he has other things to do. The State fixes what scriptures have canonical authority, what cult is to be exercised, and demands in this matter unconditional obedience ; it treats as a heretic, whoever capriciously gives public utterance to his private conviction in opposition to the doctrine authorised by the sovereign (c. 42). None of these doctrines can disturb the man who draws his religious teachings from the Bible, and learns from it, that for admission to the kingdom of heaven only two things are necessary, obedience and faith. The just, it is said, (not the unjust) shall live by faith. The sum of the obedience demanded by Christ is contained in His words : Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, etc. Again, the sum of all faith is contained in the saying,

that Jesus is the Christ, from which the whole baptismal formula may be easily deduced. Thus, if one considers that above (*sub* 5) all natural laws were comprised under one precept, it is clear, that it is impossible that a conflict should arise between the citizen and the Christian; and again, how a sovereign, even if he himself were not a Christian, should come to the point of forbidding his subjects to hope for a kingdom beyond the day of resurrection, but commanding them, till then to obey the laws of the State, cannot be conceived (c. 43). But they are not scriptural believers, who preach disobedience and rebellion, but the children of darkness, who partly do not understand the Bible, partly corrupt it by heathenism, false philosophy, and all sorts of tales and legends. Their chief error is, that they interchange the future kingdom of Christ and a present institution, which calls itself a Church, without being a particular (*i.e.* national) Church, in which consecrations, such as the Sacraments, are transformed into heathen magic, in which instead of the sole Biblical doctrine—that man who by Adam's fall became mortal, has received eternal life by faith, and therefore that after the resurrection unbelievers will first receive their punishment, but afterwards will undergo the second (*i.e.* real) death—an immortality of unbelievers is also preached, and to it fables of purgatory and the like are attached (*Lev.*, c. 44). All these errors, which are indeed very profitable to the Romish clergy, find perpetual nourishment in the fact, that people do not separate the spheres of faith and reason, that all sorts of physical doctrines which yet belong entirely to reason have been introduced into the doctrines of faith, and again, that people pry into faith, without considering, that where a thing is known, faith ends (*De hom.*, c. 14). But above all, these errors are nourished by the Aristotelianism which prevails at the universities and schools. The sole hope remains, that writings like the *Leviathan*, which teach a sound philosophy, should fall into the hands of a powerful prince, and that by him the fundamental principles therein developed, should be more and more introduced into practice (*Lev.*, 46, 47, 31).

## § 257.

## CONCLUDING REMARK.

Although the Reformation was designated above (§ 14) as

the epoch which divides the Middle Ages from modern times, this does not compel us to reckon Böhme, Bacon, and Hobbes, because they lived after it, indeed grew up in the religious conceptions which it caused to prevail, among modern philosophers. The fact that a new principle is made good in philosophy only after it has been made good in other spheres, that when that principle is very important and fertile this often happens very much later, is a consequence of the conception of philosophy (cf. *supra*, § 12), and showed itself in the first beginnings of Christian philosophy, which are separated by almost two hundred years from the appearance of Christianity itself. And again, we are taught not only by the example of Luther, who warred against philosophy, but also by that of Melancthon, who respected and taught it, that for them no other philosophy existed than the Aristotelianism of the Middle Ages, *i.e.*, of a time, to which they themselves had put an end in the sphere of religion. In all ages there have been such men, whose hearts outran their heads, or, whose hearts burned while their eyes were held fast, so that they knew not who it was that spoke to them; and therefore in and for itself it is no impossibility that children of the modern world and zealous Protestants should not have set themselves free in philosophy from the spirit of the Middle Ages. But that this, which is in itself possible, actually takes place in reference to the three individuals here in question, is the outcome of the content and character of their doctrine. It was mentioned above (§ 119) as the peculiarity of the Middle Ages, that through the opposition to the world the summons to become spiritual, had been transformed into the summons to become other-worldly. Thereby subjection to the world naturally acquires the character of being worldly, which in antiquity it had not had, and therefore, also, secular wisdom acquires the character of worldly wisdom. That modern times have to transcend this opposition, round which the Middle Ages revolve, has already been pointed out in treating of the latter, and will be the immediate subject of discussion in detail. Of any attempt at such transcendence there is no trace in the three individuals named. Böhme, with all his contempt of secular motives and all secular learning, remains no deeper fixed in this mediæval dualism than Bacon and Hobbes, with their contempt for the clergy and for clerical science. The number of historical expositions, in which they are exhibited

as beyond the limit of the Middle Ages, is very great ; especially in the cases of Bacon and Hobbes. The main reason seems to be their opposition to scholasticism. But if this is to be decisive, we must be as logically consistent as Ritter, who counts all the names of this transition period as modern. Even if this is to be the guiding point of view, and mediæval philosophy is to be taken as synonymous with scholasticism, the question arises : To what period do the Church Fathers belong ? who certainly were as little Schoolmen as Master Eckhart or Böhme, from whom they can only be distinguished by the fact that they were not yet, what the latter were no longer—Schoolmen. The place which is here ascribed to Bacon and Hobbes, namely that they close a period, also explains why, as is always the case with epoch-making systems, a circle of disciples and successors did not at once attach itself to them, but a long period had to elapse before the attention of later and much further advanced generations was directed to them. It is the same as with Nicolas of Cusa, regarding whom this reason might be added to those given in § 225, in order to justify his not being placed at the beginning of a period. Conversely, what was said at the end of that section may here be repeated word for word, in reference to Böhme, Bacon, and Hobbes. A glance back at the course which the philosophy of the Middle Ages has taken, shows that here also, as in antiquity, of the three periods which are separated from one another (§§ 121-148, 149-228, 229-256), the middle period not only shows the most systematic character, but is in general the most important. In it the three sub-periods, which were distinguished (§§ 152-177, 178-209, 210-228) repeat, on a smaller scale the differences of the patristic, scholastic, and transition period, and it need not cause surprise that the first thinker in the youthful period of scholasticism, Erigena, should recall in his philosophising the manner of the Church Fathers, and that the last in its period of decay should approximate to the philosophers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.



## INDEX TO VOLUME FIRST.

The larger numbers refer to the sections (§§), the smaller to the paragraphs; the asterisks indicate the chief sections and paragraphs. Vol. III. contains an Index to the entire work.

### A.

- Abel 144, 1.  
 Abelard 155, s. 160. 161\*. 163. 164.  
     165, s. 167. 169, 1. s. 173, 1. 175, 1.  
     184. 1. 194. 214, s. 216, s. 222, s.  
     246, s.  
 Abrabanel 190, s.  
 Abraham 134, 1.  
 Abubacer 186\*. 187, 1. 200, s.  
 Abucaten 189.  
 Abunazar *v.* Alfarabi.  
 Achillini 238, 1.  
 Acosta 249, s.  
 Adam 114, s. 156, 7. s. 195, s.  
 Adam, Brother 175, 1. 214, s. 216, 1.  
 Adami 246, 1.  
 Adelard of Bath 160. 191.  
 Ægidius Colonna 197, s. 204, s. 208,  
     s. 214, s. 217, s.  
 Ægidius of Lessines 204, s.  
 Æneas of Gaza 146\*.  
 Ænesidemus 102\*.  
 Agathon 72, s.  
 Agricola 232, s. 239, s.  
 Agrippa 102, s.  
 Agrippa of Nettesheim 206, 11. 237,  
     s\*. 242, s.  
 d'Ailly, Pierre 218. 219\*. 220, 1. s. 4.  
     221.  
 Alanus 167. 170\*. 194.  
 Alberich 175, 1.  
 Alberti 63 Lit.  
 Albertus Magnus 194. 199-201\*.  
     202. 203, 1. s. s. s. 9. 204, s. 205.  
     208, s. 7. 210. 211. 212, s. 214, s.  
     s. 215, 220, s. 247.  
 Alcher 173, s.  
 Alcibiades 63, s. 65.  
 Alcinous 237, s.
- Alcuin 147. 195, 2.  
 Alemannus, Herm. 191.  
 Alexander, Bishop 140, s.  
 Alexander of Aphrodisias 200, s.  
 Alexander of Hales 194. 195\*. 196.  
     197, 1. s. 198. 201, s. 202. 204, s.  
     212, s. 220, s.  
 Alexander the Great 83. 108.  
 Alexandre 237, 1 Lit.  
 Alexinus 68, 1.  
 Alfarabi 183\*. 184. 190, 1. 191.  
     200, 1.  
 Alfred 154, 1.  
 Algazel 185\*. 186. 190, s. 191. 195,  
     1. s.  
 Alhazen 212, s. s. 7.  
 Alkendi 182\*. 183. 190, s.  
 d'Allemand 101, s Lit.  
 Alpetrongi 191.  
 Alsted 206, 11.  
 Amafinius 96, s.  
 Amalrich 174. 176\*. 177. 185. 192.  
     220, s. s.  
 Ambrosius 143\*. 144, 1. 147. 154,  
     s. 195, s.  
 Amelius 128, s. 129, 1.  
 Ammonius 83 Lit.  
 Ammonius *v.* Saccas.  
 Amort 231, s.  
 St. Amour, William of 203, s.  
 Anastasius 142.  
 Anaxagoras 24, s. 28, 1. s. 47, s.  
     49. 50. 51. 52\*. 53. 58, 1. 63.  
     64. 70. 74, 1. 77, s. 78, s. 92. 94.  
 Anaximander 24\*. 25. 26, 1. 28, s.  
     31. 32, s. 43, s. 44. 52, s. 88, s.  
 Anaximenes 26\*. 27. 28, s. 37. 44.  
     52, 1. 192.  
 Andreæ 214, s.



- Andronicus 91.  
 Anjou, Carl of 203, 1. 208, 1.  
 Anniceris 70, 2. 74, 2.  
 Anselm 155, 2. 156\*. 157. 159, 1.  
 194. 195, 2. 206, 2. 222, 2. 223.  
 Anselm of Laon 159.  
 Antimoirus 57.  
 Antiochus 101, 2\*. 102, 1. 106, 1.  
 Antipater 97, 1.  
 Antiphon 57.  
 Antisthenes 63, 2. 72\*. 73.  
 Antoninus Pius 134, 1.  
 Anytus 65.  
 Apollinaris 140, 2. 142.  
 Apollodorus 26, 1. 34, 1.  
 Apollonius of Tyana 110.  
 Apuleius 111. 113, 2.  
 Aquila, Julius 147.  
 Aquila, Peter of, 214, 1a.  
 Arcesilaus 80. 101\*.  
 Archelaus 52, 1. 53. 63, 1.  
 Archimedes 250.  
 Archytas 31. 32, a. 110.  
 Areopagite v. Dionysius.  
 Arevola 147 Lit.  
 Aristippus 63, 2. 70\*. 72, 2. 96, 4.  
 Aristo 74, 1. 91. 97, 1.  
 Aristocles 74, 1.  
 Aristodemus 64, 2.  
 Aristophanes 75, 2.  
 Aristotle I. 15 Note. 16. 22. 23. 24, 2.  
 26, 1. 32, 1. 34, 2. 35. 36, 1. 41.  
 48. 49. 51. 52, 2. 61. 64, 2. 67.  
 69. 74, 1. 76, 2. 77, 1. 7. 81. 82.  
 83-90\*. 92. 93. 94. 96. 97, 2. 2. 4.  
 98. 103, 2. 112. 114, 2. 127. 128,  
 2. 2. 4. 154, 2. 161, 2. 163, 1. 164, 1. 2.  
 173, 1. 175, 1. 180. 181. 182.  
 184, 2. 4. 187, 2. 2. 189. 190, 2.  
 192. 193. 194. 195, 1. 2. 198. 200,  
 1. 2. 2. 201, 1. 202. 203, 2. 211.  
 212, 2. 2. 4. 2. 213. 214, 2. 215, 1.  
 216, 4. 7. 219, 4. 222, 2. 2. 232, 2.  
 237, 1. 2. 2. 238, 2. 239, 2. 2. 4. 242,  
 2. 4. 243, 4. 246, 1. 2. 247, 2. 248, 4.  
 249, 2. 2. 254, 2. 256, 2.  
 Aristoxenus 91.  
 Arius 137, 1. 140, 2.  
 Arnobius 135, 4.  
 Arrianus 97, 1.  
 Artemon 58, 1.  
 Asclepius 83.  
 Ast 13 Note. 75, 2.  
 Asterius 140, 2.  
 Astralabius 161, 2.  
 Athanasius 137, 1. 139. 140\*. 141.  
 142. 143. 194.  
 Athenagoras 134, 2.  
 Atticus 104. 111, 2.  
 Augustine 16 Note. 143. 144\*. 147.  
 148. 154, 2. 4. 156, 2. 158. 165, 2.  
 169, 2. 195, 2. 2. 196. 197, 2. 202.  
 206, 2. 214, 2. 2. 220, 4. 237, 2.  
 246, 2. 248, 2.  
 Aureolus 215.  
 Auvergne, William of 193.  
 Avempace 186\*. 187. 200, 2.  
 Avendeath 191.  
 Avennasar v. Alfarabi.  
 Avicebron 188\*. 200, 2.  
 Avicenna 153. 184\*. 187, 2. 191.  
 193. 195, 1. 2. 200, 1. 2. 203, 2. 2.  
 214, 2. 223. 241, 2. 242, 2.  
 Averrës 153. 184. 185. 187\*. 190,  
 2. 191. 192. 193. 195, 1. 199, 1.  
 200, 1. 2. 2. 204, 4. 212, 2. 4. 214,  
 2. 237, 2. 238, 1. 2.  
 B.  
 Baader, Fr. v. 234, 2.  
 Bach 231 Lit.  
 Bachsmeier 233, 4.  
 Bacon, Francis 88, 1. 249\*. 250, 1. 2.  
 257.  
 Bacon, Nicholas 249, 1.  
 Bacon, Roger 182. 184. 191. 211.  
 212\*. 213. 219, 1. 223.  
 Baconthorp 238, 1.  
 Baguet 97, 1.  
 Balentyne 15 Note.  
 Barach 158 Lit. 159 Lit.  
 Bardesanes 123, 2.  
 Bartholmæss 247 Lit.  
 Basilides 123, 1\*. 124.  
 Basilus 141. 195, 2. 2.  
 Basingstocke 191.  
 Bassolis 214, 10.  
 Baumhauer 54 Lit.  
 v. Baur 110 Lit. 124 Lit. 216, 2.  
 Bayle 13 Note. 239, 1. 254, 2.  
 Beatrice 208, 2. 2. 2.  
 Beausobre 122 Lit.  
 Beauvais, Vincent of 204, 2\*.  
 Beauvoir, Armand of 217, 1.

Becket, Thomas à 175, 2.  
 Beda 147. 153. 195, 2.  
 Bekker, Imm. 103, 1 Lit.  
 Bellarmin 252, 2.  
 Bendixen 89, 2 Lit.  
 Benedict XII. 219, 2.  
 Berengar of Tours 155, 2\*. 2.  
 Bergk 45 Lit.  
 Bernard of Chartres 159, 2\*. 160.  
 162. 163, 1. 2. 175, 1.  
 Bernard, St. 161, 1. 2. 163, 1. 169, 1.  
 195, 2. 2. 197, 2. 231, 2.  
 Bernays 43 Lit. 84. 90, 2 Lit.  
 Berthold, Brother 212, 2.  
 Beryll of Bostra 137, 1.  
 Bessarion 237, 1.  
 Beza 247, 1.  
 Biedermann, Bened. 233, 2.  
 Biel 217, 2.  
 Biese 85 Lit.  
 Bigne, de la 147 Lit.  
 Bindemann 144 Lit.  
 Bischof 233, 2 Lit.  
 Blanc 208, 2.  
 Blyson 43, 1.  
 Böckh 31. 32 Lit. 78 Lit. 78, 2. 2.  
 Bodin 254, 2\*. 2. 2. 255. 256, 2.  
 Boëthius (Boetius) 147\*. 151. 161,  
 1. 163, 2. 165, 2. 175, 1. 195, 2. 200,  
 1. 201, 2. 247, 1.  
 Boëthius 91.  
 Böhm 107 Lit.  
 Böhme, Jacob. 234\*. 257.  
 Böhmer 146. 208, 2. 230, 2 Lit. 2.  
 Lit.  
 Böhringer 140 Lit.  
 Bolognetus 252, 1.  
 Bonaventura 194. 196. 197\*. 198.  
 202. 203, 1. 204, 2. 214, 2. 215.  
 220, 2. 223.  
 Boniface VIII. 204, 2. 208, 1. 2.  
 Bonitz 84. 86, 2 Lit. 87 Lit.  
 Borgia 253, 2.  
 Bouillé Bovillus 237, 2.  
 Bradwardine, Thomas 217, 1.  
 Brandis 16 Note. 32 Lit. 34 Lit. 64  
 Lit. 84 Lit. 87 1 Lit. 88, 2.  
 Braniss 13 Note.  
 Breier 52 Lit.  
 Breul du 147 Lit.  
 Brosseus 147.  
 Brucker 13 Note.

Brumley 234, 2.  
 Brunetto Latini 208, 1.  
 Bruno, Giordano 206, 11. 245. 247\*.  
 248. 249, 2. 253, 2.  
 Brunswick, Julian of 247, 1.  
 Brutus 104.  
 v. Büнау 246, 1.  
 Buhle 13 Note.  
 Bulæus 149 Lit. 176. 195, 1. 219, 1.  
 Bunsen 135, 2.  
 Buridanus 204, 2. 217, 2.  
 Burleigh, Walter 214, 10.

## C.

Cæsalpinus 238, 2. 239, 2. 243, 2.  
 Cæsar, 208, 2. 253, 2.  
 Cain 144, 7.  
 Cajetan 231, 2.  
 Callippus 88, 2.  
 Calisthenes 83.  
 Campanella 245. 246\*. 250. 252, 2.  
 253, 2.  
 Can grande 208, 1.  
 Candalla 113, 2 Lit.  
 Cantimpré 191.  
 Capella, Martianus 147\*. 158.  
 Capreolus 204, 2.  
 Cardanus 182. 242\*. 243, 2. 2. 244,  
 2. 245. 246, 2. 249, 2.  
 Carneades 97, 1.  
 Carpocrates 124.  
 Carrière 226 Lit.  
 Casiri 182 Lit. 184. 185. 187.  
 Cassiodorus 147\*. 165, 2. 195, 2.  
 Cassius 104.  
 Cato 101, 2. 104.  
 Cavalcanti 208, 1.  
 Cavellus 214, 2.  
 Cebes 32, 2.  
 Celsus 111, 2.  
 Cerinthus 122. 123.  
 Chærephon 63, 1. 2.  
 Champeaux, William of 159, 1\*. 2.  
 160. 161, 1. 2. 163, 2. 185.  
 Chappuis, 72 Lit.  
 Charlemagne 152. 178. 227.  
 Charles 212 Lit.  
 Charles the Bald 154, 1.  
 Charmantidas 60, 1.  
 Charmidas 101, 2.  
 Charmides 63, 2.  
 Charpentier 239, 2.

Charron 248, s\*. 4.  
 Chasdai v. Crescas.  
 Christlieb 154 Lit.  
 Chrysanthius 129, 2.  
 Chrysippus 97, 1\*. 4. 101, 2.  
 Chrysostomus 144, 5.  
 Cicero 16. 22. 84. 96, 2. 5. 97, 2. 4.  
 101, 2. 2. 105. 106\*. 110. 115.  
 126. 144, 1. 161. 4. 175, 1. 2. 195,  
 2. 206, 11. 239, 2. 2.  
 Claudianus 147. 170, 2.  
 Cleanthes 97, 1. 4.  
 Clemens, F. J. 224 Lit. 247 Lit.  
 Clement IV. (Pope) 212, 1.  
 Clement VII. (Pope) 253, 2.  
 Clement of Alexandria 16 Note.  
 34, 1. 113. 123, 2. 136\*. 137.  
 237, 2.  
 Clement of Rome 123, 2.  
 Cleon 53.  
 Clichtovius 237, 5.  
 Clitomachus 101, 2.  
 Cœlestius 144, 5.  
 Colebroke 15 Note.  
 Comestor, Petrus 169, 1.  
 Commodus 135, 4.  
 Conches, William of 155, 4. 162. 175,  
 1. 223.  
 Connanus 252, 1.  
 Constantinus, Emperor 256, 7.  
 Constantius Africanus 155, 4. 191.  
 Contarini 238, 2.  
 Copernicus 247, 1. 256, 4.  
 Cornutus 97, 1.  
 Costa Ben Luce (Constabulus) 181.  
 Cousin 13 Note. 34 Lit. 158 Lit.  
 159. 160. 161, 2.  
 Covarruvius 252, 1.  
 Crantor 80.  
 Crates 72, 1. 80. 97, 1. 101, 2.  
 Cratippus 91.  
 Cratylus 44. 74, 1.  
 Cremona, Gerh. v. 191.  
 Cremonini 238, 1.  
 Crescas 190, 2.  
 Critias 57.  
 Critolaus 91. 97, 1.  
 Cusanus v. Nicolaus.  
 Cyprian 135, 4\*. 139. 144, 1. 195, 2.  
 Cyril 142.

## D.

Dähne 112 Lit.  
 Damascenus, Jo. 146\*. 173, 1. 195,  
 2. 216, 4.  
 Damascius 130, 2.  
 Damon 63, 1.  
 Dante 205. 207. 208\*. 209. 210.  
 246, 2. 253, 4.  
 David, Jew 189. 191.  
 David of Dinant 192\*. 223 .  
 Decker 22 Lit.  
 Degerando 13 Note.  
 Democedes 31.  
 Democritus 47\*. 52, 1. 58, 1. 96,  
 2. 192. 239, 1. 247, 5. 249, 2.  
 Dexinus 34, 1.  
 Deycks 68 Lit.  
 Dicaiarchus 91.  
 Dieterici 183 Lit.  
 Diodorus of Tyre 91.  
 Diodotus 106, 1.  
 Diogenes Laertius 16 Note. 96, 1.  
 97, 1. 99, 1. 101, 2.  
 Diogenes of Apollonia 28\*. 39.  
 Diogenes the Cynic 72, 1.  
 Diogenes the Stoic 97, 1.  
 Dion 74, 2.  
 Dionysius (jun.) 79, 2.  
 Dionysius (sen.) 74, 2.  
 Dionysius the Areopagite 146\*. 154,  
 2. 208, 7. 237, 2.  
 Dionysius the Great 137, 1. 195, 2.  
 Dionysodorus 57. 60.  
 Dioscurus 142.  
 Doering 90, 2.  
 St. Dominicus, 173, 2.  
 Draco 74, 1.  
 Dreydorff 237, 2 Lit.  
 Duehring 13 Note.  
 Dux 224 Lit.  
 Dumbleton (Jo.) 214, 10.  
 Duns Scotus 194. 197, 2. 204, 2.  
 213. 214\*. 215. 216, 4. 2. 222, 2.  
 247, 2.  
 Durand 215. 217, 2.

## E.

Eber, Paul 232, 2.  
 Eckhart, Master 230\*. 231, 2. 234, 2.  
 257.  
 Ecphantus 32, 2.

Eisler 181 Lit.  
 Elias 134, 1.  
 Elizabeth of England 247, 1. 249, 1.  
 Empedocles 24, 2. 28, 2. 40, 2. 44.  
 45\*. 47, 2. 52, 1. 2. 60, 1. 73. 78,  
 2. 88, 2. 90, 2. 126. 148. 249, 2.  
 Am Ende 233, 2 Lit.  
 Engelhardt 146 Lit. 172 Lit. 231  
 Lit.  
 Epicharmus 74, 1.  
 Epictetus 97, 1. 4.  
 Epicurus 96\*. 107. 1. 2.  
 Erasmus 107, 2.  
 Erigena 154\*. 155. 165, 2. 176.  
 182. 194. 205. 222, 2. 224, 2. 2.  
 225.  
 Essex, Earl of 249, 1.  
 Euandrus 101, 1.  
 Eubulides 68, 1.  
 Euclid of Megara 63, 2. 68\*.  
 Eudemus 91.  
 Eudoxus 80. 88, 2.  
 Eugenius IV. (Pope) 244, 1.  
 Euhemerus 70, 2. 96, 2.  
 Eunomius 141.  
 Euripides 52, 1. 63, 1. 2. 45.  
 Eurymedon 83.  
 Eurystratus 26.  
 Eurytus 31. 32, 4. 2.  
 Eusebius 16 Note. 113, 1. 127. 128,  
 2. 140, 2.  
 Eustachius 128, 2.  
 Euthydemus 57. 60. 164, 1.  
 Eutyches 142. 203, 1.  
 Eve 114, 2. 195, 2.

## F

Faber Stapulensis 237, 2.  
 Fabricius 16 and Note. 103, 2.  
 Falaquera, Ibn 188.  
 Faustus 144, 1.  
 Fechner, H. A. 234 Lit.  
 Felix, Minucius 135, 2.  
 Feldner 233, 2 Lit.  
 Fichte, J. G. 13. 213.  
 Fiorentino 238 Lit.  
 Fischer, Kuno 249 Lit.  
 Floria, Joachim of 176.  
 Forchhammer 65 Lit.  
 Fornerius 147.  
 Foss 60 Lit.  
 Franck, Sebastian 233, 2\*. 2.

Fredegisus 153.  
 Frederick II. (Emperor) 191, 2.  
 Frey 58 Lit.  
 Fritzsche 135, 2 Lit.  
 Fulbert 155, 2.  
 Fulco of Neuilly 173, 2.  
 Fülleborn 34, 1.

## G

Gaetano da Tiene 238.  
 Galenos 16. 91. 181. 195, 2. 241,  
 242, 2.  
 Galilei 155, 2. 246, 2. 250. 256, 2.  
 Gannaco, Bernard de 204, 2.  
 Garve 89 Lit.  
 Gass 237, 1 Lit.  
 Gassendi 239, 1. 256, 2.  
 Gaunilo 156, 2.  
 Gedike 16 Note.  
 Geel 54 Lit.  
 Geffers 101, 1. 2 Lit.  
 Gennadius 204, 2. 237, 1.  
 Gentilis, Albericus 254, 2\*. 2. 255.  
 Gerard Odo 214, 10.  
 v. Gerbel 253 Lit.  
 Gerbert 155.  
 Gerson 218. 220\*. 223. 225. 231, 2.  
 Gersonides 187. 190, 2\*. 2.  
 Gervinus 253 Lit.  
 Gfrörer 112 Lit.  
 Gichtel 234, 2.  
 Gilbert 250.  
 Gilbertus Porretanus 153. 163\*. 164.  
 166. 173, 1. 175, 1. 187, 1. 194.  
 198. 200, 2. 214, 2.  
 Gladisch 17 Note. 32, 2.  
 Glaser 84. 87, 1 Lit.  
 Goclenius 239, 2.  
 Godefroy de Fontaines 204, 2.  
 Goethals 204, 2.  
 Goethe 90, 2.  
 Goettling 89, 2.  
 Gorgias 57. 60\*. 61. 72, 2. 76, 2.  
 Gosche 185 Lit.  
 Gottschalk 154, 1.  
 Gratian 169, 1.  
 Gregory 231, 2.  
 Gregory VII. (Pope) 155, 2. 219, 2.  
 227.  
 Gregory of Nazianzus 141. 146. 195,  
 2.  
 Gregory of Nyssa 141. 154, 2.

Gregory the Great (Pope) 165, a.  
 195, a. 197, a. 208, 1.  
 Grial 147 Lit.  
 Geert de Groot 224, 1. 231, 4.\*  
 Grosch 97, 4 Lit.  
 Grossetête (Grosseteste), Robt. 191.  
 212, 1.  
 Grossmann 114 Lit.  
 Grotius (Hugo de Groot) 254, 1. 4-8\*.  
 255. 256, 5.  
 Gruppe 78, 4.  
 Guido of Ravenna 208, a.

## H.

Haarbrücker 181 Lit.  
 Hagen 226 Lit.  
 Hain 195, 1 Lit.  
 Halevi 190, a.  
 Hamberger 234 Lit.  
 Haneberg 182. 189 Lit.  
 Hartel 135, 4.  
 Hartwin 175, 1.  
 Hase 233, 3 Lit.  
 Hasse 156 Lit.  
 Hauréau 149 Lit. 165 Lit. 195, a.  
 Hegel 13 Note. 234, a.  
 Hegesias 70, a. 101, 1.  
 Hegesibulus 52, 1.  
 Hegesistratus 47, 1.  
 Heinrich 123, 3 Lit.  
 Heinze 97 Lit.  
 Heiric (Eric) of Auxerre 158.  
 van Helmont 241, 1a.  
 Heloise 161, 1.  
 Hemming 252, 4\*.  
 Hemsén 52 Lit.  
 Hennequin 247, 1.  
 Henry of Ghent 214, a. 215.  
 Henry II. Emperor 227.  
 Henry VII. Emperor 208, 1.  
 Henry II. of England 175, 2.  
 Henry III. of France 247, 1.  
 Heraclides Ponticus 80.  
 Heracleon 123, 2.  
 Heraclitus 34, 1. 40, a. 42. 43\*. 44.  
 45, 1. 46. 58, 1. 2. 63, 1. 82. 88, 1.  
 97, a. 134, 1.  
 Herbart 106, 2.  
 Herennius 128, 1.  
 Hermann, C. F. 75, a. 101, 3 Lit.  
 Hermann, Conrad 13 Lit.  
 Hermann of Tournay 159.

Hermarchus 96, a. [237, a.  
 Hermes Trismegistus 113, 1.\* 195, a.  
 Hermias 83.  
 Hermias (Philosopher) 118  
 Hermogenes 63, a.  
 Hermotimus 52, 1.  
 Hervæus Natalis 203, a. 204, a.  
 Hesiod 24, a.  
 Hestæus 80.  
 van Heusde, 76 Lit.  
 Hilaire, Barthélemy, St. 89, 2.  
 Hilary 141. 143\*.  
 Hildebert of Tours 159, 1.  
 Hildenbrandt 98, 3 Lit.  
 Hilgenfeld 123, 3 Lit.  
 Hincmar of Rheims 154, 1.  
 Hipler 146.  
 Hippasus 31. 37, a.  
 Hippasus 57. 61\*. 76, a.  
 Hippo 22.  
 Hippocrates 241, a.  
 Hippodamus 89, 2.  
 Hippolytus 6 Note. 123, a. 135 a\*.  
 Hiquæus 24, a.  
 Hirsche, 2; 1, 4 Lit.  
 Hjort 154 Lit.  
 Hobbes 256 1-7\*. 257.  
 Hock 15, 3 Lit.  
 Hofman, Melchior 233, a.  
 Holkot 217, a.  
 Holzhar 107 Lit.  
 Home 43, a.  
 Honan 155, a. 181.  
 Huber 131 Lit. 154 Lit.  
 Hugo of St. Victor 162. 164. 165\*.  
 66. 167. 169, 1. 2. 172, 1. 2. 175, 1.  
 194. 195, 2. 3. 196. 197, 2. 4. 198.  
 220, a.  
 Humbert 204, a.  
 Humboldt 250.

## I.

Ibn Ezra 188.  
 Innocent III. (Pope) 219, a. 227.  
 Irenæus 123, a. 135, a\*.  
 Isaac, Judæus 195, a.  
 Isaac of Stella 173, a.  
 Isidorus Gnosticus 123, 1.  
 Isidorus Hispalensis 147\*. 153.  
 165, a.  
 Isidorus Neo. Plat. 130, a.  
 Ithagènes 38, 1.

## J.

James (Apostle) 178.  
 James I. of England 249, 1.  
 James of Majorca 206.  
 Jamblichus 31. 126. 127. 129\*.  
 237, 2.  
 Jandunus 214, 10. 216, 1. 238.  
 Jerome St. 143\*. 147. 165, 2. 195,  
 2. 3. 204, 2.  
 Joël 114 Lit. 181 Lit. 190, 1 Lit.  
 Johannitus v. Honein.  
 John of London 212, 1.  
 John XXI. (Pope) 204, 2.  
 Jonsius 16 and Note.  
 Jordanus 199, 1.  
 Joscelin of Soissons 160.  
 Jourdain 191 Lit.  
 Judas 208, 2.  
 Julian 129, 2.  
 Justinian 130, 2. 142.  
 Justin Martyr 16 Note. 134, 1\*.  
 137, 1. 2.

## K.

Kaltenborn 252 Lit.  
 Kant 11. 13.  
 Karsten 34 Lit.  
 Keim 111, 2. Lit.  
 Kirchner 128 Lit. 129, 2.  
 Knuber 233, 4.  
 Kober 234, 1.  
 Krische 87 Lit.  
 Krohn 63 Lit. 79 Lit.  
 Krug 16 Note.  
 Krusicke 233, 4.  
 Kühn 86, 2.

## L.

Lactantius 113, 2. 135, 4\*. 143.  
 Lacydes 101, 1.  
 Lambert of Auxerre 204, 2.  
 Lanfranc 155. 156.  
 Lasaulx 64 Lit.  
 Lassalle 43 and Lit.  
 Lasson 230 Lit. 1. 249, 2.  
 Lautensack 233, 4.  
 Lavinheta 206, 11.  
 Laynez 252, 2.  
 Lead, Jane 234, 2.  
 Leibnitz 206, 11. 239, 4.  
 Leo X. (Pope) 238, 1. 253, 2.

Leo the Great (Pope) 142. 144, 2.  
 147.  
 Less 252, 2.  
 Lessing 90, 2.  
 Leucippus 47\*. 52, 1. 58, 2.  
 Lewes 13 Lit. 88 Lit.  
 Liebig 249, 2.  
 Liebner 165 Lit.  
 Lipsius 122 Lit.  
 Lipsius, Justus 239, 1.  
 Lombard, Peter 167. 169\*. 173,  
 2. 195, 2.  
 Lommatzsch 45 Lit.  
 Longinus 128, 1. 2.  
 Lorenzana 147.  
 Louis XI. 217, 1.  
 Louis XIII. 254, 4.  
 Lucretius 96, 2\*. 247, 2. 2.  
 Lucullus 104.  
 Lully 185. 205. 206\*. 207. 242, 2.  
 246, 4. 247, 1. 2. 2.  
 Luther 232, 1. 2. 233, 1\*. 2. 4. 241, 2.  
 246, 2. 257.  
 Lutterbeck 108 Lit.  
 Lychetus 214, 2.  
 Lyco 65. 91.  
 Lyra, Nicolaus de 214, 10.  
 Lysis 32, 2.

## M.

Macarius 203, 1.  
 Machaon 83.  
 Machiavelli 89, 2. 246, 2. 253\*.  
 Macrobius 195, 2.  
 Maehly 61 Lit.  
 Magnenus 239, 1.  
 Mahancuria, Peter de 212, 1.  
 Maiandrius 58, 1.  
 Maimonides 190, 1\*. 2. 2. 201, 4.  
 Manegold of Lauterbach 159.  
 Manfred 191.  
 Mani 124.  
 Marbach 13 Note.  
 Marcion the Gnostic 123, 2. 125.  
 Marcus Aurelius 97, 1. 4. 119. 134, 1.  
 Mariana 252, 2.  
 Marinus 130, 2.  
 de la Marre 204, 2.  
 Marsilius Ficinus 113, 2. 232, 2. 237,  
 2\*. 2. 244, 2.  
 Marsilius of Inghen 204, 2. 217, 2.  
 Marsilius of Padua 216, 1.

Marta 246, 1.  
 Martensen 230 Lit.  
 Martianus v. Capella.  
 Martin 78 Lit.  
 Massuet 122 Lit.  
 Mathilda 208, s.  
 Matter 122 Lit.  
 Mauritius Hispanus 192.  
 Maximus Confessor 111, s. 129, s. 146\*. 154, s. 246, s.  
 Mayro, Franciscus 214, 10.  
 Medici, Lorenzo dei 253, s. s.  
 Melanchthon 232, 3\*. 233, s. s. & 252, s\*. & 254, s. 257.  
 Meletus 65.  
 Melissus 37. 38\*. 43, s.  
 Ménard 113, s Lit.  
 Menedemus 68, 1. 101, s.  
 Mentzius 70 Lit.  
 Mersenne 256, 1.  
 Methodius 128, s. 137, s\*.  
 Meton 45, 1.  
 Metrodorus 96, s.  
 Meyer, J. Bona 88, s Lit.  
 Michelet 89 Lit.  
 Michelis 13 Note. 76 Lit.  
 Middletown, Richard of 204, s. 214, s.  
 Mnesarchus 31.  
 Mocenigo 244, 1.  
 Moderatus 110.  
 Moehler 131, 140.  
 Moeller, E. W. 121 Lit. 124.  
 Moerbeka, William of 191.  
 Mohl, Robert of 253 Lit.  
 Molina 252, s.  
 Monica 144, 1.  
 Montaigne 248, s\*. s. & s. 254, s.  
 Montesquieu 89, s.  
 Morlay, Alfred of 191.  
 Mortagne, Walter of 160.  
 Moses 114, s. s.  
 Mosheim 122, Lit.  
 Müller, Ad. 72 Lit.  
 Müller, M. Jos. 187, 1 Lit. s.  
 Mullach 16 Note. 47 Lit. 52 Lit.  
 Munck 181 Lit. 185. 187, 1. 190, 1.  
 Mundt 253 Lit.  
 Munk 75, s Lit.  
 Musonius 97, 1.  
 Musmann 118 Lit.

## N.

Naudæus 238, 1.  
 Neander 122 Lit.  
 Nemesius 146\*.  
 Nestorius 142. 203, v.  
 Nicolaus of Basel 230, s.  
 Nicolaus of Cusa 223. 224\*. 225. 231, & 233, & 237, s. 242, s. 247, 1, s. 4, s. 257.  
 Nicolaus I. (Pope) 154, 1.  
 Nicolaus V. (Pope) 224, s.  
 Nicomachus 83. 110.  
 Niebuhr 74, 1.  
 Nigidius Figulus 110.  
 Niphus 238.  
 Nizolius 239, s. 247, s.  
 Nopitsch 233, s.  
 Numenius 127\*.

## O.

Occam 190, s. 204, s. 215. 216\*. 217, 1. s. 220, s. 222, s. 223.  
 Ocellus 31. 32, s. 110.  
 Odon of Cambray 159, 1.  
 Oehler 135, & Lit.  
 Oldenbarnevelde 254, &  
 Oldendorp 252, s\*.  
 Olympiodorus 74 Lit. 130, s.  
 Opel 233, & s Lit.  
 Oporinus 241, 10.  
 Orelli 96, 1.  
 Origen 16 Note. 123, s. 128, 1. 137, 1 and s\*. 140, s. 154, s. 193. 203, s. 237, s.  
 Orpheus 113, 1. 192.  
 Orthomenes 34, 1.  
 Osiander 233, 1. &  
 Otto I. (Emperor) 227.  
 Otto III. (Emperor) 155, s.  
 Otto of Clugny 158.  
 Ostia, Henry of 176.  
 Oxenstierna 254, &  
 Oyta, Henry of 220, s.  
 Ozanam 208 Lit.

## P.

Palæologus, John 237, s.  
 Panætius 97, 1.  
 Pancratius 241, 10.  
 Pantæus 136.  
 Panzerbieter 28 Lit. 45 Lit.  
 Papencordt 47 Lit.

Paracelsus 233, 4. 241\*. 242, 2. 2. 243, 2. 2. 246, 2. 247, 2. 249, 4.  
 Paravia 231, 4.  
 Parmenides 36\*. 37. 38. 40. 44. 45, 1. 77, 1.  
 Parthey 113, 2.  
 Paschasius 154, 1. 155, 2.  
 Patritius 113, 2. 182. 244\*. 245. 246, 2. 247, 2.  
 Paul (Apostle) 107, 1. 115. 122. 178.  
 Pelagius 156, 2. 158.  
 Pericles 49. 52, 1. 74, 1.  
 Persius 97, 1.  
 Peter (Apostle) 115. 178.  
 Petersen 96, 1. 97 Lit.  
 Petrarca 238, 1.  
 Petrus Hispanus 204, 2\*.  
 Petrus Venerabilis 161, 1. 2.  
 Peyron 45 Lit.  
 Pfeiffer 230, 1.  
 Phædrus 96, 2. 106, 1.  
 Phaleas 89, 2.  
 Pherecydes 31. 123, 1.  
 Philinus, 103, 1.  
 Philip II. 246, 1.  
 Philip of Macedon 83.  
 Philippus Opuntius 80.  
 Philo Judæus 113, 2. 114\*. 115. 122, 1. 127. 154, 2. 180. 222, 2.  
 Philo of Larissa 101, 2. 106, 1.  
 Philodemus 96, 2.  
 Philolaus 31. 32, 4. 63, 1. 97, 2.  
 Philoponus 146\*. 187, 2.  
 Philostratus, 61. 110.  
 Photinus 142.  
 Piccolomini 238, 1. 239, 4.  
 Pico, Francis 237, 2.  
 Pico, John 232, 2. 237, 2\*. 4.  
 Piso 104.  
 Pius V. (Pope) 247, 1.  
 Plato 16. 30. 32, 2. 45, 1. 46. 61. 63, 2. 67. 68, 1. 73. 74-80\*. 81. 82. 83. 85, 1. 2. 86, 1. 2. 87, 2. 4. 2. 88, 1. 2. 8. 89, 1. 2. 90, 1. 94. 97, 2. 98. 106, 2. 111, 2. 112. 113, 1. 114, 2. 2. 123. 124. 127. 128, 2. 2. 4. 130, 1. 2. 134, 1. 136. 140, 2. 156, 2. 161, 2. 4. 181. 182. 187, 4. 2. 195, 2. 237, 2. 239, 2. 242, 4. 244, 2. 247, 2. 249, 2. 2.  
 Pletho, Georgius Gemistus 237, 1\*. 2.

Pliny 107, 1. 147. 249, 2.  
 Plotinus 126. 127. 128\*. 130, 1. 2. 2. 4. 144, 2. 148. 203, 7. 237, 2.  
 Plutarch 16 Note. 111\*. 127. 129, 1. 192. 248, 2.  
 Plutarch (son of Nestorius) 130, 1.  
 Poitiers, Peter of 169, 2\*. 173, 2.  
 Polemo 80. 97, 1.  
 Polus 57. 61.  
 Pomponatius 238, 2\*.  
 Ponzius 214, 2.  
 Pordage 234, 2.  
 Porphyry 128, 1. 2\*. 129, 1. 144, 2. 146. 156, 2. 181. 200, 2. 216, 2. 232, 2. 237, 2.  
 Porta 249, 2. 250.  
 Posidonius 97, 1. 106, 1.  
 Possevin 169, 1. 195, 1.  
 Prantl 86 Lit. 2. 88, 2. 2. 155, 4. 158 Lit. 203, 2. 204, 2.  
 Praxiades 24, 1.  
 Preger 229 Lit. 230, 1.  
 Preller 16 Note.  
 Proclus 126. 127. 129, 2. 130\*. 148. 156, 2. 189. 237, 2. 244, 2.  
 Prodicus 57. 59\*. 61. 63.  
 Protagoras 57. 58\*. 59. 61. 64, 1. 70, 2. 72. 73. 76, 2. 250.  
 Psellus 204, 2.  
 Ptolomæus 123, 2. 212, 2. 6. 7.  
 Pullus 167. 168. 169, 1. 175. 194.  
 Pyrrhes 36, 1.  
 Pyrrho 99\*. 100. 101, 1. 102, 1.  
 Pythagoras 30. 31\*. 34, 1. 43, 1. 4. 45, 1. 113, 1. 114, 2. 124. 247, 2.

## Q.

Quinctilianus 239, 2.  
 Quintilianus, Aristides 147.

## R.

Rabanus (or Rhabanus) Maurus 153.  
 Rabirius 96, 2.  
 Radbert v. Paschasius.  
 Raimbert of Lille 159. 160.  
 Ramus 239, 2\*. 4. 247, 2.  
 Ranke 253 Lit.  
 Raphael 241, 10.  
 Rassow 86, 2 Lit.  
 Ratramnus 154, 1. 155, 2.  
 Raumer, Fr. v. 90, 2 Lit.



Rawley 249 Lit. 2.  
 Raymond of Sabunde 221. 222\*.  
     223. 225. 241, 2. 246, 2. 248, 2.  
 Raymond of Toledo 191.  
 Regiomontanus 242, 2.  
 Reinkens 90 Lit.  
 Remigius of Auxerre 158.  
 Rémusat 161 Lit. 2.  
 Renan 186 Lit. 231, 4.  
 Rettberg 216, 1.  
 Reuchlin 232, 2. 237, 4\*. 2.  
 Rhabanus Maurus v. Rabanus.  
 Ribbing 63 Lit. 75. 76 Lit.  
 Richard of St. Victor 172\*. 194. 195,  
     2. 196. 197, 2. 4. 219, 2.  
 Richter 234, 1.  
 Richter, Arthur 128 Lit. 232, 2 Lit.  
 Rimini, Gregory of 217, 1.  
 Ritter, Heinrich 13 Note. 16 Note.  
     22. 32 Lit. 86, 2. 106, 2. 118 Lit.  
     160. 222, 2. 257.  
 Rixner 13 Note. 241 Lit.  
 Robert (Palsgrave) 217, 2.  
 Rochelle, John of 195, 2. 196.  
 Roessler 131 Lit.  
 Roeth 15 Note. 31 Lit. 32, 1. 110.  
 Roetscher 13 Note. 64 Lit.  
 Rohde 15 Note.  
 Roscellin 156, 2. 158, 2\*. 159. 161, 1.  
     2. 164, 2. 215. 222, 2.  
 Rossel 113, 2.  
 Ruysbroek 220, 2. 230, 2. 231\*.

## S.

Saadja 181.  
 Sabinus 194.  
 Saccas, Ammonius 127\*. 128, 1. 2.  
     137, 1. 148.  
 Salabert 217, 4.  
 Salisbury, John of 160. 161, 2. 164.  
     174. 175\*. 177. 185.  
 Salzinger 206, 1. 4.  
 Sanchez 248, 4\*.  
 Sandys 249, 2.  
 Saturninus 125.  
 Savigny 206, 1.  
 Scaliger 249, 2.  
 Schaarschmidt 32 Lit. 175 Lit.  
 Scharpf 224 Lit.  
 Schaubach 52 Lit.  
 Schelling 88, 2. 234, 2.  
 Schem, Job v. Falaquera.

Scherbius 239, 4.  
 Schleiermacher 13 Note. 24 Lit. 28  
     Lit. 43 Lit. 64 Lit. 75, 2.  
 Schlosser, C. F. 204, 2 Lit.  
 Schmidt, K. 230, 2 Lit.  
 Schmolders 181 Lit.  
 Schneider, J. G. 91 Lit.  
 Schneider, Leonhard 88, 2 Lit.  
 Schorn 28 Lit. 52 Lit.  
 Schultze, Fr. 237, 1 Lit.  
 Schuster 43 Lit.  
 Schwegler 13 Note. 87 Lit.  
 Scioppius 239, 1.  
 Scotus v. Duns.  
 Scotus, Michael 191.  
 Semisch 134, 1 Lit.  
 Seneca 16. 107\*. 110. 111, 1. 115.  
     119. 173, 1. 248, 2.  
 Serranus 75, 2.  
 Severinus 241, 10.  
 Sextius 110.  
 Sextius Empiricus 16 and Note. 36, 1.  
     43, 2. 99, 1. 101, 2. 103\*.  
 Seyerlen 188.  
 Shyreswood 204, 2.  
 Sibylla 161, 2.  
 Sidney 247, 1.  
 Siebeck 64, 1 Lit. 78, 1 Lit.  
 Siegebert 204, 2.  
 Sieveking 237, 2 Lit.  
 Siger 204, 4. 208, 1.  
 Sigismund of Austria 224, 2.  
 Sigwart, Chr. 232, 2.  
 Sigwart, H. C. W. 13 Note.  
 Silbert 231, 4.  
 Simmias 32, 2.  
 Simon 175, 1.  
 Simon, Jules 126 Lit.  
 Simon Magus 122.  
 Simplicius 16 Note. 146\*.  
 Sixtus IV. (Pope) 197, 1.  
 Sixtus V. (Pope) 197, 1.  
 Socher 75, 2.  
 Socrates 52, 1. 62. 63-65\*. 68, 1. 70.  
     72, 1. 73. 74, 1. 76, 1. 2. 4. 77, 2.  
     79, 2. 86, 2. 94. 97, 2. 134, 1. 161, 2.  
     162. 173, 1. 187, 4. 250.  
 Soissons, William of 175, 2.  
 Solo 214, 2.  
 Sophists 53. 54-61\*.  
 Sophroniscus 63, 1.  
 Sotion 110.

Soto 252, 1.  
 Spalding, G. L. 68 Lit.  
 Spedding 249 Lit.  
 Spengel 55 Lit. 89, 2. 90, 2. Lit. 96, 1.  
 Speusippus 80. 237, 2.  
 Spinoza 11. 118. 161, 4.  
 Stahr 83 Lit. 90, 2. Lit.  
 Stallbaum 75, 2.  
 Stanley 13 Note.  
 Staudenmaier 154 Lit.  
 Staupitz 233, 1.  
 Steck 13 Note.  
 v. Stein 76 Lit.  
 Steinhart 75, 2. 114 Lit. 126 Lit. 128 Lit.  
 Stephan (Bishop) v. Tempier.  
 Stephanus, Henr. 16 Note. 34, 1.  
 Stobæus 16 and Note. 113, 2.  
 Stöckl 13 Note. 149 Lit. 228.  
 Straton 91.  
 Sturm, Joh. 239, 2.  
 Sturz 45 Lit.  
 Suarez 252, 2.  
 Surlus 231, 1. Lit.  
 Susemihl 75, 2. 77 v. 90, 2.  
 Suso 230, 1. 231, 4.  
 Süvern 64 Lit.  
 Synesius 146.  
 Syrianus 130, 1.

## T.

Tacitus 119.  
 Taillandier 154 Lit.  
 Tasso 244, 1.  
 Tauler 230, 1. 231, 4.  
 Taurellus 239, 4\*.  
 Teichmüller 90 Lit.  
 Telesius 243\*. 244, 1. 2. 245. 246, 1. 2. 2. 247, 1. 2. 249, 4. 2. 250.  
 Teleutagoras 40.  
 Tempier 203, 2. 204, 1.  
 Tennemann 13 and Note. 75, 2.  
 Tertullian 135, 4\*. 144, 6.  
 Thales 22\*. 24, 1. 25. 26, 1. 34, 1. 43, 1. 44.  
 Thaumaturgus, Gregory 137, 1.  
 Themistius 181. 200, 2.  
 Theobald 175, 2.  
 Theodore of Mopsuestia 142. 143. 144, 2.  
 Theodorus the Cyrenaic 70, 2.  
 Theodorus the Neo-Platonist 129.

Theognis 72, 2.  
 Theologia Aristotelis 182\*. 188.  
 Theophilus 135, 1\*.  
 Theophrastus 24, 2. 26, 1. 34, 2. 47, 1. 91. 101, 1.  
 Thilo 256 Lit.  
 Tholomæus of Lucca 203, 2.  
 Thomas Aquinas 182. 194. 199, 1. 200, 2. 203\*. 204, 1. 2. 4. 205. 206, 4. 208, 2. 210. 211. 212, 2. 213. 214, 2. 4. 5. 7. 8. 215. 216, 2. 217, 2. 222, 2. 246, 2. 247, 2. 252, 1.  
 Thomas à Kempis 224, 1. 231, 4\* 233, 4.  
 Thomas of Strassb. 217, 1.  
 Thrasyllus 75, 2.  
 Thrasyllus 61.  
 Thucydides 52, 1.  
 Tibbon, ben 191.  
 Tiedemann 13 Note. 97 Lit. 113, 2. Lit.  
 Timæus 34.  
 Timon 99, 1. 100.  
 Tisias 60, 1.  
 Titze 87, 1. Lit. 88, 2. Lit.  
 Tomæus, Leonicus 238, 1.  
 Trajan 119.  
 Trapezunt, Ge. v. 237, 1.  
 Trendelenburg 13 Note. 77, v. 86, 2. Lit. 86, 2.  
 Trilia, Bern. de 204, 2.

## U.

Ueberfeld 234, 1. Lit.  
 Ueberweg, 13 Note. 77, 2. 90, 2. 106, 2.  
 Uhlhorn 123, 1. Lit.  
 Ullmann 229 Lit. 231, 4.  
 Ulpianus 252, 4.  
 Urbano (Fra) 238, 1.  
 Ursinus 241, 10.

## V.

Vacherot 126 Lit.  
 Valentinus 123, 2. 124.  
 Valerius 144, 1.  
 Valla 239, 2.  
 Varro 104. 147.  
 Vasquez 252, 2.  
 Vautrollier 247, 2.  
 Vernias 238, 1.  
 Virgil 161, 2. 208, 2. 4. 2. 2.

Virneburg, H. v. 230, 1.  
 Vischer 155, 1 Lit.  
 Vitringa 58 Lit.  
 Vives 239, 1.  
 Volney v. Chassebœuf.

## W.

Waging, Bern. v. 224, 1.  
 Waitz 86 Lit.  
 Wald 233, 1 Lit.  
 Walter, Jul. 89 Lit.  
 Walter of Glogau 234, 1.  
 Walter of St. Victor 173, 1\*. 177.  
 Weber 58 Lit.  
 Wegele 208 Lit.  
 Weickert 233, 1.  
 Weigel, Val. 233, 1-1\*. 234, 1.  
 Weil 90, 1.  
 Welcker 59 Lit.  
 Wendt 70 Lit.  
 Werner, K. 155, 1. 203 Lit. 217 Lit.  
 252 1.  
 Wiegmann 88, 1 Lit.  
 William (Franciscan) 212, 1.  
 William of Hirschau 155, 1.

Windischmann 13 Note.  
 Winkler 252, 1\*. 254, 1.  
 Witte, K. 208 Lit. 1.  
 Wolff, Gust. 128, 1 Lit.  
 Wytttenbach 232, 1.

## X.

Xenocrates 80\*. 83. 237, 1.  
 Xenophanes 34\*. 38, 1. 43, 1. 44.  
 Xenophon 63 and Lit.

## Z.

Zabarella 238, 1.  
 Zacharias 146\*.  
 Zeller 16 Note. 45, 1. 75, 1. 76 Lit.  
 77, 1. 89, 1.  
 Zeno (Emperor) 142.  
 Zeno the Eleatic 39. 40\*. 73. 77, 1.  
 Zeno the Epicurean 96, 1. 106, 1.  
 Zeno the Stoic 97\*. 98.  
 Zenodotus 130, 1.  
 Zetzner 206, 1 Lit. 11.  
 Zimara 187. 238, 1.  
 Zorzi 237, 1.  
 Zwingli 232, 1\*. 1. 237, 1.















